# Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825–6

## Volume II: Greek Philosophy

G. W. F. HEGEL

*Translated and edited by* Robert F. Brown

# LECTURES on the HISTORY of PHILOSOPHY 1825–6

**Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825–6**
**Volume II: Greek Philosophy**

Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* offer one of the easiest points of entry to his philosophical system. The second volume covers a thousand years of ancient Greek philosophy; this is the period to which Hegel devoted by far the most attention, and which he saw as absolutely fundamental for all that came after it. This edition sets forth clearly, and for the first time for the English reader, what Hegel actually said. It forms part of OUP's Hegel Lectures Series, presenting accurate new translations accompanied by editorial introductions and annotations.

These lectures challenged the antiquarianism of Hegel's contemporaries by boldly contending that the history of philosophy is itself philosophy, not just history. It portrays the journey of reason or spirit through time, as reason or spirit comes in stages to its full development and self-conscious existence, through the successive products of human intellect and activity. Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* proved to be extremely influential on the intellectual history of the past two centuries. These lectures are crucial to understanding Hegel's own systematic philosophy in its constructive aspect, as well as his views on the centrality of reason in human history and culture. The volume on Greek Philosophy covers the first one thousand years, the period to which Hegel devoted by far the most attention, and which he saw as absolutely fundamental for all that came after it. This edition adapts the considerable editorial resources of the German edition that it translates, to the needs of the general reader as well as the serious scholar, so as to constitute an unparalleled resource on this topic in the English language.

Robert F. Brown is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Delaware.

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

# LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 1825–6

VOLUME II

## GREEK PHILOSOPHY

Edited by
ROBERT F. BROWN

Translated by
R. F. BROWN and J. M. STEWART
with the assistance of
H. S. HARRIS

CLARENDON PRESS · OXFORD

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide in

Oxford New York

Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto

With offces in

Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore
South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam

Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press
in the UK and in certain other countries

Published in the United States
by Oxford University Press Inc., New York

This volume is a translation of *G. W. F. Hegel: Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 2, Griechische Philosophie I. Thales bis Kyniker*, and *Teil 3, Griechische Philosophie II. Plato bis Proklos* (vols. 7 and 8 of *G. W. F. Hegel: Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*), edited by Pierre Garniron and Walter Jaeschke, copyright © 1989, 1996 by Felix Meiner Verlag GmbH, Hamburg

The English edition has been prepared with financial support
from the Division of Research Programs of the National Endowment for
the Humanities, the generosity of which is greatly appreciated

Copyright © R. F. Brown and J. M. Stewart 2006 Editorial
Introduction © R. F. Brown 2006

The moral rights of the author have been asserted
Database right Oxford University Press (maker)

First published 2006

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press,
or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate
reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction
outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department,
Oxford University Press, at the address above

You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover
and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available

Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India
Printed in Great Britain
on acid-free paper by
Biddles Ltd., King's Lynn

ISBN 0–19–927906–3 978–0–19–927906–7

In memoriam
J. Michael Stewart
1920–1994

# CONTENTS


PREFACE xi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xiii

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION 1

1. The German Edition 1
2. This English Edition 2

THE FIRST PERIOD: GREEK PHILOSOPHY 7

Introduction to Greek Philosophy 9

I. From Thales to Aristotle 14

Introduction: The Three Divisions 14

A. The Presocratics: From Thales to Anaxagoras 14

Introduction 14

1. The Seven Sages and the Milesians: Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes 17
2. Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 31
3. The Eleatics: Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno 54
4. Heraclitus 70
5. Empedocles and the Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus 82
   a. Empedocles 82
   b. Leucippus and Democritus 87
6. Anaxagoras 94

B. The Sophists, Socrates, and the Socratic Schools 109

Introduction 109

1. The Sophists 111
2. Socrates 124
3. The Socratic Schools 156

Introduction 156
a. The Megarics 158
b. The Cyrenaics 163
c. The Cynics 171
C. The Great Systems: Plato and Aristotle 175
1. Plato 175
a. Life and Place in History 175
b. Mythos and Thought 182
c. Dialectic 195
d. Philosophy of Nature 207
e. Philosophy of Spirit 218
2. Aristotle 225
a. Life and Works 226
b. Diverse Views of his Thought 231
c. Metaphysics 234
d. Physics and Philosophy of Nature 239
e. Philosophy of Spirit 244
f. Logic 258

II. Dogmatic and Skeptical Philosophy 263
Introduction 263
A. Dogmatic Philosophy 264
Introduction 264
1. Stoicism 265
a. The Principal Stoics 265
b. Logic 268
c. Philosophy of Nature 271
d. Stoic Morals 273
2. Epicurean Philosophy 279
a. Epicurus and his Followers 279
b. Logic 282
c. Metaphysics 283
d. Philosophy of Nature 285
e. Philosophy of Spirit 288
B. Skepticism and the New Academy 294
1. The Academy in Later Centuries 294
a. Arcesilaus and the Middle Academy 295
b. Carneades and the New Academy 298

2. Skepticism Proper: Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, Sextus Empiricus 302
a. Introduction and General Aim 302
b. Argumentative Procedure: The Tropes 309

III. Neoplatonic Philosophy 317
A. General Characteristics 317
B. The Philosophers 323
1. Philo of Alexandria 323
2. The Cabalists 327
3. The Gnostics 328
4. The Alexandrian school 330
a. Ammonius Saccas and Plotinus 331
b. Proclus 340

GLOSSARY 347
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HEGEL'S SOURCES FOR GREEK PHILOSOPHY 355
INDEX 367

# PREFACE

This volume on *Greek Philosophy* is the second to appear of the English translation of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* in a new edition. It was preceded by Volume III, *Medieval and Modern Philosophy* (1990), published by the University of California Press. This order follows the publication sequence of the German edition, in which the first volume (English Volume I, *Introduction and Oriental Philosophy*) came last of all. We have, however, elected to combine the two volumes of the German edition that are dedicated to Greek philosophy into a single large English volume, with the four-volume German edition becoming, in the English translation, a three-volume edition. Hence this volume on *Greek Philosophy* is a translation of volumes vii and viii of *G. W. F. Hegel: Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*, which comprise part of the *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, edited by Pierre Garniron and Walter Jaeschke and published by Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, namely, *Teil 2: Griechische Philosophie I. Thales bis Kyniker* (1989), and *Teil 3: Griechische Philosophie II. Plato bis Proklos* (1996).

The larger background of this project has already been explained in the Preface and in the Editorial Introduction to Volume III, and need not be repeated here. As with its predecessor, our work on *Greek Philosophy* has been greatly assisted by Walter Jaeschke, who provided us with typescripts, page proofs, and ready answers to queries, and whose meticulous work in German it is a pleasure to turn into readable English as best we can. H. S. Harris, the eminent Hegel authority, critiqued all our translations and thus much improved them without his being responsible for their final form. Peter C. Hodgson, the general editor of this series of Hegel Lectures, provided invaluable assistance and guidance throughout our work.

We are indebted to the following institutions, which made the German edition possible in its present form by granting permission to use, and to publish the contents of, the five lecture transcripts for 1825–6: the

Manuscripts Division of the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin; the Hegel-Archiv of the Ruhr-Universität, Bochum; the Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Cracow Division.

The National Endowment for the Humanities, Division of Research Programs, provided generous financial support for the work on this English edition. The University of Delaware granted the editor some released time from teaching duties. Ms Gail Ross and Ms Darlene Reynolds typed and revised our seemingly endless versions and revisions on the computer with unfailing patience and enthusiasm. Without these forms of support this translation would not have been possible.

J. Michael Stewart, my collaborator on these lectures, a true gentleman and friend, passed away in 1994. This is indeed his product, both *Greek Philosophy* and the volume yet to come, on which he did a great deal of fine work right up to his untimely death. Michael dearly loved his labors on Hegel, and it is a great sadness that he was not able to see all of them in their final, published form. This volume is dedicated to his memory, with deep gratitude, affection, and respect.

Robert F. Brown

# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| An. | Anonymous transcript (Cracow) of 1825–1826 Lectures |
| *Berliner Schriften* | *Berliner Schriften 1818–1831*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1956) |
| *Briefe* | *Briefe von und an Hegel*, vols. i–iii, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister, 3rd edn. (Hamburg, 1969); vol. iv, pts. 1 and 2, ed. Friedhelm Nicolin (Hamburg, 1977–81) |
| Diels | Hermann Diels, *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca* (Berlin, 1882 ff.) |
| *DG* | Hermann Diels (ed.), *Doxographi Graeci*, 3rd edn. (Berlin, 1879; repr. Berlin, 1958) |
| DK | Hermann Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Griechisch und Deutsch*, 3 vols., 5th and later edns. ed. Walter Kranz (Berlin, 1934–60) |
| *Encyclopedia* | *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, trans. (from German 3rd edn.), with additions based on student transcripts and lecture manuscripts, W. Wallace and A. V. Miller, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1892 (repr. 1975), 1970, 1971) |
| Gr. | Griesheim transcript of 1825–1826 Lectures |
| *GW* | *G. W. F. Hegel: Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Academy of Sciences of Rhineland-Westphalia in association with the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 40 vols. projected (Hamburg, 1968 ff.) |
| Hoffmeister | *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, vol. i, *Die Vernunft in der Geschichte*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1955). (See |

| | |
|---|---|
| | Lasson for vols. ii–iv; vols. i–iv paginated cumulatively.) |
| KRS | G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 1983) |
| Lasson | *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, vol. ii, *Die orientalische Welt*; vol. iii, *Die griechische und die romische Welt*; vol. iv, *Die germanische Welt*, ed. George Lasson, 2nd edn. (Hamburg, 1923). (See Hoffmeister for vol. i; vols. i–iv paginated cumulatively.) |
| *Letters* | *Hegel: The Letters*, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler, commentary by Clark Butler (Bloomington, Ind., 1984) |
| Lw. | Löwe transcript of 1825–1826 Lectures |
| MS? | a passage in *W.* that may derive from Hegel's own lecture manuscript |
| Nisbet | *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction: Reason in History*, trans. (from Hoffmeister) H. B. Nisbet, with an Introduction by Duncan Forbes (Cambridge, 1975) |
| *Phenomenology* | *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford, 1977) |
| *Philosophy of Religion* | *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, 3 vols. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984–7) |
| Pn. | Pinder transcript of 1825–1826 Lectures |
| *Science of Logic* | *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (London, 1969) |
| Sibree | *The Philosophy of History*, trans. (from 2nd German edn. (1940)) J. Sibree, rev. edn. (New York, 1900) |
| Sv. | Stieve transcript of 1825–1826 Lectures |
| *W.* | Hegel, *Werke*, complete edition ed. an Association of Friends, 18 vols. (Berlin, 1832 ff.). Always refers to 1st edn., but some volumes issued in second editions. Vols. xiii–xv contain *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, ed. Karl Ludwig Michelet, 1st edn. (Berlin, 1833–6); 2nd edn. (Berlin, 1840–4) |

# EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

## 1. The German Edition

In the course of his career Hegel presented lecture series on the history of philosophy nine times, and he had begun a tenth series just before his sudden death in 1831. In the present edition of *Hegel Vorlesungen*, the History of Philosophy lectures given in Berlin at the Friedrich Wilhelm University during the winter semester of 1825–6 have been chosen to represent the whole, principally because we possess a better stock of materials for reconstructing them than we do for the other series, namely, five different transcripts made by auditors of the lectures. These transcripts are:

1. Griesheim (Gr.): *Geschichte der Philosophie*. Gr. is in the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin. It is a very full fair copy (some 50 percent longer than An. or Pn.), on the whole reliable, but in places given to stylistic revision and even expansion of what Hegel said.
2. Anonymous (An.): *Geschichte der Philosophie von Hegel*. An. is in the Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Cracow Division. It is a very full source too, but in the form taken down during the actual lectures and so rougher in style than Gr., although sometimes more faithful. On the whole, An. broadly corroborates Gr., while in part correcting and supplementing it.
3. Stieve (Sv.): *Geschichte der Philosophie. Vortrag von Herrn Prof. Hegel. Berlin den 31ten* [*Oktober*] *1825*. Sv. is in the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin. A fair copy, it clearly condenses the text and is inferior to the other sources also in its reproduction of the wording.

In addition to these three, which were known to the nineteenth-century editors of Hegel's *Werke*, two new sources have come to light.

4. Löwe (Lw.): *Geschichte der Philosophie nach Hegel.* (Added in another hand: *W[inter] S[emester] 1825–26.*) *J. C. Löwe.* Lw. is in the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin. A full fair copy, it is, on the one hand, related to Gr. and, on the other hand, inferior in many respects to the text transmitted by Gr. Lw. cannot therefore serve to corroborate Gr., although in a few passages it can supplement and correct it.
5. Pinder (Pn.): *Geschichte der Philosophie von Prof. Hegel. Berlin. Winterhalbjahr 1825/26. Moritz Pinder.* Pn. is in the Hegel-Archiv, Ruhr-Universität, Bochum. A very full source, although in its wording prone to pregnant brevity, Pn. is probably in a form taken down during the actual lectures. Pn. is very similar to Gr. and more particularly to An., but without being related to them. As such it serves to corroborate and to correct Gr., and occasionally also to supplement it.

The way in which Garniron and Jaeschke utilized these transcripts to establish the text we have translated has been indicated in the Editorial Introduction to Vol. III and need not be repeated here.

## 2. This English Edition

While the English text follows the German, it has been edited in a somewhat different format, comparable to that employed for the *Philosophy of Religion* and other volumes in this series. The most obvious difference is that the German has two separate footnote systems while the English has but one. The German identifies all footnotes by a line-count system, leaving the text free of footnote numbers and editorial symbols but with the disadvantage of making it more difficult to locate the textual passages with which footnotes are associated. The German footnotes indicating textual variants appear at the bottom of the page, keyed to the numbered lines to which they apply, whereas the editorial footnotes appear in a separate section at the back of the book and are keyed by page and the line numbers to the appropriate passages. In contrast, the English edition employs footnotes located at the bottom of the page, with footnote numbers appearing in the text above. The notes are in series, each new footnote series commencing with the beginning of a major division of the text.

In Volume III of our English edition, published previously, we included most of the textual variants presented in the German edition, identifying their appropriate location within the text by use of special symbols, and giving their content in special footnotes at the bottom of the page. On the advice of Oxford University Press and its reader of the manuscript, we

discontinued this practice for the present volume because only a few of the textual variants matter very much and are of interest to the English reader, while the specialist who is concerned with variant readings can consult the German volumes where they are found. The result is a cleaner, clearer text for the English reader. Those few textual variants of real consequence we discuss within editorial footnotes of the usual sort. In any event, the main text of the German edition, which is what we have translated, presents the most likely reconstruction of what Hegel actually said in these lectures.

The editorial notes identify specific passages in the works of individual philosophers or in secondary sources that Hegel is quoting, paraphrasing, or clearly discussing, as well as other passages that form the probable background for a particular portion of text. The German edition quotes these passages extensively in the original languages, as well as furnishing German translations from other languages, either drawn from modern editions or, where necessary, made by the editors themselves. This practice adds greatly to the length of these editorial notes, which all together are appreciably longer than the text itself. This English edition identifies these passages but only occasionally quotes or paraphrases their contents. For the most part, however, we translate in full the remarks of the German editors themselves, which often disclose the general contents of the quotations in any event. Primary and secondary works are cited in the original editions or in the ones most likely to have been used by Hegel, as well as in the best and most readily available modern editions. The Bibliography of Sources includes all the cited modern editions of works probably used by Hegel or related works by those same authors. They are listed in conjunction with the older editions. Other works cited appear only in the footnotes.

There is no direct correlation between individual editorial notes in the German and English volumes respectively, for we frequently combine into one footnote several German notes on adjacent or overlapping passages that are closely related in their contents. We also add (without identifying them as such) a few editorial notes of our own or supplementary remarks to the German notes, in cases where further background information is helpful to the English reader. We also correct a few errors detected in the German editorial notes and in several cases add what seem to us preferable citations to those provided there. Biblical citations and quotations are according to the Revised Standard Version.

Both editions modernize spelling and punctuation and standardize names and expressions in foreign languages. The English italicizes words and phrases for emphasis according to its own editorial needs, sometimes where the German does not and vice versa. Apart from full bibliographical

citation, books and essays are mentioned by the full or abbreviated title most familiar to the English reader, according to scholarly conventions. In some instances these are Latin titles, even for works originally written in Greek. The German edition often cites passages from the Presocratics according to their location in Diels–Kranz (DK). Wherever possible we cite them in Kirk–Raven–Schofield (KRS) instead. For these the DK citation is readily obtainable from the citation in KRS. Aristotle titles in English are uniformly those in Barnes. Occasionally we add a subject heading of our own, or deviate from the paragraphing or punctuation of the German to form units of more manageable size. These are not in any event features of the lectures as spoken by Hegel but ones affected by the judgments and conventions of auditors or editors.

To facilitate comparison with the original, we give the page numbers of the volumes in the German edition on the outer margins and indicate a page break, where that German page begins, by a vertical rule in the text. The number series in the margins starts again at 1 at the point where our translation of *Griechische Philosophie II. Plato bis Proklos* commences. This translation strives to be faithful to the German without unduly sacrificing English style and without enforcing a one-to-one equivalence of English to German terms. Some technical or quasi-technical terms have several English equivalents each, and these are shown in the Glossary, which we have used as a guide in our work and which was taken and adapted from that developed in the course of work on the *Philosophy of Religion*. For German-speakers it will in most instances be possible to infer the German wording from the English; in a few cases, where, for instance, there is a play on words or an important nuance in the German that could not be captured well by the English, the German wording has been inserted in square brackets.

For Parmenides, Plato, Plotinus and the Neoplatonists, and certain others, we capitalize 'The One' when the reference clearly seems to be to the unique metaphysical principle bearing that name; we do not capitalize the number 'one' or other instances of 'one'. In Plato we capitalize 'Idea' when it clearly refers to 'The Idea' or to the unchanging form of something, but not otherwise; likewise with 'The Good' as the metaphysical principle. In keeping with the standard set by the English edition of the *Philosophy of Religion*, we eliminate unwarranted gender-specific language wherever possible when referring to God and to human beings. 'God' can be repeated in place of 'he' or 'him', 'God's' in place of 'his'. But since the important reflexive and intensive pronouns cannot suitably be avoided or made impersonal, 'God himself' and the like occur a number of times. *Mensch* is often

'human being' or 'one', and sometimes, where suitable, 'we'. For the sake of variety and to avoid the singular masculine pronoun we sometimes shift to plural forms. In each instance we use our best judgment and a variety of expressions, without assurance of hitting on the happiest solution.

We began this work with Stewart as the primary translator of the text and Brown as the primary translator and preparer of the footnotes. But we reviewed and criticized each other's work so extensively that each part of the ensuing translation is more accurately described as a product of our joint labors, which at the penultimate stage benefited greatly from thorough scrutiny by Harris. The general editor of the series, Peter Hodgson, guided the formation of this edition from the outset and suggested a number of improvements at the final stage of our work.

# THE FIRST PERIOD
## Greek Philosophy

# INTRODUCTION TO GREEK PHILOSOPHY

1

Only with Greek philosophy do we make our beginning in the proper sense, for what went before was just a preliminary. We refrain from speaking of other philosophies—of Mongolian, Persian, or Syrian philosophy; to talk about such things is only a display of erudition.[1]

All educated people, and we Germans in particular, feel at home when we speak of Greece. Europeans have received their religion only from the East, although not from the Far East but indeed from Syria, which is but one step

1. 'What went before' refers to Hegel's discussion (in vol. i) of Oriental philosophies, namely, Chinese and Indian philosophies, which for him do not belong to the *history* of philosophy in the full sense. Furthermore, he opposes application of the ethnographic method to the discipline of the history of philosophy, something called for repeatedly around the beginning of the nineteenth century. In this he agrees with two of his principal sources. Dieterich Tiedemann refused to include in his six-volume *Geist der spekulativen Philosophie* (Marburg, 1791–7) the teachings of the Chaldeans, Persians, Hindus, and Egyptians (i, p. xix). In the same vein, Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, author of *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 11 vols. (Leipzig, 1798–1819), was criticized by a reviewer in the *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen* for not following the ethnographic method and, in particular, for not considering the philosophies of the Egyptians, the Zoroastrians, and the Hebrews (see Tennemann, *Geschichte*, ii, pp. vii–ix). As examples of the ethnographic method, the reviewer pointed to the work of Johann Gottfried Gurlitt, Christoph Meiners, Johann Gottlieb Buhle, and Friedrich Plessing. In referring to 'Mongolian philosophy' Hegel is probably speaking broadly, since his *Philosophy of Religion* (ii. 307, 564), which mentions the Mongols in connection with Shamanism, and with Buddhism and Lamaism, says nothing about Mongol religion or philosophy as distinct from that of the Tibetans or the Chinese. In his overview of histories of philosophy (in Vol. I of this edition) Hegel includes G. A. Friedrich Ast, *Grundriss einer Geschichte der Philosophie* (Landshut, 1807), which prefaces a discussion of Tibetan idealism (pp. 26–30) by saying (p. 20) that with the Chinese it turned into practical wisdom, in much the same way that with the Egyptians the Chaldaeo-Persian realism turned into materialism. Ast gives as one of his sources Peter Simon Pallas, *Sammlungen historischer Nachrichten über die Mongolischen Völkerschaften*, 2 vols. (St Petersburg, 1776–1802). On Persian philosophy, especially Zoroastrianism, see Thomas Stanley, *Historia philosophiae* (Leipzig, 1711), pt. XIV (p. 1160); cf. pts. XIII and XV, on Chaldaean and Sabaean philosophies respectively.

further east than Greece. Yet all of our science and art, what adorns and dignifies spiritual life, has either emanated directly from Greece or come to us from Greece in a roundabout way via the Romans, who were the primary models and teachers of us Europeans. The Catholic Church has retained the language of the Romans right down to the present day, and our law for the definition of property derives from Roman law. What is alien and [merely] historic was given up only after the Germanic character had undergone a rigorous service to the church and to this law, only after it felt able to free itself from them, once this service had made it pliable and more fit for a freer existence; hence this happened only after European humanity had begun to be at home with itself, after people had begun to live for the present and for themselves. Then people began to want to be at home in their own place [so to speak], to have insights and draw conclusions on the basis of their own
2 reason and understanding. The philosophy of experience | began to observe the world that was [actually] present. And so, with this spirit of being at home [*Heimatlichkeit*], good taste arose once more, the love of free science and art, the love of Greek philosophy. In order to enjoy all this, people turned to the Greeks. We feel at home with the Greeks precisely because they were at home with themselves in their world, because they themselves made their world into a homeland. We feel at ease with them because they were at ease with themselves; a shared spirit of being at home is what binds us to them.

For the history of Greek life we must go back further. In dealing with Greek art and life we are led to Asia and Egypt. But we can also get along without reverting to these other lands, and we can locate the germination, growth, and blossoming of Greek science and art within Greek life itself; even the source of its decay is already embedded in it. What came from elsewhere was but the raw material or impetus for them; and they transformed or recast it. The spiritual ethos [*Hauch*] is precisely what is characteristic of the Greeks themselves, the form of art and science that is the pure form of thinking. So in order to grasp Greek life and Greek philosophy we need look no further than the Greeks themselves. They gave a spiritual rebirth to what they received, and the spiritual is none other than that which has been born again. We find this [insight] also in the Hindu idea, where persons of the Brahman caste themselves are called the twice-born. The 'once-born' is natural life, natural consciousness, and knowledge. The second birth is life brought forth by spirit, and that life is what is spiritual.

We can see this spiritual progress in the case of the Greeks. They even constructed a history out of what they have done and what they have possessed. They have preserved all of their beginnings—a history of the

world (a cosmogony) and of the gods (a theogony), and also a history of how the human race came to possess fire, agriculture, and the olive tree.[2] The memories of these earliest beginnings of all culture, which constitute the initial transition | out of primeval savagery, the Greeks have gratefully 3
preserved. Thus they are at home with themselves even in their outward, historical aspect. So too the development of their thought emerged or unfolded from their own primordial elements, and we need not seek for some further and external stimulus, some historical tie [with other peoples].

The standpoint of the Greek world is therefore the spirit of freedom, and the character of the Greeks is a cheerful serenity [*Heiterkeit*] of spirit. Freedom is distinct from the Oriental principle. By the measure of freedom the subject *is for itself*, it finds itself to be for itself abstractly, but also absolutely. The freedom of the subject is the principle of Greek philosophy—the I that knows itself to be infinite, in which the universal is specified as present. And that is what thinking is; for thinking is the universal as active, the relation to the self—that is 'I = I'. 'I' is my relation to myself in such wise that I abstract from myself as someone particular and emphasize my own universal characteristic. This thinking, then, is what is inwardly self-determining, what sustains specificity within itself and gives itself a content, and one that is brought to the place of honor because it is a content of thinking. It is different in the case of the Orientals, where the content has been grasped only negatively, where the I is defined only as what perishes. Here, on the contrary, the specific aspect is preserved within the universal, so that the universal becomes organic and develops. The Greek world is occupied with spreading itself out in this soil, with fulfilling this thinking and giving specificity to it. The outcome is then the | intellectual world, which 4
has also the subjective aspect that this is *my* thinking, but in such a way that it[3] is the substance of the actual world.

There are two essential routes for differentiating concepts. In one the content is produced from thinking and engendered into a world—[this is] the objectivity of the intellectual world. The world of truth, objectivity produced in this way, has to take upon it the second characteristic, that of being taken back into the subject. So in the first the idea is produced as object. In the second route the idea determines itself as the self-knowing idea. The I is [re]cognized within the idea itself, knowing is grasped as the infinite form,

2. Hegel refers here to several Greek myths, especially those of Prometheus and of Demeter. His reference to cosmogony and theogony suggests that he is thinking in particular of Hesiod's *Theogony* as well as of his *Works and Days*.

3. 'It' (*sie*) could have as antecedent either 'the intellectual world' or 'the subjective aspect'.

namely, as a whole consisting of characteristics that belong to the content. The determinative element is the infinite form, and this infinite form must be comprehended as I, or as the knowing principle. Thus the idea is grasped as self-knowing, and this knowing is spirit, so that hereafter the idea has being as spirit. This [second route] is the concept in the period of the modern world. What it means for the I to be grasped as infinite form is for it not to be grasped as the particular, empirical I; that is to be set aside.

So it is the idea, or the eternal subject matter [*ewige Sache*] that subsists in and for itself, that is the principle of the Greek world. This eternal subject matter is led forth by thought and brought to consciousness. Subjectivity appears still to be contingent, and is not yet taken up into the subject matter itself; this absorption of subjectivity takes place only within spirit. In the developing of the subject matter in the Greek context, subjectivity remains over against it in a contingent form. In the Orient only one person is free, and in the Greek world only a few persons are free; for the [eternal] subject matter [itself] is defined in such a way that subjectivity stands over against it and still bears the marks of natural life and contingency.[4] The political world contains slaves as well as free [citizens]. In other words, most important among the Greeks are individuals who are virtuosos of art and
5 poetry, of science, of integrity and virtue, | and so forth. Among them subjectivity, owing to its contingency, is essentially related to the natural state. In the modern world, however, all are free, each is the subject in and for himself or herself. [In the modern world] subjectivity as such has an infinite worth, for here the natural state is put aside and the subjective aspect is made wholly identical with the subject matter itself, or with the objective aspect.

We proceed now to consider the Greek world in more detail. The main periods of Greek philosophy are: (1) from Thales to Aristotle; (2) Greek

4. Here Hegel echoes parts of the well-known schema of his *Philosophy of World History* (Nisbet, p. 54), namely, that Oriental societies knew only one person (the despot) to be free, ancient Greece and Rome knew some persons (the citizens) to be free, and the Germanic tribes knew all persons (human beings by nature) to be free. As Hegel stated just above—a point to be explained more fully in his account of Plato below—the Greeks give primacy to an objective, intellectual realm to which thinking should conform and the structures of which are, to a degree, reflected in the actual, physical world. Hence they accept as natural the social and political traditions and the distinctions among persons (citizens, non-citizens, slaves) that are familiar to them, which is why the principle of subjectivity introduced by Socrates could not effectively take root there. Only with the advent of Christianity does the primacy of the subject (God as spirit realized in individual consciousness) with its new mode of thinking emerge, nurtured in the Germanic world and blossoming in modern philosophy, in which the I fully recognizes itself as self-knowing, as spirit. Here alone can it be seen that each person, the human being as such, is by nature free.

philosophy in the Roman world; (3) Neoplatonic philosophy.[5] The first period sets forth the beginning of philosophical thought to the point where it becomes science in Aristotle—that is, the development and unfolding of thought within itself to the point of the totality of scientific knowledge. The time of Thales falls in the sixth century BC and that of Aristotle in the fourth century BC. The second period comprises the fragmentation of [philosophical] science into particular systems, which are themselves totalities—the systems of Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Skepticism.[6] In this way the particular [moment of the idea] presents itself as a system, but it is one-sided; one school constitutes the extreme of the other. The first two develop the antithesis, and Skepticism links the two; it is the negative totality over against their dogmatism. In contrast to this, the third period is affirmative; it is the Neoplatonic philosophy, which consummates the development of thought into an individual, intellectual world.

5. These are actually parts within 'The First Period', which comprises the whole of Greek philosophy.

6. These systems are the 'Greek philosophy in the Roman world' to which our text refers just above.

# I. FROM THALES TO ARISTOTLE

## *INTRODUCTION: THE THREE DIVISIONS*

We again make a threefold division within the first period.

(1) From Thales to Anaxagoras. We begin from the absolute as such, or
6 with what is simple. Then the first determinations | within the absolute come to light. These first attempts at definition, these initial modes of determination, occupy the Greek thinkers down to Anaxagoras. He defined the true as the *νοῦς*, as active thought.[1] We can call it 'reason' or 'understanding', though it is not an otherworldly understanding but an all-pervasive understanding [*Verstand überhaupt*]. Aristotle says of Anaxagoras that he appeared like a sober man among drunkards.[2] Self-determination, activity, or movement is the first principle here, or objective thought, the thought that determines itself (Anaxagoras).

(2) The Sophists, Socrates, and the Socratics: the principle of subjectivity. [Here we have] the object or thought still in its subjectivity and contingency, that is, thinking (self-determining thought) first of all defined partly as an abstract principle and partly as subjective and contingent.

(3) Plato and Aristotle, Greek science, where objective thought shapes itself into a whole. Plato's thought is pure but concrete—it is the idea or thought, but the thought is inwardly self-determining. With Aristotle too the idea is pure, but it is purely efficacious and active—it is thought that is self-determining through activity. It is not an abstraction as thought is for Plato, where the idea only is in the form of its universality. In Aristotle [we have] the idea in the form of its efficacy, or its self-determining. I will say no more about sources for this, since they can be found easily in any compendium.

## *A. THE PRESOCRATICS: FROM THALES TO ANAXAGORAS*

### Introduction

In this first division we have many different topics to consider. I will dispose of the earlier Ionian philosophy as briefly as possible. Its thoughts are still
7 very abstract and quite inadequate. It is true that the Ionians can | be

1. See n. 264, p. 101 below. Aristotle reports in his *Physics* (8.1.250b.24–6, 8.9.265b.22–3) that Anaxagoras regarded mind as the source of motion and the separator of things. See the English translation in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1984), i. 418, 443.

2. See n. 249, p. 94 below.

treated very extensively, by compiling and combining the scholarly data, by making inferences and drawing conclusions. But the content is quite scanty. What we have to consider are, more specifically: (1) Thales and the others of the seven sages; (2) the Pythagoreans; (3) the Eleatics (Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, and so forth); (4) Heraclitus; (5) Empedocles, Leucippus, and Democritus; (6) Anaxagoras.[3]

The progression in these philosophies is unmistakable. (1) With Thales and others among the Ionians we find wholly abstract characterizations such as water, air, and 'the infinite' [*das Unendliche*],[4] which nonetheless take a particular shape. Pythagoras marks step (2), the [initial] progression. Whereas previously the absolute was defined in a natural mode as water and the like, the form of its determination is now the unit or number. But already the unit fragments into 1, 2, 3, and so on; specification of what is in and for itself proceeds to something concrete. The Eleatics constitute step (3). Here thought is forcibly torn free from sensuous shape, and from the form of number too. The principle of the Eleatics is pure being. For there is on the one hand [simply] being, while on the other hand they carry out in

3. Of those named here, recent scholars count as Ionians (in regard to their philosophical outlook) all except Pythagoras, Parmenides, Zeno, and Empedocles. See, for example, G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield (eds.), *The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 1983), hereafter abbreviated as KRS. Also see just below in our text, and in n. 5, on the distinction between Ionian and Italian schools. Hegel's periodization of the first division differs from that in his sources: Dieterich Tiedemann, *Geist der Spekulativen Philosophie*, 6 vols. (Marburg, 1791–7), vol. i; Jacob Brucker, *Historia critica philosophiae*, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1742–4), vol. i; Heinrich Ritter, *Geschichte der Jonischen Philosophie* (Berlin, 1821). In keeping more strictly to a chronological order, Tiedemann undercuts the connection of Leucippus with Democritus and that of Parmenides with Zeno. Ritter takes up Anaximenes second, followed by Diogenes of Apollonia; then follow in order Heraclitus, Anaximander, Anaxagoras, and finally Archelaus, after which he gives a brief reference to Empedocles—whom he is unwilling to place with the Pythagoreans but instead puts with Anaxagoras—as well as to Leucippus and Democritus. Hegel's conception shows some kinship with Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 11 vols. (Leipzig, 1798–1819), although Tennemann treats Empedocles in a separate chapter from the one on Leucippus and Democritus, and he follows Anaxagoras with a separate presentation on the thought of Diogenes of Apollonia and of Archelaus. Another and more important difference is that both Tennemann and Tiedemann assign the Sophists to the first period within Greek philosophy, as a decadent form about which they have nothing good to say. Hegel's own conception is more closely related to that of G. A. Friedrich Ast, *Grundriss einer Geschichte der Philosophie* (Landshut, 1807), 95–149, 492. Ast separates the Sophists from 'Ionic Realism' and 'Italian Idealism', and treats them together with Socrates under the heading 'Attic Ideal-realism'—grouped as well with Plato, Aristotle (introduced only as a pupil of Plato), the Stoics, and the Epicureans.

4. Contemporary scholars doubt that for Anaximander τὸ ἄπειρον primarily designates spatial infinity, and they prefer 'the indefinite' to 'the boundless' or 'the infinite' (as Hegel puts it here and elsewhere). See KRS, pp. 105–17.

particular the movement of thinking that confounds what is specific, so as to show that only the One is what is true, not the many. In step (4) Heraclitus exhibited what the subjective process of thinking was for the Eleatics, and this subjective movement determined that the finite does not truly exist. In the case of Heraclitus this subjective process came to objective consciousness. He took process itself—movement or change—as his principle. For him the absolute is what moves, what changes. In step (5), by contrast, Empedocles, Leucippus, and Democritus pass over in turn to the other extreme: to simple, material, static principles, such that movement or process is distinct from them and they are, as it were, the substrate of this process. And finally
8 in step (6) Anaxagoras | recognizes moving and determining thought itself as the essence, and this is a great advance.

We should note that these philosophies divide as a whole into two groups geographically as well as according to their content. One group [is] primarily Oriental (Asian), while the other [embraces] in particular western Greeks or Greek Italians. Thus on the islands and mainland of Asia Minor we have: Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and others, all from Miletus; Heraclitus of Ephesus; Leucippus, possibly from Miletus or the island of Melos, and Democritus, from Thrace (Abdera was a colony of Miletus); Anaxagoras from Clazomenae, an Ionian coastal city, who came later to Athens; Diagoras from Crete; and others. The other group consists of Italians: Pythagoras, who was active in Italy though he came from Samos; Xenophanes, who came from Colophon but later lived in Elea; Parmenides, who was born in Elea; Zeno, from Elea too; Empedocles, from Agrigentum in Sicily; in addition, several of the Sophists who lived in Italy.[5] Anaxagoras was the first of these philosophers to come to Athens, and with his arrival there the science of the two groups came together for the first time at a central point; in that way it established its principal seat [in Athens]. This is the geographical distinction between these groups of philosophers.

There is a comparable distinction with regard to the shape of their thought. For the thinkers of Asia Minor [thought] has a sensible aspect or material form—water and so forth. In the West, however, thought is

5. This twofold geographical division of the philosophers into Ionian and Italian schools goes back to antiquity, to *De vitis* ('On the Lives and Opinions of the Philosophers'), a doxographical compilation in Greek by Diogenes Laertius (third century AD?); see 1.13–15; *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, trans. R. D. Hicks, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1925, 1938), i. 14–17. Unlike Hegel, Diogenes traces the continuation of the Ionian school all the way down to Chrysippus and Theophrastus, and the Italian school to Epicurus. Cf. Augustine (354–430), *The City of God* 8.2; trans. Marcus Dods et al. (New York, 1950), 244–5. Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 49–50 n.) provides an example of this division as made by a modern historian of philosophy.

paramount, and it is made into the principle in the *form of thought*—as with the 'number' of Pythagoras, the nonsensible sensible element, something sensible cast into the universal mode of thought. In the Eleatic school we have pure being. So these systems are distinguished geographically in accord with the universal form in which thought is grasped—a distinction of a more general nature, but one that finds application here too. | 9

1. The Seven Sages and the Milesians: Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes

First we encounter the so-called seven sages of Greece. For us the most interesting one of them is Thales, but I will also say a little about the others, about the character of these sages. The first thing to note is that Thales, and the other sages as well, lived in the time of Cyrus, the time of decline for the Ionian cities and for Greek freedom in Asia Minor.[6] A beautiful world that had taken shape of itself, and stood on a higher plane than did central Greece, was collapsing, and right at that point philosophy arose. Herodotus mentions that Thales accompanied Croesus [on campaign] and foretold an eclipse of the sun. Croesus and the Lydians had posed the first threat to Ionian freedom; only later on was it utterly destroyed by Persian domination. Many inhabitants of the Ionian cities sought refuge elsewhere, particularly in the West.[7] Simultaneously with this decline of the Ionian cities, in Greece proper the need for legal institutions arose, since the patriarchal age

6. Diogenes Laertius introduces his discussion of the seven sages by distinguishing a sage (σοφός) from a philosopher (φιλόσοφος); *Lives* 1.12–13 (Hicks, i. 12–15); see also n. 55, p. 34 below. Plato, *Protagoras* 343a, lists the seven as: Thales, Pittacus of Mytilene, Bias of Priene, Solon of Athens, Cleobulus of Lindus, Myson of Chen, and Chilon of Sparta; see *Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus*, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1924), 196–7. Diogenes puts Periander of Corinth on the commonly accepted list of seven and removes Myson to the list of 'additions', which also includes Anacharsis the Scythian, Pherecydes of Syros, Epimenides the Cretan, and Pisistratus of Athens. Only Thales, Bias, Pherecydes, and perhaps Pittacus lived for a time in Ionia. See *Lives* 1.22–122 (Hicks, i. 22–129). Cf. Herodotus (fifth century BC), *Historia* ('History of the Persian Wars') 1.27; *The History*, trans. David Grene (Chicago, 1987), 44. All but Pherecydes lived well before the conquest of Ionia in 546 BC by the Persians under Cyrus the Great. Hegel may have in mind the earlier and less severe threat to Greek freedom coming from Lydia (see the following note). The 'decline' of the Ionian city states was not economic and cultural but just a loss of political independence. Their destruction came only during the Ionian rebellion against Persian sovereignty in 500–494 BC.

7. Actually, Herodotus just mentions the eclipse as something Thales predicted; it occurred during the battle of the Halys (28 May 585 BC), in the war between the Medes and the Lydians, under Alyattes, the father of Croesus (*History* 1.74; Grene, p. 67; KRS, no. 74, pp. 81–2). Hegel follows Herodotus in distinguishing the earlier subjection of Ionian states by the Lydians (actually begun under the predecessors of Croesus: Gyges, Ardys, Sadyattes, and Alyattes) from their later subjection by the Persians (*History* 1.14–28; Grene, pp. 38–44). Herodotus says that only the people from Phocaea, who went to Hyele (= Elea), and those from Teos, who

was now past. Citizens began to constitute formal associations among themselves. It was in these circumstances that the sages emerged, some as participants in the struggle of the Ionian cities, some as emigrants, and some also within Greece proper, respected individuals such as Solon in Athens, and Periander the tyrant of Corinth.[8]

Seven sages of Greece are enumerated, but the names given are not always the same. Diogenes Laertius says that only four are named by all: Thales, Bias, Pittacus, and Solon. Later on he speaks about the character of their consciousness and their behavior, saying that they were neither sages nor philosophers but men of understanding and lawgivers, that they were wise but did not make science or philosophizing their essential aim. Only of Thales does Diogenes expressly state that in later life he devoted himself to
10 philosophizing.[9] They were practical men, men of affairs, | but not in the sense that this term has for us: of devoting oneself to some branch of government or of the economy. It means rather that they lived in democratic states and so they shared concern for the general [well-being] and for the government. They were not the sort of statesmen exemplified by Miltiades, Themistocles, Pericles, and the like, but statesmen in an [earlier] time when what was at issue was the existence and establishment of the state, and the grounding of a legally ordered civic life.

Thales and Bias in particular appear in this light. Herodotus speaks of both of them, and of Thales in particular he recounts that, before the Ionians were placed in subjection to Croesus, he had advised them to constitute a state with a capital or federal city, a state centered on one of the cities of Asia Minor. But they did not follow this advice and so they were fragmented, weakened, and consequently conquered. Nor did they follow the advice of Bias, who at a later time, when Harpagus, the general of Cyrus, was

went to Abdera, were exiles settling in the West (*History* 1.161–9; Grene, pp. 106–10). On the refounding of Abdera by the Teians, see also Strabo (64/3 BC–AD 21), *Geographia* 14.30; *The Geography of Strabo*, trans. Horace Leonard Jones, 8 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1917–33), vi. 236–9.

8. Herodotus names only Thales and Bias (or perhaps Pittacus) as participants in the struggle, and says nothing about an emigration of the sages except that Bias (or Pittacus) advised it (see p. 19 below, with n. 10). On Solon and Periander, see n. 11 below. No prominent political activity is reported of the other sages.

9. Diogenes summarizes variations on the list according to others (*Lives* 1.41–2; Hicks, i. 42–5). On his own list, see n. 6 just above. The statement that 'they were neither sages nor philosophers ...' is not his own but one Diogenes attributes to Dicaearchus (1.40; Hicks, i. 40–3). And Diogenes actually says that at the end of his life Thales became a student of nature (1. 23; Hicks, i. 24–5; KRS, nos. 75, 82, pp. 81–2, 86–7), although he does credit him with being the founder of Ionian philosophy (1.122; Hicks, i. 128–9).

completing the subjection of the Ionians, counseled them to assemble a common fleet and seize Sardinia where they could live freely and happily, since there was no hope of remaining free in Ionia—advice that Herodotus endorses too.[10]

We can also observe the other sages in similar circumstances. Periander is the ruler of Corinth. Solon is the famous lawgiver of Athens, and that is what he is principally known for; he too is one of the sages.[11] Few individuals have had the good fortune to gain fame as lawgivers. Solon shares this honor only with Lycurgus, Numa, and a few others. Among the Germanic peoples no individuals are honored for having been lawgivers to their people. In the modern states of today the laws are always already extant and there is little more to do except to provide for their further specification in detail—and then | it is merely a matter of the modification and interrelation of existing 11
laws, and of elaboration upon single provisions.

Both Solon and Lycurgus count as lawgivers, although they did nothing more than to cast Ionic custom (Solon) or Doric custom (Lycurgus) into another form and to bring an end to current disorder, alleviating this troubled condition by effective laws.[12] Solon himself was a statesman and lawgiver. That he was no perfect statesman is evident from the story of what happened after he had finished his legislation, for right away Pisistratus proclaimed himself tyrant. If a legislation cannot guard against this, then it still has an essential defect. Pisistratus became tyrant by a very simple,

10. On this entire paragraph, see Herodotus, *History* 1.170 (Grene, p. 110). Cf. *W.* xiii. 180 (MS?).

11. In his discussion of Periander (*Lives* 1.94–100; Hicks, i. 96–105), Diogenes Laertius refers to sources that distinguish Periander the sage from the person who ruled Corinth; but he takes no position on the issue himself. His account of Solon (*Lives* 1.45–67; Hicks, i. 46–69) presents him as the author of speeches and poems too, as well as of the famous saying 'Nothing too much'! (1.63; Hicks, i. 62–5). Cf. Herodotus, *History* 1.29–33 (Grene, pp. 44–8).

12. This assessment of Solon's lawgiving may reflect a passage in Plutarch's *Lives* (*Solon* 15.1–2); trans. Bernadotte Perrin, 11 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1914–26), i. 440–3. In contrast to Hegel, Diogenes Laertius and Herodotus credit Solon and Lycurgus with being legal innovators; see n. 11 just above, as well as Herodotus on Lycurgus (*History* 1.65–6; Grene, pp. 61–2). Perhaps Hegel also has in mind the assessment by Aristotle that, by reordering the law courts to consist of all citizens, Solon created the democracy. See *Politics* 2.12.1273b.36–1274a.2 (Barnes, ii. 2021); this passage, however, says nothing about Lycurgus. Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* stresses more the innovations of Solon's legislation, in chs. 6–11 (Barnes, ii. 2343–6), but these passages were not included in the fragmentary version of this work known in Hegel's day. Herodotus refers to the Athenians as 'Ionians' (1.56; Grene, p. 56), although he also speaks of them as 'shunning the name' (1.143; Grene, p. 100).

childlike device.[13] A proper constitution must at the very least withstand an assault of this kind. We should add here, however, that Pisistratus by no means suspended the constitution of Solon. Diogenes Laertius reports on a letter from Pisistratus inviting Solon to return to live in Athens as a free citizen. In the letter Pisistratus, of the lineage of Codrus, demands merely the rights and land rents that had been held by his lineage in Athens, and he says that he has left the old constitution in force.[14] In fact Pisistratus did nothing other than to uphold the legislation of Solon. By his rule he habituated the Athenians to the Solonic laws, he made the law into custom, so that it became the living spirit of the Athenians. Once this had been accomplished, a supreme ruler was indeed no longer necessary, and his sons were driven out of Athens.[15] Solon had made the laws, to be sure, but it is another matter to make legal requirements into habit or custom, so that they become the living
12 spirit of the people. | With this the pinnacle was attained. This may be enough for us to say about the outward life of the seven sages.

These men are also renowned for their wisdom and for their sayings, [some of] which have been preserved—for example, by Diogenes [Laertius]. In part, however, these sayings strike us as very trivial, superficial, and

13. Diogenes Laertius portrays Solon's ineffective attempt to frustrate the intentions of Pisistratus (*Lives* 1.48–50; Hicks, i. 48–51). Cf. *W.* xiii. 182 (MS?). Herodotus reports that Pisistratus seized power by a trick on three separate occasions, for twice his rule was interrupted by a coup (*History* 1.59–64; Grene, pp. 57–61). A textual variant from Lw. indicates that Hegel is thinking of the second occasion, when he entered Athens escorted by a woman of striking appearance and stature, on a chariot, who was disguised to appear as Athena.

14. The text of the letter appears in *Lives* 1.53–4 (Hicks, i. 52–5). Cf. *W.* xiii. 182–3 (MS?), where Hegel's language indicates that he (correctly) doubts its authenticity.

15. The view that Pisistratus governed Athens well is supported by Herodotus (*History* 1.59; Grene, p. 58). Diogenes Laertius too says nothing about any annulment of the Solonic laws. Nevertheless, what Pisistratus upheld was 'the right of the citizen' (for which tradition had already given Solon extensive credit) but not the democratic form of government that Solon provided for. Hegel gives a similar assessment, again without citing ancient sources, in his *Philosophy of World History* (Lasson, i. 623–4; Sibree, p. 259). According to Herodotus (*History* 5.55, 62–5; Grene, pp. 378, 380–2) the Athenians drove out the sons of Pisistratus because they had had enough of tyrannical oppression, not (as our text says) because supreme rule was no longer necessary owing to people gradually becoming accustomed to the Solonic laws. Thucydides states that the Pisistratids were not at first harsh rulers (although they always maneuvered to keep one of their own in office), but that Hippias then made the tyranny more oppressive and put many citizens to death, with the result that he was subsequently deposed. See Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 6.54, 59; trans. Charles Forster Smith, 4 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1919–23), iii. 276–9, 284–7. This agrees with Aristotle's version in the *Constitution of Athens*, chs. 14–22 (Barnes, ii. 2349–55), which states that Pisistratus himself operated more like a mayor than a despot, and that only under his successors did the rule become oppressive. Aristotle even says, in contrast to Hegel's statement, that during the tyranny Solon's laws fell into oblivion. (In Hegel's day the only known fragments attributed to this treatise did not include these parts.)

trite.[16] The reason for this is that reflection and general propositions are something wholly familiar to us, and therefore these aphorisms strike us as rather insipid and trite. But it is another matter to grasp this sort of general perspective and bring it to consciousness for the first time in a universal form. We have elegies attributed to Solon that, in maxims, express quite general obligations to the gods, to one's parents, to the fatherland, and so forth.[17] In this way these men have brought to consciousness what makes life ethical, namely, duty, or these universal specifications. Duty is what lies at the heart of the matter. Legal [*rechtlich*] and ethical relationships to others—essential specifications such as these—are what constitute duty, which governs human life.

Their wisdom consists of aphorisms of this kind. Some are insignificant, but some of them appear to be more insignificant than they in fact are. For instance, an aphorism of Chilo states: ἐγγύα, πάρα δ'ἄτα, 'Give a pledge, and suffer for it'.[18] In one aspect this is a quite common rule of prudence, although the Skeptics have given this proposition a wholly different, a higher, universal, significance. Sextus Empiricus says that in virtue of this proposition the ancients were already Skeptics, since, according to its universal aspect, the proposition means that we | will come to grief if we 13
admit [the truth of] any specific thing and find security in that. For the principle of Skepticism is that nothing finite or determinate is actual in and of itself, that it is just a semblance, something fleeting and impermanent. Thus 'to give a pledge' acquires the sense of pinning one's interest to something determinate, and through that one comes to grief, since no specific thing lasts.[19]

There are reports of several maxims of this sort from Solon. One of the most famous stories about him—which Herodotus tells very fully in his own typical way—concerns his conversation with Croesus. The moral of the story is [in Solon's words] that we should 'count no one happy prior to his death'.[20] From this narrative, however, we do become better acquainted

16. Diogenes devotes Book One to the sages and attributes famous sayings to them: Thales: 'Know thyself' (Hicks, i. 40–1); Chilon: 'Nothing in excess' (i. 70–3); Cleobulus: 'Moderation is best' (i. 96–7); Pittacus: 'Know the right time' (i. 80–1); Bias: 'Most people are bad' (i. 90–1).

17. The attribution of these elegies and other poetic forms to Solon appears in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 1.61 (Hicks, i. 60–3).

18. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 1.73 (Hicks, i. 74–5).

19. The erroneous attribution to Sextus Empiricus of this application of Chilon's aphorism is transmitted only by Gr. and Lw. Hegel is referring to a passage in Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 9.71; Hicks, ii. 484–5) relating to Pyrrho.

20. For the story, see Herodotus, *History* 1.30–3 (Grene, pp. 45–8). There the point (stated in 1.31) is thar even a person with the most favorable life circumstances is always vulnerable to a reversal of fortunes, and only death brings an end to this vulnerability.

with the standpoint of reflection in Solon's time. We see that in the story happiness is put forward as the most desirable and the highest human goal. In our modern idiom we would say: 'Happiness is the highest vocation of humanity.' This way of viewing things, this practical philosophy, we call Eudaemonism, and Solon and his age regarded this Eudaemonism as the highest [ideal] for the individual.

If we ask what happiness is, or what reflection finds it to consist of, then the answer is that happiness is any kind of satisfaction that human beings have it in their power to attain, whether that be through sensual enjoyment or spiritual enjoyment. A further implication is that not every sensual and immediate pleasure is to be seized, since happiness consists more in a reflection upon the whole of one's condition. It does not involve the principle of enjoyment or gratification alone, but rather the fact that all single pleasures are to be subordinated to this overall condition. Often, then, a single pleasure must be deferred for the sake of some later state, since the principle of Eudaemonism embraces happiness viewed as a condition of one's whole
14 life, because life itself should be regarded as a whole. |

If we compare the principle of Eudaemonism with that of Hinduism, then it is evident that the two are opposed. In Hinduism the human vocation is for the soul to be completely freed from everything corporeal and sensuous, so that the soul can exist solely as simply present to itself and with itself—a complete abstraction. For the Greeks, however, the very opposite is the case. Here too the soul is satisfied, but not by a freeing of the soul through flight or abstraction, through withdrawing into itself; instead the satisfaction is in the present; it is a concrete satisfaction in relation to the soul's surroundings.

In this standpoint of reflection, therefore, what is universal in and for itself has not yet emerged. We are at the point midway between what is immediately sensuous and what is in and for itself. The content is the pleasure or satisfaction of the subject, but already this satisfaction is [construed] in a universal mode. The form of universality is already present in it, and that is what emerges from the conversation between Croesus and Solon. Human beings should not seek immediate pleasure itself; instead, as thinking beings, they should seek to ensure pleasure for themselves in the future. Although Croesus shows Solon that he has the means for satisfaction—thus, for happiness—Solon declines to answer in the affirmative to the inquiry of Croesus [whether he is not now a happy man], because for one to be counted happy one must await the completion of all of life right up to the point of one's death, inasmuch as happiness is a function of one's entire condition all the way to the end. One's death itself must be happy and pious. As Solon says, the fact that one's condition does not yet, as a whole, have this

characteristic means that one cannot yet be counted happy, and the course of history furnishes the proof that no momentary state deserves the name of happiness.[21] This story, | although in other respects just an edifying tale, 15
characterizes fully the standpoint of reflection at that time.

Thales is the one of these sages who is of more direct interest to us. It is with him that the history of philosophy proper begins for us. Anaximander and Anaximenes belong here too. We shall not dwell on the circumstances of their lives. The year Thales was born is difficult to ascertain. The most exact indication for his birth is either the first year of the thirty-fifth Olympiad [640 BC] or, according to others, the thirty-eighth Olympiad [628–625 BC], and for his death, the second year of the fifty-ninth Olympiad [543 BC]. Croesus was overcome by Cyrus in the first year of the fifty-eighth Olympiad, and Thales lived until a few years after this catastrophe. So his span was about eighty to ninety years, and he died about 549 BC. He is reported to have been from the Phoenician family of the Thelides.[22]

As regards his philosophy, his principle is that the absolute is water.[23] Everyone generally considers Thales to be the first philosopher of nature.[24] For his pupil Anaximander the principle or the ἀρχή, what is first or the absolute principle, is the ἄπειρον, the infinite, what is undefined or lacks

21. See the preceding note. Not even the great wealth of Croesus can guarantee him future happiness. 'The course of history' refers to the death of the son of Croesus and especially to the Persian conquest of his kingdom, to his own imprisonment, and to his near execution by fire (thwarted only by Apollo's intervention). See Herodotus, *History* 1.34–56, 71–88 (Grene, pp. 48–56, 65–75).

22. The dates for Thales in the transcripts and in *W.* xiii. 194 are difficult to reconcile. Older editions of Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 1.37–8; Hicks, i. 38–9) give his year of birth as the first year of the thirty-fifth Olympiad, whereas the modern critical edition by H. S. Long, *Diogenes Laertius: Vitae philosophorum*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1964), has the 'thirty-ninth' (= 624 BC); Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 28) has the thirty-eighth, citing Christoph Meiners, *Geschichte des Ursprungs, Fortgangs und Verfalls der Wissenschaften in Griechenland und Rom*, 2 vols. (Detmold, 1781–2), i. 304, and so does Hegel in *W.* xiii. 194. Diogenes puts his death in the fifty-eighth Olympiad (548–545 BC); the source for the fifty-ninth Olympiad, given by all five transcripts, is unknown. An. and Sv. transmit the further discrepant date of 549 BC, according to which Thales would not have lived to see the defeat of Croesus—an event that in any case Hegel dates (548 BC) probably three years too early. More recent research puts the lifespan of Thales at seventy-eight years, and so his year of death at either 562 or 550 BC. On his family, see *Lives* 1.22 (Hicks, i. 22–3), as well as Herodotus, *History* 1.170 (Grene, p. 110); cf. KRS, nos. 62–3, pp. 76–7.

23. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.3.983b.18–21 (Barnes, ii. 1556; KRS, no. 85, pp. 88–9). Cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 1.27 (Hicks, i. 26–9).

24. The tradition that Thales is the founder of a school of philosophy goes back to Aristotle; see the preceding note, as well as Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 1.24 (Hicks, i. 24–7). Also see Simplicius (sixth century AD), *In Aristotelis physicorum libros*, ad I, 2, 6r.; in *Simplicius in Physicorum, Libros I–IV*, ed. Hermann Diels, vol. II (1895) of *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca* (Berlin, 1882 ff.), p. 23, ll. 29–30 (hereafter Diels); also in Hermann Diels, *Die*

determination, matter as such.[25] Anaximenes, who was a pupil of Anaximander, makes air into the principle, into this ἀρχή.[26] The principle always takes a natural form: air, water, and so forth. The universal principle has a physical shape. The ancients defined the task [of philosophy] as the knowing of nature. The title of their writings—Anaximander is said to have been the first to write a philosophical book—is given as περὶ φύσεως ('On the essence
16 of nature' or 'On what the true is in general').[27] |

To consider these principles in greater detail, according to their specific characteristics, is of no interest. The only interesting question to be asked is whether it is indeed philosophy to say that the ἀρχή is water, air, or the infinite. To us this looks like physics rather than philosophy, and yet this [distinction] specified by the understanding does not come into play, since the material element has philosophical significance. Above all we can expect an elucidation, a further elaboration of the principles, an elucidation, for instance, of how it can be proved that water or air is the substance of everything, in what way particular shapes are deduced from this principle. But on this little is to be found.

---

*Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Griechisch und Deutsch*, 3 vols., 5th and later edns. ed. Walter Kranz (Berlin, 1934–60), 11 B 1 (hereafter DK); KRS, no. 81, p. 86; there is no full English translation of this commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*. See also Hippolytus (*c.*170–*c.*236), *The Refutation of All Heresies* 1.1; *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, trans. J. H. MacMahon, vol. 5 (New York, 1886, 1903), 11.

25. Diogenes Laertius designates Anaximander as a pupil of Thales (*Lives* 1.13, 122; Hicks, i. 14–15, 128–9), a view traceable to Theophrastus (*c.*370–288/5 BC), as transmitted by Simplicius, *in Phys.* 6r. (Diels, p. 24, ll. 13–18); KRS, no. 101, pp. 106–7. On the concept of the ἄπειρον, see this passage of Simplicius, as well as Aristotle, *Physics* 3.4.203b.6–7 (Barnes, i. 347; KRS, no. 108, p. 115), and Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 2.1 (Hicks, i. 130–1). Hegel's phrase 'matter as such', in retrojecting a later conception into this early time, can be understood as echoing expressions used by Diogenes and Simplicius respectively, when they say it is not to be defined as air, or as one of the ordinary elements.

26. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 2.3 (Hicks, i. 132–3; KRS, no. 138, p. 143). Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.3.984a.5–7 (Barnes, ii. 1556; KRS, no. 139, p. 144).

27. This title has been given for the work of Heraclitus and of Pherecydes of Syros too (Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.5, 1.116; Hicks, ii. 412–13, i. 120–3; KRS, nos. 192, 44, pp. 183–4, 51). Brucker (*Historia*, i. 478–9) cites Themistius (*c.* AD 317–88), *Orationes* 20, as the source for the view that Anaximander was the first to write on natural philosophy; cf. *W.* xiii. 210 (MS?), with footnote; KRS, no. 96, p. 102. But this must refer to later ascriptions, since prior to the middle of the fifth century BC φύσις did not have this general meaning of 'nature as a whole'. The *W.* footnote, from Hegel's own hand, indicates that others, such as Pherecydes, were said to be the first philosophical authors. That Hegel in 1825–6 gives this role to Anaximander shows the influence of Diogenes Laertius, who presents him as the first actual philosopher—in distinction from the seven sages—and speaks of a written summary of his doctrines (*Lives* 1.122, 2.2; Hicks, i. 128–33). Ritter (*Geschichte*, 167–8) shares this assessment, saying that the writing of Pherecydes was more mythological than philosophical—so that Anaximander is the first philosophical author.

In this connection all that we have to take particular note of about Thales is that he said simply that the absolute is water.[28] Beyond that we know nothing at all. In the same way we do not know much more of Anaximander and Anaximenes than those simple words already mentioned. It is very easy to study their history. A half dozen passages deal with Thales, and the later ones only repeat the earlier ones.[29] Apropos of Thales, the manner in which particular figures issued from the water, namely, through condensation and rarefication, is also usually mentioned.[30] But this view holds no further interest for us—it is wholly indeterminate, it is unsupported. In this vein Anaximander too said that countless worlds and gods issue forth from the infinite and then return into it.[31] These are still Oriental

28. Textual variants pertinent to the question of whether Thales was an atheist are from An. ('God is water') and Gr. ('water is the principle, the god of everything').

29. Thus far in this paragraph Hegel has in mind only philosophical statements proper, about the principle of all things, and not the numerous other sayings attributed to the Ionian philosophers nor the historical narratives about them. Statements of the former kind about Thales are repeated almost unchanged from ancient sources such as Aristotle and Diogenes Laertius (see n. 23 above) and Simplicius, *in Phys.*, ad I, 2, 6r. (Diels, p. 23, l. 21). See also Sextus Empiricus (*c.* AD 200), *Pyrrhonian hypotyposes* 3.30; *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* in *Sextus Empiricus*, trans. R. G. Bury, 4 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; New York and London, 1933–49), i. 344–5. See also Pseudo-Plutarch, *De placitis philosophorum* 1.3; in Plutarch, *Quae supersunt omnia*, ed. Johann Georg Hutten, 14 vols. (Tübingen, 1791–1804), xii. There is no English translation of *De placitis* ... (the full title of which would be, in English, 'On the Views of the Philosophers, a Summary of Scientific Theories, in five books'), which reproduces elements from a work by Aetius—first or second century AD. See also John Stobaeus, *Eclogae physicae et ethicae* 1.1, in Stohaeus, *Anthologium*, ed. Curtius Wachsmuth, 2 vols., and ed. Otto Hense, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1884–94; repr. 1958), Hense, i. 34; Hegel had the first volume of the four-volume edition by A. H. L. Heeren (Göttingen, 1792–1801); there is no English translation of these 'Physical and Ethical Eclogues' from the fifth century AD. Hegel was familiar with these reports, in most cases through having read the texts himself; but cf. Tennemann, *Geschichte*, i. 57 n. 3. Comparable citations can be given for the statements of or about Anaximander and Anaximenes.

30. This sentence seems to echo a view attributed by Aristotle to those who affirm a single element; *De caelo* [*On the Heavens*] 3.5.303b.10–13 (Barnes, i. 496–7). The transcripts force one to the conclusion that Hegel took Aristotle to be referring to Thales. Later on (see p. 29 below), however, Hegel qualifies this statement, and a footnote by Hegel himself (*W.* xiii. 206) shows that he did not ascribe this view to Thales. That footnote criticizes Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 38) 'and other authorities' for the ascription, and cites Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 59), who, on the basis of Aristotle's *De generatione et corruptione* [*On Generation and Corruption*] 1.1.314a.1–b.25 (Barnes, i. 512–14), doubts its correctness, as does Ritter (*Geschichte*, 15). The theory of condensation and rarefaction is ascribed to Anaximenes by Simplicius, *in Phys.*, ad I, 2, 6r., and ad I, 4, 32r. (Diels, p. 24, ll. 26–31, and p. 149, l. 32–p. 150, l. 2; DK 13 A 5, 13 A 7) and by Hippolytus, *Refutation* 1.7.1–8 (MacMahon, p. 15); see KRS, nos. 140–2, pp. 144–7.

31. This ascription is found in Cicero (106–43 BC), *De natura deorum* ('On the Nature of the Gods') 1.25; trans. H. Rackham (together with the *Academica*) (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1933, 1951), 28–9; KRS, no. 144, p. 150. This passage is cited in *W.* xiii. 211 n. (a footnote composed by Hegel himself) together with [Pseudo-]Plutarch, *De plac. phil.* 1.3.3 (Hutten, xii. 349–50; DK 12 A 14). See also: Augustine, *City of God* 8.2

representations.[32] It is reported that he said more specifically that things of
17 the same kind separate themselves from this indeterminate [stuff]. | So the indeterminate is taken to be the chaos in which the determinate is already present, although still blended with it, and the separation takes place by like things joining together and separating themselves from what is unlike [them].[33] In any event these are meager specifications that only show the need to pass over from the universal to the specific. Everything about these expressions is still very unsatisfying.

We have yet to speak about the extent to which the proposition of Thales—namely, that water is the absolute or, as the ancients said, the principle—is something philosophical, is philosophy. It *is* philosophical, and philosophy has its beginning with these sayings because they usher in the consciousness that the One is the essence of everything; it is what is true, or what alone has being in and for itself. This is the beginning of a departure from what is in our sense perception, a stepping-back from this immediately existent being. The ancients had gods—they considered external things such as mountains, stars, rivers, the sun, and the like, to be independent powers, they revered them as gods and through fanciful imagination raised them to the status of energetic, activated, conscious, living, and willing [beings]. But with the proposition of Thales this whole view that particular objects in nature are, of themselves and for others, an abiding, authentic, and independent power, is superseded, and from that springs the thought that only One—the universal—*is*. This universal is thought, and it stands directly in a
18 relationship to the particular, or [to the] way the world appears. |

The next relationship that is implied in what we have said is this: these particular existents have no independence, they are not authentic in and of themselves but are something accidental, a modification. This is the negative relationship. The affirmative relationship, however, is that everything else proceeds from the One and, in its doing so, the One remains the substance of all, the absolute matter of everything—that it is only by a contingent and outward determination that particular existence comes into being, that all particular existence is transitory or, in other words, it loses the form of the particular and becomes the universal again—becomes water, air, or the like.

(Dods, p. 245; KRS, no. 114, pp. 124–5); Hippolytus, *Refutation* 1.6.1–2 (MacMahon, p. 13 = 1.5; KRS, no. 101, pp. 106–8).

32. Here Hegel probably has in mind his interpretation of Oriental religions, especially Hindu cosmogonies. See *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 316 ff., 579 ff.

33. This reference to separation of the determinate from the indeterminate is found in Simplicius, *in Phys.*, ad I, 2, 6v. (Diels, p. 27, ll. 11–15; KRS, no. 492, p. 373), in a citation by Hegel himself in *W.* xiii. 213 n., and in Tennemann, *Geschichte*, i. 69, n. 20.

This is what is philosophical in these systems, the fact that the One is what is true.

Thus the separation of the absolute from the finite is not to be grasped as meaning that the One stands over there, and the finite world stands over here in such a way that it is independent. That is often the image of God and the world, when autonomy and durability are ascribed to the world. Frequently we represent to ourselves two sorts of actuality—a sensible world and a supersensible world—in such a way that both of them have equal worth. What is philosophical here is that only the One is what is truly actual, and 'actual' must here be taken in its sublime sense—whereas in ordinary life we use this term for everything.[34]

Aristotle says that most of the early philosophers posited the principle of all things in something that has the mode of matter (ὕλη), from which everything existent is and arises and | into which (as what is ultimate) it 19
perishes in its turn. But as substance (οὐσία) this principle always remains the same and changes only in its characteristics; this is the element and the principle (ἀρχή) of all being. (The One, therefore, is the absolute *prius*.) For this reason they hold that nothing comes into being, nothing arises or passes away. That is only a semblance, or only a determination of the οὐσία, because the same nature always maintains itself as the same. There must be a nature from which all else comes into being while this nature maintains itself. What spirit needs is a One, in such a way that the particular does not have genuine actuality. Aristotle says that they do not all give the same account of this unitary principle, as to its quantity and kind. Thales is the initiator of this philosophy. He says that ὕλη is water.[35]

The second point is that for the ancients this οὐσία or ἀρχή retains a physically determinate form (air, water). None of them named earth as the principle, for its outward appearance is that of an aggregate of many singular elements. But water, on the contrary, is what is neutral, it is one and transparent; it presents the shape of sensible unity with self, as do air and fire as well.[36] The ἄπειρον too [is homogeneous] as remaining a self-contained One. The principle is said to be One, and therefore it must also

34. For the philosophical sense of 'actual' as 'reflected absoluteness', see Hegel, *Science of Logic* (GW xi. 369; Miller, pp. 541 ff.).

35. In place of ὕλη in An., Pn. has 'the One' and Gr. has 'it'. This paragraph reproduces fairly closely most of the content of Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.3.983b.6–21 (Barnes, ii. 1555–6; KRS, no. 85, pp. 88–9); cf. *W.* xiii. 197–8 (MS?).

36. The first part of this paragraph is based mostly on Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.8.989a.5–18 (Barnes, ii. 1563). But the fact that none of them named earth as the principle may also reflect the dismissal by these early thinkers of the folk piety that has its literary expression in Hesiod, *Theogony*. Cf. *W.* xiii. 219 (MS?).

have internal unity with itself. If it exhibits multiplicity, as does the earth, then it is not one with itself but is manifold instead.

On the question of how Thales came to choose precisely water, Aristotle says the following. Perhaps what led Thales to this thought is the fact that all nutriment is moist; the means all natures have for giving themselves life is by
20 taking nourishment, | and this is always moist. Warmth itself comes into being from moisture, and that from which something comes is its principle. For this reason water is that principle, and so all seeds have a moist nature. For water is the principle of what is moist. Some even hold that the most ancient tradition of theologizing [*die ganz Alten, welche theologisiert*] apprehended nature in this way too. This tradition presents Oceanus and Thetis as the procreators of all coming-to-be, and Styx as the oath of the gods, which is why the gods swear by means of water. Water is what is τιμιώτατον [most honorable] because it is what is ἀρχαιώτατον [most ancient]. Yet Aristotle recounts all this only following a 'perhaps'. Plutarch (*De placit. philos.*) omits Aristotle's 'perhaps', as do many of the more recent writers.[37]

Even today we still speak of water as an element that is a moment in everything, a physically abstract, universal power. But another consideration is that something such as water is a particular existence just as much as are all other natural things—water, air, and so on. The need for unity precludes regarding particular things as what is true, but water, air, and the like are each of them something particular. And that is the defect of these principles. Whatever is said to be a universal, authentic principle must not have a one-sided, particular form itself. Instead, the differentia [*der Unterschied*] must itself be universal in nature; the form of the One must not be one-sided but rather must be the totality of form, and totality of form is activity, self-consciousness. That the form should know itself, should be absolute form, is the most profound and latest [principle], as we have seen previously.[38]

37. This account follows fairly closely Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.3.983b.20–33 (Barnes, ii. 1556), except that Aristotle has Tethys instead of Thetis, and he adds the clarifying explanation that 'Styx' is what the gods call water. The passage referred to in [Pseudo-]Plutarch is *De plac. phil.* 1.3.1 (Hutten, xii. 349); cf. Hermann Diels (ed.), *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin, 1879), 276 (hereafter *DG*). The 'more recent writers' include Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 1.10 (Hense, i. 122), who just sums up a report from Aetius, and Simplicius, *in Phys.*, ad I, 2, 6r. (Diels, p. 23, ll. 21–9). Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 36) indicates the omission of 'perhaps' by these authors, as does Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 58), although he translates the Greek instead as 'probably'. Ritter too notes the 'perhaps' (*Geschichte*, 10–11), and refers to the sources cited by Tiedemann. But he also adds that Aristotle's statement is not just surmise but rests upon tradition, since in his *On the Heavens* 2.13.294a.27–30 (Barnes, i. 484; KRS, no. 84, pp. 88–9) Aristotle mentions the attribution to Thales of the view that the earth rests upon water.

38. See Hegel's Introduction, in Vol. I of this edition.

This principle is therefore a particular shape, and this is at once what is defective about it. The transition from the universal to the particular is an essential point and it emerges in the form of | activity, for which a universal 21
need exists. It is stated (Aristotle says this, though not directly about Thales) that everything originates by condensation and rarefaction[39]—although this is a very trivial basis for the differentiae. It is the same when Anaximander says that the infinite plurality of worlds comes forth from the One, that fish come forth from water and human beings from fish.[40] This procession is indeed a succession; it is no concept but a sensuous representation—a mere form by which something brilliant is supposedly said, but one involving no necessity, no concept, no thought.

Aristotle says therefore that the first deficiency is that the universal is expressed in particular shape.[41] The second is that the characteristic of activity is wholly lacking in the universal. In this regard Aristotle says—and it cannot be put better—that they defined the principle in the form of a [prime] matter. In their further progress the subject matter itself directed their path and obliged them to press on without ceasing. For, whether passing-away and generation occur out of one element or out of several, the question arises: by what agency, what is the cause? Matter is not the cause; the underlying subject (*ὑποκείμενον*) is not itself the principle of change. Right away we ask about the principle of change, | for neither 22
wood nor metal is itself the cause of its own alteration; wood does not make a bed, nor metal a statue, but [what does is] something else to which the basis of change properly belongs.[42] So we have to seek that other principle, the principle of movement.

39. See n. 30 above.

40. Hegel here links a report about the innumerable worlds, transmitted by Pseudo-Plutarch and Cicero (see n. 31 above), with a further report, from Pseudo-Plutarch and Plutarch, also attributed to Anaximander, about how human beings were first nurtured inside fish (in the manner of the live-bearing sharks) until they were capable of coming out on land. See [Pseudo-] Plutarch, *De plac. phil.* 5.19.4 (Hutten, xii. 482–3; KRS, no. 133, pp. 140–1). See also Plutarch, *Symposium* 8.8.4 (730 E); Plutarch, *Moralia*, 16 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1927–69), ix (1961), trans. E. L. Minar, Jr., F. H. Sandbach, and W. C. Helmbold, p. 185; Hutten, xi. 379–80; KRS, no. 137, p. 141. Cf. also Ritter (*Geschichte*, 200–1) and Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 57–8).

41. See also p. 28 above. According to the transmission in *W.* xiii. 217–18 (MS?), Hegel is probably referring to Aristotle's summary in *Metaphysics* 1.8.988b.22–6 (Barnes, ii. 1563). The same criticism appears in *On the Heavens* 3.5.303b.10–15 (Barnes, i. 496–7). See n. 30 above, and also n. 42 just below.

42. On the second deficiency, see Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.3.984a.17–27 (Barnes, ii. 1556–7). Cf. *W.* xiii. 218 (MS?).

What we find in book I, chapter 10 of Cicero's *De natura deorum* is this: 'Thales Milesius aquam dixit esse initium rerum, Deum eam mentem, quae ex aqua cuncta fingeret [Thales of Miletus said that water was the first principle of things, but that God was the mind that moulded all things out of water].'[43] Thales may well have spoken of God, but the statement that he grasped God as the νοῦς [that] formed everything out of water is Cicero's addition. The ancients are unanimous in saying that Anaxagoras was the first to adopt the νοῦς as the principle of everything.[44] Cicero puts this story, grasped quite externally, in the mouth of Velleius, an Epicurean. Cicero himself knew no better.[45] In Aristotle's *De anima* (book I, chapter 5) we find a passage in which he says: 'From what I have recounted of Thales, it seems that he held the soul to be something that imparts movement; the magnet has a soul, since it moves iron.' Diogenes Laertius adds that the same is true of amber, and says: 'Thales even attributed a soul to what is lifeless.'[46] That is surely no saying of Thales, and in any event it adds nothing, it specifies nothing universal.

This is what we have to say about the philosophy of the more ancient Greek philosophers. Anaximander and Anaximenes belong to the same

43. See 1.25 (Rackham, p. 29). Other reports to the effect that Thales spoke of God also come from later authors such as [Pseudo-]Plutarch, *De plac. phil.* 1.7.11 (Hutten, xii. 371; DK 11 A 23), and Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 1.1 (Hense, i. 34; cf. DG 301). Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 41 ff.) and Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 60–1) note the conflict between the tradition stemming from Cicero and that from the older authors, who do not say Thales spoke of God. The later view is probably due to Stoic reinterpretation; see the discussion of this issue in KRS, p. 97.

44. As evidence for the 'unanimity', see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 2.6 (Hicks, i. 134–7); Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.3.984b.15–22 (Barnes, ii. 1557)—who names Hermotimus of Clazomenae as the predecessor of Anaxagoras; Augustine, *City of God* 8.2 (Dods, p. 245). See also Plato, *Phaedo* 97b–98b; in *Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus*, trans. Harold N. Fowler (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1914), 334–9. See also Clement of Alexandria (*c.* AD 150–211/216), *Stromata* ('Miscellanies') 2.14; in *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, trans. W. Wilson, vol. ii (repr. Grand Rapids, 1962), 350 (= 2.4). Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 41 ff.) cites Aristotle, Augustine, and Clement. See also Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2.26 (Rackham, pp. 28–9), who says Anaxagoras held that all things had been ordered by an infinite mind. See the reference to this passage from Cicero in *W.* xiii. 209 n., from Hegel's own hand; it also mentions Tiedemann's reflection (*Geist*, i. 42) that the Cicero passage in 1.10 (see the preceding note) may be corrupt.

45. The doubtful passage from Cicero stands in a speech of Velleius the Epicurean, who is in dialogue with spokesmen for Stoicism and for the Skepticism of the New Academy (*De natura deorum* 1.18–56; Rackham, pp. 20–55). But Hegel is mistaken that Cicero 'knew no better', since in Cicero's introduction to the speech (1.18) he clearly distances himself from its content. *W.* xiii. 209 also takes this passage as reflecting Cicero's own view.

46. By these two further examples, apparently unrelated to consideration of the Cicero citation, Hegel again stresses the correctness of Aristotle's criticism that the Ionians do not recognize νοῦς as the principle of activity. See Aristotle, *De anima* [*On the Soul*] 1.2.405a.19–21 (Barnes, i. 645–6), and Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 1.24 (Hicks, i. 24–7); KRS, nos. 89–90, p. 95. See also the Aristotle citation in n. 42 above.

category, but we will not go into further detail. Of course scholarly erudition applies itself to best advantage to the ancients, since it is where one knows the least that one can be most erudite. | 23

## 2. Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans

We pass over now to the second philosophy—to the Pythagorean philosophy, and to Pythagoras. There is not much to be said about the outward life of Pythagoras. The later Pythagoreans, the so-called Neopythagoreans, have produced many extensive accounts of his life, and they are quite expansive in particular about the Pythagorean community [*Bund*]; they tell us many things about it. But we must deal cautiously with them if we are to uncover what is [truly] historical.

Pythagoras is a contemporary of Anaximander and of Thales too. Thales died when Pythagoras was about 26–27 years old. Diogenes Laertius places him about the sixtieth Olympiad. His birth is placed in the forty-ninth or fiftieth Olympiad, [although] more recent writers place it in the forty-third Olympiad.[47] He was a native of Samos and so belongs to the Greeks of Asia Minor. That time was a brilliant period for Samos, under the rule of Polycrates. Trade, culture, and the arts were flourishing, and Anaximander and Anacreon lived there. Mnesarchus, the father of Pythagoras, was an artist, a stonecutter. He belonged to a Tyrrhenian family that journeyed to Samos only after the birth of Pythagoras. The teacher of Pythagoras was Pherecydes, from the island of Syros in the Cyclades. We still have a few verses from this Pherecydes. One of his poems begins 'Zeus and Time and Earth were One'.[48]

47. Hegel miscalculated in stating that Pythagoras was 26–27 years old upon the death of Thales, for he was at the very least 32 and perhaps much older than that; see n. 22 above (on the dates for Thales), and Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 8.45; Hicks, ii. 360–3), who says he flourished in the sixtieth Olympiad (540–537 BC). Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 413–14) puts his birth in the forty-ninth or fiftieth Olympiad (584–577 BC). Hegel's mention of 'more recent writers' may refer to the chronology of Pierre-Henri Larcher, whose proposal of the forty-third Olympiad (608–605 BC) is cited by Tennemann. Hegel mentions Larcher in *W.* xiii. 222; he owned his seven-volume edition of Herodotus (Paris, 1786), the sixth volume of which contains a chronological essay. More recent research favors the later date.

48. This account of the background of Pythagoras apparently combines alternative versions that are kept distinct in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 8.1–2 (Hicks, ii. 320–3) and in *W.* xiii. 223; cf. Herodotus, *History* 4.95 (Grene, pp. 315–16; KRS, no. 257, pp. 217–18). See also Malchus (= Porphyry; AD 232/3–*c.*305), *De vita Pythagorae*, ed. Conrad Rittershus (Altdorf, 1610), 3–4 (§§1–2); 'The Life of Pythagoras', trans. Morton Smith, in Moses Hadas and Morton Smith, *Heroes and Gods: Spiritual Biographies in Antiquity* (New York, 1965), 107–8; Hegel uses his Syrian name, 'Malchus', but we will use the more familiar 'Porphyry' throughout the footnotes. On the rule of Polycrates over Samos, see Herodotus, *History* 3.39–48, 54–60 (Grene, pp. 228–33, 235–8). On the residence in Samos of Anacreon, see Herodotus, *History* 3.121 (Grene,

At an early age Pythagoras traveled to the mainland of Asia Minor, and he is said to have become acquainted with Thales there. Then he traveled to Phoenicia and Egypt. At that time the Greeks of Asia Minor had many political ties with Egypt, and Polycrates is therefore said to have commended Pythagoras to King Amasis. This happened shortly before the conquest of Egypt by the Persians. At that time the Greeks had manifold ties with
24 Egypt. | Amasis attracted many Greeks into the country; he had Greek troops and colonies. In Egypt Pythagoras himself is supposed to have been initiated into all mysteries and even to have been admitted into an Egyptian order of priests, and in any event his lengthy stay in Egypt had a great influence on him. There is also a story that he went to India, but there is no historical basis for this.[49]

In those days people viewed Egypt as a highly cultured land, and so it was in comparison with Greece. This is manifest even in the caste distinction, which presupposes a division among the major branches of human occupations—an elaboration of the particular occupations in the technical and agricultural domains, but also in science and religion, in the priestly caste.[50] Beyond this, however, we must not seek important scientific information from the Egyptians—for example, not in mathematics. Pythagoras is reputed to have discovered the Pythagorean theorem, named after him. It follows that the

pp. 262–3); Strabo, *Geography* 14.16 (Jones, vi. 216–17); Anacreon's poems. That Anaximander too lived at the court of Polycrates—transmitted by Pn., An., and Gr.—seems to be an error, since Polycrates became the tyrant of Samos only after Anaximander's death. According to *W.* xiii. 222–3, Hegel mentioned Anaximander here only in giving the dates for Pythagoras. On Pherecydes, one of the seven sages, and his poem, see Diogenes Laertius 1.119 (Hicks, i. 124–5), and Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 14.4.1091b.4–9 (Barnes, ii. 1724–5); KRS, no. 41, p. 50. The Pherecydes fragment Hegel mentions is actually not verse but prose, as *W.* xiii. 223 correctly notes, in a remark suggesting it was originally poetry—perhaps influenced by Aristotle, who counts Pherecydes among the ancient poets who combined poetry with science.

49. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 8.2–3; Hicks, ii. 322–3) tells of these travels (but not of a trip to India), as does Iamblichus (fl. AD 160–80), *De vita Pythagorica*, ed. M. Theophilus Kiessling (Leipzig, 1825), 3.13–4.19; *On the Pythagorean Life*, trans. Gillian Clark (Liverpool, 1989), 6–8. Iamblichus also tells of a meeting with Thales (2.11–12; Clark, pp. 4–5). See also Porphyry, *Vita Pyth.* §§6, 11–12 (Smith, pp. 109–10).

50. This portrait of Egypt is based on Herodotus, *History* 2.35–182 (Grene, pp. 145–210). Hegel's own handwritten note (*W.* xiii. 226 n.) cites Aristotle, Porphyry, and Iamblichus for the view that astronomy, geometry, and other mathematical sciences originated in Egypt. He also cites the Aristotle passage—*Metaphysics* 1.1.981b.23–5 (Barnes, ii. 1553)—in the second edition of the *Science of Logic* (*GW* xxi. 12; Miller, p. 34). See also Porphyry, *Vita Pyth.* §6 (Smith, p. 109) and Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 29.158 (Clark, p. 71), who explicitly states that Pythagoras studied these sciences in Egypt. See also, however, Hegel's critical comments in the remainder of this paragraph.

Egyptians were backward in mathematics. Thales is said to have taught them to calculate the height of the pyramids from their shadow, and that of a man by means of a simple proportion. This is something that is very easy to do, so they must have been quite backward in arithmetic. The very fact that Pythagoras is said to have discovered his theorem [himself] proves that he did not gain any very important information from the Egyptians.[51]

From Egypt Pythagoras went back to Samos, where, in the meantime, internal unrest had arisen. Polycrates had banished many citizens from Samos and they found support among the Spartans. So a civil war arose, and the Spartans wanted to abolish rule by a single individual and to entrust the government to the people as a whole.[52] During this unrest, in which | Pythagoras took no interest, he withdrew from the affairs of the 25
state, went to Greece and traveled about there, after which he set out for Lower Italy, where, as you know, there existed many Greek colonies and cities.[53]

Here in Italy Pythagoras emerged as a teacher of the public in his own right—not as statesman, warrior, or lawgiver, but with the designation of 'teacher'.[54] He is said to have been the first to call himself 'philosophos' (φιλόσοφος) instead of the prevailing label 'sophos' (σοφός). This label ('lover of wisdom') was regarded as a sign of modesty insofar as it lays claim not to the possession of wisdom but only to a striving-after it as a goal that is supposedly neither attained nor attainable. The actual distinction [, however,] is as follows. The σοφός is a man of great thoughts who at the same time shows this practically, not solely for his own sake [*für sich*], in private affairs—no wisdom is needed for that—but who is [wise] in and of himself. Such a man is wise, upright, and ethical. The φιλόσοφος is the contrast to this practical man, to the participant in affairs of the state. The term does not therefore [signify] love of wisdom as of something one longs to possess; it is not unfulfilled desire for it but rather the possession of wisdom itself, just as

51. Diogenes Laertius mentions the discovery made by Pythagoras, in *Lives* 8.12 (Hicks, ii. 330–1; KRS, no. 434, p. 334), and that by Thales, in 1.27 (Hicks, i. 28–9; KRS, no. 79, pp. 84–5). Tiedemann gives this same criticism of Egyptian mathematical knowledge (*Geist*, i. 31), whereas Porphyry (see the preceding note) extols their knowledge.

52. On these events, see Herodotus, *History* 3.44–7, 54–6 (Grene, pp. 230–2, 235–6).

53. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 8.3 (Hicks, ii. 322–3); Strabo, *Geography* 14.16 (Jones, vi. 216–17); Porphyry, *Vita Pyth.* §16 (Smith, p. 112). A footnote to *W.* xiii. 226 (MS?) surprisingly cites Diogenes, who calls Polycrates a tyrant and says nothing about banishment, whereas *W.* reads: 'Polycrates had—not as the tyrant—banished many citizens from Samos.' On the reasons for the banishment, see Herodotus, *History* 3.44–7 (Grene, pp. 230–3).

54. This contradicts Diogenes (see the preceding note), who says he gave laws to the Italian Greeks.

φίλοινος does not name someone who thirsts for wine but one who loves wine and at the same time actually drinks it. It is the same with φιλόσοφος.[55]

The work and accomplishments of Pythagoras as a public teacher in Italy are reported to us in particular by the subsequent eulogists rather than by historians. One such biography of Pythagoras is that by Malchus (Porphyry).[56] Like the others, this book is full of wondrous things. In general
26 we find | among the Pythagoreans lucidity [of mind] together with a contrasting belief in the miraculous. Hence these marvels are related about Pythagoras too; particularly numerous are the wondrous things to do with his life in Italy, some of which are quite absurd. For example, we are told how Pythagoras came to Italy and landed at Crotona, having on the way encountered fishermen who had caught nothing. He commanded them to cast their net for a new haul and told them in advance how many fish they would catch. The fishermen promised him that if that happened they would do whatever he wished. It did happen, and Pythagoras then demanded that they throw the fish back into the sea, for the Pythagoreans do not eat fish. The narrative also claims as a miracle that none of the fish on dry land died while they were being counted.[57] In Italy Pythagoras founded a school, a kind of order, which had a powerful influence on the states of Magna Graecia. It is true that the order itself soon died out, but its influence lasted for a long time.[58]

The story is that Pythagoras himself was a handsome man whose majestic aspect no doubt inspired great awe and deference, that he had a natural

55. This explanation of the label that Pythagoras selected for himself is found in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 1.12, 8.8 (Hicks, i. 12–15, ii. 326–9). But Hegel rejects the distinction between wisdom and philosophy drawn here by Diogenes (1.12), who quotes Pythagoras as saying that 'no man is wise, but God alone'. The same distinction is drawn by Iamblichus, who says philosophy is a striving for the vision of beauty, the divine, and so forth, rather than the actual knowing of these things, and that Pythagoras thought it was 'a friendship with wisdom' rather than its actual possession (*Vita Pyth.* 8.44, 12.59, 29.159; Clark, pp. 17, 23–4, 71–2). On the use of φίλοινος as an example for the correct way to understand φιλόσοφος, see Plato, *Republic* 5.19 (475a–b); trans. Paul Shorey, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1930–5), i. 512–15.

56. In the *Science of Logic* (*GW* xxi. 204; Miller, p. 214) Hegel refers to the edition of Porphyry's *Vita Pyth.* edited by Rittershus, which has no paragraph numbers. But the paragraph references attributed to Hegel in *W.* xiii show that he also used another source, such as the edition of Iamblichus by Kiessling.

57. For this miracle story, see Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 8.36 (Clark, pp. 14–15); cf. Porphyry, *Vita Pyth.* §25 (Smith, p. 115).

58. On the school, and on the duration of the order, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 8.3, 8.45 (Hicks, ii. 322–3, 360–3). Iamblichus (*Vita Pyth.* 35.263–4; Clark, p. 110) gives a very stylized report about the later influence of the Pythagoreans, even after the demise of the order. According to *W.* xiii. 228–9, Hegel distanced himself from the silly and fabulous embellishments in the accounts of the influence of Pythagoras written by Porphyry and Iamblichus.

dignity and a demeanor all his own. With this he combined particular outward features having a mysterious aura. He wore a white linen garment and abstained from certain foods, namely, meat dishes and also certain vegetables. He possessed great eloquence, with which he conveyed his deep insights to his friends. He did not merely instruct them but united them into a common life in order to mold them into persons of a particular kind, to educate them practically to be skillful in their occupations and apt for ethical life.[59] | 27

There are extensive descriptions of the organization of this society. On the whole it had the character of a monastic order or a priestly order of modern times. Whoever was to be admitted had first to undergo testing regarding his development [*Bildung*] and to undergo exercises in obedience, and Pythagoras made inquiries about his previous life, his conduct, his inclinations and occupations. The inductees handed over their property to the order but they got it back again if they wanted to leave. Within their association they led a wholly regulated life with regard to apparel, time for sleep, occupation, food, and so on; everything was prescribed. The principal occupations were music and a methodical scientific instruction. A distinction was drawn whereby the inductees were divided into exoterics and esoterics. The leaders of the order were the esoterics, who were initiated into the mysteries and the innermost secrets, namely, into the highest level of knowledge (of science); and, since the political arena was not beyond the scope of the order, they also engaged in political activity. To become esoterics they had to undergo a novitiate of five years. The foremost requirement in this apprenticeship was silence, properly called ἐχεμυθία, which was the obligation to refrain from idle chatter.[60]

59. This paragraph combines several sources. On the physical appearance of Pythagoras, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 8.11 (Hicks, ii. 330–1) and the hagiographic depictions in Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 2.9–3.17 (Clark, pp. 3–7), and in Porphyry, *Vita Pyth.* §§18–20 (Smith, pp. 113–14; KRS, no. 270, pp. 226–7). Diogenes (8.19; Hicks, ii. 336–7) says his robe was wool, not linen, which 'had not yet reached those parts'; but see the contrary testimonies about this by Isaac Casaubon (p. 504nn. 93–4 in the 1692 Amsterdam edition of Diogenes Laertius), Herodotus (*History* 2.37; Grene, p. 146), and Iamblichus (*Vita Pyth.* 21.100, 28.149; Clark, pp. 44, 66). On his abstinence from beans, see Herodotus, *History* 2.37 (Grene, pp. 146–7), where such abstinence is also attributed to the Egyptian priests, and Diogenes (*Lives* 8.19, 24, 33–5; Hicks, ii. 336–7, 340–1; 348–51; KRS, no. 275, pp. 230–1). On his eloquence and his organization of his disciples in a common life, see Iamblichus, 6.29–30 (Clark, p. 11).

60. *W.* xiii. 230 shows that Hegel relied on the Neoplatonic authors Porphyry and Iamblichus for the picture of the Pythagorean order presented in this paragraph. See Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 17.17–72 (Clark, p. 31; on the testing of applicants, and the requirement to hand over their property to the order), 15.64–6 (Clark, pp. 26–7; on the significance of music in instruction), 16.68–9, 20.94 (Clark, pp. 28–30, 42; on the role of scientific study in improving the soul, and

We can, in general, say that this is an essential condition for all education [*Bildung*]. It must begin with the ability to grasp other views and to abandon one's own; this is a general condition for learning and studying. Our inclination is to call this harsh. We usually say that understanding is developed by questions, replies, objections, and the like. By an attitude of this kind, however, understanding is in fact not so much cultivated as made vain—when children are asked to present their opinion. In education human
28 inwardness is acquired and enlarged. By restraining oneself, | by silence, one does not become poorer in thought or in vitality of spirit, for that [restraint] is the first, the principal, condition of education. They [the novices] were forbidden to ask questions or to give answers for the sake of refuting something, but were in silence supposed to comprehend alien views inwardly. In this way our minds acquire the ability of comprehending and gain the insight that the views and objections that initially occur to us are worthless, have no value. Through the growing insight that such questions and thoughts are worthless we are weaned from having them. This is what ἐχεμυθία involved.

Finally, we have precise and elaborate descriptions of the way of life of the Pythagoreans, how the times of day were allotted, what their [daily] exercises were, and so forth. During this five-year period the novices never got to see Pythagoras at all but only heard him speaking from behind a curtain. These accounts are solely from a later time. The order did not endure for long. The community is said to have disintegrated while Pythagoras was still living. We are told that it came to be envied, and Pythagoras himself is said to have met his death in a popular uprising against the community.[61]

---

on silence and other prohibitions), 21.95–9 (Clark, pp. 43–4; on the daily regimen in the order), and 17.72, 20.94 (Clark, pp. 31, 42; on the five-year novitiate). Hegel's mention of political activity may arise from a misunderstanding of 17.72, where Iamblichus, in distinguishing esoterics from exoterics, speaks of πολιτικοί (citizens, or statesmen) and νομοθετικοί (lawgivers). On the Pythagoreans' political activities, see 27.129–30 (Clark, pp. 57–8), as well as Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 8.3 (Hicks, ii. 322–3).

61. On the daily routine, see the preceding note. On the persecution and demise of the order, see Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 35.248–64 (Clark, pp. 103–10; KRS, nos. 267, 268, pp. 222–5). About 450 BC this persecution led to the dissolution of the order, although small groups of Pythagoreans persisted a while longer, as we learn from Plato's association with Archytas of Tarentum (see p. 178 below). Reports about the death of Pythagoras are contradictory. Hegel has in mind the report of Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 8.39 (Hicks, ii. 354–5), according to which the fleeing Pythagoras, who not only abstained from eating beans but regarded them as sacred, was captured and killed when he refused to cross a beanfield that lay in his path. Diogenes (8.40; Hicks, ii. 356–7) adds other reports by Dicaearchus and Heraclides (who says he died of starvation), and Hermippus. Hermippus repeats the beanfield story, as does Iamblichus (30.191), who also (35.249) transmits a report from Aristoxenus that Pythagoras went away

Such a community had no place in Greece. Pythagoras undoubtedly derived the thought behind it from the life of the Egyptian priestly caste. In free Greece such a thing could not be tolerated. In Greece freedom is the principle of civic life, but in such a way that it is not specified as the principle for legal or private relationships. In our view the individual is free because all are equal before the law, and customs, political conditions, and opinions—which in organic states must be diverse—can subsist under this umbrella. Greek democracy, on the contrary, meant that this sphere of custom and the outward mode of life had | to maintain itself in a conformity [*Gleichheit*], 29
and the stamp of freedom had to be imprinted upon this wider sphere. There was no place in free Greece for the acceptance of the Pythagoreans, who could not deliberate as free citizens but were reliant upon the plans and purposes of a particular confraternity. Its linking of education with science persisted into later times, as Plato tells us,[62] but the externals had to give way. Some say Pythagoras lived to 80, others say to 104, and the matter is hotly disputed.[63]

The main thing for us is the Pythagorean philosophy. We should note that in any event we must in general distinguish the philosophy of Pythagoras himself from its further development among his followers. We know the names of many of his followers who have given it one characteristic or another—[such persons as] Philolaus and Alcmaeon—and in many other presentations we see what is simple and undeveloped, in contrast to the further development in which thought emerges more powerfully and definitely.[64] We do not wish to go further into the historical aspect of this distinction but only wish to consider the Pythagorean philosophy in general. We also have to cut away what manifestly belongs to the Neoplatonists and

to Metapontus and died there (Clark, pp. 83, 104–5; KRS, no. 267, pp. 222–3). This version is today regarded as most probable; see, for instance, *Die Vorsokratiker*, ed. Jaap Mansfeld (Stuttgart, 1987), 98. See also Porphyry, *Vita Pyth.* §§54–61 (Smith, pp. 125–9) on the end of the order and the death of Pythagoras, an account in substantial agreement with that of Iamblichus.

62. See p. 178 below.

63. Diogenes Laertius mentions 80 years (*Lives* 8.44; Hicks, ii. 360–1). Hegel's numbers are probably based on a table in Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 413–14) depicting a range from 80 (according to dates given by Meiners, *Geschichte*, i. 362–70) to 104 (according to Larcher in his Herodotus edition).

64. Iamblichus enumerates the followers of Pythagoras (*Vita Pyth.* 36.265–7; Clark, pp. 110–13), but has little of a philosophical nature to report about Alcmaeon and Philolaus; but see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 8.83–5 (Hicks, ii. 396–401). Hegel's remark contrasting earlier and later Pythagoreans may refer to these passages. On Alcmaeon and Philolaus, see Tennemann, *Geschichte*, i. 144–9. On Alcmaeon, see p. 42 below, with n. 83. On Philolaus, see KRS, ch. 11 ('Philolaus of Croton and Fifth-Century Pythagoreanism'), pp. 322–50.

the Neopythagoreans, and for this purpose we have sources that predate them, namely, Aristotle (who devoted much attention to the Pythagoreans) and in particular Sextus Empiricus. In Plato too a great deal belonging to the older Pythagorean school came to the fore.[65]

The main thesis of Pythagorean philosophy is simply that number is the
30 being of things, and the organization of the | universe is a system of numbers and numerical relationships—in short, that number as such is the being of all things.[66] That is not to be taken to mean that there is number and measure in everything. If we say that for everything a definite magnitude or a definite number is specified, then number is only one property or one aspect of things. Instead, the straightforward meaning here is that number itself is the being of things. Aristotle says expressly that it is the characteristic Pythagorean position that the limited and the unlimited and the One are the οὐσία, and number in general is the οὐσία of everything.[67] We cannot but be astonished at the boldness of such language about these matters, language that downgrades everything that representation takes to be essential, and in this way raises something that is wholly foreign to the sensible domain of everyday representation into true substance and true being, by pronouncing it to be that.

We have now to consider how this is to be taken. What is number? The ancients were already quite well aware of this issue. In his *Metaphysics* Aristotle says Plato held that the mathematical realm has its place apart from the sensible world and apart from the Idea. It is μεταξύ, or between the two, being distinct from the sensible by virtue of the fact that number is something non-sensuous (ἀΐδιον) and immobile. From the Ideas, however, number is distinct in virtue of the fact that it contains multiplicity, and for that reason [numbers] can be similar to one another and equal to one another, whereas each Idea is One and is only by itself.[68]

In the life of Pythagoras by Malchus [or] Porphyry, this is set forth even more specifically, namely, that Pythagoras expounded philosophy in a way designed to liberate thought from its fetters. Without thought nothing true is

65. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* (bks. 1, 13), *On the Heavens* (bk. 2), and *On the Soul* (bk. 1); Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos* (bks. 4, 7, 10); Plato, *Timaeus*. Citations of particular passages are in the notes that follow.

66. Hegel's statement is based on Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.5.985b.23–986a.3 (Barnes, ii. 1559; KRS, no. 430, pp. 328–30), although Aristotle here speaks of number as the principle (not the being or the essence) of things. But see 987a.19 (Barnes, ii. 1561), where he does say number is the οὐσία or substance of all things.

67. See *Metaphysics* 1.5.986a.15–21 (Barnes, ii. 1559).

68. On this distinction of numbers from sensible things and from Ideas respectively, see Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.6.987b.10–18 (Barnes, ii. 1561).

cognized and known, for thought 'sees and hears' everything within itself, and what is sensible, or other than thought, is lame and blind.[69] For purposes of education [*Erziehung*] Pythagoras makes use of the mathematical domain, because it stands midway between the | sensible and supersensible worlds, as a preliminary exercise for the purpose of leading up to what is in and for itself.[70] Porphyry cites Moderatus of Gades as follows.[71] Since the Pythagoreans could not clearly express the first principles by thought, they had recourse to number, to the mathematical, because simple characteristics are easily stated in this way, for instance, unity or identity—the principle of things—as the number 1, and difference or change as duality. This mode of teaching in the form of number, while it was the first philosophy, has disappeared on account of its enigmatic character. Plato, Aristotle, Speusippus, and others have stolen its fruits and have passed them off as their own by a facile alteration, substituting categories of thought in place of number. 31

This abandonment of determination by number, owing to its enigmatic character, is the main thing. The numbers 1, 2, 3, and so on do, in any event, correspond to categories of thought, but *number* involves the very point that the principle is the number 1, or the element that is excluding; and further determinations are only combinations or repetitions of the number 1, in which the element of the 'one' always remains something fixed and something external. Number is the extreme of thought or of the concept in its utmost externality. The number 1 is a thought but, as excluding, it therefore has the characteristic of the sensible domain, of what is fixed and external to itself; so the 'one' and all the forms—2, 3, and so on—are afflicted with this inner externality. In thought or in the concept, however, there is unity or ideality of distinctions, for there the principal determination is the negation of what is autonomous. In contrast, when I say 'two, three', there are always three single ['ones'] in the 'three', | each of which is autonomous. That is inadequate. It is enigmatic how 'three' is supposed to signify just one thought. Subsequently there are a multitude of possible arrangements, which remain still entirely indeterminate, arbitrary, and contingent. Numbers are therefore not thoughts in themselves but just what is supposed to lead to them. This, then, is the wholly universal aspect of the Pythagorean philosophy. 32

69. See Porphyry, *Vita Pyth.* (§46; Smith, p. 122); cf. *W.* xiii. 239 (MS?).

70. See Porphyry, *Vita Pyth.* (§47; Smith, pp. 122–3). But Aristotle contradicts the explanation in our text, attributing to Plato that view of mathematical objects as intermediate and saying that the Pythagoreans think that sensible things themselves *are* numbers. See *Metaphysics* 1.6.987b.26–9 (Barnes, ii. 1561–2) and *Physics* 3.4.203a.6–7 (Barnes, i. 346).

71. The remainder of this paragraph draws upon Porphyry, *Vita Pyth.* §§48–50 (Smith, pp. 123–4). See also §53 (Smith, pp. 124–5).

The Pythagoreans say that the being of things consists of numbers. The inadequacy of this principle for expressing thought is easily recognizable. The 'one' is only the wholly abstract being-for-self, abstract externality by itself, and subsequent numbers are then wholly external, mechanical combinations of this 'one'. But, since the nature of the concept is something inward, numbers are what is least suitable for expressing concepts.[72]

We still have to consider this in more detail. The Pythagoreans say that what is first is the [number] 1. What they say about it is that each thing is 'one', and things are this 'one' through participation in *the* 'one', through imitation of it.[73] This is a remarkable relation. The 'one' is the arid, abstract 'one', but things are far more specific than it is, they are also particular—things are concrete. What then is the relation to one another of the wholly
33 abstract 'one' and the concrete being of things? | As we said, the Pythagoreans expressed this in the following way. They say that concrete things are a μίμησις (imitation) of *the* 'one'. This is according to Plato and Aristotle.[74]

The same difficulty that we encounter here recurs with the Platonic Idea, which is what is universal and abstract; this Idea is the species, over against which there is the concrete. [For example,] beauty is what is abstract, and the beautiful [thing] is what is concrete.[75] The concrete in its relation to the universal is an important point. The Pythagoreans called this relation 'imitation'. Plato used the expression μετέχειν or μέθεξις (participation) for it.[76] 'Imitation' is still a figurative, childlike, unrefined expression for the relationship. 'Participation' is in any event more definite, although Aristotle rightly says that both terms are unsatisfactory, and that here too Plato did not mark a further development but only the substitution of another name, and that this is κενολογεῖν (empty talk).[77] 'Imitation' and 'participation' only mean 'relation in general'. It is easy to give names but quite another matter to conceive the relation.

72. See n. 66 above, as well as Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr.* 3.152 (Bury, i. 428–9), and *Adversus mathematicos* 4.2 (Bury, iv. 304–5). See also Hegel, *Science of Logic*: *GW* xi. 128–30, xxi. 203–6 (Miller, pp. 212–17) for the view of Pythagoras on numbers; *GW* xi. 98 ff., 124 ff., xxi. 150 ff., 193 ff. (Miller, pp. 100 ff., 164 ff.) on 'one' as abstract being-for-self.

73. See Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 10.260–1 (Bury, iii. 336–9); cf. *W.* xiii. 244 (MS?).

74. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.6.987b.10–12: 'Only the name "participation" was new; for the Pythagoreans say that things exist by imitation of numbers, and Plato says they exist by participation, changing the name' (Barnes, ii. 1561).

75. See p. 196 below.

76. See n. 68 above, and the continuation of that passage in Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.6.987b.18–25 (Barnes, ii. 1561), on the relation of Plato's Ideas to Pythagorean numbers.

77. See *Metaphysics* 13.5.1079b.24–6 (Barnes, ii. 1707). What he says is that to call them paradigms in which other things participate amounts to 'empty words and poetical metaphors'.

What comes second is distinction, duality, δυάς. From the very outset the Pythagoreans were unable to rest content with expressing the numbers 1, 2, 3 as their principle; there had to be more precise | categories, more precise 34
thought-determinations, bound up with them. So the antithesis, which then takes on diverse forms or applications, arises principally with duality. 'Two' is the direct antithesis of 'one'. Aristotle says that the Pythagoreans grasped this antithesis as that of ἄπειρον and πέρας, the unlimited and the limited; 'one' being the ἄπειρον and 'two' being πέρας, or determination in general. In another mode that pertains more to arithmetical form the antithesis is comprehended as that of even and odd. They said that 'one' is both even and odd. First of all it is odd, but it has the property of making even and consequently it must have the property of the even. If I add one to the odd number three then it becomes even.[78]

About the dyad [*Zweiheit*], or the δυάς, they said that everything is determined or limited by participation in it, and accordingly the dyad is what is manifold, many, differentiated, what is determinate or limited.[79] In other presentations, however, this gets turned around. According to Aristotle, Plato made the δυάς to be the ἄπειρον, the indeterminate, and the 'one' to be the πέρας, the determinate. What we understand by 'limit', however, is not what is meant here, but rather 'what does the limiting'. In any case, the principle of individuality or of subjectivity is higher than the indeterminate, the ἄπειρον. This [Pythagorean] infinite, on the contrary, is what is nonspecific, what is wholly abstract. The subject or the νοῦς, however, is the form, or what determines. According to Aristotle, Plato therefore made the ἄπειρον, the infinite or the indefinite, to be the δυάς, the dyad, that which lacks specificity. Hence for the Pythagoreans the δυάς became a δυὰς ἀόριστος.[80]

The triad [*Dreiheit*] stands in general for what is perfect; however abstractly it is taken here, this is an extremely important definition. The μονάς attains completion in the τριάς. The μονάς (ἑνάς, 'one') goes forward

78. In contrast to what Hegel contends, Aristotle does not say the Pythagoreans equated 'one' with the ἄπειρον. What Aristotle actually says (in *Metaphysics* 1.5.986a.15–21; Barnes, ii. 1559), is that they called 'the even' the unlimited and 'the odd' the limited. The footnote citation in *W.* xiii. 246 (of Theon of Smyrna), in the corresponding discussion of how 3+1 make an even number, Hegel probably took from Tennemann (*Geschichte*, ii. 16 n. 7). Both of them also cite Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 2.16 (in Heeren; Hense, i. 20), though Hegel correctly notes that this report in Stobaeus comes from Aristoxenus, not from Aristotle.

79. See Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 10.261–2 (Bury, iii. 338–9); cf. *W.* xiii. 246–7 (MS?). See also n. 81 just below.

80. For this account of Plato, see Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.6.987b.25–7 (Barnes, ii. 1561–2); cf. *W.* xiii. 247 (MS?). On the δυάς as indeterminate (ἀόριστος), see the following note.

through the δυάς and again gathers up the indeterminate (ὕλη), namely, the
35 dyad [*Dyas*]. That is the | τριάς.[81] Aristotle says that what is corporeal has no magnitude other than the 'three', for it is defined by the three dimensions. Pythagoras says, τὸ πᾶν [καὶ] τὰ πάντα ὥρισται διὰ τῆς τριάδος ('the all, and all things, are determined by the triad'). The τριάς has beginning, middle, and end, namely, the number of the whole, which is why we too have adopted this characteristic, taken from nature, into the worship of the gods.[82] [It is] employed in rhetorical address to the gods. In apostrophizing the gods three times we are giving utterance to them completely, as Aristotle also tells us. Corresponding to that, we have the 'Holy, holy, holy' of the Old Testament. What is determined by three is the whole. Triplicity is equal to itself and is also unequally divisible, it has inequality within itself, there is contrast and distinction within it. [It] can be divided into one and two, and the τριάς is then the totality of this which is [inwardly] distinct.

When we go into greater detail, the first point to notice is that already in this early time things did not stop merely with expressing the form of number as such, for categories of thought were introduced and substituted for it. These included odd and even, finite and infinite. Alcmaeon, a Pythagorean who lived after Pythagoras but knew him personally, is said to have grasped and defined with greater precision these universal antitheses, of which there are ten. For the Pythagoreans the number 10 is also an important number, although the [ten antitheses] are not analogous to the Indian enumeration of principles and substances. The ten are: (1) πέρας and ἄπειρον, or limit and unlimited; (2) odd and even; (3) unity and plurality; (4) right and left; (5) male and female; (6) resting and moving; (7) straight and curved; (8) light and darkness; (9) good and evil; (10) square and parallelogram.[83] This is only a crude, unrefined beginning at a more precise specification of the opposites, one without order and inherent meaningfulness.

But we also have more refined presentations of these Pythagorean definitions available to us, presentations that are more pertinent to thought, as
36 in Sextus Empiricus. Here the | starting point is that the modes of things are of three sorts: (1) according to difference; (2) according to opposition;

81. See Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr.* 3.153–4 (Bury, i. 428–31), as well as n. 79 above. His account of the deduction of the triad differs somewhat from Hegel's.

82. This close paraphrase is from Aristotle, *On the Heavens* 1.1.268a.7–15 (Barnes, i. 447). Cf. *W.* xiii. 256–7 (MS?).

83. On Alcmaeon, see n. 64 above. On the table of ten opposites, see Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.5.986a.22–986b.2 (Barnes, ii. 1559–60; KRS, no. 438, pp. 337–9). Aristotle mentions Alcmaeon after he gives the table and does not suggest as clearly as does Hegel that he is its author. Hegel's version of the table is quite accurate, except that the last figure mentioned is a rectangle, not a parallelogram. Cf. *W.* xiii. 248 (MS?).

(3) according to relationship. This already shows a more refined reflection. These three forms are explained more precisely as follows. (1) According to sheer difference a subject is considered on its own account—earth, water, fire, horse, air, and so on—each as relating to itself, and this is the characteristic of identity, or independence. (2) Opposition is defined as the one being utterly opposed to the other, as in rest and motion, good and evil, sacred and profane, and so forth. (3) The definition of relationship is that the object is independent and at the same time in relation to the other, as in right and left, above and below, double and half—the one is grasped only on the basis of the other as, for example, that I cannot represent 'left' to myself without also representing 'right'.[84]

For characteristics that are antithetical, the arising of one means the perishing of the other and vice versa. When movement is taken away, then rest comes about, and vice versa. When health is taken away, then sickness arises, and vice versa. That is the way antithesis is. According to relationship, however, both [terms] arise at the same time and both cease to be at the same time. 'Left' and 'right' are wiped out together, and 'double' perishes when 'half' is destroyed. A second distinction is that what is in opposition has no mean; there is no third state between life and death or between motion and rest, whereas in relationship there is a mean. The mean between greater and smaller is equality, and that between too great and too small is what is enough or sufficient. The relation to self is subject, the twofold relationship is antithesis, and the third is relationship [proper]—an antithesis together with a relation. (Identity is posited in relationship too.) What is important is that these universal characteristics are brought to consciousness. All this does indeed show | a cultivated reflection, for there is an attentiveness to 37
the wholly universal characteristics that are moments in all representations, in all that is. Although of course here the nature of these opposites is not yet treated with precision, it is important that they are brought to consciousness.

Over and above these characteristics (namely, the subjects) and the twofold opposition, there must be one genus, something universal. The genus takes priority over the species; it is what rules, προάρχει, or the universal. If the universal is annulled, then so are the species, although the genus is not annulled if the species are. The latter (the species) hinge upon the former—ἤρτηται—but not vice versa.[85]

84. For this threefold distinction and the examples, see Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 10.263–5 (Bury, iii. 338–41); cf. *W.* xiii. 249–50 (MS?).

85. The Greek ἤρτηται ('they are hung upon') appears in a passage from Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. math.* 10.269; Bury, iii. 340–3)—upon which this paragraph itself 'depends'—and so does προϋπάρχειν ('to go before'); cf. *W.* xiii. 251 (MS?), where much more of the Greek is given.

As the highest genus the Pythagoreans posited the 'one' (τὸ ἕν); it is considered to have being in and for itself, and they say that the genus of what is in antithesis is that of the like and the unlike. An instance of the like is rest, and of the unlike, motion. What is in accord with nature is like, so health is the like and sickness the unlike. The third genus is a quantitative difference, namely, the excess, and the lack, of unity, of the initial unity—the quantitative distinction, more and less. These three genera are combined again as equality and indeterminate duality, and from these there comes first the 'one' of number and the 'two' of number. So here the 1, 2, 3, and so on are posited as subordinate. The remaining numbers arise because the first genus or the μονάς advances and the 'two' gets produced from the indeterminate δυάς. The indeterminate δυάς of the [initial] unity, with the μονάς, yields the triad.[86] This is a more refined reflection, to combine the universal categories with the 1, 2, 3, and to subordinate the latter as number, making
38 the universal genus what comes first instead. |

The τριάς is the whole, but they did not stop here, for after the τριάς comes the τετράς or the τετρακτύς (from τέτταρες and ἄγειν), the active 'four',[87] and subsequently among the later Pythagoreans this became the most celebrated number.[88] There are verses attributed to Empedocles—who was originally a Pythagorean—about the high esteem for the τετρακτύς: 'If thou doest this, it will lead to divine virtue, I swear it by him who has given our spirit the divine τετρακτύς, which has within itself nature's eternal source and root.'[89] This calls to mind the four elements, the four regions of the world, and so forth. As number it is the consummation of the δυάς, the dyad that is squared, the δυάς proceeding in such a way as to have only itself for its

86. This account of the three highest genera and their relation to number is based on Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 10.269–77 (Bury, iii. 340–5); cf. *W.* xiii. 251–2 (MS?). See also 4.4 (Bury, iv. 306–7), and n. 93 just below.

87. See Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 4.3 (Bury, iv. 304–7), and 7.94–5 (Bury, ii. 48–9; KRS, pp. 233–4 n. 2), where the *tetractys* is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature'. Cf. *W.* xiii. 259 (MS?), and [Pseudo-]Plutarch, *De plac. phil.* 1.3 (Hutten, xii. 352–3).

88. See the following note, as well as Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 18.82, 28.150, 29.162 (Clark, pp. 36–7, 66, 72–3).

89. Here Hegel combines two variants of a fragment of the so-called Golden Words of Pythagoras. One, from the *Poesis philosophica* (p. 116), compiled by Heinrich Stephanus (1573) from classical authors—and almost identical in E. G. Glandorf's compilation, *Sententiosa vetustissimorum gnomicorum quorundam poetarum opera*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1776), i. 156–9 (verses 45–48)—Hegel translates from the Greek into German, in *W.* xiii. 259 (MS?), in language very close to that of our text. But reference to the root(s) of nature comes instead from the other variant, found in Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 4.2 (Bury, iv. 304–5). See also slightly different versions in Sextus, 7.94–5 (Bury, ii. 48–51), and in [Pseudo-]Plutarch, *De plac. phil.* 1.3.8 (Hutten, xii. 354), and variants in Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 28.150, 29.162 (Clark, pp. 66, 72–3). On the relation of Empedocles to the Pythagoreans, see n. 221, p. 83 below.

determination.[90] The determination is the duality, which multiplies itself as it spreads itself out, equates itself with itself, posits itself as identical with itself, and in this way contains its unity with itself within it. There is a progression that has itself for its own determination, and thus identity with self is posited.[91]

This can be expressed as follows. We have unity with self and then antithesis or distinction. The distinction must be something twofold. The antithesis itself already constitutes two, and the third moment is the uniting of unity with the antithesis. When we count up, there are four elements. 'One' is a simple characteristic, but it already contains plurality within it; for the antithesis is two elements, and a fourth, the unity of these two, affords the consummation. So no great importance is to be placed on numerical characteristics.

The Pythagoreans also have this τετρακτύς in another form as δεκάς, as ten. We can say that the consummate three is the τετράς. | But now the decad has 39
the value of the consummate tetrad. The τετράς would be quaternity, but the active tetrad is the real or realized tetrad, so far as its characteristics are taken into its reality. Here we have the superficial tetrad of number. When we have 4, and count 1, 2, 3, 4, then this makes 4. If we take 1, 2, 3, and 4, each by itself, then 1 and 2 is 3, and 3 is 6, and 4 makes 10. The τετρακτύς therefore is, so to speak, the λόγος of the universe; it has the source and root of eternal nature within it.[92] The δεκάς, however, is actual nature in general and not merely source and root. Proclus, a later Pythagorean, says: 'The divine number goes forth (πρόεισι, περιπατεῖ) to the point of leaving the inviolate sanctuary of the μονάς. It arrives at the divine τετράς, which begets the mother of all things, the ματέρα πάντων, she who accommodates all things within herself (πανδοχέα)—the ancient limit that is set for everything, that is unchanging, immutable (ἄτροπος), inexhaustible (ἀκάματος)—she whom they call the holy δεκάς.'[93] The construction of the universe then follows.

The Pythagoreans also made these forms concrete by means of religious and mythological images. The μονάς they expressly call 'god', or even 'the hermaphrodite', because it is both even and odd; [and] substance, reason,

90. See n. 92 just below.

91. Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. math.* 4.4–5; Bury, iv. 306–7) is Hegel's source for this account. The monad is the point, the dyad produces the line; two squared is unity with self and identity with self.

92. On the constituents of the τετρακτύς adding up to ten, see Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 4.3 (Bury, iv. 304–7). On its status as root of nature, see also our text above, with n. 89.

93. *W.* xiii. 259 (MS?) gives a similar rendition of this text, a Pythagorean hymn transmitted by Proclus in his commentary on Plato, *Timaeus* (ed. E. Diehl, 1903–6), p. 269. It is found in the *Opera* of Sextus Empiricus, ed. J. Albertus Fabricius (Leipzig, 1718), in the commentary (p. 332 n. 1.) on *Adv. math.* 4.3 (Bury, iv. 304–7), a passage containing an abbreviated version of it.

Tartarus, Jupiter, or form—insofar as [at one time] it is thought of more as idea, what determines, and at another time more as the indeterminate (chaos and the like).[94] In the same way they give their δυάς names of this sort. But this occurs especially with the later Pythagoreans, who sought to raise the characterizations of the folk religion to a higher level by embedding such categories of thought in it. Thus they called the dyad matter (that is, in the sense of what is unlike or indeterminate in general), strife, Isis, and so on.[95] So the antithesis finds its place in the δυάς.

We need now to pass on from all this to the forms that are a more concrete application of the Pythagorean universal. They constructed everything from numbers, first of all, for instance, space and spatial definitions—and that is
40 very easy to do because of its abstraction. If we want | to express a complete definition of space, then we must invoke the aid of numbers—even in the triangle. For space, if we begin with the point, the first negation of the void, then the point corresponds to 'one', since it is what is indivisible. The line expresses the δυάς and the plane is the τριάς, especially as the outer surface. The complete or whole space is body, the τετράς. Aristotle says that from the point they construct all else; the corporeal domain as a whole is fashioned under the direction of number. Water, air, fire, and the whole universe, they say, are fashioned in accord with harmony, although naturally the physical type [of harmony] is not yet indicated by this.[96] As we said, there is no difficulty with the initial spatial definitions. Hence, where number

94. These designations of the μονάς are in [Pseudo-]Iamblichus, *Theologoumena arithmeticae*. Hegel used the edition by Friedrich Ast (Leipzig, 1817); the more recent standard edition is that by V. de Falco (Leipzig, 1922); cf. *The Theology of Arithmetic*, trans. Robin Waterfield (Grand Rapids, 1988). Specific designations include: 'chaos', 'god', 'Hades', 'hermaphrodite', 'Jupiter', 'reason', and 'substance'. Cf. de Falco, pp. 3–16; Waterfield, pp. 37–40, 46. Some, including the editors of our German edition, do not attribute this work to Iamblichus, although much English-language scholarship apparently does. In our text Hegel's rendering of οὐσία by 'substance' is inappropriate, and he is not entirely correct in saying that the μονάς was called Tartarus (Hades).

95. On the dyad, see Iamblichus, *Theol. arith.*, ch. 2, περὶ δυάδος ('On the number two'); de Falco, pp. 7–14; Waterfield, pp. 41–47; see also nn. 78–80 above. This chapter also discusses the equation of the dyad with matter and its designation as what is unlike. Lw. follows the word 'strife' (in our text) with 'Eris', whereas Gr. has 'Isis'; Iamblichus' text confirms 'Isis' (de Falco, p. 13; Waterfield, p. 46). The *Theology of Arithmetic* is devoted almost exclusively to establishing relations of this kind between the Hellenic–Hellenistic folk religion and the Pythagorean numbers from one to ten. Further examples of a theological interpretation occur in numerous other writings, for instance, Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 2.22–4 (Hense, i. 22).

96. This account of how space and all other things are fashioned out of number—point, line, plane, and so on—is based on Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 10.277–83 (Bury, iii. 344–9); cf. *W.* xiii. 260–1 (MS?). So it is an error (but probably not Hegel's own) to insert 'Aristotle says', as do Gr. and Lw. Aristotle's partially parallel account is in *Metaphysics* 1.8.989b.29–990a.8 (Barnes, ii. 1564–5).

pre-eminently constitutes the determining factor, the Pythagoreans have hit upon this too—I refer to music, or tonal harmony.

Pythagoras is credited with the discovery of the fundamental tones of harmony and the determination of their numerical relationships; here number is the factor that determines the qualitative distinction. Some audible distinctions can form harmonic relationships, whereas other combinations are dissonant. The fundamental characteristic of harmony lies in numbers, and indeed in the simplest numerical relationship. The story is that Pythagoras was passing by the workshop of a blacksmith, whose blows sounded in mutual accord—the tones were harmonic. Pythagoras turned his attention to this circumstance. He compared the weight of the hammers and in that way determined the harmony and the relationship of the tones mathematically, and ultimately he applied this to stringed instruments.[97] We know that the sound of a string—or, what is equivalent, of the column of air in the barrel of a wind instrument—depends upon three factors: the thickness, length, and tension of the strings. We can | vary each characteristic. With two strings of equal thickness and length, a difference in tension produces a difference in tone. Pythagoras found that, if he weighted one string with twelve pounds and a comparable string with six pounds, then this formed an accord, an octave. The string under greater tension makes twice as many vibrations as the other; this yields the relationship of the octave (διὰ πασῶν). He put another string under eight pounds of tension and found the fifth, the διὰ πέντε, and another under nine pounds, which yielded the διὰ τεσσάρων, the fourth. In this way he discovered an entire musical theory.[98] Number is therefore the truly determinative factor here; it is what defines the distinction. The tone is only a vibration, a motion. There are qualitative distinctions, to be sure—as, for instance, between the tones from metal strings and those from catgut, or between the human voice and wind instruments. But the essential and properly musical relationship of the tones of an instrument to one another—that upon which harmony rests—is a numerical relationship. Tone is only the vibration of air as a body in time and space. Only number accounts for the different characteristics, according to the quantity of vibrations within a time interval.[99] So a numerical specification is nowhere more appropriate than it is here.

41

97. For this story of the blacksmith shop, see Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 26.115 (Clark, pp. 50–1).

98. Iamblichus (*Vita Pyth.* 26.115–18, 120; Clark, pp. 50–4) gives a full account of these experiments with strings. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr.* 3.155 (Bury, i. 430–1), and *Adv. math.* 4.6–7 (Bury, iv. 306–9), 7.95–7 (Bury, iii. 48–51; KRS, pp. 233–4), 10.283 (Bury, iii. 348–9) and n. 96 above.

99. In An.'s margin is the notation: 'See Herder's *Aelteste Urkunde*, Second Division, Treatise 5.' In fact this treatise pursues a disagreement with William Warburton about Egyptian

In addition, the Pythagoreans construed the heavenly bodies of the visible
42 universe numerically. Aristotle says that, in | specifying numbers to be the principles of the whole of nature, they subsumed all the characteristics and divisions of the heavens and of nature as a whole under numbers and numerical relationships. Where something did not fit, they sought to compensate for this deficiency by adding something. They said that there are ten heavenly circuits or heavenly spheres because they regarded the δεκάς as the perfect number. Since only nine are visible, they invented a tenth, which they made into a counter-earth (ἀντίχθων).[100] These nine are the planets known at that time—Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Mercury—[plus] Earth, Sun, Moon, and the Milky Way, and the tenth [sphere] is therefore the counter-earth. In the middle they put fire, for the earth is a star in a circular orbit around this central body. The circle of the spheres in turn counted as the most perfect figure, corresponding to the δεκάς. We find here a certain similarity to our solar system. They posit another earth over against ours. So, as Aristotle says, they do not confine themselves to what appears to the senses but they rely on reasons, much as we too, on the basis of reasons, draw conclusions contrary to the evidence of the senses. The fire in the middle they call the guardhouse of Zeus.[101] Something similar is to be found in Aeschylus too.[102] The ten spheres make a sound, although each makes a different sound in accord with its distinctive size and velocity. The velocity is determined by the different distances [between them], which have a mutual, harmonious relation, in keeping with the musical intervals. By this means there arises a harmonious tone of the self-moving spheres, a harmonious world chorale.[103]

We cannot but admire the grandeur of this idea. The motions depend upon the velocity, the velocity depends upon size, the size upon the distances,

hieroglyphics. The first treatise touches upon Pythagorean numbers, but not even there does Herder discuss musical pitch. See Herder, *Sämmtliche Werke*, ed. Bernard Suphan et al., 33 vols. (Berlin, 1877–1913), vi. 340–1.

100. This account by Aristotle is in *Metaphysics* 1.5.986a.3–12 (Barnes, ii. 1559). Cf. *W.* xiii. 265 (MS?).

101. This account of the central fire around which all else (including our earth) orbits, and the Pythagorean reliance on reasons rather than on the senses, comes from Aristotle, *On the Heavens* 2.13.293a.21–b.4 (Barnes, i. 482–3).

102. This is probably a confusion of Aeschylus with Euripides. Hegel may have in mind a reference found in the context of the passages in the *Theol. Arith.*, which he had cited shortly before (see nn. 94–5 above). See de Falco, p. 6; Waterfield, p. 40; cf. DK 59 A 20b (Euripides: Fragment 944).

103. On this music of the spheres, see Aristotle, *On the Heavens* 2.9.290b.15–23 (Barnes, i. 479; KRS, no. 449, pp. 344–5). See also Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 4.6–9 (Bury, iv. 306–9); cf. *W.* xiii. 265–6.

and these would also have been determined by the musical intervals. Grasped here is the thought of one system of the world structure, or the solar system. For us the solar system alone is | rational, whereas the other 43
stars have no place of honor. In the system of the Pythagoreans everything is determined by numerical relationships that have a necessity on their own account, that are universal categories of thought that have come before their minds in numerical relationships. The music of the spheres is a grand representation produced by the fanciful imagination, devoid of any genuine interest for us. The reason the Pythagoreans give for why we cannot hear the world chorale is that we ourselves are comprehended [*begriffen*] within the resonance, that it [the music of the spheres] belongs to our substance, it is identical with us and not something other that emerges over against us.[104] But we must give due praise to the thought as a whole. Today we are further advanced in a certain respect, for we know from Kepler's laws how the distances and the orbital periods relate to one another, although as yet astronomy has not been able to furnish any specific basis for these distances. We know what these numbers are. We are familiar with an approximate relationship—namely, that there is an approximate regularity in these sequences of distances—and so we were fortunate enough to suspect that there are other planets between Mars and Jupiter, where later on Ceres, Vesta, Pallas, and other [asteroids] were discovered. But astronomy has so far failed to discover here a consistent sequence based on reason or understanding, so instead it disdains the regular presentation of this sequence.[105] This is, however, a most important point on its own account, and one that is not to be set aside. | 44

There are still other applications of the number system that call for our attention. The soul or the spiritual element was defined as number too. Aristotle recounts that they said the soul is a mote in a sunbeam, because these move even when it is totally calm; so these are souls.[106] Motes in sunbeams are thus something self-moving. That has little significance, but it does prove that they adopted the characteristic of self-movement as the principle of the soul.

104. According to Aristotle, *On the Heavens* 2.9.290b.24–7 (Barnes, i. 479), the Pythagoreans say the sound is in our ears continuously from birth, so that we cannot distinguish it, by contrast, from what we regard as silence. According to Porphyry, *Vita Pyth.* §30 (Smith, p. 117), Pythagoras says we cannot hear it owing to the insignificance of our nature.

105. The Lw. transcript reads: 'disdains the endeavor of Pythagoras.' On Hegel's own position on these discoveries, see the editorial report (in *GW* v) by Kurt Rainer Meist, on Hegel's Habilitationsschrift, *Dissertatio philosophica: De orbitis planetarum.*

106. See Aristotle, *On the Soul* 1.2.404a.16–20 (Barnes, i. 644; KRS, no. 450, p. 346).

Another presentation is as follows. Thought is the 'one' (μοναχῶς, by itself). Knowing is the 'two'; it already goes further. It is no longer wholly abstract thinking, for it gives itself a determination, a content. 'Three' is the representation or the number of the surface. Sensation is the number of the corporeal; it is 'four'. All things are judged by νοῦς or understanding; or by ἐπιστήμη or science; or by δόξα or representation; or, finally, by sensation. Inasmuch as the soul moves itself, it is the self-moving number.[107] Aristotle (in *De anima*, book one) cites Timaeus as teaching that the soul moves itself and, in doing so, moves the body too, since it is involved with the body. The soul consists of the elements (numbers) and is inwardly divided in accord with the harmonic numbers, and so it may have sensation and an indwelling harmony. He also says that, for the whole to have well-attuned orientation, movement, and impulses (συμφώνους φοράς), Timaeus bent linearity (εὐθυωρίαν) into a circle, and out of the whole circle made a division into two circles; in this way he converts the harmonic line into a circle and in turn converts this circle into two circles, which coincide at two points. Finally, one of these circles is in turn divided into seven circles, so that the movements of the soul are as those of the heavens. In this fashion there arise in fact ten circles. Unfortunately Aristotle did not convey the significance of this
45 more precisely. | It is noteworthy that they grasped the soul as a system that is a counterpart to the system of the heavens.[108] In the case of the Platonic numbers we find a similar representation of the fact that the sequence of relationships is bent into a circle, divided into two circles, and in turn into seven divisions of one of these circles. Plato also indicates the more precise numerical relationships,[109] although even to the present day no one has yet found a rational significance in them. Thus a numerical arrangement is easy, but indicating the significance in a meaningful way is difficult and will always remain arbitrary.

There is one further noteworthy specification the Pythagoreans make with regard to the soul—the transmigration of souls. Cicero says that Pherecydes,

107. See Aristotle, *On the Soul* 1.2.404b.21–30 (Barnes, i. 645) on these correlations with the first four numbers and on the soul as the self-moving number.

108. The whole passage beginning with the soul's movement of the body is taken from Aristotle, *On the Soul* 1.3.406b.25–407a.6 (Barnes, i. 648). Our text apparently attributes these views to Timaeus (a Pythagorean from Locri, in Italy), a (possibly fictitious) character in Plato's dialogue, the *Timaeus*, whereas Aristotle is most likely speaking of the dialogue by name. According to Plato it is the Demiurge who bent the straight line (εὐθυωρίαν) into a circle. Cf. *W.* xiii. 269 (MS?), on the soul and the circles. Aristotle's account concludes with the criticism that soul is not a magnitude and that Plato must mean the soul of the whole is like thought, which is one and continuous, not like (Aristotle's) sensitive or desiring soul.

109. See *Timaeus* 36b–d; in *Timaeus, Critias, Cleitophon, Menexenus, Epistles*, trans. R. G. Bury (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1929), 68–73.

the teacher of Pythagoras, was the first to say the human soul is immortal, and that he is very ancient and lived at the time of Cicero's kinsman Servius Tullius (*regnante Servio*).[110] The doctrine of the transmigration of the soul originated with the Egyptians, as Herodotus (2. 123) expressly states. He says that the Egyptians were the first to have said that the human soul is immortal and that after death, when the body perishes, the soul clothes itself (ἐσδύεται) in another living thing, and when it has gone through all the animals of land and sea, and the birds, then it assumes a human body once again; such a cycle is completed in 3,000 years. He says, however, that these views have also been adopted among the Greeks, that there are some who have helped themselves to these views and spoken of them as if they were distinctively their own. He knows who these persons are but does not wish to name them.[111] By this he probably meant the Pythagoreans. | 46

We have already noted that he [Pythagoras] adopted [the model for] his community from the Egyptian priests. But both were too far removed from the Greek spirit for it to be able to gain a foothold there. Consciousness of the higher, free individuality was already too pronounced among the Greeks for them to be able to believe that the thinking and free human being—this presence-to-self subsisting of itself—might pass over into the mode of animals. In mythology they have of course the representation of human beings who have become springs, trees, animals, and so on. But this amounts to a degradation; it appears as a punishment, as the consequence of wrongdoing. Aristotle summarily belittles such views in his own way. He says that, according to the Pythagorean myths, any old soul can take on any old body. This is like saying that architecture can employ musical instruments. Each art has its own characteristic tools, and the body is most firmly determined for, and connected with, the soul; so the body is a necessary, rather than a contingent, form for the soul. The mode of the body is not contingent relative to the mode of the soul, and vice versa.[112]

110. Servius Tullius was the sixth king of Rome (578–535 BC). See Cicero, *Tusculanarum quaestionum* 1.38, in *M. Tullius Cicero: Opera*, 5 vols. (4 vols. plus an index vol.) (Leipzig, 1737), iv. 384; *Tusculan Disputations*, trans. J. E. King (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1927; rev. edn., 1945), 44–7. Cf. *W.* xiii. 270 (MS?).

111. See Herodotus, *History* 2.123 (Grene, p. 185; KRS, no. 261, pp. 219–20); cf. *W.* xiii. 270–1 (MS?). On a separate sheet Hegel discusses this report but is disinclined to accept it because in his view belief in immortality rests upon the soul's feeling of its own inward infinity, a feeling he thinks is not yet present in the Egyptians. See *Berliner Schriften*, pp. 706–7. See also Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 8.14 (Hicks, ii. 332–3), on the Pythagorean adoption of this doctrine. For the more specific Pythagorean configuration of the doctrine, see Porphyry, *Vita Pyth.* § 19 (Smith, p. 113; KRS, no. 285, p. 238), and in particular Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 14.63 (Clark, p. 26).

112. See Aristotle, *On the Soul* 1.3.407b.13–26 (Barnes, i. 649–50); cf. *W.* xiii. 272 (MS?). We render Aristotle's and Hegel's 'flutes' as 'musical instruments', since in English (alone) 'flutes'

The practical philosophy of the Pythagoreans is closely linked to these observations. Aristotle says that Pythagoras was the first who sought to speak about virtue, that is, to speak [about it] philosophically; but, because he reduces virtue to number, he consequently fails to arrive at a proper theory about it.[113] The Pythagoreans adopted ten virtues, just like the ten heavenly spheres.[114] Justice, among others, is described as what is
47 ἴσακις ἴσος, | what is equal to itself in an equal way, like an even number, which, when multiplied by itself, always yields the same.[115] This self-sameness is a wholly abstract characteristic that applies to many things. We still have distichs that are called the 'golden words' of Pythagoras, the χρύσα ἔπη.[116] These are ethical teachings like those of Solon,[117] in which what is ethical or essential is expressed clearly and with simple dignity. But things of this sort do not deserve to be regarded as properly philosophical, although they are important to cultural progress.

As far as the ethics of individuals is concerned, we can see from the institutions of Pythagoras that he wanted to secure ethical behavior through a common life shared with ethically cultivated people, that his preference went to practical procedures and training. We have an anecdote about him that is [also] told about others. A father is said to have asked him how he should educate his son to be an ethical man. Pythagoras is said to have replied: 'Make him a citizen of a well-ordered state.'[118] This is an important and a truthful reply, for personal cultivation depends upon the family and upon the favorable condition of one's native land; the main thing here is governance by authentic laws, through which the individual is in fact culti-

has a potentially confusing alternate meaning designating features of architectural design. Hegel's and Aristotle's point here is not about whether soul is separable from body; it is that the nature of each particular soul suits it for a body of a particular sort.

113. See Aristotle, *Magna moralia* 1.1.1182a.11–14 (Barnes, ii. 1868); cf. *W.* xiii. 273 (MS?).

114. Hegel apparently infers ten virtues from the Pythagorean efforts to show an agreement between the cosmic order and the ethical order, on which see Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.8.990a.18–29 (Barnes, ii. 1565), and 1.5.985b.26–986a.12 (Barnes, ii. 1559); see n. 120 just below, and nn. 66 and 100 above. The variant reading of Lw. indicates that Hegel also had in mind the tenfold division of the soul according to *On the Soul* 1.3 (on which, see n. 108 above).

115. See Aristotle, *Magna moralia* 1.1.1182a.14 (Barnes, ii. 1868), which says that 'justice is not a square number'; cf. *W.* 13: xiii. 273 (MS?).

116. The Greek phrase ('golden verses') is in An.'s margin. Hegel could have known them from the *Poesis philosophia*, pp. 114–17—a volume in his library that was compiled by Henricus Stephanus (Henri Estienne) and published in 1573. According to the transmission of *W.* xiii. 273–4, Hegel was clear about the ascription of these sayings to later Pythagoreans.

117. See pp. 21–3 above, with nn. 17 and 20.

118. For this anecdote, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 8.15–16 (Hicks, ii. 334–5), where it is ascribed to his pupil, Xenophilus. According to the transmission of *W.* xiii. 276 (MS?), Hegel knew that this anecdote was ascribed to a disciple rather than to Pythagoras himself.

vated. Other contingencies are subordinate to the great principle of living in the spirit of one's people, which is what intellectual cultivation is. This may suffice to give us a portrait of the Pythagorean system. | 48

I do, however, still want to refer briefly to the principal moments in Aristotle's criticism of the Pythagorean numerical forms, which applies in part to the Platonic Ideas. He says that when number alone—even and odd, or just πέρας and ἄπειρον, limited and unlimited, and so forth—is made the foundation, this does not thereby tell us how movement comes about and how, without movement and becoming, there is coming-to-be and perishing, or the states and activities of the heavenly bodies.[119] This is a significant shortcoming. These numbers 1, 2, 3 are lifeless and arid forms, for the principle of vitality or movement is quite another determination, one that is by no means present here. What we have is a wholly abstract and inadequate principle. Secondly, he [Aristotle] says that other characteristics of body are not conceivable on the basis of the numbers (even and odd). Air, water, and the like, says Aristotle, are not to be conceived on the basis of numbers, which are supposed to specify them, but what is concrete is not presented in this mode. The transition from number to concrete determination is not to be made in this way. Thus, for instance, a heavenly sphere, a virtue, an ethical property, and then a natural phenomenon on earth in its turn, are all defined by one and the same number.[120] But this is what makes the Pythagorean principle into something [merely] formal. It is a formalism that is very barren. It is the same as when people today want to make the schemata of electricity, magnetism, galvanism, compression and expression, male and female, and the like, apply to everything.[121]

There are many other scientific thoughts and discoveries attributed to Pythagoras and his pupils that do not concern us. Thus he is said to have recognized that the morning | star and the evening star are one and the 49
same, a discovery that is attributed to others too. We have already noted the musical aspect [of his work]. He is also credited with discovering that the moon receives its light from the sun.[122] What is best known, however, is the Pythagorean theorem, which is in fact the principal theorem in geometry; it is not to be viewed in the same way as any other theorem. Porphyry tells us that they [the Pythagoreans] slaughtered a hecatomb [100 oxen], at a feast

119. See Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 1.8.990a.8–12 (Barnes, ii. 1565); cf. *W.* xiii. 277 (MS?).

120. For this second criticism, see Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 1.8.990a.12–29 (Barnes, ii. 1565); cf. *W.* xiii. 278 (MS?).

121. See Hegel's criticism of this tendency in contemporary philosophy of nature, in the discussion of Oken near the very end of Vol. III of this edition.

122. On the identity of the morning star with the evening star, and on moonlight, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 8.14, 27 (Hicks, ii. 332–3, 342–3). On the musical intervals, see, p. 47 above.

given in rejoicing over the discovery of this theorem, and he [Pythagoras] realized the correctness of doing this.[123] So we are told by [Sextus] Empiricus. Others take the view that the expenditure was too great, that he made up the hecatomb not of many bulls but of oxen made of dough.[124] But in his joy such a man could well have arranged for a great feast. The discovery surely merited the effort. His other views concerning the nature of air, the earth, and the like are more in the nature of imaginative modes than of philosophical conclusions.

### 3. The Eleatics: Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno

The most famous of the Eleatics are Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Zeno. Melissos, the admiral from Samos, is, to be sure, included here, although what Aristotle says about him is that he did not bring anything definite to light.[125] Let us consider these figures together.

Xenophanes, of Colophon in Asia Minor, was a contemporary of Anaximander and Pythagoras. His year of birth and year of death are unknown.
50 About the sixty-third Olympiad (528 BC) he went from | Colophon to Greece, [and then] to Italy. He spent time in Zancle (Messina) and Catania in Sicily; this is the only circumstance of his life that we know with certainty. He is said to have lived in great poverty and to have attained an age in excess of 100, to have buried his sons with his own hands. There is no definite date for his residence in Elea. Diogenes Laertius tells us that he wrote 2,000 verses on the colonization of Elea.[126] Strabo mentions Parmenides and Zeno, but not Xenophanes, in connection with Elea, and he calls these

123. Hegel links the report from Diogenes Laertius about the sacrifice (see n. 51 above) with the correction by which Porphyry accommodates it to the Pythagorean prohibition of bloody sacrifice, especially of bulls. See Porphyry, *Vita Pyth.* §36 (Smith, p. 119).

124. The statement (transmitted by An.) that the reference to Pythagoras having approved the sacrifice comes from Sextus Empiricus is incorrect; the actual source was Porphyry (see the preceding note). Doubts expressed about whether the sacrifice occurred reflect the prohibition more than the cost. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 8.20, 22 (Hicks, ii. 338–41); Iamblichus, *Vita Pyth.* 28.150 (Clark, p. 66); Proclus, *In Euclidem* 1.47 (DK 58 B 19).

125. What Aristotle actually says (*Metaphysics* 1.5.986b.25–7; Barnes, ii. 1560) is that Xenophanes and Melissos are to be neglected (in comparison with Parmenides) because they are 'a little too naive'. On the life of Melissos, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.24 (Hicks, ii. 432–3). According to *W.* xiii. 300–1, Hegel took his reference to Melissos as an admiral (in the defeat of the Athenian fleet, 441 BC) from Plutarch, *Lives*, namely, from *Pericles*, §§26–7; Perrin, iii.74–9; KRS, no. 519, p. 390. See also Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* 1.116–17 (Smith, i. 192–5).

126. Most of these biographical details are found in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.18–20 (Hicks, ii. 424–9; KRS, no. 161, p. 163). According to *W.* xiii. 282, Hegel instead gave the sixty-first Olympiad (536 BC) as the date when Xenophanes emigrated to Italy; footnoted there is Tennemann, *Geschichte*, i. 151 (erroneously) and 414; see also Tiedemann, *Geist*, i. 139, citing Christian Gottlob Heyne. Diogenes just mentions the sixtieth Olympiad (540–537 BC) as the time when Xenophanes flourished but gives no date for his going to Italy.

men 'Pythagoreans'. Cicero calls their school 'Eleatic', from which we may conclude that all three lived in Elea.[127]

Parmenides was born in Elea. Little is known of his life. Aristotle mentions it as legendary that he was an associate of Xenophanes and was his pupil.[128] The main fact about him is his journey with Zeno to Athens, about which Plato speaks at length in his dialogue *Parmenides*. Socrates, when a young man, saw and spoke with him.[129] What is historical fact in this account is not ascertainable, and the account in Plato need not be historical either. Socrates was born during the seventy-seventh Olympiad.[130] He [Parmenides] made the journey during the eightieth Olympiad, when Socrates must therefore still have been quite young, so that he could hardly have carried on the sort of dialogue that Plato depicts in his *Parmenides*.[131] Diogenes Laertius indicates that Xenophanes was said to have been the teacher of Parmenides, [but] that it was Ameinias who brought him to a tranquil state through philosophy. Parmenides is said to have been from an illustrious family, and wealthy (Diogenes Laertius). Everywhere he is spoken of with great respect and reverence, and the well-being of the Eleatics is attributed to his sound laws and ordinances.[132] | Cebes uses 'a 51

127. See Strabo, *Geography* 6.1 (Jones, iii. 2–5). See also Cicero, *Academica* 2.129 (*Opera*, iv. 78; Rackham, pp. 634–5). Hegel's supposition that Xenophanes resided in Elea is based on his construal of the referent of an ambiguous demonstrative pronoun in Cicero. But the interpolation by Diels in his text of Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 9.18; Hicks, ii. 424–5)—that Xenophanes joined the colony at Elea—supports that view (see DK 21 A 1, line 15). Cf. *W.* xiii. 282 (MS?).

128. See *Metaphysics* 1.5.986b.21–2 (Barnes, ii. 1560; KRS, no. 174, p. 171). Hegel's statement that this is legendary reflects not Aristotle's words but those of Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 163), who says Aristotle's report was based on mere 'hearsay'.

129. Plato's *Parmenides* (127a–c) states that this encounter with the young Socrates took place when Parmenides (at about age 65) and Zeno (at about 40) attended the Great Panathenaea festival; see *Cratylus, Parmenides, Greater Hippias, Lesser Hippias*, trans. H. N. Fowler (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1926), 200–3; KRS, no. 286, p. 239. See also Plato's *Theaetetus* (183e) and *Sophist* (217c), in *Theaetetus, Sophist*, trans. H. N. Fowler (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1921), 154–5, 268–9. See also n. 134 just below.

130. See p. 127 below, with n. 29.

131. Hegel adopts this dating—the eightieth Olympiad (460–457 BC)—from Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 152, 415). Plato's report about the philosophers' respective ages (see n. 129 above) does not agree with the statement in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.23, 29 (Hicks, ii. 432–3, 438–9; KRS, no. 287, pp. 239–40) that Parmenides flourished about the sixty-ninth Olympiad (504–501 BC) and Zeno about the seventy-ninth (464–461 BC); cf. Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 415), who says 'seventy-eighth' for Parmenides. According to Diogenes, therefore, Parmenides would have been about forty years older than Zeno and been born about 540 BC. So we cannot place confidence in the historical accuracy of the narrative framework of Plato's *Parmenides*.

132. On how (according to Sotion) Ameinias, a Pythagorean, was the actual teacher of Parmenides, on his family background and wealth, and on his role as lawgiver, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.21, 23 (Hicks, ii. 428–33; KRS, no. 287, pp. 239–40). His role as lawgiver is also referred to by Isaac Casaubon's footnote 14 to Plutarch's *Adversus Colotem* 1126A.

Parmenidean life' as a proverbial expression for an ethical life.[133] In Plato, Socrates speaks of him with respect.[134]

Zeno is the youngest of these Eleatics, and he has to be distinguished from the other Zeno; he was particularly associated with Parmenides, who adopted him as a son. He was universally renowned and particularly esteemed as a teacher.[135] Plato attributes it to his pride that he remained in Elea; men from Athens and other places in Greece traveled there in order to associate with him; in this he sought fame.[136] He became especially famous on account of his death, when he displayed great strength of soul. There are various accounts of it. A conspiracy had been hatched against a tyrant, although we are not told who he was or where the action took place. Zeno was one of the conspirators and their plot was betrayed. The tyrant had him tortured publicly in order to force a confession, but Zeno named the tyrant's friends and the tyrant himself. Because of his resoluteness under torture and his repeated exhortations, and because of the example of his fortitude, the citizens were finally emboldened to fall upon the tyrant, to kill him, and so to free themselves. The story goes that he drew near to the tyrant as though he wished to impart something confidential to him, whereupon he then bit the tyrant's ear and held fast to it until the citizens killed him.[137] There are also several other Eleatics whose names we know, but they hold no interest for us.[138]

133. Cebes was a pupil of Philolaus and of Socrates. An extant dialogue (the *Πίναξ*, or *Writing Tablet*), erroneously attributed to him, is cited in this context by *W.* xiii. 292. See Cebes, *Tabula* 19.2.25–30; *The Tabula of Cebes*, trans. John T. Fitzgerald and L. Michael White (Chico, Calif., 1983).

134. See Plato, *Parmenides* 127a–c (Fowler, pp. 200–3; KRS, no. 286, p. 239)—'a fine-looking man' (καλὸν δὲ κἀγαθὸν τὴν ὄψιν), *Theaetetus* 183e (Fowler, pp. 154–5)—'in Homer's words, "one to be venerated" and also "aweful" ' (αἰδοῖός, δεινός), *Sophist* 217c (Fowler, pp. 268–9)—'he carried on a splendid discussion'.

135. These details are from Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.25 (Hicks, ii. 434–5); see also n. 129 above. The 'other Zeno' was a Stoic; see pp. 265–6 below.

136. It is not Plato but Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 9.28; Hicks, ii. 436–9) who reports that Zeno mostly stayed at home in Elea and that his motive in doing so ('he despised the great') was a preference for Elea over 'the splendor of Athens'. Two different reports are probably confused here. According to *W.* xiii. 303, Hegel mentioned, just before citing this report from Diogenes, that Plato says people from Athens and other places sought out Zeno in Elea.

137. This account of Zeno's death is taken from Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.26–7 (Hicks, ii. 434–7), but it mixes together two versions that Diogenes reports separately. In one (attributed to Heraclides), Zeno was killed after biting the tyrant's ear. In the other (attributed to Antisthenes), he incited the crowd to stone the tyrant to death. In the version of Hermippus (mentioned by Diogenes but not by Hegel), Zeno was 'cast into a mortar and beaten to death'.

138. Hegel could be thinking here of Melissos (on whom see n. 125 above), as a variant reading in Sv. suggests. But he could also have in view information in Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 190) that Xeniades the Corinthian was a follower of the Eleatic system. See Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 7.53 (Bury, ii. 28–9).

When we come to the philosophy of the Eleatics we enter a purer domain. The principal Eleatic doctrine is that there is only the One, or being, and that all else is devoid of truth, is only opinion or semblance. In comparison with this we have in the preceding philosophies only sensible form—water, air, and the like—or, in the case of | Pythagoras, number, the 52
principle of the external 'one'. But here there is pure thought, the One, the wholly universal, the immediate product of thinking—the One which, comprehended in its immediacy, is being. For Parmenides [it is] being, for Xenophanes the One (τὸ ὄν, τὸ ἕν). Only being *is*, and what is nothing *is not at all*.[139] With this, consciousness raised itself up into the domain of free thought, and pure thought made itself the object and maintained itself therein.

Being or the One is something familiar and trivial to us, a category with which we have long been acquainted, an auxiliary term in grammar. When we know about 'being' and 'one' in this way, however, we locate this as a particular attribute alongside all the others—for we have endlessly many attributes; taken in this way, it is one single attribute. In contrast, the meaning of the Eleatics is that only the One *is*; no truth, no actuality, no being at all belongs to everything else, for there is only the One. Here we must forget our own views. We know about God, spirit, the world, and so forth, we know other categories of thought, whereas the Greeks had before them only the sensible world—the gods [depicted] in fanciful imagination and other kindred forms. Thus they had nothing of a higher [intellectual] kind before them in this sensible world; they stood isolated. | Because they 53
find no satisfaction there—in the sensible world and in the mythical world alike—[the Eleatics] therefore reject all of that as something untrue and by so doing arrive at this pure, abstract thought that being belongs only to the One.

This is a tremendous advance. With the Eleatic school, thought, properly speaking, begins to be free for the first time on its own account, as essence, or as that which alone is true; now thought grasps its own self. This [being] is, to be sure, at first still wholly abstract; just as it is [here] what is first, so it is also what is last and that to which the understanding comes back again, as in most recent times, [when] God is [said to be] absolute being [*Wesen*] or abstract identity. If we say that God is the absolute being, is outside us or above us, then we cannot know anything of God except that God is—and

139. This sentence echoes the account Simplicius gives of Parmenides, *in Phys.* 86.27–8 (KRS, no. 293, p. 247).

as a result God is what is devoid of attributes. For us [then] God has no attributes. Were we to know an attribute, then this would be a cognition; whereas we must allow all attributes ascribed to God to vanish, [for they] are only analogies. What is true, then, is only that God is the One, not in the sense that there is only One God—this is a different specification—but rather that God is just what is self-identical, what is devoid of attributes. This [position] therefore is wholly equatable with the Eleatic thesis that there is only the One, only being. Modern reflection has taken a circuitous route, not only through the sensible domain but also through reflection, through the philosophical views of God, through the host of predicates that
54 get attached to God. | In the abstraction of modern reflection all this is negated, but the content or the result in the recent and the Eleatic philosophies is the same, namely, the One.

In Xenophanes there seems to have been a lively sentiment directed not only against the sensible world but also against mythological representations. We still have fragments by him in hexameters; Brandis in Bonn has made a critical collection of fragments by Xenophanes and Parmenides.[140] With the Greeks, what is more ancient is in poetic and didactic garb. In these fragments Xenophanes expresses himself very strongly in opposition to the Greeks' representation of the gods. [He says:] 'If cattle and lions had hands with which to depict the gods, then they would make the gods in a shape like their own.'[141] He inveighs in similar fashion, as Plato did later on in opposition to Homer and Hesiod, against their ascription to the gods of all that they find shameful in the human race—murder, theft, and adultery.[142] This sort of vehement sentiment about the nullity of phenomena in human natural and ethical life and in the representation of the gods was particularly characteristic of Xenophanes. Others of the ancient Greeks had such sentiments too, and singular expressions of them have been preserved. One of them puts it this way: 'All is dust and all is laughter

140. Christian August Brandis, *Commentationum Eleaticarum pars prima: Xenophanis Parmenidis et Melissi doctrina e propriis philosophorum reliquiis veterumque auctorum testimoniis exposita* (Altona, 1813).

141. See Brandis, *Comment. Eleat.*, 68, which contains an extract from Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 5.109.3 (Wilson, p. 470). Cf. Hegel's abbreviated translation in *W.* xiii. 289–90 (MS?). See also KRS, nos. 168–9, pp. 168–9.

142. See Brandis, *Comment. Eleat.*, 69–70, which quotes a report from Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 9.193 (Bury, iii. 98–9; KRS, no. 166, p. 168). Cf. *Adv. math.* 1.289 (Bury, iv. 166–7). See also Plato's criticism of Homer in *Republic* 386c–392c and 598d–607a (Shorey, i. 200–25, ii. 432–65).

and nothing is all,' πάντα κόνις, πάντα γέλος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι πάντα.[143] This sense of the nullity of everything is shared by Xenophanes and Parmenides. They express it in saying that everything is semblance, everything is untrue, that only the One or being is what is true.

We have a large portion of the poem of Parmenides, some 130 verses, preserved by Sextus Empiricus and Simplicius (in his commentary on Aristotle's text). One | fragment is an allegorical introduction to his 55
poem, περὶ φύσεως, 'On Nature', and it shows us directly the style of the times. [The proem to it reads:] 'Horses that carry me as their courage impels them brought me on the exalted road of the goddess who leads those of understanding into the land of truth. The daughters of Helios go before, and out of the dwelling-place of night they advance to the light, raising the thick veils with their hands, drawing near to the gates of the pathway of the day.[144] These heavenly maidens'—editors of this text take them to be the [five] senses—'draw nigh to the gates, and Dike bears the key. She opens them, and horse and carriage drive on into the vast field. The great goddess receives me. She takes me by the hand and speaks to me: "No evil fate has brought thee on this path so remote from that of mortals; thou shalt behold all, [both] the truth and the false opinions of human beings. Keep thought far from the latter path and with reason alone apprehend my teaching."' [Later he continues:] '"Ponder" speaks the goddess, "ponder thoroughly the two paths of knowing. For one path, only being is, and non-being is not. This is the path of conviction, of truth. The other path is that of non-being, the [view] that non-being must be. This is irrational. Thou canst not know, attain, or express what is not. It can only be said that what has being is. Taking the nothing to be something true is the error that mortals of two minds [*doppelköpfig*] devise in their perplexity. They are uncultivated hordes, those who take being and non-being as the same and not the same. [This is a] contradictory path."'[145] | 56

143. The last Greek phrase should probably be rendered: 'and all does not exist'. This citation cannot be traced. Perhaps Hegel has in mind the views, and a verse, of Xenophanes as transmitted by Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 7.53–4, 9.313 (Bury, ii. 28–9, iii. 362–3), to the effect that, if all things are false, there is no criterion for judging, and that all things spring from the earth and have their end in it.

144. *W.* xiii. 293 (MS?) adds: 'and the night'.

145. At the beginning of this paragraph Hegel mentions by name only the two most important sources for the poem of Parmenides. The *Poesis philosophica*, which he used, also cites Clement of Alexandria, Plutarch, Plotinus, Proclus, and Theophrastus. The incorrect reference to 130 verses could only have in view the number known in Hegel's day (although Brandis in his *Comment. Eleat.* counts 162); today we know of 153, although the extent of the original is unknown. Our text contains a paraphrase (within single quotes) of most of the

This is the principal definition. Only being is what is true, only being is, and the nothing is not at all. In this brief definition, negation in general comes under the head of this nothing. We have non-being before us in more concrete form—limit, finitude, restrictedness, particularity, and so on; for the Eleatics all this is negation. *Omnis determinatio est negatio*—that is Spinoza's great dictum.[146] The version of Parmenides is that limit, negation, every form of determinacy, what is individual or singular, and thus the negative—all this is not at all. The human error is to give that which is not [*das Nichtseiende*] the status of something that is [*etwas Seiende*], or to confuse being and non-being with one another, to take them to be one and the same, to ascribe the same value to them, or even to distinguish between them as if 'limit'—or 'finitude' in general—were real. The truth is just 'it is'. It is unbegotten and imperishable, whole, unlimited, unwavering, and without end. It neither was nor will be, but is a simultaneously whole present, it is a single nexus. We are neither to say nor to think that what is not 'is'. By what sort of necessity is it [the 'is'] supposed to have originated [from the 'not']? Perishing and originating must be divorced from knowing. [There] is no 'more' or 'less', but a single nexus; being coalesces with being; it is held quite immovably fast in the bonds of stark necessity.[147] Thinking, and that of which it is the thought, are the same—later Plotinus says this too.[148] For there is nothing without subsisting being within which it manifests itself, nor do you find thinking apart from subsisting being. Thinking produces itself, and what is produced is thought. Thinking is therefore identical with its own being. You will not find thinking apart from subsisting being, for outside

---

proem, or introduction, for which, see Sextus, *Adv. math.* 7.111 (Bury, ii. 56–61); Simplicius, *De caelo* 557.25 ff. (KRS, no. 288, pp. 242–3). The interpolated comment that editors take the heavenly maidens to be the senses may refer to the interpretive remark of Sextus, 7.112–13 (Bury, ii. 60–1); cf. *W.* xiii. 293 (MS?). The continuation, taken from the first principal division of the poem, selects elements from passages that appear in KRS, nos. 291, 293–4, pp. 244–8. KRS no. 291 is from Proclus, *in Timaeum* 345.18, and Simplicius, *in Phys.* 116–28; no. 293 is from Simplicius, *in Phys.* 86. 27–8 and 117.4–13; no. 294 is from Plato, *Sophist* 237a (Fowler, pp. 338–9), and Sextus, 7.114 (Bury, ii. 114–15). The order of the passages follows that in Brandis, pp. 92–105 (verses 1–55). Cf. *W.* xiii. 293–5 (MS?). Other parts of the poem of Parmenides appear on pages 60 and 61 below.

146. See Vol. III of this edition.

147. These sentences on truth are found in Brandis, *Comment. Eleat.*, pp. 107–12 (verses 58–72). See Simplicius, *in Phys.* 78.5, 145.1 ff. (KRS, nos. 295, 296, pp. 248–50). Cf. *W.* xiii. 295–6 (MS?).

148. An allusion in *W.* xiii. 296 (MS?) suggests that Hegel is here referring to *Enneads* 6.1.8, where Plotinus declares that Parmenides said 'Thinking and being are the same', and then adds that 'being is unmoved'. See *Plotinus*, trans. A. H. Armstrong, 7 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1966–88), v. 41.

being there is nothing and there never will be anything.[149] This is the great affirmation. We find this maintained more directly in Parmenides, less so in Zeno, and this distinction is to be found also in | Plato's *Parmenides*. Plato 57
says that Parmenides established being, whereas Zeno proceeded more dialectically yet said the same thing, except that he confronted the 'many' and showed that this 'many', this manifold, this limited domain, *is not*, that instead it annihilates itself.[150]

We will bring one specification found in the statements of Parmenides into greater prominence here, namely, that the all is just one nexus, for being coalesces with being. This is part and parcel of the dialectical reasoning according to which Parmenides and Xenophanes said that change is not, it has no truth, and so it belongs to the second path. The first path is that of knowing, of thinking, of truth, and the second is that of opinion, which has no part in being and in truth. In this way, therefore, change is not. That change is not, or that it is self-contradictory, they showed in the following way, which is ascribed to Xenophanes and which Zeno is supposed to have stated too.

This line of argument is found in Aristotle's *De Xenophane, Zenone, Gorgia*, although we lack this text's beginning, where it would have been stated whose argumentation it presents, and it is only conjectured to be that of Xenophanes.[151] Contrary to this conjecture, however, Aristotle says explicitly that Xenophanes did not yet express anything clearly; he offered no further definition of the One, to show whether, as Melissos apprehended it, the One is ὕλη or matter, or whether it is the One according to reason and λόγος. That was done by Parmenides. Xenophanes, in contrast, had done no more than touch upon the definition of the One. Thus, gazing into the expanse of the heavens, into the blue, εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, he had said, 'God is

149. See Brandis, *Comment. Eleat.*, pp. 117–18 (verses 96–8). See this passage from Simplicius (*in Phys.* 146.5) embedded within KRS, no. 299, pp. 252–3. Cf. *W.* xiii. 296 (MS?).

150. See Plato, *Parmenides* 128a–b (Fowler, p. 205) for this comparison and contrast of Parmenides and Zeno.

151. This treatise was not known to be only pseudo-Aristotelian in Hegel's day, although some, such as Georg Gustav Fülleborn, doubted its authenticity. Hegel's observation that its initial argumentation is presumably from Xenophanes (cf. *W.* xiii. 285–6) was plausible at the time, for the Bekker edition of Aristotle (1831) assigns passages to Xenophanes (1.974a.2–2.977a.11) and Zeno (3.977a.14–4.979a.9) that today are assigned to Melissos and Xenophanes respectively, and the title is now sometimes given as *De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia* (Barnes: *On Melissos, Xenophanes, and Gorgias*). But Johann Gottlieb Buhle had already assigned the two initial chapters to Melissos rather than Xenophanes, in his 'Commentatio de ortu et progressu Pantheismi inde a Xenophane Colophonio, primo eius auctore, usque ad Spinozam' in the *Commentationes Societatis Regiae Gottingae*, vol. x.

58 the One'.[152] From Xenophanes we also have verses | that have a quite crude and unrefined aspect.[153] Judging from them, the refined argumentation contained in Aristotle is not that of Xenophanes.[154] There we read: 'If something is, then it is eternal, namely, it is non-sensuous, unchanging, immutable; it *is*. Originating and becoming are excluded, for nothing can come into being out of nothing, something cannot originate from nothing. Neither can something originate from subsisting being; there is no passing over into what is unlike, for what subsists already is and it does not first arise out of what subsists.'[155]

We find the same line of argument in Zeno. Like cannot produce unlike, he says, for in what is like there is no ground for what is unlike. In the same way, like cannot proceed from like, for then the one would be what engenders and the other what is engendered. But, if they are like one another, then one cannot have a different definition from the other.[156] Once we accept likeness, the distinction between engendering and being engendered disappears. More specifically, this is the argument by which it is proven that it is impossible for something to originate, for there to be any 'coming-to-be' at all. Like does not arise from like. It is in this sense that Parmenides says being coalesces with being, that it is identical with itself—and hence the distinction is annulled.[157] In the same way, nothing can originate from the unlike, for something cannot originate from what is unlike it—for instance, the stronger cannot originate from the weaker, the greater from the less, and so on, nor vice versa, for the weaker does not contain within itself the stronger that can issue from it, nor vice versa. Were the weak to issue from what is strong, this would be a passing-over from being into nothing.[158] Diminution, weakness, or limitation, is negation. Being, however, is what is positive or affirmative, in which nothing negative resides. Thus Zeno also shows that it does not move itself; the One does not move, nor is it unmo-
59 ved. | Such predicates as moving, or being at rest, are inapplicable to it. It is

152. Aristotle's comparison of these three with regard to defining the One is in *Metaphysics* 1.5.986b.18–24 (Barnes, ii. 1560; KRS, nos. 164, 174, pp. 165, 171).

153. See nn. 141–2 above, as well as the verses on one God, cited in *W.* xiii. 283 (MS?), from Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 5.109.1 (KRS, no. 170, p. 169; Wilson, p. 470).

154. Another reference to the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise (see n. 151 above).

155. Hegel is paraphrasing parts of the pseudo-Aristotelian account, *On Melissos* ... 1.974a.2–4, 2.975a.21–2 (Barnes, ii. 1539, 1541), as well as Simplicius, *in Phys.* 103.15–22. See KRS, nos. 353, 524, pp. 291–2, 392. Cf. *W.* xiii. 287 (MS?). Today this material is ascribed to Melissos, not to Xenophanes.

156. See *On Melissos* ... 3.977a.14–19 (Barnes, ii. 1545). Today this passage is ascribed to Xenophanes, not to Zeno. Cf. *W.* xiii. 304 (MS?).

157. See the citations from Simplicius in n. 147 above.

158. See *On Melissos* ... 3.977a.19–22 (Barnes, ii. 1545), a passage today ascribed to Xenophanes, not to Zeno. Cf. *W.* xiii. 304–5 (MS?).

not unmoved, for what is unmoved is what has no being [*das Nichtseiende*]; there no motion takes place. No other impinges upon it nor does it act upon another, and consequently being cannot be immovable. If subsisting being too were immovable, then it would be equated with non-being; but being is not equivalent to nothing. [In another sense,] however, being is also unmoved. Only what is different from others is moved; this presupposes temporal and spatial plurality and therefore a negation. But being is the One and so involves no plurality, nor the negative nor non-being; consequently it cannot be moved.[159] This is the dialectical mode of the ancients.

What is held fast in all this is identity, the affirmative, what is equal to itself—it is held in such a way that the negative is utterly excluded from it; the nothing is declared to be nothing, as without being of any kind. It is the principle of the understanding, right down to the present day, to consider being only as being, the One only as one, the affirmative purely and simply as such. Negation or change is not a factor in it. Thus change, spiritual activity, and so forth are *ipso facto* movement, negation, difference, for in activity difference is directly | posited. In the Eleatic school this abstraction was held fast and 60
became established as the abstract being [*Abstraktum*] of the understanding.

[Today] we take another path to this abstraction. We do not need any such line of reasoning. Our procedure is quite trite and more direct, when we say that God is unchangeable, that change is applicable only to finite things. We grant validity to these finite things, and hence we concede the fact of change. But, in the case of immutability, we exclude change from this abstract, absolute unity with itself. This is the same separation except that we also grant validity as being to what is finite, which is something that the Eleatics disallow. They said that the finite is not at all. Or else we pass over from the particular to kinds and classes, and with the kinds we gradually leave aside particularity and the negative. The highest class is what is wholly universal, God, the *ens entium*, the highest being, which can only be affirmative or real in such a way that all attributes are removed from it.[160]

159. This lengthy argument about being and motion, which Hegel attributes to Zeno, is from *On Melissos* ... 4.978b.15–27 (Barnes, ii. 1547–8). Today this passage is ascribed to Xenophanes. Cf. *W.* xiii. 306 (MS?).

160. Hegel is referring to the concepts of God in the theology of rationalism, which are those of an *ens perfectissimum* or *ens realissimum* (a most perfect or a most real being); see Vol. III of this edition. Based on Spinoza's characteristic concept of determination as negation (instead of as reality), Hegel says that all determinations are to be removed from the concept of the most real being. It is in this perspective that the essential sum (*Inbegriff*) of all realities (the *omnitudo realitatis* or *ens entium*) becomes the sum of all negations. Cf. *Science of Logic*, *GW* xi. 76, xxi. 100: 'God as the *pure* reality in all realities, or as the sum total [*Inbegriff*] of all realities, is just as devoid of determinateness and content as the empty absolute in which all is one' (Miller, p. 113).

Or else we pass over from the finite to the infinite, [arguing] that the infinite is the ground of the finite, which must have a ground because it is limited.[161]

All these forms, which are quite familiar to us, involve the same thing: on one side there is this One, this infinite or affirmative element, devoid of determination, so that to the other side we relegate the world of finitude and change, as a subsisting being. This is an external line of thought that is followed by the understanding. The question is the same one that arises with regard to Eleatic thought. On one side there is just what is simple, equal to itself, identical. But in that case, where does determination come from? How
61 does the infinite go | out into the finite? The difficulty is therefore the same. The Eleatics differentiate themselves in their thought from this ordinary reflective thinking of ours, in that they set to work speculatively. For they say that there is no change at all and that, if we presuppose the One, or being, then change is something self-contradictory and incomprehensible. That is because the characteristic of negation, of plurality or change, is removed from the One, from being. In our view, however, we say that the real, finite world holds good on one side, and the One on the other side. The Eleatics denied this; and in this way they proceeded in consistent fashion to the [conclusion] that only the One is, and the other is not at all. So we have this great abstraction to admire in the Eleatics; on the other side, however, we must not fail to recognize that they did not advance beyond the abstract as abstract. They ascribed being to the abstract alone, and in so doing they repudiated everything finite—which is more consistent than our own reflection.

The second point on which to comment is that Parmenides also discussed the doctrine of human opinion, the deceptive system of the world. He establishes two principles for this system of phenomena: fire or flame, and the nocturnal—in other terms, the dense, heavy, and cold essence, and its opposite, what is warm and ethereal. The cold, or night, is passive. He says, then, that fire is the animating aspect, and in the middle, between the two, is the goddess, nature, who rules over everything—this is the bond of necessity.[162] We have some figurative portrayals by Parmenides too. The way the

161. This reference is not to the transition from finite to infinite in Hegel's own *Science of Logic* (*GW* xi. 82–3, xxi. 123–4; Miller, pp. 136–7), but to a form of it present in the cosmological proof for God's existence (which Hegel does not explicitly treat in these lectures). On the cosmological proof as such a transition, see *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 132–4, 262, 399–401, 726–7. See also Hegel's *Lectures on the Proofs for the Existence of God* (*W.* xii. 357–517); in *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, trans. E. B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson, 3 vols. (London, 1895), iii. 153–367.

162. Here Hegel ties together several fragments from the didactic poem of Parmenides as transmitted by Simplicius (*in Phys.* 30.4, 31.13, 38.28, 39.14). See Brandis, *Comment. Eleat.*, pp. 121–3 (verses 111–20); KRS, nos. 300, 302, 306, pp. 254–8. There follows at this point in

Eleatics speak about the 'all' of being also takes | the form that the all or the 62
whole is without defect, in equilibrium, and round or spherical. But what directly occurs to us in this connection is that a sphere is something limited, something closed, and so there must be an other to it as well—so [this perfect] cognition is defective.[163] The two principles—light and darkness, warmth and cold, dense and ethereal—are ascribed principally to Parmenides, who speaks of them in the manner of Pythagoras. There are two crowns [*Kronen*] that are intertwined (as in the Pythagorean view), consisting of the rarified and the dense, of darkness and light. A wall, something solid, holds them together. The innermost, purple ring is of fire. Beneath the mixed ring the energy is fire, the author of all movement, the ruler and determiner, which contains the fates of all things. *Δίκη* and *'Ανάγκη* have Eros [*Amor*] as their helper, from whom all the gods and all [else] are engendered.[164]

The aspect of the Eleatic philosophy that has still to be mentioned is the dialectic. The main thing is that only the One—being, what is true—*is*. The dialectic of the Eleatic school was elaborated primarily by Zeno. Plato says this too, [in] his *Parmenides*, namely, that Parmenides proved that the One is, but Zeno showed that the many is not. In other words, everything involving change is self-contradictory or self-annulling—according to our

*W.* xiii. 298 (MS?) a further reference to Simplicius (180.8). Hegel's reference to the properties of the two principles derives from a later scholium transmitted by Simplicius (31.3), which reflects the views of Empedocles and which Brandis had inserted in his text (p. 126, verses 127–9). In the fragmentary cosmological speculation of Parmenides, the goddess stands 'in the midst' of the heavenly rings, which are variously composed of fire and night.

163. On the spherical form of the whole, see the fragment in Brandis, *Comment. Eleat.*, pp. 119–20 (verses 103–6); KRS, no. 299, pp. 252–3 (from Simplicius, *in Phys.* 146.5). Cf. *W.* xiii. 297 (MS?).

164. On the dense and the ethereal, see the citations in n. 162 above. Hegel may have compared Parmenides with Pythagoras because of the former's chosen mode of presentation, but he was also surely aware of ancient testimonies of the personal ties Parmenides had with Pythagoras or with Pythagoreans. On this, see the end of this note as well as n. 127 above and n. 221, p. 83 below. In his account (at least as transcribed) Hegel weaves together two fragments, both of which are in Brandis, *Comment. Eleat.*, pp. 162, 127. The first (in KRS, no. 307, pp. 258–9) is from [pseudo-]Plutarch, *De plac. phil.* The other, quite short, is from Plato, *Symposium* 178b: 'Parmenides says of Birth (Genesis) that she "invented love before all other gods".' See *Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias*, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1925), 100–1. Cf. *W.* xiii. 299 (MS?). Hegel does not seem to have followed ancient or modern sources in his unfounded connection of these two passages. The fact that Hegel renders *στέφανος* as 'crown' [*Krone*] rather than as 'ring' or 'wreath' [*Kranz*] could show reliance on Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.28 (Rackham, pp. 30–1: 'something resembling a crown ... an unbroken ring of glowing lights, encircling the sky ...'). Just before this Cicero mentions the all-permeating world soul of Pythagoras; this too may have prompted Hegel's comparison of the two philosophers.

ordinary view of self-contradiction it is nothing genuine.[165] So the result is just that the thing in question *is not*. Thus it was primarily Zeno who elaborated the dialectic.

To begin with, 'dialectic' is an undefined term. We must distinguish a twofold sense of the word. First, there is an external dialectic, as a way of considering the object. Here we bring forward reasons and provisions for
63 undermining something previously held to be established, | or for contradicting [whatever is asserted]. Our reasons may even be wholly external ones; we will have more to say about this dialectic in connection with the Sophists. The other dialectic, however, is the immanent treatment of the object, not according to external circumstances, laws, reasons, and the like, but by considering the determinations in the object itself and showing that in itself it contains opposing characteristics, so that it annuls itself. This authentic dialectic can be counted among the accomplishments of the Eleatics. Nevertheless, the definition and mode of their comprehension was not yet broadly developed. Instead they got no further than the point that something is null when its contradiction is exhibited.

Zeno's dialectic dealt primarily with motion. But it did not extend as far as what we see in Plato. Zeno was particularly concerned to deny [the reality of] motion. He said that there is no motion, meaning that being does not pertain to it, that motion is nothing genuine. 'There is no motion' is a statement that can be refuted (as Diogenes [the Cynic] refuted it), by walking up and down.[166] But the anecdote about Diogenes does not serve at all to refute this dialectic. The meaning is not that there is no motion at all, for the fact of motion, that this phenomenon exists, is not the point in question, and it never occurred to Zeno to deny motion in this sense. He was concerned only with whether it was something genuine. Zeno shows that the representation of motion inherently involves contradictory determinations.

Aristotle has preserved Zeno's dialectic for us, and he does this in four forms. The first mode or application is that what is moved must, before
64 reaching its goal, first cover half of the distance | to it, and this we grant. But each half has in turn a half, for space is something continuous. Relatively speaking, this [new] half is again a whole, which in turn has a half, and so on *ad infinitum*. The conclusion is that therefore what is moved cannot reach its goal.[167] Every space is divisible into two halves. The one half must be

165. See n. 150 above, for Plato's statement.

166. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 6.39 (Hicks, ii. 40–1), and Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. hyp.* 3.66 (Bury, i. 372–3).

167. Aristotle's account of this argument is in *Physics* 6.9.239b.9–13 (Barnes, i. 404; KRS, nos. 317, 318, pp. 269–70).

traversed, and this has a half which must in turn be traversed; however small the space we posit, this relationship always applies and the process continues *ad infinitum*. We can express it in the following way. A space I pass through is infinitely divisible; there are an infinite number of limits [to pass through]. In a given time I must therefore pass through an infinitude of points. But this infinitude cannot be completed and for that reason I do not reach my goal. The space consists of infinitely many limits [or points]. This multiplicity on the part of the space is irrefragable, and it follows that I cannot pass through it. This argument presupposes the infinite divisibility of space.

Another form to mention is known as Ἀχίλλευς, the 'Achilles [Paradox]'. The ancients loved to clothe the incomprehensible in sensuous images. Two bodies are moving in one direction, one being ahead of the other and in motion. The other is behind and starts moving later, although it moves faster than the first. So we know, then, that the second will overtake the first. Zeno says the contrary, that the second cannot overtake the first, and he proves it in the following way. At a certain [moment of] time the first body is in one place and the second in | another place. The second one then requires a 65
certain time in order to arrive at the place where the first is located at the beginning of this time. During this period, however, the first does not remain stationary. It moves forward during the time that the second uses to reach the point where the first stood when the period began.[168] And so it goes on *ad infinitum*, without their coinciding. They come ever closer together, but the second is always represented as behind, for the first is ever ahead when the second arrives at the spot where the first stood before. So faster motion is of no avail to the second body, for in order to pass through the intervening space by which it is behind at this moment of time it requires a certain time. But the first uses this same time to move ahead, so that it remains in the lead. This is a very subtle line of argument.

Aristotle says it is a ψεῦδος, something untrue, because the second will indeed overtake the first if it is allowed to pass or go through the limit, or what is limited.[169] This short answer says it all. In fact [Zeno's] representation makes use of two points of time and two points in space; these are [on the one hand] separate and distinct from one another, that is, they are reciprocal limits, they are limited. On the other hand, however, space and time are continuous, that is, two points in time or in space are related to one another, meaning that they are no less identical than they are separate. Just

168. Aristotle gives the 'Achilles Paradox' in *Physics* 6.9.239b.14–18 (Barnes, i. 404; KRS, no. 322, p. 272).

169. See *Physics* 6.9.239b.26–9 (Barnes, i. 405).

as much as two points of time are two, they are also not two, they are identical. So Aristotle puts it very well when he says that the limit is likewise no limit. One point of time also contains two points of time, and two points in space are embraced in one; we must be able to overstep the limit that we
66 take as a point in time, because in | motion two points of time are, in very truth, one. 'To move' means to be in one place and not to be in one place; that is the continuity of time and of space. When we speak of motion as such, we say a body is in a place, that it moves further along and then it is in turn in another place. Where is it while it is moving? While it moves, it is no longer in the first place but it is also not yet in the second place. If it were in the first, it would be at rest; and if it were in the second, it would also be at rest.[170] If we say it is between these two places, that is empty talk, κενολέγειν (Aristotle), for between the two it is also in a place.[171]

Here, therefore, we are faced with the same difficulty. 'To move' means to be in one place and at the same time not to be in one place. The latter is the continuity of time and of space, and this is what makes motion possible. Now Zeno's dialectic presupposes the ordinary representation. There is [such a thing as] a temporal point by itself, and the spatial point is also a point by itself. We say this too. Being consistent, Zeno held these two points [in time, or in space,] in strict mutual opposition. We take the discrete character of time and of space to be an utter division. Zeno holds the same view. But Aristotle says it is open to him to overstep the limit, that is, to posit the limit as no limit and the divided points of time as not divided.[172] There is
67 no one space in and for itself, nor a point of time in and for itself. |

In the third form [of Zeno's dialectic], he says that the flying arrow is at rest, for it is always in the 'now' and in the 'here'. But what is in the selfsame 'now' and 'here' is at rest. Consequently it is at rest—now here, now here, and now here.[173] The fact that we point to something, however, does not concern the 'now' but is the work of our finger. Likewise, the 'heres' are not distinct from one another, and thus the arrow is in the same 'here' during its flight. Whenever I designate another 'here', I always say the same thing.

170. In these remarks Hegel interprets Aristotle's resolution of Zeno's second paradox partly by drawing upon terminology from the *Science of Logic* (the concept of limit, and of continuity; see Miller, pp. 126 ff). But see also the reflections of Aristotle prior to his presentation of Zeno's argument, in *Physics* 6.8.239a.23–b.4 (Barnes, i. 404).

171. Aristotle does not speak of κενολεγεῖν or κενολογεῖν ('empty talk') in connection with Zeno's paradoxes. But see p. 40 above, with n. 77.

172. See n. 169 above.

173. For the third paradox, see Aristotle, *Physics* 6.9.239b.5–9, 29–33 (Barnes, i. 404–5; KRS, no. 323, pp. 272–3). Hegel's own analysis of 'now' and 'here' (as the twofold shape of 'this') in the structure of sense-certainty is in the *Phenomenology*, paras. 95–9 (Miller, pp. 59–61).

[Zeno's] dialectic is quite correct, only presented in sensuous form. Within these sensuous relationships there is no genuine distinction. The distinction of the 'heres' is not yet objective, but subjective; genuine, objective distinctions emerge only in the spiritual domain. This, then, is Zeno's dialectic. The fourth form is too lengthy and difficult, so I will leave it aside.[174]

The merit of this dialectic of Zeno is that he brought to his conscious awareness essential determinations involved in our representation of motion, of space and time, and, holding fast to them, he showed what is contradictory in them. The universal aspect of the dialectic, the universal thesis of the Eleatics, is that only the One, or being, is what is true. Everything else is not. Kant says that we know only phenomena, we know nothing true in and for itself.[175] By and large that is the same result. The content of consciousness is only an appearance, it is nothing genuine. But at the same time there is a | major distinction between them, in the fact that Zeno and 68
the Eleatics stated their thesis in the following sense: that the world in itself is only appearance with its infinitely manifold configurations and motions. In itself it has no truth. Kant maintains, however, that in our turning to the world and our knowing the world, namely, in spirit's turning to the external world, to this multitude of characteristics—and, for thinking, the inner world is an outer world too—we bring it about that it is appearance; the activity of our thinking, our stance in relation to it, is what imposes so many characteristics on the outer world, characteristics of reflective thinking and the like. In this way we make it into what is untrue. This multitude of characteristics that we impose on it is appearance, it is untrue. The world itself, however, is what is true. Our stance toward it, our mental [*geistig*] activity, is the damaging factor that tinges it with untruth.

This is the major distinction, that for Kant the mental factor is what ruins the world whereas for Zeno the world in and of itself *is* this appearing. According to the Kantian philosophy, our thinking, our mental activity, is what is at fault. In the Bible Jesus says, 'Are you not better than the sparrows?'[176] According to Kant, *we*, as thinking or as mental activity, are what is inferior to, or of lesser value than, the world. It is only mental activity that brings forth untruth. The world is what is genuine, and we are only flesh and blood, like the sparrows. The | sense of Zeno's dialectic 69

174. Aristotle's account of it is in *Physics* 6.9.239b.33–240a.1 (Barnes, i. 405; KRS, no. 325, pp. 274–5).

175. See Vol. III of this edition.

176. See Matt. 6: 26 ('Look at the birds of the air ... Are you not of more value than they?') and Luke 12: 7 ('you are of more value than many sparrows').

is more objective than that of this modern dialectic. The world in itself is phenomenal, and only the One Being is what is true. Thus Zeno's dialectic grasps the characteristics that belong to the content itself. We can still call this dialectic 'subjective', because it takes place within the considering subject. The One, or what is pure, is devoid of this dialectical movement—One, abstract identity. Hence space is [the domain of] this dialectical movement.

The next step, now, is for this dialectic or this movement itself to be grasped as what is objective. That is the advance made by Heraclitus. So what is first is being. The second [moment] is becoming. Heraclitus says that the absolute is becoming. He went on to define becoming.

## 4. Heraclitus

We must start by giving a brief account of the life circumstances of Heraclitus. Heraclitus became famous about the seventieth Olympiad; he was a contemporary of Parmenides and an Ephesian. Little is known of his life except for his relation with his fellow countrymen.[177] This relationship was mainly one of contempt on both sides: they despised him and they were even more deeply despised by him—a relationship that is quite usual nowadays, where each is for himself or herself, and holds everyone else in contempt. In the case of Heraclitus, this contempt arose from a profound feeling that his countrymen were perverse; various expressions of this
70 contempt have come down to us.[178] | Diogenes Laertius says that Antisthenes, in commenting on the greatness of soul of Heraclitus, reported that he ceded the kingship to his brother.[179] No further explanation is given. Diogenes Laertius also cites a letter from Darius Hystaspes, who wrote to him asking for an explanation of his work *On Nature*. But there is scant

177. According to *W.* xiii. 328 (MS?), Hegel drew upon Diogenes Laertius for this information, although Diogenes says Heraclitus flourished during the sixty-ninth Olympiad (504–500 BC); see *Lives* 9.1 (Hicks, ii. 408–9; KRS, no. 190, p. 181). Like Hegel, Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 194) and Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 210) both state that he flourished during the seventieth Olympiad (500–496 BC) and the latter says, 'Very little is known of his life'.

178. Diogenes Laertius reports on the low regard his fellow Ephesians had for Heraclitus as well as his disdain toward them (*Lives* 9.1–3, 9.15; Hicks, ii. 408–11, 420–3). See also the characterization of him by Timon of Phlius (*c.*320–230 BC) as a 'shrill mob-reviler' and 'riddler', in Diogenes, 9.6 (Hicks, ii. 412–13). See also just below in our text, with nn. 181–2.

179. Antisthenes of Rhodes (fl. early second century BC) wrote *Successions of the Philosophers*, from which this remark comes. According to Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 9.6; Hicks, ii. 412–15; KRS, no. 191, p. 183), Heraclitus renounced his claim to kingship. According to Strabo (*Geography* 14.633; Jones, vi. 198–9), descendants of the founder of Ephesus were still called 'kings' and retained certain privileges.

corroboration for this correspondence, though the letter from Heraclitus is entirely in character.[180]

Diogenes further recounts that Heraclitus said that all adult Ephesians deserve to have their necks broken, and that the city should be turned over to the minors (just as people today are of the opinion that only youth understands how to govern), because they had driven out his friend, that most excellent man Hermodorus, giving as their reason that no one among them should be more excellent than the rest; if anyone wants to be so, let him be so elsewhere.[181] It was on the same grounds that great men were banished from Athens. Heraclitus was a noble man and, because he felt deeply the perversity of his fellow citizens, he spoke out freely about it. But he also withdrew again into himself.[182] [Proclus says that] the noble Heraclitus censured the people as lacking all understanding and thought; the majority are bad, and only a few are good.[183] His fellow citizens called upon him to take part in the administration of the state, but he refused because he did not approve of their laws and constitution.[184]

His work *On Nature*, or *The Muses*, is notable. He is supposed to have deposited it in the Temple of Diana; it was an obscure book, σκοτεινός.[185]

180. This apocryphal correspondence is in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.12–14 (Hicks, ii. 418–23). To the request of the Persian king Darius the Great (reigned 522–486 BC) that Heraclitus come to dwell at his court and instruct him, the philosopher replied that, whereas all men 'owing to wicked folly ... devote themselves to avarice and thirst for popularity ... I have renounced all wickedness ... and because I have a horror of splendor, I could not come to Persia, being content with little, when that little suits me'.

181. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.2 (Hicks, ii. 408–11). Cf. *W.* xiii. 329 (MS?). See also the similar reports in Strabo (*Geography* 14.642; Jones, vi. 230–1) and Cicero (*Tusc. disp.* 5.105; King, pp. 530–1).

182. This sentence from An. probably refers to the report of Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 9.3; Hicks, ii. 410–11) that, disgusted with human beings, Heraclitus retreated to the mountains and lived on grass and herbs.

183. See Proclus, *Commentarium in Platonis Alcibiadem*, in *Opera omnia*, ed. Victor Cousin, 6 vols. (Paris, 1820–7), iii. 115, which is a passage cited by J. A. Fabricius in his edition of Sextus Empiricus, p. 397, n. R (to *Adv. math.* 7.127). According to *W.* xiii. 329–30 (MS?), Hegel included, in the middle of the quotation: 'What then, he said, is their understanding or discretion?' Cf. DK 22 B 104. Here in 1825–1826, as well as in *W.*, Hegel omits the concluding remark of Fabricius that this statement gained Heraclitus the satirical title 'mob reviler' (see n. 178 above).

184. On his refusal, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.2–3 (Hicks, ii. 410–11).

185. Hegel combines two separate reports from Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.5–6, 9.12 (Hicks, ii. 412–15, 418–19; KRS, no. 192, pp. 183–4). According to Pn., Hegel applied the epithet 'obscure' (σκοτεινός) principally to the book, as in our text; according to Lw., Hegel applied it to Heraclitus himself. An early source for this epithet is Lucretius (*De rerum natura* 1.640), whom Hegel never mentions, although he possessed the edition by Giphanius Buranus (Antwerp, 1566); trans. W. H. D. Rouse, 3rd edn. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1937), 46–7. Another source is Cicero, *De finibus bonorum et malorum* 2.5; trans.

Socrates says (somewhere in Plato) that the part he understood in the book of Heraclitus was excellent, and that he believed what he did not understand was the same, but that it needed a Delian swimmer to get through to its excellence.[186] The part of it that has come down to us is excellent too.[187] Cicero expresses the view (in *De natura deorum* 1. 26 and 3. 14 as well as in *De divinatione* 2. 6) that Heraclitus wrote obscurely on purpose;[188] but this
71 is said in a very silly way. | In this matter of the 'obscurity', Aristotle refers rather to how Heraclitus neglects punctuation. Because of these obscure passages in his book, Heraclitus himself is also called ὁ σκοτεινός.[189] Plato studied the philosophy of Heraclitus with special diligence; we find much of

H. Rackham, 2nd edn. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1931), 94–5. See also Strabo, *Geography* 14.642 (Jones, vi. 230–1) and the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *De mundo* ('On the Universe'—*c.*50 BC–AD 150), 396b.19–22 (Barnes, i. 633). See also just below in the text, with nn. 189, 199.

186. This attribution to Plato by Pn. rests on an error, probably his. Hegel refers to Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 2.22 (Hicks, i. 152–3), where Socrates says, in reply to a question of Euripides about the treatise, tbat 'it needs a Delian diver to get to the bottom of it'; cf. 9.11–12 (Hicks, ii. 418–19)—'one Crates ... said it required a Delian diver not to be drowned in it'. It was usual in Hegel's day to render κολυμβητῆς as 'swimmer' rather than 'diver'; see Ritter (*Geschichte*, 82–3) and Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 211).

187. According to *W.* xiii. 330–1, Hegel's sources for Heraclitus—apart from fragments in the ancient authors he consulted—were the anthologies by Heinrich Stepbanus, *Poesis philosophica*, and Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Herakleitos der Dunkle, von Ephesos, dargestellt aus den Trümmern seines Werkes und den Zeugnissen der Alten, Museum der Alterthums-Wissenschaft*, ed. Friedrich August Wolf and Philipp Buttmann (Berlin, 1808), vol. i, pt. 3, pp. 313–533. The latter contains seventy-three fragments; it is also available in Schleiermacher, *Sämmtliche Werke*, 3rd division (Berlin, 1838), ii. 3–146.

188. The *De natura deorum* says that Heraclitus 'spoke obscurely on purpose' (1.74; Rackham, pp. 72–3), and—in the context of a discussion of the Stoics—tbat 'he did not wish to be understood' (3.35; Rackham, pp. 318–19). The *De divinatione* 2.132 says that 'Heraclitus is very obscure'; *Opera*, iv. 706; trans. with *De senectute* and *De amicitia* William Armistead Falconer (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1923), 518–19. (In our text Hegel uses the old numbering for these Cicero passages.) Cicero is even clearer on the obscurity of Heraclitus in a passage (*De finibus* 2.15; Rackham, pp. 94–5) not mentioned by Hegel: 'Obscurity ... may be deliberately adopted, as in the case of Heraclitus, "The surname of the Obscure who bore, So dark his philosophic lore".' Schleiermacher (*Herakleitos*, 324–5) criticizes Cicero, yet excuses his remissness on the ground that he did not wish to commit himself about the view of fire held by Heraclitus as compared with that of the Stoics. See also n. 178 above.

189. See Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.5.1407b.14–18 (Barnes, ii. 2244–5). See also Hegel's partial translation of this passage in *W.* xiii. 331 (MS?), as well as its transmission by Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 7.132 (Bury, ii. 72–3). According to *W.* xiii. 331, Hegel also referred to Demetrius of Phalerum (fourth–third centuries BC), *De elocutione*, §192, p. 78, in the edition by J. G. Schneider (Altenburg, 1779). This reference may come from Ritter (*Geschichte*, p. 81 n. 2); but see also Schleiermacher, *Herakleitos*, 325–6.

it presented in his works, and it is incontestable that he got his earlier philosophical education through it.[190] Hippocrates belonged to this school too.[191]

The obscurity in the philosophy of Heraclitus lies essentially in the fact that it expresses a profoundly speculative thought, which is always obscure for the understanding. The concept or the idea is in conflict with the understanding and cannot be grasped by it. Heraclitus utters the bold and more profound dictum that being no more is than is non-being—τὸ ὂν οὐ μᾶλλον ἔστι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος—but no less either.[192] The Eleatics took being for the principle, the absolute, whereas Heraclitus says that being no more is than is non-being. Heraclitus grasped the dialectic of the Eleatic school objectively and he treated this objective dialectic as the principle, or as the absolute.

Being no more is than is non-being. At first this seems to be thoughtlessness, universal denial. But we have yet another expression, one that conveys the sense of the principle more precisely. For Heraclitus says also that everything flows, πάντα ῥεῖ; in other words, nothing subsists or remains the same.[193] Aristotle says that Heraclitus compared things to the current of a stream, into which one cannot step twice; it flows, and one comes in contact

190. This assessment of the influence of Heraclitus (and Cratylus) on the young Plato, before he knew Socrates, is found in Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.6.987a.32–987b.1 (Barnes, ii. 1561). Diogenes Laertius reports (*Lives* 3.6; Hicks, i. 280–1) that, after the death of Socrates, Plato 'attached himself to Cratylus the Heraclitean'. On Heraclitus in Plato, see *Sophist* 242d–e (Fowler, pp. 358–9); *Cratylus* 402a–c, 412b–c (Fowler, pp. 66–9, 98–101); *Symposium* 187a (Lamb, pp. 126–7); *Theaetetus* 152d–e, 160d (Fowler, pp. 42–5, 72–3).

191. Hegel's regular sources, Brucker (*Historia*, i. 1223–7) and Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 371–7), affirm the ties between Heraclitus and Hippocrates. In light of the account in Meiners (*Geschichte der Wissenschaften*, ii. 789), Tiedemann grants that perhaps not everything bearing the name of Hippocrates can be ascribed to him, for instance, passages in the treatise *De diaeta* (1.127) that clearly show the influence of Anaxagoras.

192. Hegel also ascribes this expression to Heraclitus in the *Science of Logic* (GW xxi. 70, with n.; Miller, p. 83). In his *Metaphysics* (1.4.985b.4–10; Barnes, ii. 1558; KRS, no. 555, pp. 413–14) Aristotle attributes this expression to Leucippus and Democritus. Possibly Hegel's error is due to passages in 4.7–8.1012a.24–6, and 33–b.2 (Barnes, ii. 1598), which say that for Heraclitus 'all things are and are not' and 'all things are true and all are false'.

193. Hegel links reports from Plato and Aristotle. In essence, he follows Plato, *Cratylus* 402a (Fowler, pp. 66–7; KRS, no. 205, p. 195)—'you cannot step twice into the same stream'—but the expression 'nothing remains the same'—also in *W.* xiii. 333 (MS?)—may come from Simplicius, *in Phys.*, ad V, 4. 207v. (Diels, p. 887, ll. 1–2). The phrase πάντα ῥεῖ is also ascribed to the disciples of Heraclitus and to others; see Simplicius, 8.8.308v. (Diels, p. 1313, ll. 8–12). See also Plato, *Cratylus* 440c (Fowler, pp. 190–1), and *Theaetetus* 160d (Fowler, pp. 72–3); Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.6.987a.32–4, 13.4.1078b.12–14 (Barnes, ii. 1561, 1705), and *On the Heavens* 3.1.298b.30–4 (Barnes, i. 490). See also n. 196 just below.

with other water.[194] His followers even said 'not even once, since it directly changes'.[195]

Aristotle goes on to say that Heraclitus declares there is only one that remains, out of which all else is developed and changed. Everything flows
72 and nothing is fixed, everything changes.[196] The more precise | category that we use to express this is becoming. The Eleatics said that only being is, that it is what is true. Heraclitus says that everything is becoming, that becoming is the principle. This is contained in the expression 'Being no more is than is non-being'—this is precisely becoming, for becoming contains the identity of the two, of being and non-being. By 'becoming' we understand arising and perishing; neither is on its own account, but they are identical; this is what Heraclitus expressed by this saying. Being is not, so it is non-being, and non-being is not, so it is being. This unity is what is true.

It is a great thought to pass over from being to becoming; it is still abstract, but at the same time it is also the first concrete element, that is, the first unity of opposed characteristics. The latter are thus restless in this relationship, for it contains the principle of vitality. In this way it fills the gap to which Aristotle pointed in the other philosophies, that they did not know what the principle of becoming is.[197] This principle of motion itself is becoming, the stirring of the vitality of generation according to one aspect

194. The earliest attestation of this statement, attributed to Aristotle by all five transcripts, is Plato, *Cratylus* 402a, although Hegel probably has Simplicius (*in Phys.* 8.8) in view as well (see the preceding note). The expression about contacting other water suggests a fragment transmitted by Arius Didymus (first century BC) according to Eusebius of Caesarea (AD 260–340—*Praeparatio evangelica* 15.20) and Cleanthes; Hegel could have known it from Schleiermacher, *Herakleitos*, 360; see KRS, no. 214, pp. 194–5. The same thought is also clearly expressed in a fragment transmitted in Plutarch's *Quaestiones naturales* 912a and his *De E apud Delphos* 392b, which Hegel could have known from Ritter, *Geschichte*, 87; see Plutarch, *Moralia*, trans. Philip H. DeLacy et al., 16 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1927–69)—*Causes of Natural Phenomena*, trans. Lionel Pearson and F. H. Sandbach, in vol. xi (1965), 152–3, and *The E at Delphi*, trans. Frank Cole Babbitt, in vol. v (1936), 228–31.

195. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 4.5.1010a.7–15 (Barnes, ii. 1594–5). In speaking of multiple followers (Aristotle speaks only of Cratylus), Hegel may also have in view other sources: Heraclides Ponticus, *Quaestiones Homericae* 24.5 (cited in Ritter, *Geschichte*, 86; see DK 22 B 49a); Schleiermacher, *Herakleitos*, 529–30.

196. See Aristotle, *On the Heavens* 3.1.298b.29–33 (Barnes, i. 490); cf. *W.* xiii. 333 (MS?).

197. See above for Aristotle's criticism of this gap in the Ionian and Pythagorean philosophies (pp. 29, 38). In presenting the Eleatic One, Hegel does not expressly mention Aristotle's critique. Unlike Hegel, Aristotle does not regard Heraclitus as solving the problem of a principle of motion. Heraclitus made fire his principle and hence he counts among those who sought to furnish the cause of arising and perishing (see p. 85 below), though in so doing he superseded the cause of motion—although Aristotle thinks fire makes a better principle than does any of the other elements. See *Metaphysics* 1.8.988b.22–989a.3 (Barnes, ii. 1563) and *Physics* 8.3.253b.6–9 (Barnes, i. 423).

or another. Hence it is no bygone philosophy that first of all becoming is the truth, or the absolute. This | principle is essential, and hence it is to be 73
found in my *Logic*, right after 'Being' and 'Nothing'. To recognize being and non-being as abstractions in which there is no truth, and to see that what is first true is only becoming, is a great insight. The abstract understanding holds fast to being, and equally it holds fast to the nonexistent, to what is seeming, as something that truly subsists. Reason, on the contrary, recognizes the one in the other—that in the one its own other is contained, and that the absolute is to be defined as becoming.[198]

To begin with we had the abstraction of being and non-being in a wholly immediate, universal form. Heraclitus grasped the opposites more precisely and expressed them in a more determinate way. The ideal is just [the process of] making itself into the real and the real is that of making itself into the ideal. This is the unity of real and ideal, of objective and subjective. The subjective consists in becoming objective, else it is devoid of truth; the objective consists in becoming subjective, and what is true is this very process. But the truth is still expressed abstractly.

Heraclitus expressed this mutual inward positing [*sich Ineinssetzen*] of the differences in a determinate form. For instance, Aristotle says that Heraclitus linked the whole and the not-whole or the part together; making itself into the part is what the whole is, and becoming the whole is what the part is. So there is the συνᾷδον and διᾷδον, the concord and discord—one from all, and all from one; this is not the abstract One but the activity of self-diremption.[199] | The lifeless infinite is a poor abstraction in compari- 74
son to this depth and inwardness of the concrete that we find in Heraclitus. Sextus Empiricus says something similar, that Heraclitus said the part is different from the whole, yet the part is the same as what the whole is; the substance is the whole and the part.[200] That the One makes itself into what is differentiated, that God has created the world, undergone self-diremption, begotten his Son, and so forth—all this is already contained in those determinations.

With regard to the principle of Heraclitus, Plato says in his *Symposium* that the One, being differentiated from itself, unites itself with itself—

198. See Hegel's *Science of Logic* on the first three categories—Being, Nothing, Becoming (*GW* xi. 43–4, xxi. 68–70; Miller, pp. 82–108).

199. Hegel's reference is to the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *De mundo* [*On the Universe*], the authenticity of which he did not doubt; see also n. 185 above. This passage from ch. 5 (396b.19–22; Barnes, i. 633; KRS, no. 203, p. 190) attributes to Heraclitus the terms συνᾷδον (singing together, in harmony) and διᾷδον (singing for oneself). Cf. *W.* xiii. 335 (MS?).

200. See *Adv. Math.* 9.337 (Bury, iii. 162–3); cf. *W.* xiii. 335–6 (MS?).

τὸ ἓν διαφερόμενον ἀπὸ ταὐτοῦ συμφέρεσθαι; this is the process of vitality; it unites itself like the harmony of the bow and the lyre. In the *Symposium* Eryximachos then objects that [for Heraclitus] the 'harmony' forms a disharmony; it is made up of opposites, for harmony arises not from high and low tones as distinct, but only when they are united by the art of music.[201] But this does not contradict Heraclitus. Harmony is not the repetition of one tone, for distinction belongs essentially to harmony. Brought together abstractly, difference does of course yield dissonances; but the essential point is that each particular, every different [note], is different from another note; it is not, however, [just] abstractly different from any other note—it is different from its own other. Each note is only insofar as its other is contained implicitly in its concept. In consciousness spirit relates itself to the sensible, and this sensible element is its other. In the same way the tones must be different, yet, as elements that differ in this way, they have a relation one to
75 another. The subjectivity is the other | of the objectivity, not of a piece of paper [or any random thing]—which is obviously senseless; the other must be *its* other, and the fact that something is other to something else is constitutive of their very identity. The understanding only isolates; it takes everything—ideal, real, subject, and so forth—each by itself; thus everything is the other of the other, as its other. But Heraclitus grasps everything more profoundly. The great principle of Heraclitus may appear obscure, but it is speculative; and for the understanding, which holds fast to being and nonbeing, subjective and objective, real and ideal, [each of them] by itself, this is always obscure.

The second point is that Heraclitus also represented this general principle in a *real* way. He did not rest content with the purely logical but gave his idea a real expression too. This real shape belongs basically to the philosophy of nature; in other words, its form is natural rather than logical. Heraclitus is still an Ionian, and Ionian principles generally take the shape of something natural. But the historians disagree about the shape that the real mode of his principle assumed. Most of them say that he took the subsistent being to be fire, others say air, still others say exhalation, and finally there are those who

201. See Plato, *Symposium* 187a–b (Lamb, pp. 126–7); in our text Hegel gives its title in Greek. The praise of Eros spoken by Eryximachos celebrates the universal mastery of Eros over all beings and arts. The formulation of Heraclitus is presented in this context: 'The One at variance with itself is drawn together like harmony of bow or lyre' (διαφερόμενον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ξυμφέρεσθαι ...). Cf. W. xiii. 336 (MS?) as well as the fragment as transmitted by Hippolytus, *Refutation* 9.9 (MacMahon, p. 126 = 9.4; KRS, no. 209, p. 192). Eryximachos goes on to argue that harmony of things at variance with one another is impossible, that true harmony is when variance is replaced by agreement.

say time (Sextus Empiricus).[202] We could credit this diversity to carelessness on the part of the historians, but the witnesses to it are the best, such as Aristotle, Sextus Empiricus, | and others. We could also blame it on the 76
obscurity of the Heraclitean philosophy.

If we view the matter more closely, this superficial diversity vanishes, and in the profundity of the teaching of Heraclitus itself we find the way out of the difficulty. What Heraclitus said was that time is the first, corporeal, outwardly real being; as we have noted, we find this in Sextus Empiricus. So Heraclitus did not rest content with the logical expression of becoming but gave to his principle the shape of subsistent being; and for that purpose the form of time had to be the first that offered itself to him. In the sensible or intuitable realm, time is what first presents itself to us as becoming; it is the first form of becoming. Time is pure becoming as intuited. To be and not to be is what time is—in its being, immediately not to be, and in its non-being, immediately to be—this turning over from being into non-being. It is intuited becoming, it is the first form in which becoming presents itself. What is in time is not what is past and future; it is only the now. Just as the now *is*, it is verily a not-being, it is directly nullified, gone; yet this non-being is also turned over into being; it is and also it is not—even while I have

202. Textual variants on the very end of this sentence are as follows. The Gr. transcript reads: '[he] took it to be time; according to Sextus Empiricus he defined time as what is first, is subsisting being, is real'. The Lw. transcript reads: 'time. Is not this very diversity an advance? Does it not portray these configurations as images of a principle and not as the principle itself?' Hegel seems to draw primarily upon ancient authors for his remarks about the principle of Heraclitus, although these diverse views also appear in the accounts of his contemporaries. On the tension between fire as principle and as phenomenon, see Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 201), Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 216), and in particular Ritter (*Geschichte*, 88–93). Important ancient testimonies to fire as his principle include Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.3.984a.7–8 (Barnes, ii. 1556), and *Physics* 3.5.205a.3–4 (Barnes, i. 349); Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.7–8 (Hicks, ii. 414–17); Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 5.104.2 (Wilson, p. 469 = 5.14)—see n. 206 just below. Tennemann (i. 215–16) and Ritter (pp. 88 ff.) give others. On air as the principle, see *W.* xiii. 337 (MS?) as well as Tiedemann (i. 198 ff.), Tennemann (i. 216–17), and Ritter (p. 95); ancient testimonies include Tertullian, *De anima* 9—*Ante-Nicene Fathers*, trans. Peter Holmes, vol. iii. (repr., Ann Arbor, 1963), 188—and Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 9.360, 10.231–3 (Bury, iii. 172–3, 324–5). Schleiermacher (*Herakleitos*, 488–9) contests the correctness of this attribution and seeks to account for its origin. On exhalation or evaporation as the principle, see nn. 205 and 207 just below. On time, see Sextus 10.216 (Bury, iii. 316–17), who says that Aenesidemus formulated this thesis 'according to Heraclitus'. From this report one must conclude that Heraclitus held time and air to be identical. Hegel too, just below in our text, seeks to link these diverse reports about fire, air, and time as the principle, especially since—according to *W.* xiii. 337—he holds the view that Aristotle and Sextus 'determined to speak of these forms without drawing attention to these differences and contradictions'. But he disregards the fact that Sextus (10.231–3) is playing off the assertion that for Heraclitus subsistent being is air, against the contrary assertion that it is time. The main concern of Sextus, moreover, is to show that time is no corporeal being.

spoken the word 'now'. The 'now' is the abstract intuition of this overturning, and therefore it is quite correct that the first form of what becomes is time.[203]

The second form is more physical. Time is intuiting, but wholly abstract intuiting. When we use physical, concretely real modes to represent to
77 ourselves what time is, the question that we face is | what purely physical nature corresponds to this determination [and] immediately exhibits the intuition of becoming. In this context it is directly evident to us that neither air nor water nor earth is acceptable, because the very next point is that they are not themselves the process. But the process is fire, which is the more real mode of the Heraclitean principle, since fire is physical; it is restlessness. Although fire is, it is the consuming of itself as well as of its other; it is not still in the way that water or earth is still; it is not lasting, [it is] physical restlessness or process. It is real time, and it is therefore wholly consistent that, starting from his basic definition, Heraclitus made fire the principle.

Then he defined this fire more precisely and elaborated it more fully as a real process. Of itself, fire is this real process; its reality is the process as a whole, in which the determinations or moments are then specified in greater detail and more concretely. In this regard it is reported of Heraclitus that he said that the changes, the metamorphoses and activities, of fire (its τροπαί) are first of all the sea, and then one-half of it the earth and the other half the lightning or the fire that springs up (πρηστήρ).[204] That is the universal [moment], and it is very obscure.

Next, Heraclitus distinguished more precisely two pathways in the process, one downward and one upward. The downward path is that fire is condensed and congealed (συνιστάμενον)—so it becomes water, θάλασσα, and hardened water becomes earth. Fire that extinguishes itself, fire that collapses into the indifference of its process, is water. But then this becomes earth, and that is the downward path. Earth in turn becomes fluid or molten,
78 and from it there comes dampness or sea, and the evaporation | of the sea in its turn passes over into fire—fire breaks forth from it once again. This is

203. Hegel's discussion of the 'now' is in the *Phenomenology*, paras. 95–7 (Miller, pp. 59–60). The 'now' and the 'here' (see n. 173 above) together constitute the twofold shape of the 'this', which is the most basic element of consciousness, called 'sense-certainty'.

204. On the 'turnings' (τροπαί) or changes of fire, see Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 5.104.3 (Wilson, p. 469; KRS, no. 218, pp. 197–8). Hegel knew this text from the *Poesis philosophica*, p. 132, and he also quotes from it in *W.* xiii. 341 (MS?). See also Schleiermacher (*Herakleitos*, 374, 379), who, unlike Hegel, renders πρηστήρ not as 'lightning' but as 'phenomenal fire, as it forms in the atmosphere'. Hegel's translation is in its content oriented to Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 1.30 (Heeren, p. 594; Hense, i. 232 = 1.29).

the upward path.[205] In this way Heraclitus defines the process more precisely. The downward path is fire that dies out and [becomes] water. On the one hand, earth comes into being, and, on the other hand, this earth is metamorphosed back into water, and from the water fire then once again breaks forth.

In this context Aristotle tells us that Heraclitus said no divine or human agency made the universe, for it is, ever was, and will be, an everlasting, living fire that dies out and kindles itself according to its own measure (μέτρῳ). The dying-out is the originating of water and earth; the kindling is the upward path.[206] For this transition, for this transformation, Heraclitus used a particular term: exhalation, ἀναθυμίασις. Only superficially is 'exhalation' the meaning here; for it is rather transformation or transition from fire into water, from water into earth, [and back] from water again into fire.[207] And so, says Aristotle, for Heraclitus the soul is the principle because the soul is what is exhaling or issuing forth from everything, and this ἀναθυμίασις, this exhalation, this living activity, is what is most incorporeal and ever in flux.[208] Another expression occurs in Clement of Alexandria: to become water is death to the soul, and to become earth is death to water; water comes into being out of earth, and out of water comes fire, the soul.[209]

205. Hegel's paragraph down to this point is a paraphrase of Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.8–9 (Hicks, ii. 414–17).

206. All five transcripts agree on ascription of this account to Aristotle, although the source is Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 5.104.2 (Wilson, p. 469 = 5.14). According to *W.* xiii. 342 (MS?), Hegel referred to John Potter's edition of Clement (Oxford, 1715; Würzburg, 1778) and to p. 131 (should be p. 132) of the *Poesis philosophica*; in *W.* Hegel also translates part of the passage. Schleiermacher (*Herakleitos*, 374) opposes the reading μέτρῳ, a correction taken from Eusebius; the version in *Stromata* has μέτρα, in accordance with which KRS (no. 217, pp. 197–8) translates 'an everliving fire, kindling in measures and going out in measures' (that is, 'not all of it is burning at the same time'). On the two paths, see the preceding and following notes.

207. On the concept of 'exhalation', see n. 205 just above. Scholars also use the alternate rendering 'evaporation'; 'exhalation' seems to fit better in most contexts here, especially when we come to the topic of soul. The Greek term itself is not attested prior to Aristotle (see the following note) and is probably not an authentic expression from Heraclitus. On this, see *Héraclite: Fragments*, ed. Marcel Conche (Paris, 1986), 310, as well as Schleiermacher (*Herakleitos*, 390). Whereas just above in our text Hegel speaks of 'exhalation' only in connection with the 'upward path', here he uses the term for the 'downward path' too. This double application is less evident in Aristotle, *Meteorology* 1.3.339a.34–1.4.342a.33 (Barnes, i. 556–60) than it is in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.9–11 (Hicks, ii. 416–19). It is not sufficiently clear what the systematic connection is between the two modes of representation, that of 'exhalation' and that of 'the two paths'. Schleiermacher (*Herakleitos*, 404 ff.) regards this account as a key passage for understanding the thought of Heraclitus about transformation.

208. See Aristotle, *De Anima* 1.2.405a.25–7 (Barnes, i. 646); cf. *W.* xiii. 340 (MS?).

209. See Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 6.17.2 (Wilson, p. 484; KRS, no. 229, p. 203). Cf. *W.* xiii. 342–3 (MS?).

So in general what we have is this process of the opposed going back into one and issuing forth from one.

But it is also represented that Heraclitus spoke of a world conflagration or, as we picture it, of the world perishing in flames. But we can see at once
79 that this burning-up | is not the end of the world but only expresses the general life of the universe as a whole.[210] With regard to fire or the soul being the animating principle for Heraclitus, we find an expression that may seem bizarre, namely: 'The driest souls are the best.'[211] Of course we do not take the wettest to be the best either, but, on the contrary, the one that is most vital; for 'dry' here means 'fiery'. So for Heraclitus the driest soul is pure fire, and this is not lifeless but is vitality itself.

We have still to consider in Heraclitus the relationship of the world, of what is, to consciousness, to thinking. His philosophy is in the mode of a philosophy of nature; his principle is certainly logical, but in its natural mode it is comprehended as the universal process of nature. Concerning cognition, there are several passages preserved from Heraclitus in which he explains that sense-certainty is no truth, because it is that for which something subsists—or

210. According to *W.* xiii. 343, Hegel at this point referred to Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.8 (Hicks, ii. 414–17). The report of Diogenes is ambiguous, suggesting, on the one hand, a periodic world conflagration and, on the other, a fiery dissolution in connection with the upward path, thus a continuous transformation. Here Hegel evidently understands it in the latter sense, as does *W.* xiii. 343, with editor Michelet's reference to Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 22 (Heeren, p. 454; Hense, i. 187). On the interpretation as world conflagration, see Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 218, 227) and Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 210). In addition to Diogenes, Tennemann cites Aristotle, *Physics* 3.5.205a.1–3 (Barnes, i. 349) and *On the Heavens* 1.10.279b.14–17 (Barnes, i. 463); Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 5.104.2 (Wilson, p. 469); [Pseudo-]Plutarch, *De plac. phil.* 1.3, and Plutarch, *Antoninus* 3.3. Tiedemann cites the *Physics* as well as Diogenes, Clement, and [Pseudo-]Plutarch. Michelet cites Eusebius of Caesarea, *Preparatio evangelica* 14.3.8, which says that according to Heraclitus there is a time established for the dissolution of all things into fire, and for origination from it. See also *De plac. phil.* 1.3.11 (Hutten, xii. 355–6; DG, 283–4). Schleiermacher (*Herakleitos*, 461–71) denies that Heraclitus taught a periodic world conflagration. This representation is connected with that of the 'great year' (μέγας ἐνιαυτός), attributed to him by some compilers; the *De plac. phil.* 2.32.2 (Hutten, xii. 418) puts its period at 800,000 solar years, in a corrupt text that should read '10,800'.

211. Hegel's version of this fragment is from Stobaeus, *Eclogae* 3.17.42, 3.5.8; it is present in similar form in Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 226–7) and Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 209–10). The fuller version (3.5.8) reads: 'A dry soul is wisest and best' (KRS, no. 230, p. 203). Conche (*Héraclite*, 34●–2, fr. 97) favors yet another variant, also containing both 'wisest and best'. See also Stobaeus, *Sententiae*, Sermon 17, 'On Continence', ed. Conrad Gesner (Tiguri, 1559), 160; Plutarch, *De esu carnium* 995c. Michelet cites the latter passage in *W.* xiii. 343, even though it mentions only 'wisest' but not 'best'; see *Plutarchi opera omnia*, vol. ii, ed. Guglielmo Xylander (Lutetia = Paris, 1624). Schleiermacher (*Herakleitos*, 507–15) supports this version.

is—which in fact also *is not*.[212] Sense perception is only the form in which external objects subsist on their own account. He says, 'Our eyes and ears are poor witnesses insofar as we have barbarous souls.' Λόγος or reason is the sole judge of truth—not, however, the Logos that is ready to hand, but only the divine, universal λόγος.[213] This process, this determinateness of movement that permeates the all, this rhythm or measure, an ethereal being that is the seed for generation of the whole—this One is the Logos.[214] | 80

What Sextus Empiricus has to say about the relationship of subjectivity, of particular reason, to the universal reason, or to this process of nature, is this: what is universal, or the universe, is rational, logical, understandable. If we breathe this in, then we come to understand—but only in the waking state; asleep we are in oblivion. The form of having understanding is a being awake, namely, being rational, having one's wits about one. This being awake, this consciousness of the external world, this property of having understanding, is more precisely one [common] state, and it is taken here for the whole of rational consciousness. In sleep the channels of feeling are closed off and the understanding is separated from the surrounding circumstances; all that remains is breathing. This is what makes the connection with the external world; it is the persisting root of the state of having one's wits about one. In waking, however, the understanding, through the channels of feeling and through interacting with the external world, gains the force of logic, just as coals near to a fire catch fire themselves, while in separation from it they go out.[215]

212. Diogenes Laertius transmits this saying (*Lives* 9.7; Hicks, ii. 414–15): 'he used to call ... eyesight a lying sense'. Conche (*Héraclite*, 232–3) doubts its authenticity. In *W.* xiii. 348 (MS?) Hegel translates a fragment found in Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 3.21.1 ('What we see when awake is death, but what we see when sleeping is dream'), in agreement with Schleiermacher's version (*Herakleitos*, 472). The Greek ὕπνος would be more accurately rendered as 'sleep' rather than as 'dream'; cf. the variant in Clement, 4.141.2 (KRS, no. 233, p. 205). Conche sees this fragment (no. 103 in his volume) as both stressing the one-sidedness of sense perception and opposing the Homeric view that in sleep one meets with a higher revelation. See also nn. 213 and 215 just below.

213. See Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 7.126–7 (Bury, ii. 68–71; KRS, no. 198, p. 188). Cf. *W.* xiii. 348 (MS?) as well as *Poesis philosophica*, 129. Hegel implicitly accepts the broader interpretation of Sextus, for whom Heraclitus rejects the senses because they are devoid of reason (ἄλογος) and therefore belong to barbarous souls. Schleiermacher too (*Herakleitos*, 364) notes that Sextus goes beyond a literal interpretation of the words of Heraclitus.

214. The words 'this rhythm or measure' draw upon a fragment from Clement of Alexandria; see n. 206 above. The remainder of our text paraphrases a passage in [Pseudo-]Plutarch, *De plac. phil.* 1.28.1 (Hutten, xii. 387; DG 323); cf. *W.* xiii. 347 (MS?). The last phrase, on the Logos, perhaps echos Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.1 (Hicks, ii. 408–9): 'thought, as that which guides the world everywhere'. Cf. *W.* xiii. 348–9 (MS?).

215. See Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 7.127, 129–30 (Bury, ii. 68–73; KRS, no. 234, p. 205). Cf. *W.* xiii. 349–50 (MS?).

Presence of mind, consciousness, or rational thinking is here taken more in the physical mode of being awake, the mode in which the soul itself was called 'fire'. In this regard, Heraclitus says also that we do and think everything according to our participation in the divine λόγος. We must follow this universal λόγος. Yet many live as if they had an understanding of their own, ἰδίαν φρόνησιν. True understanding, however, is none other than insight into the way the whole is arranged and ordered, τὸν τρόπον τῆς διηγήσεως τοῦ πάντος. Consequently, to the extent that we
81 participate in this universal | knowing, to that extent we are in the truth; in what we have [as] particular we are in error.[216] This is quite correctly said about the truth of consciousness of the particular. People usually suppose that when they are to think of something it must be something particular, but this is mistaken. What is true is what is universal in and for itself.

Apart from this, we also have many other fragments from Heraclitus, single sayings and the like. He says that human beings are mortal gods and the gods are immortal human beings; the death of the gods is life, and dying is the life of the gods.[217] What is divine is elevation through thinking, beyond the merely natural life that belongs to death.

## 5. Empedocles and the Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus

### *a. Empedocles*

We are treating Leucippus and Democritus together with Empedocles.

The fragments of Empedocles—over 400 verses—have been collected by Sturz (Leipzig, 1805). Amadeus Peyron collected them too, together with those of Parmenides and others (Leipzig, 1810).[218] Schleiermacher published the fragments of Heraclitus in a volume of Wolf's [and Buttmann's] *Museum*.[219] The most complete collection, however, is one by Creuzer,

216. See Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 7.133 (Bury, ii. 72–5; KRS, no. 195, p. 187). Cf. *W.* xiii. 351–2 (MS?). Conche (*Héraclite*, 57 ff.) contests the authenticity of this fragment. In *W.* xiii. 351 Hegel gives a translation of the immediately preceding passage, 7.131–2 (Bury, ii. 72–3; KRS, no. 194, pp. 186–7).

217. As confirmed by *W.* xiii. 353 (MS?), this statement is drawn from a footnote (n. C, p. 185) by Fabricius in his edition of Sextus Empiricus, on *Pyrr.* 3.230 (Bury, i. 478–9). A similar formulation appears in a fragment from Hippolytus, *Refutation* 9.10.6 (MacMahon, p. 127 = 9.5; KRS, no. 239, p. 208) that was unknown in Hegel's day.

218. See *Empedocles Agrigentinus: De vita et philosophia eius exposuit carminum reliquias ex antiquis scriptoribus collegit* ..., ed. Friedrich Wilhelm Sturz, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1805). See also *Empedoclis et Parmenides fragmenta ex codice Taurinensis Bibliothecae* ..., ed. Amadeus Peyron (Leipzig, 1810).

219. On Schleiermacher's collection, see n. 187 above.

which is to appear shortly; he has turned it over to a young man for publication.[220] Sturz's collection is a *specimen industriae* ['model of industry']. But such collections | are as a rule too prolix; they contain a great deal 82
of erudition, and are sooner written than read.

Empedocles is a Pythagorean, born in Agrigentum in Sicily. He was well known about the time of the seventy-seventh Olympiad (460 BC) and was a friend of Zeno.[221] He was much respected by his fellow citizens, and his fame was widespread in subsequent generations. Later he was regarded by

220. No record of such a publication can be found. Even in correspondence between Hegel and Creuzer from the years 1820–5, which often speaks of plans for scholarly editions instigated by Creuzer, there is no mention of a new edition of fragments of Empedocles or of Heraclitus. Yet we find a reference to the project in his autobiography, *Friedrich Creuzer: Aus dem Leben eines alten Professors* (Leipzig and Darmstadt, 1848), 130, where he remarks that the study of philosophy before Plato 'made me think seriously about a collection of the fragments of Heraclitus, for already I had actually collected many of them. ... When I subsequently handed over the assembled fragments to Eichhoff, a member of our philological seminar and student of Hegel, he produced a draft manuscript entirely in the spirit of that school.' According to *W.* xiii. 331, Hegel gave a different reason for dropping the planned collection, namely, the early death of Eichhoff.

221. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 8.50 (Hicks, ii. 366–7), concludes his account of Pythagoras by saying, just before the next chapter, on Empedocles, that he will 'speak next of the noteworthy Pythagoreans'. The subsequent life of Empedocles mentions several reports that connect Empedocles with Pythagoras or the older Pythagorean school but also states that he was excluded from the school for giving public expression in a poem to secret Pythagorean doctrines (8.54–6; Hicks, ii. 368–73). Iamblichus (*Vita pyth.* 36.267; Clark, pp. 111–13) counts Empedocles, Parmenides, and many others as Pythagoreans. Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 243) says he received Pythagorean instruction but was not one himself. Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 240–1) discounts any ties with the Pythagorean community but allows that he might have known some Pythagorean ideas, although that cannot be verified from the fragments. Ritter (*Geschichte*, 307) thinks he was not a Pythagorean. According to *W.* xiii. 356, Hegel himself did not think the teaching of Empedocles had Pythagorean aspects. Despite all these doubts, however, there is an undeniable connection of Pythagorean thought with the ethics of Empedocles as expressed in his *Kartharmoi* ('Purifications') as well as in his concept of φιλία or friendship. On his roots in Acragas, or Agrigentum, see Diogenes, *Lives* 8.51, 54, 67 (Hicks, ii. 366–71, 380–1; KRS, no. 332, pp. 280–1). The obvious error in our text, in placing 460 BC in the seventy-seventh Olympiad (472–469 BC), reflects discrepancies in contemporary sources, the confusion being made worse by an error on Hegel's part. Sturz (*Empedocles*, 9–10), drawing upon Henry Dodwell (the elder), *De aetate Pythagorae*—in his *Exercitationes duae* (London, 1704), 220—and upon a doubtful calculation of the age of Empedocles, cites the seventy-seventh Olympiad; cf. *W.* xiii. 354 (MS?). According to this, Empedocles was born in the first year of the seventy-seventh Olympiad (472 BC). In these lectures, as all the transcripts show, Hegel gave this instead as the time when Empedocles flourished, not when he was born. Diogenes says (*Lives* 8.74; Hicks, ii. 388–9; KRS, no. 333, pp. 280–1) that he flourished in the eighty-fourth Olympiad (444–441 BC). Only Gr. among the transcripts has 460 BC, a date traceable to Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 240, 415); cf. *W.* xiii. 354. See also Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 243), who places the birth of Empedocles about the seventy-first Olympiad (496–493 BC). Whether or not Empedocles and Zeno were friends, they were, according to Dodwell (see above) and Diogenes (8.56), at the same time fellow pupils of Parmenides.

some as a wonder-worker and sorcerer.[222] After his death his native city Agrigentum had a statue erected to him. He did not turn his back on the affairs of his fatherland, and he exerted great influence on civic life. Agrigentum was ruled by a tyrant, after whose death Empedocles brought it about that the city adopted a democratic constitution, that all citizens were given equal rights. He defended this constitution against the assaults of individuals who wanted to make themselves the masters. He was offered the crown himself, but he declined it and lived as a private citizen.[223]

There are many legends about his life and death. We are told, for instance, that he did not wish to be counted a mortal, and for that reason he disappeared after a feast, or else he threw himself into [the volcano of Mt] Etna so that his friends might believe he had been taken up among the gods. But Etna later cast up one of his slippers, and so people saw that he lay hidden in Etna, and so forth.[224] It is certain that he was highly respected. His verses seem to display great arrogance. We read, for example: 'O Friends who dwell in the great city on yellow Agrigentum, greetings! To you I am an immortal god, no longer a mortal human being. Wherever I go I am honored, decked out with golden crowns and verdant garlands. Wherever I turn, thousands of men and women follow me and ask me about the way to profit, others on account of illness. But what is it to me that I sojourn
83 among mortal, corrupt humankind?'[225] | Words such as this could have

222. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 8.59–65 (Hicks, ii. 372–9; KRS, nos. 345–99, pp. 285–6, 313). The first part of this passage tells of his magical powers, including control of wind and rain. The remainder concerns the high regard in which he was held; see also 8.70–3 (Hicks, ii. 384–7), according to which the people of Selinus worshiped him as a god after he had diverted two rivers so as to free them from pestilence.

223. Various elements of this account of his political activities, not exactly as Hegel presents them, are found in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 8.63–4, 66, 72 (Hicks, ii. 376–81, 386–7).

224. Hegel brings together two separate accounts found in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 8.67–9 (Hicks, ii. 380–3). In the first the feast follows a religious sacrifice, and after his disappearance was noted the following morning someone reported seeing a light in the heavens during the night and hearing a loud voice calling Empedocles. In the second he apparently set out for Etna alone, to hide there, but was found out when the volcano cast up one of the bronze slippers he was in the habit of wearing. Cf. *W.* xiii. 355–6, and the following note.

225. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 8.66; Hicks, ii. 380–1) recounts that in some passages of his poetry Empedocles is boastful and self-satisfied. Diogenes transmits all but the last sentence of our text, in recounting the opening verses of the proem to his poetic composition *Purifications* (*Lives* 8.62; Hicks, ii. 366–7; KRS, no. 399, p. 313). That last part is transmitted by Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 1.302 (Bury, iv. 174–5). So Hegel must have taken the whole from a collection of fragments that presents it in this way, such as the *Poesis philosophica* (pp. 23–4) or Sturz, *Empedocles* (p. 530); cf. Stobaeus (in DK 31 B 112, 113). Sturz renders περέειμι in the last line by *supero* or *antecello* ('I rise above' or 'I excel'), whereas Hegel (according to Pn., An., Gr., and Lw.) translates it as *ich verweile unter* ('I sojourn among'); cf. *W.* xiii. 356 (MS?). The third verse in Sturz's version is not present in Hegel's paraphrase.

inspired the belief that he wanted people to think he had ascended to the gods.

I will give only a brief account of his thoughts. It is from Empedocles that we get the view that there are four elements. Fire, water, air, and earth are the four basic principles, which always endure and do not come to be, but subsist and do not pass away; everything has come about only through the specific union and separation of these four. Aristotle reports that, with regard to their mutual relationship, Empedocles employed friendship and enmity as principles too, and so he has six principles. If, says Aristotle, we were to take this consistently and according to the understanding—and not merely as Empedocles stammers it out—then we could in a certain sense say that friendship is the principle of good, and enmity the principle of evil.[226]

So Aristotle says that in Empedocles good and evil emerge for the first time as principles. This principle of good (appearing later in Socrates) is what Aristotle finds lacking in Heraclitus, so he was glad to find it in Empedocles. The good is what is an end in and for itself, what is utterly firm within itself. Aristotle finds the principle of motion lacking in the older philosophers. He says that we cannot conceive change on the basis of being.[227] We have already found this principle in Heraclitus, in the motion of becoming. But Aristotle expresses this sort of principle more profoundly, as his τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, 'that for the sake of which', the purpose, and the good then is what is an end in and for itself.[228] 'Purpose' is the concept that

226. Aristotle gives this account of the six principles in *Metaphysics* 1.3.984a.5–9, 23–1.4.985a.4 (Barnes, ii. 1556–8). There he says that, while earlier philosophers make one element primary—air, water, or fire—Empedocles gives this status to all four, adding earth to the list. Cf. *W.* xiii. 357–8 (MS?), which also cites on this point Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* 1.1.314a.26–7, 314b.4–8 (Barnes, i. 513). The *Metaphysics* continues that, while Hesiod was perhaps first to look for a cause of beauty and order that brings things together in the world, 'another thinker' (namely, Empedocles), to account for contraries too, introduced friendship and strife (rather than Hegel's 'enmity' as in our text). See also *Gen. corr.* 1.1.314a.16–17 (Barnes, i. 512) and Sextus Empiricus (see n. 230 just below).

227. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.3.984a.27–b14 and 1.4.985a.7–10 (Barnes, ii. 1557–8); cf. *W.* xiii. 358 (MS?). Although Aristotle finds in Empedocles the principle of the good that he says is lacking in the older philosophers of nature (not just in Heraclitus), even here in Empedocles he regards its expression as inadequate. He holds that one has not conceived of the principle of motion just by virtue of establishing a plurality of principles. See the following two notes.

228. On Aristotle's criticism of Heraclitus and Hegel's different interpretation of him, see p. 74 above, with n. 197. According to *W.* xiii. 346–7, Hegel expressed a reservation too, about the solution of Heraclitus as compared with later efforts, particularly Aristotle's (cf. just below in our text); nevertheless, unlike Aristotle, he implicitly credits Heraclitus with introducing the principle of becoming into philosophy. Aristotle's criticism of earlier philosophies in relation to his own view of purpose, or final causality, occurs in *Metaphysics* 1.7.988b.6–16 (Barnes, ii. 1563); see also his definition of purpose in connection with his doctrine of four causes, in *Physics* 2.3.195a.23–6 (Barnes, i. 333).

84 determines itself, it stands firm in and for itself; | namely, what is true, what is utterly on its own account, or that in virtue of which everything else is. If we express the true as the good, then we must define it in such a way that the true is what is active, it is self-completion or what realizes itself. As far as it goes, this is the idea, the self-determining concept; hence 'purpose' is the concept that objectifies itself and is, in this objectivity, identical with itself. So it is this principle of purpose, of what remains equal to itself or of self-preservation, that Aristotle finds missing in Heraclitus, where there is only becoming, with no grasp of the reversion into the form of the universal.

In this principle of friendship Aristotle believes he can find a character that is equal to and identical with itself. But Empedocles only stammers, says Aristotle, he does not yet establish everything securely enough. In this way he has six principles, four physical and two universal—friendship and enmity, or uniting and separating. These are very important thought-determinations, but Aristotle reproaches him too, for not employing his principles in a comprehensive way. He does not adhere to them firmly enough, since in his work friendship is often what separates and enmity is what unites. Thus air and fire [are] parted [by enmity], but then [each is also] self-united by it. We ought to remark, however, that there is no union at all without separation
85 and no separation without union. Distinguishing | combines uniting and separating. It is very important to know that two categories that are opposed to one another are [both] identical and distinct. Identity and non-identity are thought-determinations of this kind but they cannot be separated.[229] So the reproach of Aristotle lies already in the nature of things. But there was no consciousness of this on the part of Empedocles.

Sextus Empiricus speaks even more definitely about the six principles of Empedocles, and he quotes some verses that refer to them: 'With earth we see earth, with water we see water, with air the pure air, with fire the divine fire, with love eternal love, with strife grievous strife.'[230] Thus the soul is a

229. Aristotle's reproach occurs in *Metaphysics* 1.4.985a.21–31 (Barnes, ii. 1558; KRS, no. 361, p. 297); cf. the translation in *W.* xiii. 359–60 (MS?). Further criticism of the principles of Empedocles occurs in *Metaphysics* 1.8.989a.25–6, 3.4.1000a.25–b.21 (Barnes, ii. 1564, 1580), and *On Generation and Corruption* 2.6.333b.20–334a.9 (Barnes, i. 546; KRS, nos. 372, 387, pp. 300–1, 307). See also n. 233 just below.

230. Sextus Empiricus juxtaposes the four elements with love and strife in his discussion of Empedocles in *Adv. math.* 9.10, 10.317 (Bury, iii. 6–7, 364–7). In 7.120–1 (Bury, ii. 64–7) he speaks of six principles and presents the passage translated by Hegel in our text, according to which it is our own soul's partaking of these elements that makes it possible for our senses to detect them in other things. See also the presentation of these verses in Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 3.4.1000b.6–9 (Barnes, ii. 1580; KRS, no. 393, pp. 310–11) and *On the Soul* 1.2.404b.13–15 (Barnes, i. 645), as well as the following note. The translation in *W.* xiii. 361 (MS?) incorrectly reads 'divine air' for αἰθῆρ ('ether' or 'pure air') and 'eternal fire' (ours has 'divine fire') for

totality of these elements, and in this way 'it relates itself to earth according to the principle of earth, to water according to that of water, with air [we are aware of] divine air, with fire [the] eternal fire, with love [we know] love, and with strife grievous strife'.[231] But these elements are not merely juxtaposed the way they are in our representation; Empedocles places fire on one side and the others as antithesis, and expresses something universal.[232] He refers also to the process of these elements but without being more specific about it. Uniting and separating are active combinations.[233] This is what Empedocles says. But it is still quite indefinite and incomplete. These are the principal moments. | 86

### *b. Leucippus and Democritus*

In Empedocles we see the emergence of a determinacy of principles to a greater extent than in Heraclitus, for we have consciousness of diversity. But in part the principles still have the character of physical being, and in part they have, to be sure, that of ideal being (friendship and enmity)—although the form is not yet that of thought. In Leucippus and Democritus, in contrast, we see principles that are more ideal, the atom and the nothing. With regard to their philosophical thoughts, these two philosophers are to be taken up and treated together. Democritus is said to have elaborated the

---

πῦρ αἰδηλον ('consuming fire'). The error could lie in copying the Greek text, since the *Poesis philosophica* (p. 19) has these terms correctly.

231. Hegel's sudden introduction of the soul into the doctrine of basic principles is probably based on Aristotle's *On the Soul* 1.2.404b.7–15 (Barnes, i. 644–5), which, as indicated above, presents the verses just cited. See also his *Metaphysics* 3.4.1000b.3–9 (Barnes, ii. 1580), which questions whether, if like is supposed to know like, God, who contains no strife, could on this view know strife. On the relation of the soul to the elements, see also the Fabricius edition of Sextus Empiricus (p. 389, n. T, to *Adv. math.* 7.92). Hegel's view of the soul's relation to the elements as seen by Empedocles seems less influenced by Aristotle ('like knows like') than by the emphasis Sextus places on 'participation'; see the preceding note, as well as *W.* xiii. 361.

232. On the special status of fire, see Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.4.985a.31–b.3 (Barnes, ii. 1558) and *Gen. corr.* 2.3.330b.19–21 (Barnes, i. 541).

233. These elliptical closing remarks on Empedocles, as conveyed by the transcripts, forgo any concrete presentation of union and separation; cf. *W.* xiii. 362. Uniting and separating stand not for the principles of love and strife respectively but for mixing and interchanging (μείξις, διάλλαξις). His consistent development of this point leads Empedocles to challenge the actual coming into being of anything (φύσις construed as 'birth'); see Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* 1.1.314b.6–8 (Barnes, i. 513). In *W.* xiii. 362 (MS?) Hegel refers to this passage as well as to 2.6.333b.14–15 (Barnes, i. 546), there translating φύσις unsuitably as 'nature' (as does Tennemann, *Geschichte*, i. 256), and διάλλαξις as 'separation' (*Trennung*) rather than as 'interchange'. This may indicate that Hegel based his translation on a text that supports this rendering, such as [Pseudo-]Plutarch, *De plac. phil.* 1.30.1 (Hutten, xii. 389); cf. Sturz, *Empedocles*, 517. In *W.* xiii. 362 (MS?) Hegel also cites Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 3.3, probably meaning by that the passage 998a.30–b.13 (Barnes, ii. 1577).

teaching of Leucippus further, although it is not possible to decide what historically belongs to him in particular.[234] As a whole the doctrine is still quite undeveloped and it cannot satisfy us.

We know nothing of the native land or life circumstances of Leucippus except that Democritus was his friend and pupil.[235] Democritus was an Abderite, from Abdera on the Black Sea. He lived about the eightieth Olympiad, and some place his birth about the seventy-first Olympiad. This makes him a contemporary of Socrates. His relationship to his fellow countrymen, the Abderites, was the subject of much comment, and Diogenes Laertius recounts many unflattering anecdotes about it. He was very rich; he had a large fortune. His father had shown hospitality to Xerxes during the campaign against Greece. His fortune amounted to 100 talents, which is somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 talers. He spent this fortune on travels to Egypt and to the East. When he returned to his native land, he lived very modestly, very simply; he was supported by his brother because he had spent his fortune. He came to be highly revered among his fellow countrymen—not owing to his philosophy but because of a number of prophetic sayings. Since he had spent his fortune, he could not be buried in the family tomb. But he is said to have read his work Διάκοσμος before his fellow citizens, the Abderites, and they presented him with 500 talents for doing
87 so. | They erected a statue to him, and they buried him with great pomp after he died without any lamentation. This present from the citizens was supposedly an Abderite jest. Democritus was over 100 years old.[236]

234. This view is not based on the ancient sources on which Hegel most relies—Diogenes Laertius, Plato, Aristotle, Sextus Empiricus—for they do not go extensively into the relationship between the two. It is based rather on the fact that Leucippus was overshadowed by Democritus, as Tennemann presents them (*Geschichte*, i. 271, 273–4); see also Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 265 ff.) and Ritter (*Geschichte*, 308), the latter agreeing with Hegel that in their individual views they are hard to distinguish from one another.

235. Here again Hegel draws upon his contemporary sources, Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 224) and Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 256–7); Ritter (*Geschichte*, 308) even questions whether Leucippus was a pupil of Democritus. *W.* xiii. 365 cites Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.30 (Hicks, ii. 438–9), who reports his birthplace variously as Elea, Abdera, or Miletus, and says he was a pupil of Zeno (cf. *W.* xiii. 366). Each reflects an effort to link him to a particular school—either stressing his closeness to the Eleatics or to the Ionian philosophers of nature, or viewing him exclusively as founder of the Atomists. On the link between Leucippus and Democritus, see Diogenes, 9.34 (Hicks, ii. 442–5; KRS, no. 542, pp. 402–3) and Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.4.985b.4–5 (Barnes, ii. 1558; KRS, no. 555, pp. 413–14).

236. Diogenes Laertius says (*Lives* 9.34; see the preceding note) that Democritus was from Abdera or, according to some, Miletus; Hegel's contemporary sources (Tiedemann, *Geist*, i. 263; Tennemann, *Geschichte*, i. 271; Ritter, *Geschichte*, 308) mention only Abdera. The erroneous location of Abdera on the Black Sea (transmitted by An., Gr., and Lw.) may be Hegel's mistake; *W.* xiii. 365, 378, situates it correctly in Thrace. Diogenes (9.41; Hicks,

The system of Atomism originates with Democritus—the atom and the void, the full (or real) and the nothing. The principles of all things are the full, τὸ πλήρης, and the empty (or void), τὸ κενόν. The principle is therefore that the atom and the void are what is true, what has being in and for itself—not atoms as we speak of them, not this one alone as we picture it to ourselves, for instance, as floating in the air, for the intervening space, this nothing, is just as necessary, and they defined it as the negative of the one, or as the void. Democritus opposes the atom and the void to one another. Thus we have here the first appearance of the atomic system.[237]

The following points also need to be stated about this atomic principle. The one is what has being for itself—an essential, necessary thought-determination; the atomic principle is not something dead and gone, for in this aspect there will always be a need for it. The one is not something over and done with; it is now and ever will be. This thought-determination must play a part in every logical philosophy, as an essential moment though not as what is ultimate.[238]

---

ii. 450–1) puts the birth of Democritus either in the eightieth Olympiad (460–457 BC) or in the third year of the seventy-seventh (470–469 BC); Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 263) has the seventy-second, and Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 271) settles on the time of the seventieth through the seventy-second. Hegel probably picked the midpoint of Tennemann's range for the birthdate in our text (496–493 BC) and erroneously (as transmitted by An., Gr., Lw., and Sv.) reported as his time of flourishing one of the birth dates given by Diogenes. The earliest of the dates is incompatible with the report of Diogenes (9.34) that Democritus was forty years younger than Anaxagoras, who was quite probably born about 500 BC. Tennemann (p. 271 n) mentions that the father of Democritus was hospitable to Xerxes. Diogenes does not recount so many unflattering anecdotes about Democritus as Hegel maintains, so Hegel was probably influenced by the ridicule heaped on the Abderites by classical authors such as Cicero, Lucian, Juvenal, and Martial, a ridicule echoed in modern times in Pierre Bayle's article on 'Abdera' in his *Historical and Critical Dictionary*, 3rd edn. (Rotterdam, 1720), and in Christoph Martin Wieland, *Geschichte der Abderiten: Eine sehr wahrscheinliche Geschichte* (Weimar, 1776), 15. On the fortune of Democritus, his travels, and his subsequent life in Abdera, see Diogenes, 9.35–6, 39 (Hicks, ii. 444–9; KRS, no. 544, p. 406). Diogenes says it was the *Great Diacosmos* that he read aloud; he was also reportedly the author of a *Lesser Diacosmos*, among other works. Diogenes also reports on discrepant versions of these last events as recounted by Demetrius and Hippobotus.

237. On the initial statement of the principles, see Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.4.985b.4–9 (Barnes, ii. 1558; KRS, no. 555, pp. 413–14). According to Aristotle here the Atomists 'say that what is is no more than what is not, because body no more is than the void', a formulation that Hegel erroneously ascribes to Heraclitus (see above, p. 73 with n. 192). The remainder of the passage is based on Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 7.135, on which see n. 243 just below, as well as *W.* xiii. 366 (MS?). Diogenes too says of Leucippus (9.30; Hicks, ii. 440–1) that he was the first to make atoms the first principles.

238. The *Science of Logic* sets forth the historical background of this category of the one, and makes clear that it is one of the initial logical categories. See *GW* xi. 91–3, xxi. 150–4; Miller, pp. 163–9. In our text the following paragraph and the first sentence of the next discuss the significance of the atomic principle in the terms of the *Science of Logic*.

The more concrete definition of the one, of unity, or of being, is that the one is being-for-self, namely, being, or simple relation to self. But this relation is also defined more amply, for this being-for-self is relation to self through negation of other-being. I am for myself, that is, not only I *am* but also within myself I negate all other, from myself I exclude every-
88 thing | other. It is negation of other-being. Other-being is what is negative over against me. Negation of other-being is negation of negation, that is, the absolute negativity. I am for myself—for I negate other-being, the negative, and this negation of negation is affirmation. So this relation to myself subsists as an affirmation that is no less a result; it is mediated by an other but through negation of the other. It involves mediation, but a mediation that is itself no less superseded. Being-for-self is a grand and essential principle. Becoming is only the transposition of being into nothing and of nothing into being, where each is negated. But now we have both, the negative and its negating, simply being on their own [*einfach bei sich selbst sein*].

That is the principle of being-for-self, which came to proper consciousness in Leucippus and became the absolute determination. There is progression from being and from becoming. Of course, what comes next in logical order after that is determinate being [*Dasein*], although it is what is phenomenal, or semblance; it belongs to the sphere of appearance, so that it is incapable of being made into the principle of a philosophy. Determinate being is only relation to other; it has not yet reverted to unity with self.[239] The historical development of philosophy must correspond to the development of logical philosophy, although there must be points in the latter that do not occur in the historical development. These points are the stages of difference, and determinate being belongs among them. For instance, if we wanted to make determinate being the principle, that would be only what we have in our ordinary consciousness. Things are there determined through

239. The initial determinations of Hegel, *Science of Logic*, are: Being, Nothing, Becoming, Determinate Being (*GW* xi. 43–60, xxi. 68–98; Miller, pp. 82 ff.). But he does not follow the same path of argument that he adopts in both editions of that work, when he here interprets determinate being as phenomenal, as a mere semblance that belongs to the sphere of appearance—to a realm treated in the second book of the *Science of Logic*, under the doctrine of essence (see Miller, pp. 394 ff., 499 ff.). In the Logic of the *Encyclopedia* (3rd edn., §85; Wallace, pp. 156–8) Hegel makes a further departure, taking into account the order of the *Science of Logic*, by arguing that the second determination of a domain—as a determination of difference—cannot be grasped as a definition of the absolute, and declares it to be a definition of the finite. On this, see also the following note. On determinate being as relation to other, see *GW* xi. 60–2; in the second edition of the *Science of Logic* (*GW* xxi. 105–6) the concept of 'something' (*Etwas*) replaces the concept of determinate being.

relation | to other things. This [determinate being] is a category of unthinking consciousness.[240] 89

But now mutual externality is grasped in the 'one' by Leucippus. Being-for-self is still the abstract way of being concrete. But, when the principle wants to make itself more concrete, and explains the appearing of the world, then we discover right away how inadequate and poor it is. The essential definition is the one over against unity, against being; it is singularity and universality—individuality or subjectivity, and universality; these are the characteristics of the system of Leucippus.

Everything involves this antithesis—there is the law and my will, and so on—and we only know what these seemingly arid categories amount to when we also discover concretely that everything revolves around this definition, as do freedom and law. Both are will. Here everything involves just this antithesis of the definition of the singular and the universal. The principle of the one is wholly ideal; it pertains wholly to thought, even though the assertion that the atom exists was also intended. Thus in Leucippus we are offered the hypothesis [*Vorstellung*] that we cannot see the atoms simply because of their smallness—just as they tell us today about molecules.[241] But this is only a subterfuge. We cannot see the atom or the one because it is an abstraction of thought. We cannot pull the atom apart because it is always one. We cannot exhibit it with the magnifying glass or the scalpel, because what we can exhibit is always matter, which is composite. This [that is exhibited] is a mutual externality, not [the] exclusive being-for-self. | 90

Hence the principle of the one is wholly ideal, but not as if it were only in thoughts or in my head; instead it is ideal in this connection, that thought is the true essence of things. And for that reason the philosophy of Leucippus is no empirical philosophy and the atom is nothing empirical. Tennemann is quite wrong when he says, on the contrary, that the system of Leucippus acknowledges the world of experience as the only objectively real world and

240. The thesis of a parallel development in the history of philosophy and in logic appears in the introduction to these lectures (see Vol. I of this edition) and also in a text newly incorporated into the second edition of the *Science of Logic* (*GW* xxi. 76). On the absence of certain logical stages in the historical development, see the preceding note. The *Encyclopedia* and these lectures thematize the issue in different perspectives, systematic and historical respectively. The *Encyclopedia* takes the stages of difference to be unsuitable for defining the absolute; these lectures simply exclude them from the historical account.

241. In *On Generation and Corruption* 1.8.325a.23–30 (Barnes, i. 532) Aristotle presents Leucippus as teaching that what is is a plenum, which is not itself one but consists of an infinite number of minute and invisible components. This passage is cited in part in *W.* xiii. 369 (MS?) and in full in Tennemann, *Geschichte*, i. 261 n. 6, and 262–3 n. 7.

bodies as the only genuine beings [*Wesen*].[242] The one is invisible; nothing is more remote from experience than the atom and the void.

Leucippus and Democritus say that it is not through the senses that we become conscious of truth. Democritus is expressly reported to have said: 'Warm and cold, sweet and bitter, colors, and the like, are so according to opinion. This is all empirical but it does not pertain to truth, for in truth (ἐτεῇ) there is only the indivisible, the ἄτομον, and the void, κενόν.'[243] 'Individual' is the literal translation of ἄτομον; by it we directly represent to ourselves something concrete and singular.

These principles deserve our great respect, for they constitute an advance. But their inadequacy is readily apparent as soon as we move on beyond them. All further concretion or actuality, the existent generally, is portrayed in such a way that it is only through dissolution and division or through union and conjunction that everything *is*. Union constitutes the origin of bodies; their perishing is only dissolution. All further categories of the concrete are subsumed under these. But uniting and dividing is only an external relatedness, since something independent gets bound to something independent; they remain independent and so it is but a mechanical union and no true union, else it would not have been able to be separated. In its
91 truth everything is the | atom: organic life, the spiritual, and so on. So concretion is only combination. Hence change, production, and creation are only external; they are mere union, and so they are also separation. Here the total inadequacy [of the hypothesis] is directly evident. This system has been resuscitated in the modern era too, by Gassendi in particular, and it is widely prevalent. The only difference is that he called the atoms 'molecules'.[244] But the main thing is that once we grant independent subsistence to these atoms, molecules, particles, and so on, all union becomes merely mechanical; in other words, the united elements nevertheless remain remote from one another. The bond between them is only external; it is a combination, for there is no actual union or unity.

Leucippus felt the need for a more specific distinction than this superficial one of union and separation, and he tried to supply it by saying that atoms

242. See Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 261) and *W.* xiii. 370 (MS?). For this reason Tennemann says this system is a type of materialism.

243. Sextus Empiricus reports this in *Adv. math.* 7.135 (Bury, ii. 74–5; KRS, no. 549, p. 410); cf. *W.* xiii. 379 (MS?).

244. On Gassendi as reviver of Epicureanism, and thus atomism, see Vol. III of this edition. Although some encyclopedias from Hegel's day say that Gassendi simply equated his 'molecules' with the atoms, this is incorrect. His molecules are corpuscles possessing distinct qualities, and on the scale of things they fall somewhere between atoms and objects of the bodily senses. See Pierre Gassendi, *Epicuri philosophiae tomus primus*, 3rd edn. (Lyons, 1675), 108a, 123b.

are diverse, that they move, they divide from one another, they repel one another—repulsion, exclusion of being-for-self—they unite and so constitute bodies or what is actual.[245] He also sought to specify their diversity more precisely. Aristotle reports that Leucippus said the atoms differ first of all in shape, as does A from N, secondly in order, as AN differs from NA, and thirdly in position, as N differs from Z.[246] This distinction is already inconsistent by itself. The atom is what is individual, the wholly simple one, which is equal to itself, and we cannot properly speak of 'shape', nor of 'order' and 'position', because the atoms are completely alike. By themselves these specifications are very inadequate.

Aristotle also says that, in speaking of the sensible domain, Democritus and most of the other ancient philosophers do something very inept, since they want to make everything sensible into something tangible, and that is a bad thing to do. Everything sensed is | reduced to shape, to the differing 92
combination of molecules, which makes something susceptible to smelling or tasting. They say therefore that white and black differ in that one (white) is rough while black is smooth.[247] The same reduction has been attempted in the modern period. There is the impulse of reason here, but it is on a false path, since such an arrangement of molecules is a wholly vacuous generality.

The way in which Leucippus sought to represent the genesis of the universe, according to his principle of the atoms and the void, is an equally empty hypothesis. Diogenes Laertius provides a detailed elaboration as follows. There is the great void, and the atoms in it make up a vortex together; they jostle together and circle about, and atoms of the same kind are segregated together. Had they been in equilibrium, they would never be able to move about. The finer ones go into the outer void, as it were, whereas the others remain together, and, as they get entangled, they coalesce and

245. The view that Leucippus accepts this kind of superficial distinction is expressed by Aristotle in *On Generation and Corruption* 1.8.325a.31–4 (Barnes, i. 532) and in *On the Heavens* 3.4.303a.4–8, 10–12 (Barnes, i. 496; KRS, no. 579, pp. 423–4). Perhaps Hegel is here drawing upon the account of the cosmology of Leucippus found in Diogenes Laertius; see n. 248 just below.

246. The final symbol is N laid on its side. Aristotle enumerates these distinctions in *Metaphysics* 1.4.985b.10–19 (Barnes, ii. 1558); cf. *W.* xiii. 374 (MS?). See also his *On Generation and Corruption* 1.1.314a.21–4 (Barnes, i. 512) and 315b.6–9 (Barnes, i. 514–15; KRS, no. 562, p. 416), where these differences are said to account for differences in phenomenal objects.

247. See Aristotle, *De sensu et sensibilibus* [*Sense and Sensibilia*] 4.442a.29–b.12 (Barnes, i. 702; KRS, no. 527, p. 428). Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 287 n. 43) cites this text in Greek, as does *W.* xiii. 375 n. 2; the translation in *W.* xiii. 376 is not wholly accurate. Aristotle does not say that Democritus and Leucippus reduced *all* sensible attributes to shape or figure, but only those involving taste. The statement in *W.* xiii. 376 that 'they reduce everything to the sense of taste' cannot have come from Tennemann, for it is not contained there.

form the earth, then a moist membrane, and so on, and at last the stars.[248] This is a vacuous presentation. The atoms move. Thus the principle of their movement is the void or the negative, the negative over against the affirmative. The atoms relate to one another and to this negation of them (the void), and this relation is a change in them that can be grasped only as movement. The principle and the advance that it constitutes deserve our great respect. But, if we go further, onward to the concrete, then, as we have seen, the
93 inadequacy of this system is evident. |

6. Anaxagoras

Aristotle says of him that he appeared like a sober person among drunkards. He also says that the philosophers before him are comparable to the combatants called 'natural [i.e. untrained] fighters', for, just as natural fighters often make good thrusts that are not in accord with the martial art, so these philosophers seem to have no consciousness of what they are saying.[249] It was this very consciousness that arose in Anaxagoras. He says that what is universal in and for itself, what is objective, is thought in and for itself. Being, becoming, and one are thoughts; they are nothing sensuous, nor are they representations created by human imagination, like the gods, with a content taken from the sensuous domain. 'Being' and the others are just thoughts in some definite form or other. But Anaxagoras says that it is not some definite thought or other that is substance, but thought in and for itself. We must not, however, represent subjective thought to ourselves under this heading, for in doing so we shall think right away of thinking as it is in our consciousness. No, we must represent objective thought instead—as when

248. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.31–3 (Hicks, ii. 440–3; KRS, no. 563, pp. 416–18). The transcripts convey a free rendition, severely abbreviated toward the end, of the translation of this passage given in *W.* xiii. 377 (MS?).

249. What Aristotle says, at the end of a long discussion of inadequacies of the early philosophies, is that one who views reason as present throughout nature is like a sober person contrasted with others who talk at random, and that Anaxagoras was such a person (*Metaphysics* 1.3.984a.17–b.19; Barnes, ii. 1556–7). Aristotle's subsequent remark (1.4.985a.10–23; Barnes, ii. 1558) relates not to philosophers before Anaxagoras, as our text suggests, but to those who for the first time posited two kinds of causes, namely, matter and the source of motion. Among them he includes Parmenides, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras. So he clearly counts Empedocles and Anaxagoras as untrained fighters. His subsequent comments show that he regards Empedocles more highly than Anaxagoras, in particular for having introduced two additional causes by positing the division of good (as principle of what is, and its motion) into good (friendship) and its contrary, evil or strife (1.3.984b.20–3, 1.4.984b.32–985a.10, 985a.29–31; Barnes, ii. 1557–8); see n. 226 above. Hegel's high assessment of Anaxagoras finds a sounder basis in the speech of Socrates in Plato, *Phaedo* 97b–98b, on which see n. 267, p. 104 below. On these Aristotle passages, see *W.* xiii. 381 (MS?).

we say that there is reason or understanding in conscious nature or in nature generally, or when we speak of kinds in nature. The natural genera are what is universal. For example, the dog is an animal and animal is the genus, what is substantial in the dog; the dog itself is an animal. These laws, this universal aspect, and this understanding are thus immanent in nature, they are what is essential in nature. The table, too, is rationally made, but the equality and parallel placement of its four legs are an understanding external to the wood itself—so the understanding is regarded as an external form that is imposed on the object. That is not how we must take all this, however, for what is meant here, on the contrary, is the understanding or the universal factor that is the immanent nature of the objects themselves. | This is the principle. 94
So, whereas thus far we had thoughts, universal thoughts, now we have thought in general, and that has been made into the principle.

Anaxagoras concludes this period, which we usually refer to as Ionian philosophy; after him a new one begins.[250] In accordance with the received view that principles pass down from teacher to pupils, he is presented as an Ionian philosopher, because Hermotimus of Clazomenae was his teacher.[251]

250. Only Pn. has this statement, which contravenes the time-honored practice of distinguishing Ionian and Italian branches of these most ancient philosophies; see n. 5, p. 16 above. Ritter, for instance, largely respects this distinction; see n. 3, p. 15 above. Hegel has already discussed non-Ionians: Pythagoras, Parmenides, Zeno, and Empedocles. Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 53–74) construes 'Ionian' so narrowly as to embrace only Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes. Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 388–91) has a more complex schema but also a narrow construal of 'Ionians' as distinguished from Pythagoreans and Eleatics. Tennemann and Tiedemann both conclude the first period of philosophy with the Sophists, not with Anaxagoras. Hegel's unconventional use of 'Ionian' here could be justified by a broad conception embracing both island and mainland Ionians and taking account of the geographic origins of Pythagoras (from Samos), of Parmenides and Zeno (from Elea, colonized by Phocaians from Ionia), and of Democritus (from Abdera, colonized by Teian exiles from Ionia); see n. 7, p. 17 above, and n. 136 above. Empedocles, however, bas no plausible tie to Ionia, if we discount contentions that he was a Pythagorean.

251. Anaxagoras is presented as an Ionian not because he belongs to an Ionian school but because he comes from Clazomenae; see n. 255 just below. Diogenes Laertius made into a structural principle of his *Lives* the 'received view' that each philosophical orientation becomes a school (σχολή) and then a sect (αἵρεσις), each having a sequence of leaders (σχολάρχαι) who are the successors (διάδοχαι) to the founder. Diogenes adopted this view from predecessors such as Sotion of Alexandria (fl. 200–170 BC), whose *Succession of the Philosophers* includes Anaxagoras; see n. 260 just below. Diogenes (2.6; Hicks, i. 134–5) presents Anaxagoras as a pupil of Anaximenes rather than of Hermotimus, as also does Th. Aldobrandinus in a footnote to this passage in the edition of Diogenes owned by Hegel (Amsterdam, 1692), citing in support of his view Simplicius, *in Phys.* c.6b. The statement that Hermotimus was his teacher goes back to Aristotle's remark (*Metaphysics* 1.3.984b.19; Barnes, ii. 1557) that Hermotimus expressed earlier some of the same views as Anaxagoras, a remark also cited by later commentators—John Philoponos (*c.* AD 490–570), Alexander of Aphrodisias (early third century AD), and Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. math.* 9.6–7; Bury, iii. 4–5). As source of the view that Anaxagoras

An article about Hermotimus has appeared in Fülleborn's *Magazin für Geschichte der Philosophie*; it is by Carus (professor in Leipzig). Carus looks for the source of the principle that was established by Anaxagoras.[252] But this other one [Hermotimus] must in his turn have gotten it from others. Aristotle says that Hermotimus came from Clazomenae but that he had nothing clear to say, οὐδὲν φανερόν.[253]

Anaxagoras lived in the time between the Median [Persian] War and the Age of Pericles, and hence at the apogee of Hellenic life; but he also lived on into the transition period of the decline and the extinction of the beautiful Athenian life. The battle of Marathon fell in the seventy-second Olympiad, and that at Salamis in the seventy-fifth. The seventy-seventh saw the birth of Socrates.[254] In the eighty-first Olympiad Anaxagoras came to Athens. His birth is put about the seventieth Olympiad. His native city was Clazomenae in Lydia, on a small isthmus. He did not devote himself to public affairs but spent his time principally on the study of science, in temples, and traveling, and he finally came to Athens in the thirtieth or, more probably, forty-fifth
95 year of his life. He came there in the city's most flourishing period.[255] | Pericles

was a pupil of Hermotimus, a view that he himself regards with grave reservations, Ritter (*Geschichte*, 209 n. 28) also refers to John Philoponos. Brucker (*Historia*, i. 493–4) cites Aristotle, Philoponos, and Alexander (according to Simplicius, *in Phys.* 8.321).

252. See Friedrich August Carus, 'Ueber die Sagen von Hermotimos aus Klazomenae: Ein kritischer Versuch', *Beyträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie* (Jena and Leipzig), ed. Georg Gustav Fülleborn, 9 (1798), 58–147. Contrary to Pn., Carus actually seeks to illumine critically the legendary accounts concerning Hermotimus, particularly in regard to his technique of ecstasy, thus in the context of the anecdote reported by Hegel just below in our text (see the following note). Carus links him with Pherecydes, and in that way with the forerunners of Pythagoras (p. 140) more than with Anaxagoras; and he does not dispute the latter's originality even while recognizing the view of the soul held by Hermotimus as a forerunner of the doctrine of a non-corporeal cause (pp. 143–4). In a subsequent article in the same periodical—'Anaxagoras aus Klazomenae und sein Zeitgeist', 10 (1799), 162–282—Carus distinguishes Hermotimus from an earlier proponent of metempsychosis, one Hermodorus (see pp. 211–12 n.).

253. Aristotle (*Metaphysics* 1.3.984b.18–20; Barnes, ii. 1557) does not say this about Hermotimus. From *W.* xiii. 392 (MS?) it is plain that Hegel construed the adverb φανερῶς ('clearly' or 'certainly') with the wrong verb, reading 'We know that Anaxagoras adopted these views clearly, but Hermotimus of Clazomenae is credited with expressing them earlier', rather than, as modern translations do, 'We know that Anaxagoras certainly adopted these views'. This assessment of Hermotimus colors the entire passage in which Hegel paraphrases an anecdote about his soul leaving his body, reported by Pliny (*Historia naturalis* 7.52) and transmitted by Brucker (*Historia*, i. 493–4 n.) and Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 300); *Natural History*, trans. H. Rackham et al., 10 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1938–62), ii. 622–3; see *W.* xiii. 392, where it is given as 7.53; cf. *W.* xiii. 271.

254. See n. 29, p. 127 below.

255. Diogenes Laertius mentions the origins of Anaxagoras (2.6) and variously dates his birth in the seventieth Olympiad (500–497 BC) 'according to Apollodorus' and in the first year of the seventy-fifth Olympiad (480 BC); see *Lives* 2.7, 45 (Hicks, i. 134–7, 174–5; KRS, no. 459,

stood at the head of the civic administration. He sought out Anaxagoras and lived on very intimate terms with him.[256]

At that time Athens had attained the pinnacle of its grandeur, and what now becomes especially interesting is the opposition between Athens and Sparta. Athens is at this time the seat of the arts and sciences as a whole, including philosophy. This primacy she owes to the distinctive character of her constitution and to her entire spirit. We must esteem the Lacedaemonian constitution very highly too. Its principal feature was the subordination of all personal particularity to life in the state and to the goals of the state. Individuals were conscious of their honor, their validity, and so forth, only through living and acting for the state. This is a great and essential principle, one that must be present in every genuine state, but which remains one-sided in the Lacedaemonian case. The Athenians avoided this one-sidedness, and for that reason they became greater.

In Lacedaemon, personal character [*Eigentümlichkeit*], the particular personality or individuality, was so much less regarded that individuals could not have a free development and expression of their own. Particular

pp. 352–3). Diogenes says (2.7) that he settled in Athens at age 20, which corresponds to the seventy-fifth Olympiad, not the eighty-first. Other elements in his report are not consistent. He says Anaxagoras came to Athens at age 20, during the archonship of Callias (456 BC), and spent thirty years there. If this date is correct and he was born about 500 BC, then he would have been nearly 45 at this time. If, however, as recent researchers believe, he came to Athens in the archonship of Calliades (480 BC), at age 20, according to the figures of Diogenes he would then have left Athens about 450 BC, which is not the case. In favoring the figure 45 Hegel thus follows Diogenes on the archonship but not on the age of Anaxagoras at the time. This is also the position taken by Meiners (*Geschichte*, i. 724), Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 313), Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 300), and Ritter (*Geschichte*, 204). Hegel obviously follows Tennemann in these matters as well as in the dates given for the two battles (see *Geschichte*, i. 415). The figure of age 30 in our text, from Gr. and Sv., has no support in the sources and is possibly the result of confusing separate statements in Diogenes about Anaxagoras arriving in Athens and his spending thirty years there. In *W.* xiii. 383 Hegel describes more fully the location of Clazomenae, by drawing upon Strabo, *Geography* 14.1.31 (Jones, vi. 238–9); cf. also 1.3.17 (Jones, i. 216–17) and Pausanias, *Description of Greece* 7.3.8–10—trans. W.H.S. Jones, 4 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1918–33), iii. 184–5. Diogenes reports (2.6–7) that Anaxagoras did not devote himself to public affairs but to science; see also Plutarch, *Lives* (*Pericles* 16; Perrin, iii. 52–5) and Plato, *Greater Hippias* 281c (Fowler, pp. 338–9). The travels of Anaxagoras are mentioned by Carus (see n. 252 just above—'Ueber die Sagen', 61), Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 300), and Ritter (*Geschichte*, 203), the latter two citing Valerius Maximus, *Dictorum factorumque memorabilium* 8.7.6; see *Scriptores Latini* (London, 1819 ff.), cxix. 770. Ritter's other citations of Plutarch and Cicero are in error. Only Pn. refers to time spent in temples, and this could be a mistake.

256. See Plutarch, *Lives* (*Pericles* 4–5; Perrin, iii. 10–13). See also *Pericles* 6, 8 (Perrin, iii. 14–17, 20–2), and Plato, *Alcibiades I* 118b–c; *Charmides, Alcibiades I and II, Hipparchus, The Lovers, Theages, Minos, and Epinomis*, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1927), 154–5.

personality was not acknowledged, and hence it was not brought into harmony or unity with the general life and purpose of the state. This abrogation of the right of particularity, or of personality, was carried to an extreme by the Lacedaemonians, and we find the same principle in Plato's *Republic*, expressed in his own fashion.[257] The Athenians, however, had democracy as well, and theirs was indeed a purer democracy than that of Lacedaemon. Each citizen had his own substantial consciousness in unity with the laws, with the state; but individuality, the spirit and thought of the individual, was at the same time allowed free rein to develop, to confirm,
96 express, and indulge itself. In Athens the principle of subjective | freedom comes to the fore in all its vigor. And we shall have to highlight this, particularly in the following period.

The principle of subjective freedom at first appears as still bound up with its essential foundation, the universal foundation of Greek ethical life, of legality, and of mythology. Insofar as it still stands in unity with this foundation, this principle of subjective freedom gave rise in its deployment to [what we know as] the grand and beautiful masterpieces of the plastic arts as well as the immortal works of poetry and history. At this stage the principle of subjectivity had not yet taken the form in which the content too is supposed to be a subjectively particular content, or at least not in distinction from the universal, substantial foundation, the universal ethical life, legality, and religion. In the great [artistic and literary] works, subjectivity made its appearance in unity with the substantial content. Thus the principle of subjective freedom was only the bringing of this unity to consciousness. In these works, therefore, we see the great, divine, and authentic content made into the object for consciousness and brought before consciousness as such. This form of subjectivity subsequently becomes free on its own account and sets itself up in antithesis to the substantial aspect, or in general to custom as such, to law and religion, as we shall see for ourselves later on.

In Anaxagoras we see the foundation of this principle of subjectivity, but a foundation that is still quite general. He lived somewhat earlier than Socrates, though Socrates was acquainted with him.[258] In this time of flowering, the principle of which we just noted, he came to Athens. Athens

257. See pp. 223–5 below; cf. *W.* xiv. 289–93.

258. According to Diogenes Laertius, Anaxagoras was born either about 500 BC or about 480 BC (see n. 255 above), whereas Socrates was born in the fourth year of the seventy-seventh Olympiad—469 BC (*Lives* 2.44; Hicks, i. 174–5). Since both lived in Athens, it is probable that they were acquainted. Diogenes (2.19, 45; Hicks, i. 148–9, 174–5) even says Socrates was a pupil of Anaxagoras, as does Hegel (see p. 127 below). Plato certainly does not confirm their acquaintance; *Phaedo* 97b–98b (Fowler, pp. 334–9) reports only that Socrates heard readings from a book by Anaxagoras and subsequently read it himself. See pp. 104–5 below, with n. 267.

was the seat of the great luminaries of art and science; many philosophers, and renowned Sophists in particular, | visited Athens, and in this period 97
especially they resided there for a while. Anaxagoras lived in Athens as a friend of Pericles; but it is also said that he got into difficult straits in his outward circumstances because Pericles neglected him. The lamp that gave Pericles his light he failed to supply with oil.[259]

What is more important is that Anaxagoras was accused of despising the gods, those that the people accepted as such. We will touch more fully upon this sort of complaint in the case of Socrates. Anaxagoras was accused of taking the sun and the stars to be red-hot rocks. Something that the prophets (μάντεις) held to be a miracle he declared to be natural.[260] Yet we find a number of similar views in all the philosophers from Thales onwards. The common theme of all the views that the philosophers held about objects of this kind is that what we call nature has been divested of its divinity, that the beautiful poetry or fanciful imagination of the Greeks has been degraded into prose. In other words, they declared these objects—stars and the like—to be mere things, just as we regard them in that way too. For us they are things, objects external to spirit, objects devoid of spirit.[261]

259. See Plutarch, *Pericles* 16 (Perrin, iii. 52–5), where it says that Anaxagoras nearly died of starvation before Pericles came to his aid, doing so more out of concern at losing a political adviser than for his own sake. Then Anaxagoras said to him: 'Pericles, even those who need a lamp pour oil into it.'

260. The first part of the charge against Socrates was that he taught disrespect of the gods; see pp. 148–50 below, with nn. 70, 72–75. On this teaching of Anaxagoras about the heavenly bodies, and the complaint about it, see n. 262 just below as well as Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 2.8–12; Hicks, i. 136–43), who says Anaxagoras thought that there are dwellings, hills, and ravines on the moon. This shows that he did not suppose all the heavenly bodies consisted of red-hot metal. A fragment from Hippolytus, *Refutation* 1.8.3–10 (MacMahon, p. 15 = 1.7; KRS, no. 502, pp. 380–1), not known in Hegel's day, presents the contradictory views that Anaxagoras taught that the moon is a red-hot rock, but also that it shines by light received from the sun and has valleys and the like, as Diogenes reports; see *Lives* 2.9 for the distinction Anaxagoras drew between luminous and non-luminous stars. Sometimes Anaxagoras speaks of all heavenly bodies as stones (*Lives* 2.11–12), thus justifying our text's identification of the sun with the stars. On the views of Anaxagoras about the conditions under which meteors fall, in connection with the meteor that fell at Aegospotami, see Plutarch, *Lives—Lysander* 12 (Perrin, iv. 260–5); Pliny, *Natural History* 2.59 (Rackham, i. 284–7). The account of his naturalistic explanation of a supposed miracle is based on Plutarch, *Pericles* 6 (Perrin, iii. 14–17), who says that Lampon the seer treated a one-horned ram's head as a sign given regarding the resolution of the political struggle between the party of Thucydides and that of Pericles, whereupon Anaxagoras opened the head and showed how the single horn was the result of a natural deformity of the animal's brain. (Plutarch then remarks that both interpretations can be correct, one identifying the divine purpose of the sign and the other its natural cause.)

261. On Thales, see p. 26 above. Hegel could be thinking of when Thales predicted a solar eclipse (see n. 7, p. 17 above) as well as of reports in Diogenes Laertius about what Anaximander and Anaximenes said about the heavenly bodies (*Lives* 2.1, 3; Hicks, i. 130–3; KRS, nos. 94,

'Thing' [*Ding*] can be derived from 'thinking' [*Denken*]. What thinking does essentially is to hunt down those objects and representations that we may call divine or poetic, together with the whole range of superstition, and demote them all to the level of what we call natural things. It is precisely in thinking that spirit knows itself as the truly subsistent identity of itself and actual being. For the spirit that knows itself in its actuality, what is
98 unspiritual | or external downgrades itself to the level of the negation of spirit, of something devoid of spirit, of the prosaic, at the level of things. Through thinking, spirit becomes conscious of itself. This, then, is the compass change that representation necessarily makes, because of the strengthening of thinking or because of consciousness of oneself, because of philosophy.

So Anaxagoras was accused of atheism, namely, of not accepting the gods of the people as actual gods. This accusation may have been directed particularly at Pericles, whom envy sought to injure by accusing his friend, since it was not willing to come out against him directly and publicly. In the same way his foes also brought charges against his friend Aspasia, and Pericles had to beseech the citizens tearfully, one by one, for her acquittal.[262] The Athenian people in its freedom obliged those whose superiority they conceded to perform acts of this kind, acts that demonstrated a corresponding subjection and powerlessness of these superior ones.

Reports about the outcome of the accusation against Anaxagoras differ. Pericles was very energetic on his behalf and managed at least to save him from a sentence of death. He led Anaxagoras before the people and spoke for him, that is, he pled for him, since that was what the citizens of Athens demanded. Moreover, Anaxagoras himself was already advanced in years, and his emaciated state aroused pity. The people either acquitted him or banished him, and according to these reports he went away from Athens, perhaps out of vexation at the accusation or else from fear of facing a new one. According to another account he fled from Athens with the help of Pericles and was condemned to death in absentia—a punishment

138, pp. 100, 143). In 2.11 (Hicks, i. 140–1) Diogenes seems to connect de-divinization of nature with the allegorical interpretation of Homer.

262. In *Pericles* 32 (Perrin, iii. 92–3) Plutarch tells of these accusations against Anaxagoras and Aspasia, and that their actual purpose was to harm Pericles; see also *Pericles* 24 (Perrin, iii. 68–73), on the leader's relationship with Aspasia. Regarding the defense of Anaxagoras by Pericles, see the following note.

that naturally | could not then be carried out. He died in Lampsacus when 99
he was 69 or 70 years of age.[263]

Anaxagoras recognized νοῦς as the absolute—thinking, understanding, reason.[264] This principle is very important. It is the principle of the self-determining activity, not that of being nor that of the becoming of Heraclitus, which is only process. What is at once contained in it is that, in setting itself in motion, or in constituting process, this activity maintains itself as the self-identical universal. Only a little while ago I called your attention to the concept of purpose.[265] We must not think merely of purpose in the form that it has in us, as conscious beings. We have a purpose, we carry out its specification, we realize it. In that case the purpose is my representation, and I can realize it or not. But what purpose involves is precisely the activity of realizing, for what results from the purpose by means of the activity, what is produced, must be in accord with the purpose unless one has made a bad job of it. The object [of the activity] must embody nothing else than what the purpose itself embodies. My activity is my making the purpose ever more objective. In this way there is a passing-over from subjectivity to objectivity, since the purpose is taken to be one-sided and is made objective. I am unsatisfied with my purpose, with the fact that it is only something subjective; my activity consists in removing this defect and making the purpose objective. In this objectivity the destination or goal is attained. For example, I build a house—I perform many different operations, I join things together

263. The first sentence of this paragraph is a quotation from Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 2.12) and Hegel's ensuing discussion of the legal proceedings draws mainly on the last two of the four accounts (those of Sotion, Satyrus, Hermippus, and Hieronymus) transmitted by Diogenes (2.12–14; Hicks, i. 142–5). Sotion reports that the offense of Anaxagoras lay in saying the sun consists of red-hot metal, but that, owing to the intervention of Pericles, he got off with a fine and banishment. Hermippus recounts the words of Pericles in his behalf and says that Anaxagoras was acquitted but subsequently committed suicide on account of the indignity he had suffered. Hieronymus says his emaciated condition got him acquitted out of sympathy. Satyros reports that Anaxagoras was condemned to death in absentia. Plutarch says (*Pericles* 32; Perrin, iii. 92–3) that Pericles sent him away, not that he helped him to flee. Diogenes mentions his death in Lampsacus (2.15; Hicks, i. 144–5) and puts it, according to Apollodorus, in the first year of the seventy-eighth Olympiad (468 BC)—in the edition Hegel used, but the eighty-eighth (428 BC) in modern, corrected editions (2.7; Hicks, i. 136–7; KRS, no. 459, pp. 352–3). Hegel ignores the erroneous date, as do his contemporary historians. Diogenes also says (in 2.7) that Anaxagoras lived seventy-two years.

264. Hegel places this new concept at the forefront of his presentation of Anaxagoras, unlike his sources who begin their accounts of this philosophy with a commentary on the thesis 'From nothing, nothing comes' (so Tiedemann, *Geist*, i. 316, and Tennemann, *Geschichte*, i. 305), or with the concept of a material primordial being (so Ritter, *Geschichte*, 210). Thus Hegel follows the tradition of Plato (*Phaedo* 97b–98b; Fowler, pp. 334–9) rather than that of Aristotle (see n. 266 just below).

265. See p. pp. 85–6 above, with n. 228.

and pull things apart, and the result of the purpose is its end, the house, in
100 which the purpose is realized. |

But in our representation of purpose we must not confine ourselves, as we usually do, to this subjective purpose [which] exists independently in my representation. For example, God as the wise being governs according to purposes. Here too there is representation—the fact that the purpose exists as such in a representation. But the form of the purpose is that it is only in consciousness, that it is what is universal—that it has a fixed character on its own account, and this character, which is posited by the determining activity, is then active further to realize the purpose, to make it into outwardly determinate being, into an object. This determinate being is, however, governed by the purpose, which, when embodied in it, is still the same. So purpose is what truly is [*dies Wahrhafte*], the determination of a thing [*Sache*]. In the reality, in this passage effected by the activity, the initial character is preserved and no other content emerges than the one that was already present in the purpose.

The best example of this is afforded by the living being. A living being exists, it does things and has instincts, and these are its purposes. It knows nothing about these purposes, for it just lives. Instincts are as yet only primitive, fixed determinations. The animal exerts itself to satisfy its instincts, that is, to carry out its purpose. It is active, it acts in relation to external things, to light, air, water, plants, and the like, and in doing so it functions in part mechanically in that it makes them its own, and in part chemically in that it becomes water or air. But its activity does not remain just mechanical or chemical in this way, for the external things are assimilated and the product of this process, what results, is the animal itself that already existed. It is an end in itself [*Selbstzweck*], and in its activity it only
101 produces itself. So the mechanical and chemical | relationship always gets inverted through the fact that the animal produces itself. In the case of the mechanical and chemical relationship something else results, whereas with purpose it is the same at the end as at the beginning. We can say therefore that the animal produces nothing other than itself; this is self-preservation, continual production, ever taken back into what is first, what produces. Thus nothing new arises through the activity of the living thing, for only what was present beforehand is produced.

This then is what we essentially have to think under the heading of purpose and, in general terms, this is νοῦς, or the activity that determines itself. Initially it appears as a character that is primitive and fixed, but still subjective. It appears as impulse in the soul, but then it becomes objective; thereby it becomes other, but this antithesis is sublated ever anew in such a

way that what is objective is none other than what is subjective. The commonest examples show this. In every impulse that we satisfy or realize we posit its subjective element objectively, while the objective is in turn transformed into what is subjective. This self-determining activity, which then is active upon another too, which posits itself in the antithesis but in turn negates it, masters it, and in this activity takes itself back into itself or reflects itself upon itself—this self-determining activity is νοῦς, it is thinking.

If we look more closely at how far Anaxagoras got with the development of this thinking and what further concrete meaning this νοῦς has, then all we see is that it is in general the activity that determines itself from out of itself and is, to be sure, the positing of a measure, a characteristic. The development extends no further than the characteristic of measure. Anaxagoras provides no development that is more concrete, no specification of νοῦς that is more concrete. | Yet that is what is needed, for we still have nothing 102
beyond this abstract characterization of what is inwardly concrete.

What Aristotle says about this in his *De anima* is that Anaxagoras does not always definitely distinguish between soul and νοῦς. Anaxagoras does indeed speak of νοῦς as the cause of the beautiful and the right (τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς), and yet νοῦς itself moves all things, and, so characterized, it is only the moving [cause] in general. He goes on to say that νοῦς is simple, without suffering or passivity, ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀπαθῆ, not susceptible to being determined by another, unmixed, and not standing in community with anything else.[266] These are characteristics of simple, self-determining activity. So this νοῦς relates itself to itself, it determines itself, is identical with itself, but through an operation in which it remains equal to itself. This is the one side in the principle of Anaxagoras, and in this perspective νοῦς is only what determines; it is substance. But this is highly formal, and what would now have to be shown is the relationship to what is further determinate and concrete, how νοῦς goes forth to further determinations, to development.

266. In *On the Soul* 1.2.404b.1–5 (Barnes, i. 644), after remarking that Democritus identifies soul with mind, Aristotle says that Anaxagoras 'is less clear', sometimes stating that *nous* is the cause of beauty and order, sometimes equating *nous* with soul, which is found in all living things. In 405a.13–19 (Barnes, i. 645) he says that in practice Anaxagoras treats the two as a single substance and presents *nous* alone as simple, unmixed, pure, as origin of both knowing and movement. In 405b.19–21 (Barnes, i. 646) he says that for Anaxagoras '*nous* is impassible (ἀπαθῆ) and has nothing in common with anything else'. See also Aristotle, *Physics* 8.1.250b.24–6, 8.5.256b.24–7 (Barnes, i. 418, 429); the former passage—cf. *W.* xiii. 397–8 (MS?)—says that according to Anaxagoras mind introduced motion and separation into all things, which were previously at rest, and the latter passage says mind is impassive and unmixed, for only such a thing could cause motion and be in control. See also Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.3.984b.15–19, 12.2.1069b.20–3 (Barnes, ii. 1557, 1689).

It is certain that the νοῦς of Anaxagoras remained wholly something formal, and this is nowhere more fully presented than in the *Phaedo*.[267] In Plato's *Phaedo* Socrates says about the νοῦς of Anaxagoras that νοῦς will always posit what is best. Socrates recounts how he fared with [the thought of] Anaxagoras. With Plato's eloquence Socrates says here: 'When I once heard it read from a book of Anaxagoras that the understanding is the orderer and cause of the world, I rejoiced in such a cause and on that account I took it that νοῦς arranges all reality. If it does function in this way, then it will dispose everything for the best and purpose will be shown forth. Now anyone who wishes to discover the cause why any single thing is as it is, why it comes to be or perishes, must ask in every case how it is best for it to be,
103 must determine the purpose | or the concept of each. It is fitting for human beings to consider themselves and everything else on this basis, considering only what is best and most perfect. They are then also familiar with what is bad.' Socrates continues: 'Reasoning in this way, I believed that I had found in Anaxagoras a doctrine of the cause of how things are [*des Seienden*]. Hence I believed that Anaxagoras would show me, for example, whether the earth is flat or round, or why it is in the center and so forth, and that it is better for things to be this way. And I was prepared that he should adduce no other causes, that he would show me the best regarding each single thing and then expound what is universally best for all; he would exhibit the absolutely final purpose of the world in its realization and development—everything exhibited in relation to the absolute purpose. I was filled with the most beautiful hopes. Almost nothing could move me to surrender these hopes. I was eager to get to know the good and the bad, and I read his writings zealously in order to discover what is best. But I found that with regard to the formation of things the man makes no use of νοῦς at all, but instead employs air, fire, and water, and much that is even less suitable. He seems to me to be like one who says that Socrates does everything with understanding, and then, if he were going on to provide the reason for a single event—

267. The quotations that follow in this paragraph are paraphrases, with omissions, from Plato, *Phaedo* 97b–99a (Fowler, pp. 334–41; KRS, no. 495, p. 374); cf. *W.* xiii. 408–10 (MS?). The only exception is Hegel's interpolation about Socrates declining to escape from prison, which comes from Xenophon, *Apology* 23 (but is also the theme in Plato's dialogue *Crito*); trans. O. J. Todd (*Socrates' Defense to the Jury*) in *Xenophon*, 7 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1914–25), iv. 654–7. The central theme of this passage in the *Phaedo* is the point with which Hegel introduces it, namely, that νοῦς (sometimes rendered in what follows as 'understanding'—*Verstand*) arranges everything as it is best for it to be. The statement that 'they are then also familiar with what is bad' is an abridgment of the Socratic point that familiarity with what is inferior is, by a process of contrast, derivative from knowledge of what is good.

why I am sitting here—he would say that I sit here in prison (awaiting death) because my body consists of bones and muscles, because the bones are hard in order to support my body and the muscles are capable of bending, extending, and stretching, they are capable of moving my limbs; and though he would similarly bring in voice and respiration and the like, he would, in doing so, neglect to furnish the true cause, namely, that the Athenians deemed it better to condemn me and I deemed it better and more upright to remain'—for the friends of Socrates had prepared a means of escape, which he rejected—'and to submit myself to the state and suffer the punishment. For how easily could these bones and muscles be in Megara | or in 104
Boeotia if I did not regard it as better to submit to justice.'

Plato quite correctly places these two kinds of grounds and causes in opposition to one another here—the cause deriving from purpose, and the external cause of mechanism, chemical process, and the like. In this example, however, a purpose exists insofar as a human being consciously posits it for himself. Anaxagoras makes a show of defining an ultimate purpose and determining all else accordingly. But straight away he lets the matter drop and passes over to wholly external causes. [Socrates continues:] 'To call these bones and muscles the cause is inept; it is extreme thoughtlessness. Someone who said that without bones I could not do what I take to be best would be correct, of course. But it shows a great lack of understanding not to distinguish the true cause. One is the cause according to οὐσία, the other is only that without which the cause cannot be, the condition.'[268] By this speech Plato wants to show that the νοῦς [of Anaxagoras] is only something wholly formal, and so it remains.

What comes next is the other aspect of the determinate according to Anaxagoras. Here Aristotle says the same: someone who holds that Anaxagoras has two principles would seem to be saying something paradoxical—since the general view is that νοῦς is his principle—but it would nevertheless be quite correct.[269] To use an expression characteristic of Anaxagoras, the other principle is ὁμοιομέρεια. This says that the στοιχεῖα or elements are ὁμοιομερῆ, meaning that such things as bone, metal, flesh, and so forth consist internally of like parts, are assemblages of like

268. See *Phaedo* 99a–b (Fowler, pp. 340–1); cf. *W.* xiii. 410 (MS?).

269. See *Metaphysics* 1.8.989a.30–3 (Barnes, ii. 1564). Aristotle does not speak of anything 'paradoxical' here. Hegel could have in mind the term καινοπρεπεστέρως (in 989b.6), which can mean 'in an extraordinary fashion', although modern translators give it a temporal sense—Anaxagoras is 'somewhat modern in his views' (thus Barnes). The 'general view' is that presented in Plato, *Phaedo* 97b–d, and Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.3 (see nn. 249, 267 above).

elements—so they are also called ὁμοιομερῆ, αἱ ὁμοιομερείαι, 'like parts', and this is the general name for them.[270]

On this topic Aristotle states more precisely that Anaxagoras offers a view of the elements opposed to that of Empedocles. The latter takes fire, water, air, and earth to be the primordial principles that subsist in and for themselves. But Anaxagoras regards στοιχεῖα or elements, the ὁμοιομερῆ, as
105 qualitatively determined too, and indeed as determined in an infinite | varivariety of ways, as bone, flesh, and so on; whereas air, fire, and the like are an admixture of these elements. The elements or στοιχεῖα of Anaxagoras are ἀΐδια, nonsensible and invisible owing to their smallness. The 'four elements' are mixtures of them, so that air, water, and so forth only seem to be uniform. Everything arises through them and insofar as these infinitely many principles go their separate ways. In this process of separation, like finds itself together with like. There is no coming-to-be and perishing, since coming-to-be is only the coming-together of like components and perishing only their separation. The νοῦς is the moving factor that brings like to like and separates them in turn.[271]

270. Very probably Anaxagoras did not use this terminology himself, speaking instead of the elements of things as σπέρματα ('seeds'), on which see Simplicius, *in Phys.* 34.29 (KRS, no. 483, pp. 368–9). This point is recognized since the work of Eduard Schaubach, whose collection of fragments—*Anaxagorae Clazomenii fragmenta, quae supersunt omnia* (Leipzig, 1827)—Hegel later came to possess. The term τὸ ὁμοιομερές and its variants are not attested for Anaxagoras prior to Aristotle, who uses the term in *Physics* 1.4.187a.25 (Barnes, i. 319; KRS, no. 485, pp. 368–9), 3.4.203a.21 (Barnes, i. 346), and 4.5.212b.5 (Barnes, i. 361); *De partibus animalium* [*Parts of Animals*] 2.646b.35–47a.2 (Barnes, i. 1007); *On Generation and Corruption* 1.1.314a.18–20 (Barnes, i. 512), and *On the Heavens* 3.3.302a.28–b.4 (see the following note), two passages Hegel very probably has in mind, from the examples mentioned in our text. Aristotle seems to understand the plural of his term to mean 'homogeneous parts', which is not what Anaxagoras had in mind by 'seeds'; for a discussion of this issue, see KRS, pp. 365–78. According to *W.* xiii. 399, Hegel took from Friedrich Wilhelm Riemer, *Griechisch–Deutsches Hand-Wörterbuch*, pt. 2 (Jena, 1816), 176, the renderings he uses there for the abstract and plural Greek forms respectively: 'the similarity of individual parts to the whole', 'the elements or primary matter'. These forms are also attested by later sources: Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr.* 3.32–3 (Bury, i. 344–7), the latter part of which is cited in *W.* xiii. 399; [Pseudo-]Plutarch, *De plac. phil.* 1.3.5 (Hutten, xii. 351; KRS, nos. 496–7, pp. 374–5, 378); Plutarch, *Pericles* 4 (Perrin, iii. 10–13).

271. See Aristotle, *On the Heavens* 3.3.302a.28–b.4 (Barnes, i. 495; KRS, no. 494, p. 373), for the passage on which this account is partially based. There Aristotle says specifically that, according to Anaxagoras, the homoeomerous consists in elements such as bone, flesh, and the like, while air (Barnes has 'earth') and fire (and presumably earth and water), of which all things are composed, are themselves mixtures, each containing all the different kinds of homoeomerous elements or 'seeds'. On the elements as without sensible characteristics, and on their role in coming to be and perishing, see *Metaphysics* 1.3.983b.7–12, 984a.13–16 (Barnes, ii. 1555–6), and *Physics* 1.4.187a.32–b.1 (Barnes, i. 320; KRS, no. 485, pp. 368–9). Cf. *W.* xiii. 400–1 (MS?). On νοῦς as the moving factor, see *Physics* 8.1.250b.25–6 (Barnes, i. 418), as well as n. 1, p. 14 above, and n. 266 just above.

This is the general view, and it is quite the same as the one that prevails in our own time—in chemistry, for instance—when we speak of there being absolutely simple chemical elements. The chemical elements are oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and so on, which are held to exist on their own account. But then there is also what is concrete—gold, silver, and comparable metals. Chemistry tells us that, if we want to know what flesh, wood, stone, and so forth truly are, then we must display their simple components clearly. These count as what is ultimate. Yet it is also conceded that they are only relatively simple. In this regard many things naturally appear to us as simple that are not so—for instance, platinum, which consists of three to four metals.[272] Thus for a long time water and air were held to be simple, prior to their [chemical] analysis. In this chemical perspective the principles of natural things are taken to be qualitatively determinate and hence immutable, unchanging. On this view a human being consists of a quantity of carbon, hydrogen, and nitrogen, with a little bit of earth, oxides, phosphorus, and the like. This is the whole stance of the philosophy of Anaxagoras: that what is qualitatively determinate in an unlimited way is what comes first—of course we no longer regard flesh as simple | but we do hydrogen gas and 106
the like—and that everything else consists only of the combination of such simple components.

In this new chemistry, therefore, the first natural things are taken qualitatively and, as such, defined as immutable or unchanging. Anaxagoras agrees, saying that what is qualitatively determinate is what is first, and that other things arise from the combination of these simple components. Admittedly, this view held by Anaxagoras is also different from that of modern chemistry in that, for instance, flesh, bones, and the like—thus things we hold to be concrete—are for him qualitatively determinate, as consisting of like parts to which the absolute fixity of the qualitative elements is basic. In the case of flesh he nevertheless grants that the parts are not all alike, although it is called 'flesh' owing to the preponderance of parts of that kind that have mixed with others.[273] This is quite different from the

272. This statement about platinum is false, but the error is not that of Gr., our source for it. A similar statement appears in an ancillary thesis in the *Encyclopedia*; see *W.* vii, pt. 1, p. 390 (§330); *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, trans. M. J. Petry, 3 vols. (London and New York, 1970), iii. 199. It shows that Hegel is referring to the metals of the platinum group—ruthenium, rhodium, palladium, osmium, iridium—which are commonly alloyed with platinum but are not constituents of platinum itself. Platinum first became known and described as one of the basic metals shortly before Hegel's time.

273. In *Physics* 1.4.187b.1–7 (Barnes, i. 320) Aristotle says of 'the physicists' (including Anaxagoras) that they say everything is mixed and they name a thing according to its numerically predominant constituent. Cf. *W.* xiii. 403 (MS?).

way Thales or Heraclitus views things, where what is fundamental is not only the possibility but also the actuality of one thing changing into another, where the comparable qualitative distinctions are capable of changing themselves into others.

This 'change' is an extremely interesting category, and it is necessary to distinguish what is under consideration. First there is change with respect to existence, and second there is change with respect to the concept. Thus, about the changing of one [thing] into another, we say that what is meant is change with respect to existence. So we investigate whether water admits of being changed into earth, and so on, through chemical procedures—heat, distillation, and the like. That is the limit of what finite chemistry can do. Change with respect to the concept, however, is another matter. Thus in
107 Heraclitus, and in all philosophy, the sense of 'change' is | that the concept of space translates itself into that of time and the concept of time translates itself into that of space. That is not something that can be displayed in chemical retorts. This same transition of one qualitatively determinate thing into the other qualitatively determinate thing is what is meant in the philosophy of nature of Heraclitus. As it is represented in the Heraclitean process, what assuredly transpires is that water changes into earth, and air into water.[274] Here we have this internal connection within the concept, that the one cannot be without the other, that the other is utterly necessary to it, so that in the very life of nature too the one implicitly becomes the other, just as also neither can subsist without the other. We find it plausible, for example, that stones could surely subsist if water were taken away but plants could not. Similarly with colors we could, for example, take away blue; the other colors would be unaffected by that; each would remain on its own account. But this is only with respect to existence. There is a necessity here with respect to the concept, for there cannot be the color blue without the other colors. In the case of living beings, we do, of course, notice that things are different, for here the concept attains existence. If we cut out the heart, then all the other members will perish. But in fact everything in nature is united by the concept. Nature exists only in unity, just as the heart exists only in unity with the other organs, for, if the heart is taken away, the entire life is destroyed.

So Anaxagoras took as basic the assumption that what is qualitatively
108 distinct is what is original, and he regarded *νοῦς* as | the combining and

274. On fire as the real process of change according to Heraclitus, see pp. 78f. above with nn. 204–5. Hegel is also referring here to the view that Thales was already teaching a process of change on the part of water; see p. 25 above with n. 30. In another previous passage (p. 29) Hegel himself rejected this ascription.

separating factor only in a formal way. This will be enough for us. We can easily get confused by the ὁμοιομερῆ of Anaxagoras, but we must hold fast to the main definition.

This brings the first period of Greek philosophy to an end, and we now pass on to the second. The yield so far is not very great. Although some indeed suppose that there is particular wisdom here,[275] the thinking is still youthful, the characterizations are still poor, abstract, and arid. Thinking has only a few of them here, and even they cannot last long; the principle of water, that of being, of number, and so on, do not pass the test. The universal must still develop itself purely on its own account. In Anaxagoras the universal is defined as the self-determining activity.

## *B. THE SOPHISTS, SOCRATES, AND THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS*

### Introduction

In this second period we have to consider first the teachers of wisdom or the Sophists, second Socrates, and third the Socratics in the narrower sense.[1] Plato will be separated from the other Socratics and considered together with Aristotle. Our [initial] standpoint is the νοῦς of Anaxagoras—but this self-determining activity is still completely formal. That we can speak of 'the self-determining activity' is very important. But the determining, or determinacy itself, is still wholly nonspecific, general, abstract; with '[self-] determination' we have still no content at all. Hence we must proceed to investigate the question: what is it through which the | self-determining 109
activity makes itself specific? So the immediate requirement is the advance to a content and this content, its actual specification, begins here in the second period. Thus thinking in general, thinking as self-determining activity, is what comes first. The question is then: what is the specification of thinking,

275. We cannot be certain to whom this criticism is directed. It is probably aimed less at historians such as Tiedemann and Tennemann than at those who edited collections of fragments, such as Peyron, Sturz, and Schleiermacher; see p. 82 above. But see also the conclusion of the passage quoted from August Boeckh by Ritter (*Geschichte*, 323), taken from Boeckh, *Philolaos des Pythagoreers Lehren nebst den Bruchstücken seines Werkes* (Berlin, 1819), 109 n., which reads: 'Lack of insight into the ancient form of representations frequently gives rise to the illusion that the old philosophy had been quite immature [*knabenhaft*], whereas in its genius and greatness of intuition it is hardly inferior to any more recent system.'

1. According to Pn., An., Gr., and Sv., Hegel speaks here of a second period (*Periode*) within Greek philosophy. Gr. and Lw. insert as a heading 'Second Section' (*Zweiter Abschnitt*), to which our 'B' corresponds.

what is the absolutely universal content that thinking gives to itself? [That comes] second.

This question about the content constitutes the general standpoint. The ancients thought in an untrammeled fashion; they entertained universal thoughts. Over against these universal thoughts there now stands the consciousness of the fact that the subject thinks. Previously one had before oneself only objects, a content—the absolute, God. But this is not the whole of what is present here, and the second factor is the thinking subject that has these thoughts. This subjectivity of thinking is an essential feature; *we* have thoughts, and hence the second factor is the thinking subject. The totality of the objective embraces the subjectivity of thinking too. Moreover, this subjectivity has the characteristic of being the absolutely infinite form, the self-relating activity, the determinative in general. So the universal in this form thereby receives characteristics, a content, and the essential side is the question of the content. The other side of subjectivity is that the subject is what thinks, what posits, and consciousness now has to reflect upon this, which involves thinking's return into itself from out of objectivity, out of thinking only objects [*aus der Objectivität, aus der Gegenständlichkeit*]. At first thinking immerses itself in the object, and yet in this way—like the νοῦς of Anaxagoras—the *activity* of thinking has still no content, because the content stands on the other side.[2] The return of thinking into itself is the consciousness that the subject is what thinks, and bound up with this there is the specific form, that the content to be acquired must be an essential,
110 absolute content. |

This content, taken abstractly, can be twofold. First is the fact that, with regard to its *form*, *I* am what is determinative of the content—that I am the content, I am what is essential, the content is my own, a quite particular content. I have the characteristics *within me*. But the second aspect is that the content is determined as what is wholly universal, the idea. These are the two points of view involved—how one is to grasp the determination of what is objective, and the fact that I am what thinks. What I as the thinker produce, however, is the universal too. Philosophizing hinges upon both what the object or content of thought is, and the fact that I am who does the positing. Although *I* do the positing, what I posit is nonetheless objective; it has being in and for itself. If thinking gets stuck at the standpoint that *I* am doing the positing, then we have the spurious idealism of modern times. In antiquity something posited by me was nevertheless known to have being

2. On this aspect of Anaxagoras, see pp. 101–5 above.

in and for itself, and thinking was not stuck at the point where what is thought is spurious because I posit it, or because it is something subjective.

Now the Sophists and Socrates belong here, and also the Socratics to the extent that they grasped the content—as defined by Socrates—in greater detail but in direct continuity with him.

## 1. The Sophists

We have first to consider the Sophists. 'Sophist' or 'sophistry' is a term of ill repute. By these expressions we understand that some definition or other is arbitrarily refuted or undermined on grounds that are false, or else that something that is not in itself right is made plausible or proved upon false grounds. We have to set this bad sense of the term aside and put it out of our minds; we must treat the position of the Sophists in Greece more precisely than that. | 111

The Sophists are the teachers of Greece, for through them what we call 'general culture' came into existence in Greece. 'Culture' is a vague expression [*unbestimmt*]. It covers our acquaintance with the general viewpoints that pertain to any object or issue. An action can be viewed from many perspectives. I must be familiar with them, and conscious of them; but in addition I must grasp these perspectives in a general way. The matter gets subsumed under universal characteristics. This is general culture. A person of culture has a current awareness of what is involved. Thus a judge knows the different laws or, in other words, directly knows the different legal perspectives under which the case in dispute has to be considered. On their own account, indeed, these perspectives are universal aspects of the case. So the judge has a universal consciousness and deals with the issue itself in a universal fashion.

Greece has the Sophists to thank for this cultivation. In Greece there had to awaken the need for reflection, namely, the need to determine one's course by thinking in general terms about circumstances and no longer to decide merely by oracles or by custom, passion, and momentary desires, but instead by specific thinking about the factors involved. The purpose of the state is defined by thought—this is culture. Private interest is grasped under universal perspectives.

The Sophists disseminated this culture. They called themselves 'teachers of wisdom' and followed the business and profession of making people wise. They traveled about from city to city and the young men attached themselves to them. Plato's | *Protagoras* provides an example of this. Here he has 112
Protagoras expound in detail the art of the Sophists. Socrates has come to Protagoras with a young man named Hippocrates, who wants to place

himself under Protagoras for purposes of instruction. Socrates asks Hippocrates what he wants to learn from Protagoras and what he thinks he will become among the Sophists. Hippocrates then defines the concept of the Sophist. He says that the art of the Sophist is that of making someone a powerful speaker, τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν, the art of rhetoric, of turning things around and viewing them from many sides.[3]

That is what first strikes us, for it is what is initially striking in a cultured person or nation—the art of speaking well. The French are good speakers in this sense; they have what we call 'the gift of gab'. An uncultured person is ill at ease among the sort of people who know how to grasp and express all points of view readily. But skill in speaking as such is not the whole story. Whoever wants to learn to speak French well must assimilate French culture. Speaking well involves culture—that diverse points of view are present to one's mind, that they impinge equally on it and come readily to consciousness, so that one can express them in speech and display them. This was the art of the Sophists, the art of speaking readily about everything. Aristotle
113 says that every topic has a wealth of τόποις, of general categories or | points of view under which one must consider it.[4] Thus the skill that people sought to gain from the Sophists requires one to have a ready mastery of a multitude of points of view, so as to deal readily with the topic in light of them.

Socrates now remarks that the principle of the Sophists has not been defined adequately, but he nevertheless leads the young man to Protagoras, whom he finds in a large assembly of the foremost Sophists, like an Orpheus entrancing people by the charm of his words. Socrates asks Hippocrates whether he will speak to Protagoras about his intention openly, in the presence of the others, or privately. Protagoras praises the discretion of Socrates because so many young men have attached themselves to the Sophists in the conviction that these will make them better and wiser; and so the Sophists have attracted much envy and ill will. Protagoras talks about this at great length and poses some questions as he does so. He maintains that the art of the Sophists is ancient, although just in order to avoid giving

3. This account abridges that in *Protagoras* 310a–12e, stressing the latter part; see *Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus*, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1924), 96–105. The Greek word δεινός in our text can mean 'clever' or 'skillful' as well as 'powerful'. The remark about 'turning things around' is not actually from this passage but is a summary interpretation of statements later in the dialogue about what Sophists do.

4. This sentence is taken from An.'s margin. It is not a specific citation but a general indication of the content of Aristotle's *Topics*, similar to that in *W.* xiv. 408–9. Aristotle says something in the same vein in his *Rhetoric* 1.2.1358a.10–14, 31–2; see *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1984), ii. 2159.

offense those who have practiced it have given it a cloak under which they concealed it. Some of the ones from whom culture derived, such persons as Homer and Hesiod, employed poetry [as a cloak], others such as Musaeus and Orpheus employed the mysteries and oracular sayings, others again gymnastics, and others music. All of these arts are modes whereby human beings impart culture. Protagoras ascribes the same goal to the Sophists and adds that all of them who have feared envy against the sciences have employed a pretense of this sort. So, even though the populace takes no notice of such [scientific] thinking, they [the Sophists] create the impression [*Schein*] of being deceivers and impostors. Protagoras himself professes to have gone the opposite way and says openly that he is a Sophist, a teacher of culture, that his business is to give people spiritual culture, παιδεύειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, just as the others have done—Homer, Hesiod, and the like.[5]

The conversation then focuses on the object or content, on the skill that Hippocrates would acquire under his tutelage. | Protagoras says that he 114
will not encounter the treatment that the other Sophists would give him, those who took young men against their will back to sciences that they wished to avoid—arithmetic, music, geometry, and the like. For he guides them only toward the general goal to which they aspire. So the intention was to make young people into cultured persons, and the way to this goal was the province of the Sophists. What Protagoras taught, on his own telling, was in fact what the young men sought, and it consists in counsel about what is in one's own best interest, περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, what concerns oneself, and also about the interests of the state—so that he [the pupil] will become capable of doing what is best and of speaking with regard to it. These were the two goals of the general culture—the goal of the individual and that of the state.[6]

Socrates disputes this and is particularly surprised at the last contention of Protagoras, that he imparts instruction concerning skill in the affairs of the state, since he (Socrates) [had hitherto] believed that the political art could not be taught. From what Protagoras says, we can come to know better what the approach of the Sophists was. Protagoras says that political virtue can be taught. Socrates objects that experience shows that those who

5. This whole paragraph is a paraphrase, with omissions, of passages from Plato, *Protagoras* 314b–c, 314e–15b, 316a–17b (Lamb, pp. 108–19). It is reasonably accurate, with several minor exceptions. One is that Protagoras, not Socrates, is first to ask whether their conversation ought to be public or private (316b), and Socrates merely echoes this query (316c). The other is that in his discourse in this part of the dialogue Protagoras does not 'pose questions'.

6. This discussion of the methods and goals of the education offered occurs in *Protagoras* 318a–19a (Lamb, pp. 120–5).

have mastered the political art cannot pass it on to others. Pericles had his sons instructed in everything except politics, where he left them to find their own way on the off chance of succeeding, and other great men have done the same.[7]

Protagoras then replies, seeking permission to adduce evidence to the contrary and asking whether he, as an elder addressing his juniors, should speak by means of a myth, μῦθον, or on a rational basis, λόγῳ. The company
115 leaves it up to him, so he begins with | a myth that is quite noteworthy. The long and the short of it is that he tells the story of Prometheus and Epimetheus. The gods gave Prometheus and Epimetheus responsibility for adorning the world and apportioning capacities [*Kräfte*] to its members. Epimetheus squandered everything on the animals, so that nothing remained for human beings, and they were left without weapons, clothing, and so forth. For this reason Prometheus stole wisdom and fire from heaven in order to equip them, but they lacked political wisdom, and so they lived without political bond or connection. Then Jupiter commanded Hermes to impart modesty (αἴδω, obedience, reverence) and δίκη [justice] to them. Αἴδω means reverence such as that of children [toward their elders], respect toward those more highly placed, natural esteem. In our day reverence is of decisive importance (Goethe). Prometheus then asked whether he should impart this as a particular art given to singular individuals. Jupiter answered, however, that he should impart it to all, because no social union could endure unless all its members partook of right and awe, and that the individual lacking these must be expelled from the state. For this reason the Athenians seek the advice of an architect when they build but they let every [citizen] participate when they make a decision about a concern of the state. Political science is thus something in which everyone should by definition participate. Political virtue consists precisely in that awe and justice [that Prometheus imparted]. But the fact that it can be acquired by instruction and exertion is the next topic.[8]

7. See *Protagoras* 319a–20b (Lamb, pp. 124–9). Socrates does not say here that he himself believes the political art cannot be taught; he only says that, in his observation, persons in another field of endeavor, such as shipbuilding, turn to professionals for advice, whereas those engaged in political deliberations seek out no experts and so they obviously think the political art cannot be taught.

8. This lengthy and instructive story derives from *Protagoras* 320c–23a (Lamb, pp. 128–37). Our text reproduces the gist of it, with omissions, in a reasonably faithful way. In Plato's version people needed to band together to live in cities so as to be protected from wild beasts. Yet, without political virtue, they could not succeed in this enterprise, owing to the harm they did to one another in the absence of law and mutual respect. Hegel's interpolation concerning

Protagoras then gives the reasons for the contention that virtue can be acquired by instruction and effort. He appeals to the fact that people are not reproached for shortcomings or ills they suffer owing to nature, fortune, or chance, but those that can be gotten rid of by habit, diligence, study, or training are deemed blameworthy and punishable—one is accountable for them. The latter include impiety | and injustice, in short, whatever runs 116
counter to public virtue. People who are guilty of these vices are reproached in the sense that they could have eschewed them and, through culture and education, they could have made political virtue their own instead. Now these are very good reasons.[9]

Turning next to the allegation by Socrates that famous men such as Pericles did not impart their political virtue to their children and friends, Protagoras says that political virtue is so constituted that it pertains to everyone. It is something common to all citizens, and justice, moderation, and holiness should all be comprehended under the general virtue of a man—which must be the property of all citizens. Children are educated in it from their tenderest years, in custom and right—all instruction relates to it. They are introduced first to the poets and then to grammar, music, and gymnastics—everything contributes to the goal of not allowing free rein to caprice and preference but of becoming accustomed instead to self-regulation in accordance with a law or a rule. Once people step outside this sphere of instruction they enter that of the state's constitution. Then the entire magistracy makes its own contribution to keeping everyone within the bounds of law and order. Thus political virtue is a result of our being educated from our youth onward.[10]

---

the decisive importance of reverence (*Ehrfurcht*) probably has in mind a passage in Goethe's novel *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre; oder, Die Entsagenden*, pt. 1, ch. 10 (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1821), 168–70, 175–6, a passage also referred to in *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 97 with nn. 12–13. In it Wilhelm Meister is enjoined to a threefold reverence—for what is above us (heaven), for what is under us (the earth), and for our comrades or equals. Out of the three forms springs the highest reverence, namely, reverence for oneself, to the end that one attains the highest level of which one is capable. See *Goethe: Werke, Sophien-Ausgabe*, 1st division, vol. xxiv (Weimar, 1894), 239–41, 244; *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship and Travels*, trans. Thomas Carlyle, 2 vols. (New York, 1882), ii. 162, 164. The question in our text put to Jupiter (the Greek 'Zeus' in Plato) about how reverence is to be imparted is (according to Pn., An., Gr., and Lw.) posed by Prometheus, whereas in Plato's version it is posed by Hermes.

9. See *Protagoras* 323a–24c (Lamb, pp. 134–41).

10. On this argument, as Protagoras characterizes it in distinction from the earlier 'myth', see *Protagoras* 324d–26d (Lamb, pp. 140–5). Hegel's report on this passage and the preceding one in the *Protagoras* leaves out of consideration the argument of Protagoras (325a–b) that the unquestionable culpability of offenses against virtue presupposes that virtue is imparted to all and can be increased by educational measures. See also Plato, *Meno* 94a–d (Lamb, pp. 348–51), where the same issue is discussed.

To the objection that excellent men have not imparted their excellence to their children and friends, Protagoras replies very well in the following way. In a state where it was decreed that all citizens must be flute-players, all of them would get instruction in that art. Some would be excellent, many good, some mediocre, and perhaps also a few would be bad. All would have a certain skill, but it might also be the case that the son of a renowned flute-
117 player could not perform very well and | vice versa. Excellence depends on particular talents, on one's nature. All citizens would master flute playing to a certain degree, and they would at all events be more proficient than those who had received no instruction. In the same way, the worst citizens of a rational state are at all events better than those who belong to a people that has no culture, no education, no law. The citizens owe this superiority to the laws, instruction, and culture in their state.[11] Now that is a very good argument and an effective reply to what Socrates said, which is only one empirical instance based on experience.

The question now is, more precisely, how far this sophistical approach may appear to be something defective, and in particular to what extent Socrates and Plato engaged in a struggle with the Sophists and constituted the antithesis to them. As we have already noted, the Sophists played a necessary role in Greece and performed a great service to Greek culture. Our own culture is no less open to reproach than was theirs. 'Culture' consists in consciousness being conversant with universal and essential points of view. The principal way to become acquainted with them is to be made attentive, for reflection to be directed to what is going on in our inner and outer experience, to our views of right and wrong, for the universal to be distilled from this, and for us therefore to pass over from what is particular or singular to the universal. This is the necessary course of free, thinking reflection, and our own culture has taken this course too.

That the Sophists embraced one-sided principles correlates above all with the fact that in Greece and in Greek culture there was no such firm foundation as we have in the modern world. Culture has entered into the European
118 world too, | but under the aegis and presupposition of the spiritual religion—not under that of a religion of fanciful imagination. Hence it came to us under the presupposition of [scientific] cognition, or of the knowledge of spirit's eternal nature, of humanity's absolute final purpose and vocation, which is to be actual spiritually, to determine ourselves on the basis of spirit or in spiritual fashion and to posit ourselves in unity with spirit. In modern Europe the foundation has been a principle that is secure

11. For this argument by analogy, see *Protagoras* 327a–d (Lamb, pp. 146–9).

and indeed spiritual, one that in that way satisfies the needs of subjective spirit. All subsequent relationships, [including] the categories of duty and morality, determine themselves on the basis of this absolute, universal principle, and are made dependent on it. The inevitable result was that culture did not adopt the multiplicity of orientations that it had among the Greeks and those who disseminated culture in Greece, namely, the Sophists. Confronted there with the religion of fanciful imagination and with undeveloped principles of political relationships, culture could splinter into a great variety of points of view; as a result, private or subjective points of view could be established as supreme principles. In contrast, where one already has a mental image of a supreme principle, a private principle cannot so easily attain this rank, and the subordination of principles under that one is already firmly established.

As far as the form as such is concerned, our form of culture—to the extent that it is 'culture'—is the same as that of the Sophists; the standpoint is the same. As opposed to Socrates and Plato, the standpoint of the Sophists is that points of view about what the true or the right is, about the human vocation, and so forth, are abstracted from experience; they are based upon perspectives that we form in accordance with our mental images. The main purpose of the Sophists—what we call 'culture' and 'enlightenment'—consists precisely in learning to know the many points of view and giving them due weight. But for Plato and Socrates the nature of the circumstance or the | thing considered in and for itself, the concept, is to be grasped and 119
conceived in and for itself. As opposed to this concept—what the right or the true is in and for itself—any discussion based on points of view or reasons is a step backwards, for these are always no more than particular specifications as opposed to the one concept of the thing. The standpoint of the Sophists is our standpoint too, and their mode of cognition or thinking is what we call argumentation—the advancing of reasons for and against something.

But the concept disposes of all such reasons once and for all. It is possible to produce reasons for and against anything. The worst action embodies a point of view that is in itself essential. When we grant its validity we can excuse and defend the action. A soldier who deserts in battle has a very good reason for doing so—his duty to preserve his life for the sake of his wife and children, and so forth; this too is embodied in this action. These are points of view that will justify the action if their validity is granted. The greatest crimes—assassination, treason, and the like—can be justified in this way, provided that the person's intention or design has some feature that, when considered abstractly, can be justified, for instance, [by the principle] that

one must oppose evil and promote good. What we call argumentation is none other than the granting of validity to points of view of this kind. These constitute the reasons [in favor], and the points of view whose validity one is not willing to grant constitute the reasons against. It may be a good thing when cultured people speak about issues [in this way], but it is none other than what Socrates and Plato called sophistry.

Socrates adopted the standpoint of the Sophists no less than did the Sophists themselves. When duty and virtue are commended in preaching, validity is granted to one point of view or another. A host of reasons is advanced in the attempt to persuade or convince. But this is a procedure no
120 different from that of the | Sophists. When one opposes philosophy by bringing up the diversity of philosophies, this is a good argument [*Grund*] in the manner of the Sophists. Or [one can say] that philosophy deals with abstruse topics, and how does that serve the practical side, the heart and feeling?[12] To speak of the weakness of human reason and so on is sophistry. So all these ways of considering points of view that one accepts as valid according to one's own heart and feeling, one's experience, are the ways of sophistry whether or not we use this term for them. In this connection what the nature of reflection involves is this—that what consciousness counts as firmly fixed gets shaken by reflection. This is something that we will see more fully in the case of Socrates.[13] Thus in Greece there were firm laws in religion generally and in such things as cultic practices and [the worship of] god, as well as in custom, in public or civic virtue, and in private life and conduct. So reflection consists in getting to know different points of view, in thinking them and grasping them in a universal form, a form that counts as something essential, as a being-in-and-for-itself.

Acquaintance with so many varied points of view results in the shaking of what was fixed. For the law, or what is fixed, also has a limited content. It
121 comes into collision | with other things. Sometimes it counts as supreme and decisive, while at other times it takes a back seat to other points of view. This shows up equally in the case of Socrates. He unsettles the views of his friends, so that they confess that they are conscious of knowing nothing.[14] Ordinary consciousness is brought into perplexity in this way, like the young men who believed that they knew something. One thing counts as fixed, but now validity is accorded to another point of view opposed to it. If the new

12. The introduction to these lectures (see Vol. I of this edition) refers in several places to the common objection based on the diversity of philosophies.

13. See p. 142 below, with n. 55.

14. See the example of this below, p. 135 with n. 41.

consciousness is valid, then the previous one loses its absolute validity or worth.

The Sophists therefore were reproached for having encouraged private interest, ambition and other passions, and the like. This flows directly from the nature of culture, which places different points of view at one's disposal. Which is to prevail depends solely on the subject, on the fact that the subject counts as good only what is good in its own view—[that is,] when it is not basing itself on a universal point of view. In every truth there can be found a point of view that, when singled out as essential, controverts it. My inclination decides what I will count as good. This is the case also in our world today, where the rightness or truth of an act is supposed to hinge upon good intentions, upon my outlook and conviction. The cultured person knows how to bring everything under the perspective of the good, to make everything good, to exhibit an essential point of view everywhere. Someone who has not got good reasons in support of the worst option must not have come very far in his or her cultural development. These good reasons are points of view that one must even allow to count as essential on their own account. All the evil that has happened in the world since Adam has happened for good reasons. To go into the singular or particular [arguments] of the Sophists would take us too far afield. | 122

Very many of the Sophists were famous. I will introduce two in particular, Protagoras and Gorgias, with a view to expounding their principle in greater detail in a single instance.

Protagoras is said to have been born in Abdera. He is a contemporary of Socrates, though slightly older. He spent his life on the study of the sciences and on instruction. He is reputed to have been the first to travel about Greece proper and give readings from his writings. Hence he was the first public teacher in Greece, just as Pythagoras was a teacher in Italy.[15] To some extent the Sophists took the place of the poets and rhapsodists. At that time there were no teaching institutions nor books from which one could gain instruction. Education in Greece consisted mainly in becoming familiar with many

15. For these biographical details about Protagoras, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.50, 54, 56; *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, trans. R. D. Hicks, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1925, 1938), ii. 462–3, 466–9. Diogenes reports that, according to Apollodorus, he lived to age 70, that he had a career of forty years as a Sophist, and flourished during the eighty-fourth Olympiad. These dates might put his birth in the period 484–481 BC, at least twelve years before that of Socrates (in 469). Plato (*Protagoras* 310a–c; Lamb, pp. 94–7) remarks on his travels too. Diogenes says the first of his books that Protagoras read in public, in Athens, was *On the Gods*. On Pythagoras as public teacher, see pp. 33–4 above. This comparison of the two as teachers disregards the formation of the Pythagorean order as well as the fact that Pythagoras taught only at home in Crotona and did not charge a fee.

poems and knowing them by heart, just as for us only fifty years ago biblical stories and sayings were the people's culture; there were no preachers who built something more on that foundation.

Protagoras came to Athens and became one of the more intimate associates of Pericles. Pericles developed his intellect [*Geist*] particularly through association with such persons. Pericles and Protagoras are supposed to have spent a whole day arguing about whether the death of a contestant (or a horse) is to be blamed on the javelin, on the one who threw it, or on the [official] supervising the throwing—therefore about accountability, about blame or lack of it.[16] 'Blame' is the sort of general expression the analysis of which can in any event lead to a difficult and protracted inquiry. If I say that I am to blame for something, that opens the door to many arguments and counter-arguments. Protagoras shared the fate of Anaxagoras in being banished from Athens, and for his writings at that. He died on the journey from
123 Athens to Sicily in his seventieth year | and in the ninety-third Olympiad. His book was burnt in Athens, and this may well be the first instance of a book burning at state order. Only the beginning of it has come down to us. It reads: 'As to the gods, I do not know how to discern [*erkennen*] whether they are or are not, for there is much that impedes discernment—the obscurity of the matter and the brevity of human life.'[17]

Like other Sophists, Protagoras was not merely a cultured teacher but also a deep and fundamental thinker, a philosopher who reflected upon quite

16. Plutarch reports (*Pericles* 4–6) that philosophers and Sophists were important to Pericles in his intellectual development but does not mention Protagoras; see Plutarch, *Lives*, trans. Bernadotte Perrin, 11 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1914–26), iii. 8–17. In *Pericles* 36 (Perrin, iii. 104–5) he tells of this discussion about accountability. What Hegel omits (as also in *W.* xiv. 29) is that this anecdote was spread around by Xanthippus, the son of Pericles, in order to make his father seem ridiculous. In Plutarch the anecdote concerns an accident at an athletic contest, and Xanthippus reported that the two 'squandered' the entire day discussing it.

17. The reports on the age and death of Protagoras are contradictory. Hegel combines—as does Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 11 vols. (Leipzig, 1798–1819), i. 380—two of the three accounts found in Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 9.55–6; Hicks, ii. 468–9). But putting his death in the ninety-third Olympiad (448–445 BC), as only Gr. has it, is neither correct nor is it traceable in any of Hegel's usual sources. Based on a birth date of about 481 BC (cf. n. 15 just above) and a lifespan of seventy years, his death would have come about 411 BC. On the banishment of Anaxagoras from Athens, see n. 263, p. 101 above; on that of Protagoras, as well as on the book burning and his book's opening words, see Diogenes (9.51–2; Hicks, ii. 464–5). Dieterich Tiedemann remarks that this is the first such book burning—in his *Geist der spekulativen Philosophie*, 6 vols. (Marburg, 1791–7), i. 352. According to *W.* xiv. 30 (MS?) Hegel himself cited the opening words of the book as transmitted by Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos* 9.56; trans. R. G. Bury, *Sextus Empiricus*, 4 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; New York and London, 1933–49), iii. 32–3.

general thought-determinations. The specific thesis that he propounded was: 'The human being is the measure of all that is—of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not.' *Πάντων ὄντων ἄνθρωπος μέτρον.*[18] This is an important thesis. What had to be done was to grasp thinking as determinate, to find the content in *νοῦς*. But what is it that determines, that furnishes the content? This universal determination is the measure or the yardstick of value for everything. Protagoras proclaimed that the human being is the measure of all things. This bears an important meaning but one that also directly involves an ambiguity—is it each human being according to private individuality, so as to make one's particular self the purpose, or is it the human being according to its rational nature and universal essence? This essence enters our consciousness through thinking, for thinking is the activity that brings forth the universal. We encounter this same thesis [about thinking] in Socrates and Plato, although here [in Protagoras] the human being is the measure insofar as it is doing the thinking and gives itself a content. This content, however, is the universal, it is being-in-and-for-self. So here we have expressed the great thesis upon which almost everything henceforth turns. | 124

The more precise implication is that everything, all content, everything objective only *is* in relation to consciousness, to thinking consciousness. Thinking subjectivity—this is the essential moment that is expressed here. Without consciousness it [every content] is incomplete—the fact that consciousness is essentially what produces the content in this objective thing, in water and the like. Subjective thinking is essentially active and productive in the content, and this [importance of subjective thinking] is what reaches right down to the most recent philosophy. Kant says that we know only phenomena, meaning by this that what counts for us as the objective, or as having being, is to be considered only in relation to consciousness and is not [there] without this relation.

The second moment is the more important one. The subject is what is active, what determines, what produces the content. The issue now is the further determination of the content—whether it is restricted to the private sphere [*Partikularität*] of consciousness or whether it is defined as having being universally in and for itself. God, the good, or the Platonic Idea, is a product of thinking, something posited by thinking. But it is also every bit as

18. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 9.51; Hicks, ii. 462–3) presents this thesis as the opening words of another (unidentified) writing by Protagoras. According to *W.* xiv. 30 (MS?) Hegel cited it from Plato, *Theaetetus* 152a—in *Theaetetus, Sophist*, trans. H. N. Fowler (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1921), 40–1—and Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrrhonian hypotyposes* 1.216 (Bury, i. 130–1).

much in and for itself. Only what is itself the universal in its import do I posit as having being—what is so constituted as if it is equally well not posited by me. This is what the thesis of Protagoras involves, and he himself elaborated it much more fully.

Sextus Empiricus has preserved for us a great deal of the philosophy of Protagoras. The next point in it, then, is the specification that nothing in and for itself is one, nothing in and for itself is equal to itself, but everything is what it is only according to its relation to consciousness. This is elucidated by examples, and the elucidation has the sense of a proof. The elucidation shows that, in the sense of Protagoras, what is posited and determined by us is not grasped as the universal, as what is equal to itself. The examples
125 offered are primarily of a sensuous kind. | Some of us freeze in the wind and others do not. So we cannot say that the wind is cold or warm, for it is warm and cold according to its relationship to a subject. In another example we have six dice. If we place four more beside them, then the six are more than the four. But if we place twelve beside them, then the six are fewer than the twelve. The determination [more or less] is therefore only relative; it is nothing in itself but merely in relation to another, or in a definite context. So he says there is only relative truth. Each thing can be everything and is something different for different ages or different states, such as waking or sleeping.[19]

On this topic Plato further suggests (in the *Theaetetus*) that everything we say about things—for instance, that they are hot, white, black, and so on—is not a characteristic that belongs to them in themselves, but only is [so] in relation to feeling, to our eyes. Reciprocal motion first gives rise to white. White is no cause on its own account. So what is active is only something that is active insofar as it comes together with the passive, with what it affects; thus our activity or our determining plays a part here too.[20] The Kantian 'phenomenon' is nothing but the fact that there is an impulse out

19. Hegel is referring to examples found in Plato (*Theaetetus* 152b, 154c; Fowler, pp. 40–1, 50–1)—the wind and the dice—and to a contention in Sextus Empiricus (*Pyrr.* 1.217–19; Bury, i. 130–3)—that 'matter is capable of being all those things that appear to all' according to different ages or to the sleeping and waking states. Cf. *W.* xiv. 33 (MS?).

20. According to *Theaetetus* 153d–4b and 156c–7b (Fowler, pp. 46–9, 56–61), this doctrine of Protagoras holds that a color is neither simply outside nor simply inside the eye that sees it but exists in the interaction between the motion in the object and the eye's impact on it. The ancients typically held that vision was at least in part owing to something moving out from the eye to the object seen. This passage says (156d–e) that 'sight from the eye and whiteness from that which helps to produce the color are moving from one to the other'. Plato also reports here (157a) on the general interdependence of active and passive elements according to Protagoras.

there, an 'x', an unknown, an in-itself, what receives its character only through our feeling, through relation to us.[21] Even though an objective ground exists for our calling this cold and that warm—thus we can of course say that they must be intrinsically different—nonetheless warmth and cold first occur in our sensation and therefore in our consciousness—[perceived] things are characteristics of our activity, of our 'determining'. That is why experience has been called 'phenomenon'; as phenomenal, it consists of relations to us and to others. This then is the reflection on consciousness that has come to consciousness in Protagoras himself. | (Sextus Empiricus, 126
Plato, and Aristotle.)

Gorgias is from Leontini in Sicily. During the Peloponnesian War he was sent as an envoy from Leontini to Athens. This was in the second year of the eighty-eighth Olympiad and therefore after the death of Pericles, who died in the fourth year of the eighty-seventh Olympiad (Diodorus Siculus). He journeyed from one city to another and assembled the people in the market-places. He is said to have attained an age of over 100 years.[22]

His dialectic has been preserved for us in Sextus Empiricus and in Aristotle's *De Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia*.[23] The particular forte of Gorgias was the dialectic concerning the wholly universal thought-determinations, being and non-being. Tiedemann is quite wide of the mark in saying that he

21. Hegel does not distinguish here between the concept of the transcendental object developed by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the concept of the 'impulse' employed by Fichte. Kant designates the transcendental object as 'x' only in the first edition of the *Critique* (Riga, 1781), which Hegel does not use elsewhere; see A 108–9; cf. A 250; see the translation by Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1929, 1933) made from R. Schmidt's collation of the first (A) and second (B) editions. (On Kant's designation of the transcendental subject as 'x', see B 404.) On Fichte's 'impulse', see his *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre als Handschrift für seine Zuhörer* (Leipzig, 1794), 171–4, 228; Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, ed. Reinhard Lauth and Hans Jacob, 1st division (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1964 ff.), ii. 355 ff., 387; *Science of Knowledge*, trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (New York, 1970), 188–91, 220–1 (where *Anstoss* is translated as 'check').

22. Hegel probably draws these biographical remarks about Gorgias from Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 361–2), who cites Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca historia* 12.53; *The Library of History*, trans. C. H. Oldfather et al., in *Diodorus Siculus*, 12 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1933–67), v. 32–3. Diodorus reports that Gorgias 'in eloquence far surpassed all his contemporaries' and that he was 'first to devise the rules of rhetoric', that his instruction was so excellent that he could charge his pupils an enormous fee for it, and that as envoy in Athens he was 'introduced to the people in assembly'. Mention of his great age appears in Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 8.58; Hicks, ii. 372–3), in a brief remark about Gorgias as a pupil of Empedocles; Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 362) makes a similar remark about his age.

23. According to *W.* xiv. 37–42 (MS?), Hegel's presentation of the dialectic of Gorgias is broadly based on Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 7.65–85 (Bury, ii. 34–45) and less so on the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *De Melissos* ... (on which see n. 151, p. 61 above).

went further than sound human understanding can go.[24] That can be said of every philosopher, for they all go well beyond sound understanding. This sound understanding consists only of current maxims. Thus, for instance, it would have been contrary to all sound human understanding had anyone maintained prior to Copernicus that the earth revolves about the sun, or before the discovery of America that there is land over there. Sound understanding is the mode of thought of one period and it encompasses all the biases of that period too; thought-determinations govern it without its being conscious of that fact. So Gorgias undoubtedly went beyond sound under-
127 standing. |

Some propositions from his dialectic are preserved for us. His work περὶ φύσεως has three parts. In the first he proves that 'nothing is'; in the second, that, even if 'it is'—'something' does not wholly capture his meaning—there cannot be any cognition of it; in the third, that, even if there is cognition, no communication of that cognition is possible.[25] These are extremely abstract thought-determinations. Here we are dealing with the most speculative moments (cf. Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus) and it is no idle talk, as people are apt to believe.

## 2. Socrates

Socrates is the most interesting figure in the history of the philosophy of antiquity. His epoch is of the greatest importance. His principle constitutes a major turning point in the world's consciousness. The principle is in general none other than that he traced the truth of what *is* back to the subject's consciousness and thinking—something that he has in common with the Sophists, that is, with the culture of the time. This is the period of reflective thinking, of thought returning to itself. Authentic thinking thinks in such a way, however, that its content is no less objective than it is subjective. The freedom of consciousness is involved here in that human beings are at home with themselves in what is true, that what is true is their own—this is what freedom is.

The principle of Socrates is that human beings have to discover and learn [*erkennen*] from themselves what their vocation and final goal are, and also

24. In his very contemptuous presentation of Gorgias, Tiedemann says (*Geist*, i. 362) that 'in destroying our cognitive certainty Gorgias went much further even than Protagoras, much further too than any human being of sound understanding can in all seriousness go'. Hegel's remark just below, concluding this section of our text, also may be directed at Tiedemann.

25. See Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 7.65 (Bury, ii. 34–5). Hegel's unwillingness to render εἰ ἔστιν as 'if something is' is probably directed against the versions of Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 363) and Tiedemann (*Geist*, i. 363), both of whom insert 'something' (*etwas*).

what the world's purpose is, what is true in and for itself; they must attain truth by and through themselves. So this principle is the return of consciousness into itself, a return that is, however, defined at the same time as the departure from particular subjectivity. What it involves is the banning of contingency with regard to representation | and willing, the banishing of 128
whim, caprice, and private interest. Thus one has in inner [being] what is true, although what is inner is at the same time a departure from one's particular subjectivity—[it is] what is in-and-for-itself. 'Objectivity' has here the meaning of universality subsisting in and for itself, not that of external objectivity; it means the universal that is in and for itself. So truth is posited as mediated, as the product of thinking, as posited by thinking.

Ingenuous or unquestioned custom [*unbefangene Sitte*], unquestioned religion and right, [simply] *is*. Sophocles has Antigone say that there are eternal laws and no one knows whence they have come (*Antigone*, l. 455).[26] This is ingenuous ethical life—these are laws and they are true and right. But now there has come on the scene the consciousness that what is true is mediated by thinking. In recent times we have heard a lot of talk about immediate knowing, belief, and the like—to the effect that we know immediately within ourselves that God is, that we have religious or godly feelings.[27] But with this there comes also the misunderstanding that this feeling is not thinking. The felt content—God, the good, the just, and so on—is a determination of feeling or of representation, yet it is nothing else but a mental [*geistig*] content, one posited by thinking. Religious or godly feelings are not considered to be thoughts. But that is a stupid way to talk, for spirit or the concept is posited not merely by feeling but by thinking. Thinking is vital and active, it depends only on mediation. Animals have feelings but no religious feelings, for they know nothing of God. What is religious belongs only to thinking, to what is divine and spiritual within us. This consciousness arose with Socrates—what is true posited by us, by thinking. | 129

The second characteristic [of the principle] is the emergence of a distinction of Socratic consciousness from the consciousness of the Sophists, in the very fact that thinking's positing and producing is at the same time the producing and positing of what is equally something *not* posited, but what is in and for itself. What is objective, what is subsistent in-and-for-itself, is

26. See lines 496–501 in *Greek Tragedies*, ed. David Grene and Richard Lattimore, 4 vols. (Chicago, 1991), ii. 178: 'I did not believe your proclamation had such power to enable one who will someday die to override God's ordinances, unwritten and secure. *They* are not of today and yesterday; they live forever; none knows when first they were' (trans. David Grene).

27. On Hegel's criticism of the acceptance of immediate knowing and of the specific meaning of the concept of belief in his day, see Vol. III of this edition.

exalted above private interests and contingency; it is independent, being at the same time the power over this whole private domain. In one aspect it is subjective; it is posited through the activity of the thinking [subject]. This is the moment of freedom in that the subject is at home with what is its own—this is the spiritual nature. But it is no less subsistent in and for itself; it is objective, meaning by that not outward objectivity but spiritual universality. This is what is true or, in modern terminology, the unity of the subjective and the objective. This is the universal principle of Socrates.

In the older histories of philosophy the surpassing merit of his philosophy is said to be that Socrates wedded morality to philosophy.[28] The philosophies of his predecessors were only philosophies of nature. 'Morality' means that the subject is free, and that it has to posit the definition of the good and the true out of itself; in positing this definition from itself it also sublates the determination of positing-from-out-of-itself in such a way that there is something eternal, something subsisting in-and-for-itself. This is the universal [aspect] of the principle of Socrates.

His life history deals, on the one hand, with what pertains to him as a particular person and, on the other hand, with his philosophy. His philosophy is woven inextricably into his life itself. His fate lies in his being at one with his principle, and it is supremely tragic in the true sense of the word, not in the superficial sense in which we call every misfortune tragic, as when
130 someone dies or is executed. | These events are sad but not tragic. We also call it tragic when a worthy individual encounters misfortune or violent death, and so suffers innocently or is wronged; that is why we say that Socrates, though innocent, was condemned to death and this is tragic. But it is not a rational misfortune when the individual suffers only innocently. The misfortune is rational only when it is brought about by the subject's own will and freedom, for only then is the subject free in misfortune. But the subject's action and will must at the same time be infinitely justified and ethical; one must be responsible oneself for the misfortune, but equally the power under which the subject is crushed must be infinitely justified and not merely a natural power or that of a tyrannical will. Everyone dies, for that is the right that nature exercises over us. In the genuinely 'tragic' situation there must be a justified and ethical power on each side that come into collision. That is how the fate of Socrates is genuinely tragic.

28. According to W. xiv. 46, Hegel referred in this connection to Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 3.56; Hicks, i. 326–7), who says that Socrates added ethics to the earlier physics and that, by adding the third dimension, dialectic, Plato brought philosophy to perfection.

What comes into view or enters our imagination through Socrates is the tragedy of Greece and not merely his own tragedy. Here two powers are arrayed against one another. One power is the divine right of unquestioned custom, the law of the fatherland, and religion. This power is identical with the will—it is objective freedom, ethical life, religiosity, humanity's own essence, and at the same time it is what has being-in-and-for-itself, what is true; it is in this unity with its essence that the human being is subjectivity. The other power is the no-less-divine right of consciousness, the right of knowing, of subjective freedom; this is the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil—self-knowing reason. We see these two principles collide with one another in the life of Socrates and in his philosophy. | 131

First we have to deal with the beginnings of his life and of his career; his fate and his philosophy present themselves as a unity and must be treated as such. Socrates was born in the fourth year of the seventy-seventh Olympiad. His father was Sophroniscus, a sculptor, and his mother Phaenarete, a midwife. His father encouraged him in his art, and he is said to have become quite proficient in it. After his father's death he received a small inheritance. His art no longer satisfied him and he read whatever works of ancient philosophers came his way, devoting himself generally to science. He listened in particular to Anaxagoras, he saw a good deal of Archelaus (who was successor to Anaxagoras), and he also listened to famous Sophists, to Prodicus the teacher of rhetoric and author of the well-known allegory 'Hercules at the Crossroads'. He received instruction in the natural sciences, in music, poetry, and the like, generally in everything that was requisite at that time for a cultured person. Crito the Athenian is said to have underwritten his expenses.[29]

29. Diogenes Laertius contains these reports about his birth ('the fourth year' = 469 BC), his parents, his activity as a sculptor and stonemason, and his tutelage under Anaxagoras and Archelaus (*Lives* 2.16, 18–19, 44; Hicks, i. 144–51, 174–5); see also n. 258, p. 98 above, on his relation to Anaxagoras. In asserting that Socrates turned to study because he was 'no longer' satisfied with his art of stonecarving, the statement in our text distorts the account in Tiedemann (*Geist*, ii. 9) and Tennemann (*Geschichte*, ii. 25–6), both of whom suggest that economic necessity compelled him to pursue his father's vocation even though his own aspirations lay elsewhere. Diogenes (2.20; Hicks i. 150–1) conveys a report that Crito brought Socrates 'from his workshop and educated him, being struck by his beauty of soul'. Plato (*Crito* 50d–e) has Crito speak about having directed the father of Socrates to educate his son in music and gymnastics; see *Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus*, trans. H. N. Fowler (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1914), 176–7. On Socrates and Prodicus, see Plato's *Protagoras* 315c–d (Lamb, pp. 112–15), which makes no mention of a pupil–teacher relation between them, although *Cratylus* 384b–c suggests one; see *Cratylus, Parmenides, Greater Hippias, Lesser Hippias*, trans. H. N. Fowler (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1926), 8–9. Nor is it mentioned in the reference by Socrates to the allegory 'Hercules at the Crossroads'; see Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 2.1.21–34; trans. E. C. Marchant, in *Xenophon*, 7 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1914–25), iv. 94–103.

As an Athenian citizen he had the duty of defending the fatherland. Hence he took part in three campaigns of the Peloponnesian War. On campaign he won for himself no mere fame but what counted as the finest merit of all, that of having saved the lives of other citizens. The first campaign was the siege of Potidaea in Thrace. Alcibiades had already attached himself to Socrates at this point, and in Plato's *Symposium* he recounts that Socrates was able to endure all hardships—hunger and thirst, heat and cold—with bodily fortitude and tranquil mind. In one engagement during this campaign, when Socrates saw Alcibiades wounded in the midst of the enemy, he pulled him out and rescued him together with his weapons. For this the
132 generals awarded him a wreath | as the prize for the bravest one, but with their permission he gave it to Alcibiades.[30]

During this campaign Socrates is said to have stood in deep meditation a whole day and a night rooted to one spot until the morning sun awoke him from his trance, during which his consciousness had been wholly absent, or rather, inward. Socrates often fell into cataleptic states of this sort, which may be akin to the state of mesmerism [*Magnetismus*].[31] We see this withdrawal or interiorization [*Innerlichwerden*] of consciousness existing here in an anthropological mode; in Socrates it assumes a physical shape. He remained in the trance for a day and a night.

His second campaign was at Delium in Boeotia, where the Athenians lost a battle. Here Socrates rescued the second of his favorites, Xenophon, who had been unhorsed and lay wounded. Socrates took him onto his shoulders and carried him away while defending himself. The third campaign in which he took part was at Amphipolis in Aetolia.[32]

30. Plato (*Apology* 28d–e; Fowler, pp. 104–7) and Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 2.22–3; Hicks, i. 152–3) mention the three campaigns. The battle of Potidaea, in Chalcidice, which lies in eastern Macedonia adjacent to Thrace, took place in 430 BC; Hegel may have located it in Thrace because of the account given by Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* 1.56–65; trans. Charles Forster Smith, 4 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1919–23), i. 92–107. In Plato, *Symposium* 219e–20e, Alcibiades tells of his own attachment to Socrates, of the hardihood of Socrates in facing adversity, and of his exemplary conduct at the battle of Potidaea; see *Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias*, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1925), 232–7. Alcibiades says that after his rescue he urged the generals to award the prize to Socrates though they were inclined to award it to him instead, and that Socrates urged even more strongly than they that it go to Alcibiades.

31. In *Symposium* 175a–e Plato tells about this propensity of Socrates, and in 220c–d about the specific incident in the Potidaea campaign (Lamb, pp. 88–93, 234–5). The frequency of such states in Socrates is particularly stressed by Tiedemann (*Geist*, ii. 17). In Hegel's day rudimentary forms of what we know as hypnotism were classed among the phenomena referred to as 'mesmerism' or 'animal magnetism'; Schelling, among others, had been especially interested in them.

32. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 2.22–3; Hicks, i. 152–3) mentions his role in these two campaigns (Delium in 424 BC, Amphipolis in 422 BC), on which see also Thucydides, *Peloponnesian*

In addition Socrates held civic office under various circumstances. After the [Athenian] democratic constitution was suspended by the Lacedaemonians—who converted it into an aristocratic system in which they took partial control of the government—he was elected to the council. This council was supposed to constitute the representative body in place of the people. In this capacity he displayed unshakable firmness against the will of the thirty tyrants and against that of the people, for he remained steadfast in what he held to be right. He sat on the court that condemned to death the ten generals who had been victorious in the battle of Arginusae, for, when the storm prevented retrieval of the dead from the sea and their burial ashore, these generals had been remiss about erecting monuments in their honor. Socrates alone did not concur in the verdict.[33] These | were his official roles 133
in relation to the state; he did not thrust himself to the forefront of public affairs.

His life's occupation, properly speaking, was what we can call ethical philosophy, or philosophizing in general. This constituted the business of his individual life. We are told of a whole series of virtues that he possessed, and these virtues of Socrates must, of course, be taken as virtues in the proper sense, virtues that he acquired by effort of will and made into a matter of routine or habit. His countenance suggested a natural inclination toward vulgar passions—as he himself put it too.[34] But he subdued these passions by his will, and he stands before us as a work of plastic, classical art that has raised itself to this level of perfection. The great individuals of ancient times are like their works of plastic art. The excellence of a work of art in the proper sense consists in some idea (for instance, of Zeus) having brought forth or portrayed a character such that every feature is determined by this idea. That is when the work of art is vital and beautiful. In the same

*War* 4.89–101, 5.6–12 (Smith, ii. 364–87, iii. 10–25). On Socrates at Delium (site of Apollo's shrine), see also Plato, *Symposium* 221a–c (Lamb, pp. 236–7).

33. The sequence of these two reports about Socrates in public office suggests that Hegel's main source here was Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 2.24 (Hicks, i. 154–5). In the *Apology* (32a–d; Fowler, pp. 114–17) Plato presents a fuller account, but there the sequence is reversed. According to Plato, Socrates claims to have held only one office, that of senator, and that in opposing the charges of the Thirty against Leon of Salamis he acted not as an officeholder but simply as a citizen. Xenophon tells of the stance taken by Socrates in the trial of the ten generals (*Memorabilia* 1.1.18; Marchant, pp. 10–13). The battle of Arginusae (406 BC) took place near three small islands off the coast of Aeolis opposite Lesbos; in his *Hellenica* (1.6.27–1.7.15) Xenophon gives a full account of the battle and of the trial, including the role of Socrates in it; trans. Carleton I. Brownson, i. 60–73 in *Xenophon*, vols. i–ii.

34. Socrates does not say this about himself, but Alcibiades, in Plato, *Symposium* 215a–b (Lamb, pp. 216–19), says it about him, in comparing his appearance to Silenus figures or to images of the satyr Marsyas.

way, the great men of that time, Socrates and Pericles, are classical works of art; they worked to bring out their individuality in an existence suited to it, in a character that constituted the governing trait of their whole being. The great statesman Pericles took it as his sole end to live for the state. The story is that from the time that he dedicated himself to affairs of state he never again laughed or attended a banquet, that he dedicated himself solely to this political end and lived for it alone.[35] In this way Socrates too expresses a wholly determinate character completely attuned to his life's calling, in which he made himself proficient and presents himself as a real work of art.

More specifically, his occupation as a philosopher properly consisted in associating with all and sundry, with people of different ages and of quite diverse vocations. This mode of association was facilitated by the general
134 style of Athenian life. | Athenian citizens spent a large part of the day in the marketplace (without abandoning themselves to simple idleness); it is true that a free citizen, a free republican, might be an artisan as well, but most of the work was done by slaves. So Socrates too went round in the marketplace and the gymnasium, where the Athenians chatted and took their physical exercise.[36] The style of Athenian life made this mode of conduct possible for Socrates. Today such a life on the street corner [*Herumleben*] would not fit in at all with our customs. What Socrates did [in this setting] was quite characteristic of him. In general it can be called moralizing; that is the characteristically Socratic method, which consists, generally speaking, in getting individuals involved in thinking about things [*Nachdenken*]. Socrates took up any purpose or interest that chance circumstances provided and used it to lead people into this thoughtful meditation; and then, in the second stage, he elicited from them consciousness of the universal, of what is valid in and for itself, of the good, the true, and the beautiful.

In more detail, the Socratic way of bringing people to meditative thinking was to take advantage of whatever situation the occasion had to offer, or else he went into the workshops of artisans and the like. The first moment [of his procedure] is the so-called irony with which he usually began—the 'Socratic irony' that belongs to his method. Whether in conversation with young people, mature citizens, or even highly cultured persons (Sophists), his irony consisted primarily in declaring that he knew he was ignorant and proceeding to ask questions on that basis, putting on a show of wanting to be instructed and in this way leading his interlocutors to express themselves,

35. See Plutarch, *Lives* (*Pericles* 7; Perrin, iii. 18–21).

36. See the account of his typical activities, in Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.1.10 (Marchant, pp. 6–9).

to bring their basic premisses and views into the open.[37] From one side this irony seems to involve a kind of untruth, since Socrates professed ignorance and in that way lured people into the open. But his conversational style was combined with the utmost urbanity. | The loquacity inherent in the ap- 135
proach of the Sophists, and the reciprocal respect for what every speaker says, combines with the utmost openness; he allows his interlocutor to speak, allows him his due—and this was generally the Athenian character, to demonstrate one's respect for the other. Thus this irony was bound up with the freedom of urbanity, granting to each his right and honoring it. When Socrates says 'I am ignorant', what this implies is: 'I do not know what the other person's view is on this matter.' This is always the case. People discuss topics of general interest endlessly and express one view or another about them. Usually each individual takes the latest views and terminology to be generally acknowledged as valid. Familiarity with them is presupposed on all sides. But if we are in fact going to achieve some insight, then it is these very presuppositions—what passes as acknowledged—that have to be investigated.

In recent times people have talked and written about faith and reason in this way. Believing and knowing are concerns of the spirit that currently occupy our attention. Every one of us proceeds as though we know what reason is, and it counts as bad manners if someone else wants to tell us what faith or reason is. Most of our disputes are on this theme. Ten years ago a celebrated theologian, Claus Harms, set forth ninety theses on reason that dealt with very interesting questions, and, although much debate ensued, the result was nil.[38] So one person asserts something about faith, another asserts it about reason, and they do not get beyond | the antithesis. The two are 136

37. Further on in our text Hegel offers an example of this procedure, in discussing the interchange between Socrates and Meno; see p. 135 below, with n. 41.

38. See *Das sind die 95 theses oder Streitsätze Dr. Luthers, theuren Andenkens. Zum besondern Abdruck besorgt und mit andern 95 Sätzen als mit einer Uebersätzung aus Ao. 1517 in 1817 begleitet von Claus Harms* (Kiel, 1817). These new theses not only addressed the relationship of faith and reason but also generally opposed that version of Christianity bearing the stamp of the Enlightenment, including contemporary reforms in church polity such as the union of Lutheran and Reformed denominations. More than 200 publications carried on the controversy following from these theses. Hegel has in mind here at least the exchange between his own distant relative, von Ammon, and Schleiermacher, on which see the following items. [Christoph Friedrich v. Ammon,] *Bittere Arznei für die Glaubensschwäche der Zeit. Verordnet von Herrn Claus Harms und geprüft von dem Herausgeber des Magazins für christliche Prediger. Aus dem zweiten Bande des Magazins besonders abgedruckt* (Hanover and Leipzig, 1817). Friedrich Schleiermacher, *An Herrn Oberhofprediger Ammon über die Prüfung der Harmsischen Sätze* (Berlin, 1818). [Ammon,] *Antwort auf die Zuschrift des Herrn Fr. Schleiermacher über die Prüfung der Harmsischen Sätze, von dem Herausgeber des Magazins für christliche Prediger* (Hanover and Leipzig, 1818). [Schleiermacher,] *Zugabe zu meinem Schreiben an Herrn Ammon* (Berlin, 1818).

assuredly distinct from one another, but the only way agreement [about this] is possible is precisely by *explicating* what passes as well known. If we presuppose its being well known and leave it at that, then issues of this sort and the effort expended on them will remain a house of cards [*Bruchwerk*]. So the first thing is to indicate the characteristics of reason; then where the consensus and the differences lie, and which aspects of the differences are essential and which non-essential.

The great significance in the irony of Socrates is that it leads people to make these abstract representations concrete. As something presupposed, reason and faith are abstract, empty representations; for them to become concrete they must be explicated and viewed as unfamiliar. Unless this happens one can go on writing about reason and faith for years without getting to the essence of the question. So Socrates carries out the explication of the representations. This, then, is nothing untrue but is wholly true. In this context, too, it is quite correct to say that one knows nothing, for I do not know what the other person understands reason to be. In this case too it is only something presupposed, although it has to do precisely with the concept. This is the element of truth in Socratic irony. One person speaks of faith and the other of reason and yet there is no knowing what these terms represent for them; everything hinges on the concept, on bringing it to consciousness; and that involves the explication of what is merely representation, and for that reason is something abstract.

In more recent times irony has been understood to mean something quite different. Friedrich von Schlegel presented the thought of irony as what is highest or as the divine as such. This irony is a product of Fichte's philosophy and forms an important point in the understanding of the most recent concepts.[39] Through my dialectic or through my cultivated thinking, I, the

39. See Friedrich Schlegel's fragments on irony in *Lyceum der schönen Künste*, vol. i, pt. 2 (Berlin, 1797), 134, 143, 149, 161–2; and in *Athenäum, eine Zeitschrift von A. W. Schlegel und Fr. Schlegel*, vol. i, pt. 2 (Berlin, 1798), fragments 14, 31, 70, 83–4, 107–8, 140; vol. iii, pt. 1 (Berlin, 1800), idea 16. Cf. *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe*, ed. Ernst Behler, Jean-Jacques Anstett, and Hans Eichner, 35 vols. (Munich, Paderborn, and Vienna, 1958 ff.), ii (1967): *Lyceum* fragments 7, 42, 48, 108; *Athenäum* fragments 51, 121, 253, 305, 362, 431; *Ideas*, no. 69. In the *Philosophy of Religion* (i. 246–7 with n. 165) we can see how Hegel links Schlegel's concept of irony with Fichte's philosophy; the irony that makes everything totter leaves the I 'standing as a god above the ruins of the world'. This is a reference to Fichte, *Appellation an das Publikum*—'Appeal to the Public concerning the Charge of Making Atheistic Assertions'—(Jena, Leipzig, and Tübingen, 1799), 110, 112; cf. Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe*, v. 452. The same allusion occurs in Hegel, *Theologische Jugendschriften*, ed. Herman Nohl (Tübingen, 1907), fragment 93; in his *Glauben und Wissen* (*GW* iv. 402)—*Faith and Knowledge*, trans. Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris (Albany, 1977), 174; and in the *Science of Logic* (*GW* xi. 144; Miller, p. 230).

subject, know how to bring all definitions to naught—those of | right, the 137
ethical, the good, and so on. I know that if something appears good to me, if I deem it good, I can by the same token invert everything. I am lord and master of all definitions of this sort, in granting them validity or not. In this case the subject lacks seriousness, for its making all things good, and the like, is just a show. The Socratic definition of irony was quite remote from this recent one. For him, as for Plato, it has a restricted meaning; it is rather a style of conversation, merely a negative stance with regard to knowing.

The second [moment of the method] is what Socrates called more precisely his art of midwifery. His mother had been a midwife and so he says that he learnt from her this art of bringing something forth out of the human spirit and into the world—this way of eliciting thought-determinations. He adopts an attitude of questioning, of instructing himself by means of the views of others.[40] For this reason the Socratic method has been called one of question and answer, but it involves more than merely asking and answering. Socrates asks and lets the other answer; his question has a purpose, but the answer initially seems a mere matter of chance. In written dialogues the respondents are at the disposal of the author. But it is another matter to find people in the actual world who reply as one would like them to. In the Socratic dialogues, [that is,] in Xenophon and Plato, the respondents are pliable youths, [so that the exchanges] can be said to be creatively shaped [*plastisch*]. They answer only what has specifically been asked, and the questions are posed in a way that will greatly facilitate the [desired] answer—all individual caprice is excluded from the replies. We can infer from this that the Athenian style of conversation had in it this inherent plasticity.

The opposite of this way of replying is when one speaks about something other than what was asked, or when the response is at least not in relation to how the question is put. With Socrates, on the contrary, his questions are answered in such wise that the respondent shows respect for the way the questioner framed them and replies in | keeping with that. Speaking in the 138
opposite way involves wanting also to call attention to oneself and to be able to introduce a different point of view of another sort, a different notion based upon one's own perspective. That is the spirit of a lively interchange, to be sure, but competition of this sort is excluded from the pliable Socratic style, where the main thing is keeping to the point. A spirit of disputatiousness

40. See Plato, *Theaetetus* 148d–51d (Fowler, pp. 28–39), for the extended comparison Socrates makes between his techniques and those of a midwife; cf. 210b–d (Fowler, pp. 254–7). Socrates says that, just as a midwife is (in his culture) a woman too old to become pregnant herself, so he has no ideas of his own but just assists others in giving birth to theirs.

or self-assertion, a sudden shift upon noticing that one is getting into difficulties, this side-stepping by jest or changing the subject—all these strategies are excluded here; they have no part in good manners and are quite out of place in the portrayal of Socratic discourse. We must not be surprised, therefore, that participants in the dialogues did not offer their own bright ideas or alternatives but instead responded precisely to how the question was put. That is the plasticity of the conversation. The best of modern dialogues, on the contrary, always blend in an element of caprice, of contingency. But this distinction bears upon the external or formal aspect.

The next point, which is the main thing and what the questioning was supposed to elicit, is above all the derivation [*ableiten*] of something universal from the particular. The particular is experience or representation, whatever is in our consciousness in a naive way. Socrates latched onto these facile representations of uncultured people, onto their concretely empirical consciousness. He began with them and drew attention to the universal element that they contained; and in this way he brought some universal proposition or new definition to consciousness. By this means some special case grasped from experience was developed further. We can see this particularly well in Plato's *Dialogues*, where many examples are given one after another. But for us there is something wearisome and tedious about developing the universal from so many particular instances. Our reflection is more familiar with the
139 universal; | we are used to abstract, universal representations and so this eloquent wealth of examples often appears tedious to us.

The main thing, therefore, is the development of the universal out of a familiar representation. The direct consequence may be that consciousness is surprised to find that in what is questioned, or in the view that it has held till now, there lies something that it does not believe to be the case. For instance, everyone is familiar with becoming, and with how we represent it. In our reflection, what becomes is not and yet it also is; there is both being and non-being in it. 'Becoming' is defined in this simple way, and yet it is a unity of immensely distinct terms too, namely, of being and non-being and becoming—all together—a unity in which being and non-being are posited as utterly identical. We can find it astonishing that there is such an immense distinction in this simple representation.

The result that lies closest at hand was partly the wholly formal result that the interlocutors are brought to the conviction or consciousness that they know nothing. They became convinced at least that they would be contradicting themselves or falling into confusion if they still believed they were knowledgeable about the issue, and so they became aware that what they 'knew' had refuted itself. So Socrates developed the viewpoints that were

opposed to those that consciousness initially has, and the direct effect was therefore that consciousness became inwardly confused and fell into perplexity. Among the examples that Plato gives is one in the *Meno* in which Socrates asks: what is virtue? Meno says that the virtue of man, woman, child, and so forth, consists in this or in that. Socrates then poses his questions, so that Meno's perplexity becomes patent. Meno finally says: 'Even before I knew you I heard that you yourself adopt the standpoint of doubt and perplex others too. You bewitch me, you cast a spell on me so that, if you will allow me a jest, I shall compare you to the electric eel. Whoever touches it is made numb. | That is what you have done to me. I 140
do not know any longer how to answer you, though in the past I have had very many conversations—and I believe they were good ones—about virtue. But now I no longer know anything. You do well not to go abroad, for you could be put to death as a wizard.'[41]

Many of the conversations of Socrates end in this way and leave us quite unsatisfied regarding their content. Plato introduces his *Republic* in the same manner, with opinions about justice.[42] From the answer given, Socrates singles out perspectives that refute the very definition that his interlocutor proposed for some topic or concept. The ensuing perplexity then leads to meditation, and this is the aim of Socrates. Perplexity, however, is merely negative. There is a perplexity with which philosophy proper must begin, and which it brings forth of itself. Descartes says that we must doubt everything. We must do away with everything presupposed in order to get it back again as something produced by the concept. The affirmative element that Socrates unfolded within consciousness is what has now to be described in more detail.

This affirmative element is none other than the good insofar as it is brought forth by knowing, by consciousness—the good or the beautiful as known, what we call the idea, what is eternal and has being in-and-for-itself, the universal that is defined by thought that is free. This thought that is free brings forth the universal, the true, the absolute end in itself—this is the good. In this respect Socrates differs from the Sophists and is even opposed to them. Protagoras says that the human being is the measure of all things.[43] But this 'human being' is still indeterminate, and in its conception embraces

41. For this conversation, see Plato, *Meno* 71d–80b (Lamb, pp. 268–99), especially the first and last parts. The quotation in our text is an abridged paraphrase of Meno's statement in 80a–b.

42. See *Republic* 331c–69a; trans. Paul Shorey, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1930–5), i. 2–149.

43. See p. 121 above, with n. 18.

its own [private] end and interests. The human being is supposed to make itself the end—and this includes its own particular passions. Socrates too makes the human being the measure, but this measure is spirit, or one's
141 thinking; expressed objectively, this measure | is the true or the good. We should not blame the Sophists for not making the good the ultimate end; this was a feature of the loss of orientation at the time, and Socrates had not yet made his discovery of the good. The good, the true, and the right have always been fundamental for us, but in ancient times they constitute a stage of culture. In [the history of] culture or human consciousness it was Socrates who discovered that the good is the end in and for itself. So it is no crime that others did not make this discovery earlier, for each discovery has its time, and earlier times could not have made this one. This, in short, is the style and the philosophy of Socrates.

It seems as if we have not yet presented much of the Socratic philosophy because we have confined ourselves to the principle. But this is the main point, the fact that the consciousness of Socrates was the very first one to arrive at this wholly abstract level. The good is the universal but it is no longer quite so abstract, for it is brought forth by thinking. It is not the νοῦς of Anaxagoras[44] but the universal that determines itself inwardly, the universal that realizes itself and is supposed to be utterly realized, the universal that is the world's and the individual's end. It is an inwardly concrete principle but one that is not yet apprehended in a concrete definition, and this abstract stance is the deficiency of the Socratic principle. There is nothing further of an affirmative nature that we can point to, for it has no further elaboration.

The first specification of the Socratic principle is the great one—even though it is only formal. This is the specification that what is true is something that consciousness draws out of itself and hence it has to create it.[45] That is the principle of subjective freedom. Cicero says that Socrates brought philosophy into the homes of human beings and to the marketplace,
142 a comment that makes it look as if he | promoted a philosophy for the home and kitchen.[46] Socrates is, of course, the hero of all 'popular philosophy'.

44. See pp. 105–6 above.

45. Throughout this section Hegel uses the verb *schöpfen* and its correlative noun to express the Socratic–Platonic theme that we come to know by drawing out and rendering explicit a content already latent in our minds. So here the familiar rendering of *schöpfen* as 'to create' (common elsewhere in these lectures) recedes into the background but without entirely disappearing, whereas the other meaning, 'to ladle or scoop out', assumes the primary role.

46. See Cicero, *Tusculanarum quaestionum* 5.10, in: *Cicero: Opera* (Leipzig, 1737), iv. 425–6; *Tusculan Disputations*, trans. J. E. King (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1927; rev. edn., 1945), 434–5. See also Cicero, *Academica* 1.4; trans H. Rackham

But he led human consciousness back into itself in order to bring it to the universal, to the good, and *this* is the popular element in it.

The leading of consciousness back into itself appears in the following form, expounded so often in Plato. Human beings can learn nothing, not even virtue; it is not just in non-scientific matters but in general that we cannot learn (where 'learning' means passively taking into ourselves from without something merely received or a given, in the way that wax acquires an imprint [*Form*] from a signet ring), for everything is already there in the human spirit so that we only seem to learn.[47] Everything of course begins with experience, but that is only the beginning. The truth is that experience is only the impulse for the inner development of spirit. Thus everything that we learn [*alle Kenntnisse*] is developed out of what has value for human beings. Our focus therefore is not on historical things but on what is true in and for itself. One principal moment is that human beings draw the concepts of the true, and so forth, out of themselves or, in other words, they can learn nothing. 'To learn' [*lernen*] here means only gaining information about outwardly specific things. Of course this outward element comes in via our experience, but what is universal in experience belongs in any case to spirit or to thinking itself—not to subjective or to slipshod thinking, for we are speaking of something truly universal, a determination of thinking every bit as much as of things. In the antithesis of subjective and objective, the universal is what is equally subjective and objective. The subjective as such is only something particular. Regarded as distinct from the subjective, the objective is likewise only something particular | over against the subjective. 143
The universal is the combination of the subjective with the objective.

This is the soul of the Socratic principle, that nothing has validity or truth for humanity where spirit does not itself bear witness that it is the one that becomes conscious of itself. In this consciousness the human being is then free, or is self-contained. That it contains the moment of subjectivity wholly within it is what makes it subjective freedom. Just as the Bible says 'Flesh of my flesh, bone of my bone', so what is to count for me as truth or as right must be spirit of my spirit.[48] Therefore what spirit draws out of itself in this

together with *De natura deorum* (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1933, 1951), 412–15. See Vol. III of this edition, where Hegel observes that we can say the same thing about Francis Bacon that Cicero says about Socrates; Friedrich Ast had already made the same observation in his *Grundriss einer Geschichte der Philosophie* (Landshut, 1807), 357.

47. See especially Plato, *Meno* 81c–6b (Lamb, pp. 302–21), the famous passage illustrating the doctrine of Recollection via the slave boy's demonstration of the Pythagorean theorem, a doctrine tied to that of the immortality of the soul, as the beginning and end of the passage show.

48. In Gen. 2: 23 Adam says of the newly created Eve: 'This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh ...'.

way, what has this validity for it, must stem from it as universal, from spirit as the active universal and not from inclinations and the like. These last, of course, are something inner too. They are implanted in us by nature although they are our own only in a particular or natural fashion; they belong to the particular. What is higher than inclinations is genuine thinking, the concept, the idea, the rational sphere—this is what is true.

The thought that is universal in and for itself Socrates set against the inwardness that is selfish [*partikulär*]. In doing so he stands over against the Sophists who say that the human being is the measure of all things, whereas for Socrates it is rather spirit that is their measure.[49] Plato says that human beings only *recollect* what they seem to learn. The inner element is the good, and it is in the main still undefined. What is good? We should note that Socrates did not adopt definitions of 'good' taken from the natural aspect of things. So the good, as end subsisting in and for itself, is a topic of metaphyics too. Socrates took up the good with an eye above all to human actions, to the final purpose of the world and of nature. The determination of the good is cognized and known as the determinacy of the particular case; it is taken up in *empirical* science [i.e. the science of *human experience*]. Socrates had scant respect for all the philosophical sciences and other types
144 of skill | and natural lore, because this is empty information having no genuine purpose for human beings.[50] We have only to recognize what the good is—a one-sidedness that Socrates maintains quite consistently, for we should only trouble ourselves about the moral sphere. Not only is religion the essential element to which one's thoughts are to be directed, but it excludes all else.

For Socrates, however, the good as such still remained indeterminate, and for him the ultimate determinacy—the determining and what does the determining—is what we generally call subjectivity. The definition of the good should have the sense above all that the good is in the first place only a universal maxim, but it is in the second place not sheerly inert, not mere thought, but a defining and effective presence. The good is effectual only through subjectivity or only through human activity, and its being something definite means more precisely that it be something actual or, in other words, that in order to become actual the good must be conjoined with the subjectivity of individuals. Individuals must be good but they must also know what

49. On this Sophist principle, see p. 121 above, with n. 18.

50. Support for this characterization of the attitude of Socrates can be found in Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 2.21; Hicks, i. 150–1) and especially in Xenophon (*Memorabilia* 1.1.11–13; Marchant, pp. 8–9).

the good is, and we call this relationship 'morality', namely, when people not only *are* ethical but also *know* what the good is, when they consciously do what is right. This is what morality is and this distinguishes it from ethical life, or the unconscious doing of what is right. Ethical Athenians act in accord with the laws of the state and they do so without any prior consideration, for that is the character of a person in whom what is good is firmly rooted. But when consciousness [of morality] is what matters, then we find choice as to whether this or that is good and whether I directly will the good or not. In this way the consciousness of morality easily becomes dangerous and occasions the arrogance of the individual that arises from his consciousness and choice—I am the master, it is I who choose the good, and this implies that I am an excellent | human being. Through the free choice of my 145
deciding for the good I gain the consciousness of my excellence. So moral conceit is closely connected with this [consciousness]. In the case of Socrates we have not yet reached this definite opposition between the good and the subject as chooser, for here it is only a matter of the definition of good and its connection with subjectivity. This connection involves two things, knowing the good and the subject's being good or the subject's having good as its character, its habit. This is what the ancients called 'virtue'. The subject is 'virtuous' in character without having to ponder the situation beforehand.

Concerning Aristotle's criticism of the principle of Socrates, we should note here that he says Socrates placed virtue exclusively in λόγος, in knowing. He would have made virtue into a science (ἐπιστήμη), but that is not possible. All knowing is tied to a reason [*Grund*] or λόγος, but the reason is in thinking only, so he makes virtue a matter of insight. So Socrates does away with the alogical (ἀλλογική) aspect of the soul, to which belong πάθος and ethical custom.[51] In this case 'pathos' does not mean passion but rather the inclination or willing of one's heart. This is a good clarification of virtue. Although virtue consists in self-determination according to universal purposes rather than private ends, it is not only insight or consciousness but also involves the agent's identifying 'heart and soul' with the insight, and this is what Aristotle calls the alogical aspect of being. He goes on to say that, on the one hand, Socrates was on the right track in his research, while, on the other hand, he went astray in holding the virtues to be φρονήσεις [practical

51. See Aristotle, *Magna moralia* 1.1.1182a.15–23 (Barnes, ii. 1868–9). Aristotle says here that Socrates locates all excellences in the rational part of the soul and so does away with the irrational part of the soul, thus doing away with passion and character. See also nn. 113, 115, p. 52 above. Cf. *W.* xiv. 77 (MS?).

insights]. It is correct, however, that there are no virtues ἄνευ φρονήσεως (without [practical] insight or circumspection), for the universal element of their object or end belongs to thinking. So Socrates made virtue into λόγος,
146 whereas Aristotle says it | involves λόγος but is not itself λόγος,[52] which is an important specification. That the universal begins with thinking is just one part of the picture, for being humanly virtuous includes being whole [*eins*], and that involves one's 'heart and soul'.

The second point then is that, since Socrates sticks to the indeterminacy of the good, in its more precise meaning its determinacy expresses only what is particular. The determining relates also to the particular good, and what comes to pass is that the universal results only from the negation of the particular. This particular good, however, consists of particular laws, the laws in force, the ethical realm [*das Sittliche*] in general, or what was at that time the custom [*Sitte*]. Now, when thought or reflection presses on to what is universal or has being in and for itself, this can come to pass only by exhibiting the limitation of the particular, by undermining its stability. This is a very important albeit hazardous aspect, for to exhibit the limited nature of the particular is to render it unstable. Ethical people regard custom as utterly fixed, [whereas] thinking consciousness or reflection knows how to show up the deficiencies in everything particular so that it does not count as fixed. Its fixity is then undermined. There is, of course, an inherent inconsistency in assigning absolute validity to something limited, but this inconsistency is unconsciously amended by the ethical agent; the amendment resides in the subject's own ethical life and in the corporate life as a whole. There can certainly be collisions of extremes—and these are unfortunate; but they are only exceptional, particular cases.

An example from Xenophon will clarify how the particular comes to be shaken by this thinking that seeks to hold fast to the universal in its universal form alone. In his *Memorabilia* Xenophon wants to justify
147 Socrates. | Xenophon is supposed to have portrayed Socrates more faithfully according to his own characteristics than did Plato, and without his own embellishment. In the fourth book he seeks to show how Socrates attracted the young men to him and brought them to recognize their need for culture; and also in part how he imparted this culture to them, and what they learned in his company. He says that within this circle Socrates no

52. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.13.1144b.18–21, 28–30 (Barnes, ii. 1808). Cf. W. xiv. 78 (MS?).

longer perplexed them with subtleties but disclosed the good to them in the clearest and most open way.[53]

He gives an example from the conversation of Socrates with Hippias. Here Socrates maintains that the just person is the law-abiding person and that the laws are divine laws. Hippias counters this by asking how Socrates can declare obedience to the laws to be an absolute duty, seeing that the people and the lawgivers themselves are often dissatisfied with the laws and change them all. This presupposes that they are not absolute. Socrates replies by asking whether those who make war did not also make peace and so condemn war; thus they annul once more what they have willed, and do not regard it as having intrinsic being. The happiest state is the one whose citizens obey the laws; that cannot be denied. Here Socrates disregards the inconsistency.[54]

Xenophon also recounts a discussion Socrates had with Euthydemus. Socrates asks him if he does not strive for that virtue without which one cannot be of service to one's own family and to the state. Euthydemus declares that undoubtedly one must do so. Socrates also asks whether this is impossible without justice, and, further, whether Euthydemus has made himself a just person, has achieved justice in himself. Euthydemus answers affirmatively, saying that he thinks he is as much a just man as is anyone else. Socrates then says that, if this is so, he will also know how to state what the just do, what their actions are like. Euthydemus says that he can easily do this. Then Socrates proposes that | under the letter J Euthydemus shall 148
write down what the just person does and under the letter U what is unjust. Euthydemus begins by putting lying under what is unjust; defrauding,

53. In this paragraph, and more specifically in the last sentence, Hegel generalizes from a more limited account in *Memorabilia* 4.2.40 (Marchant, pp. 296–7) about the attitude of Socrates toward Euthydemus; cf. *W.* xiv. 81 (MS?). The view that Xenophon portrayed Socrates more faithfully than Plato did finds expression in Tiedemann (*Geist*, ii. 41–2) and Tennemann (*Geschichte*, ii. 31, 63). Tiedemann—citing Jacob Brucker, *Historia critica philosophiae*, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1742–4), i. 563—says that Plato's account of the view of God held by Socrates bears too much of the impress of Plato's own thinking. Tennemann thinks highly of both, in comparison with Plutarch and others, yet says that 'Xenophon's simplicity' provides a truer mirror for reflecting the teaching of Socrates than does 'Plato's fruitful spirit'. Schleiermacher had raised this issue anew in his treatise 'On the Value of Socrates as a Philosopher'; see his *Sämmtliche Werke*, 3rd division, iii. 287–308. According to *W.* xiv. 81, Hegel presents this assessment of Xenophon as his own view and not with reference to the views of others; there the basic text follows Gr., whereas in this edition it follows Pn.

54. The example in this paragraph comes from Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.4.12–25 (Marchant, pp. 314–25), especially sections 12, 14, 15; cf. *W.* xiv. 81 (MS?). The concluding remark is Hegel's own; the inconsistency pointed out by Hippias is not resolved by the analogy Socrates offers here nor by his further examples in Xenophon, although the author has Hippias acquiesce that the gods (and presumably legislators too) ordain what is just.

stealing, depriving someone of freedom, taking someone's property—these are unjust and so belong on that side. Socrates asks if it is just when a general subdues a hostile state. Euthydemus says that it is. Socrates asks if it is the same when the general deceives or robs the enemy. Euthydemus concedes this. Then the same qualities that are on the side of injustice belong on the side of justice. Euthydemus now adds the qualification that he meant Socrates to understand that lying and the like are unjust only vis-à-vis friends. Socrates accepts this but asks whether a general acts rightly if, upon seeing his troops waver in the course of battle, he tells them that help is on the way. Euthydemus concedes that he does. Socrates asks the same thing about a father who secretly mixes medicine into the food of his sick children, thus deceiving them and making them well. Or about someone who by guile or by force takes away the weapon a suicidal friend means to use to carry out his intention. Euthydemus concedes again. So lying and deceiving friends both belong on the side of justice too.[55]

For the universal to have validity we must show that the particular is not something fixed. Reflection undercuts the stability of the particular good. Socrates points to universal commands such as 'Thou shalt not kill'. Their universality is bound up with a particular content, which is conditioned. Once we become conscious of this conditional status of the content, its fixity is shaken. In the case of laws or commandments what matters are the circumstances, for the laws are something conditioned by circumstances or opinions. Insight discovers conditions or circumstances of this sort from which there arise exceptions to this 'unconditionally valid' law.

The next aspect is that things that have validity in consciousness (custom and what is lawful) have been undermined by the culture of reflective
149 consciousness. Here we have to mention that Aristophanes | latched onto this aspect of the Socratic philosophy; as we know, he did this in the *Clouds* (*Nubes*). People have tried to justify and make excuses for Aristophanes in various ways; they have tried to argue on the basis of chronology that his

55. This conversation is reported in Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.2.11–18 (Marchant, pp. 276–81). Socrates proposes making two columns for the two sorts of qualities, one under 'delta' (the Greek 'd', the first letter of δίκη or 'justice') and the other under 'alpha' (the Greek 'a', for ἀδικη or 'injustice'). Our German text reads literally 'under a triangle ... in one corner ... and on the other side', where 'triangle' (*Dreieck*) probably refers to the shape of the capital Greek 'delta'. Throughout this paragraph the terms rendered as 'just' (*gerecht*) and 'unjust' (*ungerecht*), and their correlatives, could be rendered equally well as 'right' and 'wrong' (in the moral sense); the same is true of the Socratic examples themselves (whether in Xenophon or in Plato), which often straddle the boundary between the more abstract or general sense of 'justice' and the more mundane and specific 'doing what is right'.

portrayal had no influence on the condemnation of Socrates.[56] But the sole justification is that Aristophanes was correct in the *Clouds*, that he did Socrates no wrong. Aristophanes was no shallow jester who seized on every opportunity to make the Athenians laugh, for he was thoroughly and deeply patriotic, a proper Athenian citizen. Genuine comedy does not consist of superficial jests, but presupposes earnestness of the most profound sort. The comic theater of Aristophanes is of itself an essential ingredient in Athens, and Aristophanes was no less important a figure there than were the moralistic Socrates, the great statesman Pericles, and the impetuous Alcibiades; Aristophanes belongs as much as any other in this circle of luminaries of the Greek world. He made jokes about Socrates busying himself with fundamental investigations into how far fleas jump, and how for this purpose he stuck wax on their feet.[57] This is not historical fact, but it is established that the philosophy of Socrates had this aspect [of concern with minutiae], which Aristophanes sarcastically highlighted. It shows how apt a grasp of the Socratic philosophy Aristophanes had.

The story line of the *Clouds* is briefly as follows. Aristophanes has Strepsiades, an honorable citizen of the old school, pay a visit to Socrates. He is in financial distress because of his extravagant and fashionable son, who carries on a style of life beyond his means, and because of the boy's no

56. The editions that Hegel possessed included *Aristophanes: Comoediae undecim* (Basle, 1532); *Wolken: Eine Komödie*, in Greek and German (Berlin, 1811) = *Clouds*. Hegel may be referring here to efforts in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to justify and exculpate Aristophanes. The French Enlightenment, especially Voltaire, rendered a harsh verdict on Aristophanes. The German Enlightenment, specifically Lessing and Mendelssohn, sought to excuse him on the grounds that his critique was directed at sophistry as a whole and not at Socrates in particular. Christoph Martin Wieland, however, in his *Die Abderiten* (Weimar, 1776) took the view that his polemic had no influence on the condemnation because the public had not taken it seriously. The whole issue is discussed in the introduction to the (anonymous) 1811 edition of the *Clouds* that Hegel used; see pp. vi–xv, especially the summary on p. xv, which says Plato would not have included Aristophanes in the company portrayed in his *Symposium*, or else would have depicted him differently there, had Plato been ambivalent about his role vis-à-vis Socrates. A similar view is found in *Ueber den Process des Socrates* (n.p., n.d.), i. 33, 40, a work published anonymously, and attributed by the German edition to Dieterich Tiedemann. In addition to remarks in his *Lectures on Aesthetics*, Hegel's interpretation of Aristophanes finds expression in the dissertation by his student H. Theodor Rötscher, *Aristophanes und sein Zeitalter: Eine philologisch-philosophische Abhandlung zur Alterthumsforschung* (Berlin, 1827).

57. See Aristophanes, *Clouds* 144–54; in *Aristophanes: Plays*, trans. Patric Dickinson, vol. i (Oxford, 1970), 114. In the *Clouds* a student reports that Socrates asked Chairephon how many lengths of its own feet a flea can jump and that Chairephon (or perhaps Socrates—the Greek is ambiguous on this point) devised and executed the plan of using wax slippers that, when cooled and removed from the flea's feet, could be used as the basic unit of length for measuring the distance jumped.

less extravagant lady of a mother. In his distress the father goes to Socrates, who does not teach him that this or that is what is right but instead teaches him the dialectic of the laws. He learns the λόγος, or how to find clear reasons for overturning specific laws by reasoning—such laws as that of paying one's debts. The father makes his son go to the school of Socrates too, where he learns much that is new in his turn. With the new philosophy Strepsiades is
150 then armed against pressing troubles and the threatening | creditors who soon appear on the scene. To his great delight, Strepsiades now knows how to present these creditors with good reasons why he may avoid paying his debts. But the scene soon changes. The son comes in and behaves very badly, striking his father. The father loudly laments this extreme injustice, but his son proves with good reasons that he had a perfect right to strike him. The play ends with Strepsiades cursing Socrates and his dialectic, and with a return to the old ways.[58]

The exaggeration for which Aristophanes could be faulted here is his consistent pursuit of the dialectic to its bitter end; but in that he was not unjust to Socrates. The laws and customs, the government and the administration, the actual life of the state—within themselves these have at once their own corrective for the inherent inconsistency of pronouncing specific and particular content of this sort to be absolutely valid. [But] because consciousness so destabilizes the particular and the lawful, the subject now becomes what determines and decides, and the first question that arises is how this subjectivity manifests itself in Socrates himself. The person or the individual becomes the decisive factor, and so we come back to Socrates as a subject or person, which calls for an explication of his personal circumstances.

We have already spoken at the beginning about his personality in general terms. He was a thoroughly noble and upright man, cultured in the classical manner. Nothing need be added in this respect. His association with his friends was, on the whole, highly beneficial, fortunate, and instructive for them.[59] But now that ethical life is made to rest upon subjectivity, upon one's own determining, the contingency of character comes into play. For the life of the individual it is one thing that the citizens should receive a general education in civic life, and quite another that individuals should develop

58. This brief synopsis omits the point that Strepsiades was a poor pupil whom Socrates expelled owing to despair over his stupidity (verses 789–90; Dickinson, p. 138). The play ends with Strepsiades setting fire to the school (the 'logic factory') of Socrates and Chairephon, and saying that they deserve what they get, because of their injustice to the gods (Dickinson, pp. 162–3).

59. This is probably a reference to Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.1.1 (Marchant, pp. 264–5): 'Nothing was more useful than the companionship of Socrates.'

their own culture in this way by reasoning [*Gründe*]. So, although association with Socrates was genuinely educational, this contingency and arbitrariness [of individual character] does nevertheless come into play. | We find that later on the most gifted of his friends, Critias and Alcibiades, played roles that led their fatherland to regard them as its enemies, as traitors to their fellow citizens, as oppressors and even as tyrants of the state.[60] 151

We have still to mention the characteristic shape taken by this subjectivity in Socrates, by this inner certainty that is the decisive factor. We are familiar with it as 'the genius of Socrates'. What it implies is that human beings will now reach decisions in accordance with their inner being, insight, reasons, and consciousness in general, although genius is not yet 'conscience', for that is a later expression. The subject's inner being knows and decides from out of itself.

In the case of Socrates this inner being had a still more characteristic form. It was not merely spirit that is reflectively conscious, for his genius also had the shape of a knowing directly coupled with an absence of consciousness, a knowing similar to a mesmeric [*magnetisch*] state. Something similar occurs with the dying. People in a state of illness or catalepsy can come to recognize connections, to foreknow future events or to know what is happening elsewhere at the time[61]—things that are totally inaccessible to them by any understandable connection. These are facts that people often harshly and categorically deny. What the inner spirit of Socrates—his inward knowing or this form of unconscious knowing—activates is in this mode. We are told that in the military camp he once fell into a cataleptic state of this kind.[62]

This then is the 'genius' of Socrates. In his case this form of knowing or his inner being assumed the characteristic figure of a | δαιμόνιον.[63] We must consider this condition more closely in connection with what follows. In general, what we see coming to the fore in Socrates is human knowing 152

60. In *Memorabilia* 1.2.12–18 (Marchant, pp. 16–21) Xenophon recounts some of these accusations against the two associates of Socrates but goes on to say that they were overly ambitious before they studied with Socrates, and that a teacher can only offer personal example and argument and cannot control the behavior of the pupil once the pedagogical relationship has ended.

61. The Lw. transcript reads: '{to know} contemporary events, in the way this is employed in *William Tell* ...'. The reference to *William Tell* in the variant may be Hegel's or it may be Lw.'s own addition. In all probability it refers to the dying words of Attinghausen in Schiller, *Wilhelm Tell*, IV. ii. *Schillers Werke: Nationalausgabe*, ed. Siegfried Seidel (Weimar, 1980), x. 238; trans. William F. Mainland (Chicago and London, 1972), 104–5 (lines 2438–51). The dying man, 'speaking in an inspired and prophetic tone', foresees future episodes in the Swiss struggle for freedom.

62. On the experience in the military camp, see p. 128 above, with n. 31.

63. On the δαιμόνιον, see shortly below, nn. 67, 68, 72.

within and of itself, determining to be at home with its own spirit, to give its own testimony about what is right and good—we see human freedom, the freedom of spirit. The second point, however, is that human beings become for themselves the decisive factor with regard to their particular affairs too, and about what they should do—the subject makes itself the decisive factor [there too].

We must be quite clear in this regard about what the standpoint of Greek freedom essentially was. On the moral side, the standpoint of the Greek spirit is determined as an unquestioning ethical life—in custom and laws, and in what counts as sacred practice, hence in religion too; people do these things without further reflection. The Greeks had not yet carried inner reflection to the point of self-determination from out of themselves, and still less was present what we call 'conscience'. Custom and laws, however, not only *are* but they also *come to be*, they originate, they become established. Under one aspect only do they count as a tradition that has developed in a self-contained way and emerged on its own account without definite public consciousness; this was the aspect that made them divine laws sanctioned by the gods.

Under their other aspect as well, decisions were called for about immediate situations in civic and private life. The subject was not yet the deciding factor. Neither generals nor statesmen nor the people (in the wholly democratic forms) yet took it upon themselves to decide matters, nor did individuals do so in their private affairs. Oracles were used for this purpose and subjective decisions rested upon them. These oracles include the flight of birds, the inspection of sacrificial animals, and also the consultation of a μάντις [seer]. Someone who wanted to make a journey would consult the oracles. The general who was about to engage in battle based his decision not on himself but on the entrails of sacrificial animals, as we often find in
153 Xenophon's *Anabasis*.[64] ¦ Pausanias too, prior to the battle of Plataea, frets all morning over the entrails and only at noon first gives the signal for battle.[65] This aspect is essential, namely, that the people were not what

64. See Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.8.15, 2.1.9, 2.2.3, 4.3.9, 4.3.19, 5.4.22, 5.5.3, 5.6.28–9, 6.1.22–3, 6.2.15, 6.4.9, 6.5.8, 6.5.21, 6.6.36, 7.1.40, 7.2.14, 7.2.17, 7.8.4–5, 7.8.10, and in particular the full account in 6.4.13–22; trans. Carleton L. Brownson in *Xenophon*, iii. 74–5, 108–9, 114–17, 280–5, 380–1, 386–7, 404–7, 444–5, 456–7, 470–3, 482–3, 486–9, 506–7, 526–7, 532–5, 616–19, and especially 472–7.

65. This is probably a reference to a report of Herodotus (*Historia* 9.36–7), who says, however, that both the oracles of the Spartans under Pausanias and those of the Persians under Mardonius showed a favorable result would ensue only if they took up a defensive position; see *The History*, trans. David Grene (Chicago, 1987), 629. See also 9.61–3 (Grene, pp. 639–40), which says that later on in the same day Pausanias prayed and received a different omen, this

resolved the matter. The subject did not yet take it upon itself to decide, for the decision came from outside, and that marks a lack of subjective freedom. When we speak of freedom today we mean by it subjective freedom, which was something not generally present among the Greeks. We shall see more about this in Plato's *Republic*.[66]

It is noteworthy that Xenophon speaks in defense of the δαιμόνιον of Socrates right at the beginning of his *Memorabilia*. In the first book he says that the gods have reserved to themselves knowledge of what is most important, τὰ μέγιστα. Agriculture, architecture, and even the art of government and that of war are human arts. But those who till a field do not know who will enjoy its fruits; whoever administers a state does not know whether doing so is profitable or hazardous for him; whoever builds a house does not know who will live in it; the general does not know whether it is expedient to engage in battle; whoever weds a beautiful wife does not know whether he is laying up joy for himself, or immense grief. Owing to these uncertainties people must have recourse to μαντεία, in which the will of the gods reveals itself. This is how Xenophon expresses it—that the gods have reserved to themselves what is most important.[67]

With us it is quite different. When—in the state of somnambulism or at the point of death—one of us knows the future in advance, we do indeed view this as a higher inspiration or a higher insight, but strictly as an insight that involves only private concerns and the interests of individuals. For someone wishing to marry, to build a house, and the like, this [foreseen] content is only a private concern. But what is genuinely divine, correct, and universal, what has being in-and-for-itself, includes such things as the institution of agriculture | itself, building construction itself, the state or mar- 154
riage as such, government itself—these are what is genuinely divine. Compared to them, it is a minor matter or just my private concern to know how I shall fare on a journey, to know whether or not I shall perish if I travel by ship; [to think that these things concern God] is a perversion of

one favorable for offensive action, after which he attacked successfully and Mardonius was killed. For Herodotus this shows the importance of oracles, since the Persians also attacked, contrary to the advice of their oracle, and they were eventually routed and their leader killed. Hegel also refers briefly to this incident twice in his *Philosophy of World History*. See Hoffmeister p. 13; Lasson, iii. 612; Nisbet, p. 18; Sibree, p. 254. The latter of the two references (found in Lasson and Sibree) describes the incident correctly.

66. See pp. 223–5 below.

67. See Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.1.8–9 (Marchant, pp. 4–7). He concludes the list of examples of human uncertainties by saying that it is irrational to think such things are within the grasp of human knowing, and that divination discloses them in signs given to those to whom the gods are gracious.

our imagination, but one that readily seizes hold of it. After all, particular fortunes are something wholly secondary as compared with knowing what is true, what is ethical.

What the daimon of Socrates reveals to him and to his friends as well is nothing but counsel about particular fortunes of this sort.[68] The universal aspect of it seems to have come to the notice of Socrates too; this universal aspect is the return of spirit into itself. A clever man can be prescient about many things, about what is beneficial and advisable. But in the case of Socrates there seems to have been something similar to a mesmeric state.[69] Here, where it first occurs, the return of consciousness into itself still has the form of a physical or physiological state. The crux of the entire world-historical revolution [*Konversion*] constituted by the principle of Socrates is that the testimony of the individual's spirit has replaced oracles, that the subject has taken the decision making upon itself. The daimon of Socrates is a characteristic form in which his subjectivity appeared.

Socrates as this subject, with this new principle, as person—an Athenian citizen whose occupation was teaching—did in his personality enter into a relationship with the entire Athenian people, a relationship not merely with a number of them or with a ruling group but a relationship with the spirit of the Athenian people. It is this relationship that we have to consider. The spirit of the Athenian people in itself, its constitution and entire subsistence, rested on what is ethical and religious, is in and for itself and is firmly
155 determined. Socrates now made what | is true to rest upon what the inner consciousness decided. This is the principle he taught, and he brought it into a vital relationship [with Athenian ethical life] and in this way came to oppose what the Athenian people regarded as implicitly right and true. So he was rightfully accused, and we have to consider this accusation and his subsequent fate in more detail.

The accusation included two points. The first was that Socrates did not consider to be gods those that the Athenian people accepted as gods; the second was that he led the youth astray.[70] Let us examine more closely both the accusation against him and his defense. Xenophon depicts the accusation

68. Xenophon (*Memorabilia* 1.1.2–4; Marchant, pp. 2–5) emphasizes the direct parallel between offering sacrifices at temples for purposes of divination (which Socrates himself did too), and the daimon's guidance of Socrates in his own life. Plato (*Apology* 31d, 40a–b; Fowler, pp. 114–15, 138–41) neither draws the same parallel clearly nor does he deny it.

69. See p. 128 above, with n. 31.

70. Xenophon opens his *Memorabilia* with the statement of these charges (1.1.1; Marchant, pp. 2–3). Cf. Xenophon, *Apology* 10 (trans. O. J. Todd, pp. 646–7 in *Xenophon*, vol. iv) and Plato's *Apology* 24b–c (Fowler, pp. 90–3).

against Socrates and his justification. His *Apology* depicts the entire Socratic spirit.[71] Nevertheless, we cannot just take our stand with the contention that he was an excellent man, that he suffered innocently, and so forth.

According to Xenophon, to the first point Socrates replied that he had always offered the same sacrifices at the public altars as everyone else, and all his fellow citizens had seen him do so. Addressing the charge that he introduced new 'daimons', based on the voice of God appearing to him and showing him what he had to do, he appealed to the fact that the μάντεις [seers] regard thunder, the flight of birds, the voice of the Pythia, and the position of the entrails of sacrificial animals to be the voice of God, and that God foreknows the future. He argued that it is universally believed that God imparts this knowledge to whomsoever he wishes. That he was not simply lying, that the voice of God did announce itself to him, he could prove through the testimony of his friends to whom he had often announced God's decree, for what he indicated had always been found to be true.[72]

Xenophon says that this justification had the effect of displeasing his judges—some because they did not believe Socrates, with others who had believed him becoming annoyed out of envy that Socrates | had been more 156
highly honored by the gods than they were.[73] This is a very natural effect, and things are no different today, when people do not believe the general proposition that such revelations occur, nor do they believe the individual to whom something was supposedly revealed. Anyone who maintains something of this sort is muzzled by police action. Or else people do not deny the general proposition that God knows everything and is able to reveal it, but they do not believe that it is revealed to this particular person, which amounts to the same thing as not believing it at all. Their obscure feeling about this is that when God acts and reveals himself it does not take place in such a particular fashion and with reference to issues of private interest. They regard such things as too trifling to merit being revealed by God in a private and quite particular instance. People are, on the contrary, quite willing to concede that God determines even the single cases, but that is because all single cases, the totality of them, are embraced within God's determination. We say that God's mode of operation is universal nature.

71. The account that follows in our text is almost exclusively based on Xenophon, *Apology*, because of Hegel's express conviction that Xenophon's presentation is historically truer than Plato's; see p. 141 above, with n. 53.

72. This paragraph follows closely Xenophon' *Apology* 11–13 (Todd, pp. 646–9). Cf. Plato, *Apology* 26b–7a (Fowler, pp. 96–101) and *Euthyphro* 3b–c (Fowler, pp. 8–11).

73. See Xenophon, *Apology* 14 (Todd, pp. 648–51).

Prophecies that refer to particular, single cases to the exclusion of all others, however, are not to be believed.

In any event, even this 'daimonion' of Socrates did not deal with what is true and has being in-and-for-itself but only with private particulars, and this 'daimonic revelation' was in his case much less significant than the revelation of his spirit, of his thinking. The Delphic Apollo himself declared [through] the Pythia that Socrates was the wisest of the Greeks, and this reference to him by the oracle is noteworthy.[74] People asked Socrates what that signified. The one who presides over the Delphic oracle is Apollo the god of knowledge, Phoebus, the one who knows and who has given to the Greeks the basic rule: γνῶθι σαυτόν, 'Know thyself'.[75] This rule does not refer
157 to acquaintance with one's own private human concerns, | for, on the contrary, 'Know thyself' is the law of spirit. Socrates fulfilled this commandment. He was the heroic figure who established the principle that, within themselves, human beings know what is true, that they must look within, that they should turn back into themselves. The Pythia's utterance expresses the revolution in which the human being's own self-consciousness, the universal consciousness in anyone's thinking, has taken the place of the oracle, of the knowing that comes from another. This is surely a new god, not the god that the Athenians had heretofore. So the accusation that Socrates introduced new gods is entirely correct.

The second point of the accusation was that he led the youth astray. Against this accusation Socrates set the whole manner of his life. The oracle was cited in this regard too, the fact that no one is freer, nobler, more just, or wiser than Socrates. Since he set his example and his mode of life against the general charge—that by his company and his life he led the youth into evil ways—this charge was spelled out more definitely. Witnesses came forward. Meletus testified that he knew some whom Socrates had persuaded to obey him rather than their own parents.[76] This was a reference above all to

74. In the words Xenophon attributes to Socrates (*Apology* 14; Todd, pp. 648–51), the oracle said that no one is freer, more just, and more prudent or temperate (σωφρονέστερος) than he is. According to Plato (*Apology* 20e–1a; Fowler, pp. 80–1) the Pythia said no one is wiser (σοφώτερος) than Socrates.

75. In Plato, *Charmides* 164d–5a, Critias interprets the import of this inscription on the temple at Delphi as the advice to 'Be temperate'; *Charmides, Alcibiades I and II, Hipparchus, The Lovers, Theages, Minos, and Epinomis*, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1927), 46–9. The inscription is also mentioned in Plato, *Phaedrus* 229e (Fowler, pp. 420–3) and *Protagoras* 343a–b (Lamb, pp. 196–9), the latter passage (spoken by Socrates) pairing it with a second rule, 'Nothing too much' (see n.16, p. 21 above).

76. On the reply of Socrates to this charge and specifically to the testimony of Meletus, see Xenophon, *Apology* 18–21 (Todd, pp. 652–5). Here (as our text just below indicates) Socrates concedes that people should obey him at least in the one area of education (for he is presumably

Anytus. In leaving the court [after the trial] Socrates recounted that Anytus had become his enemy because Socrates had told him that he should educate his son not in his father's business of tanning but instead in a manner worthy of a free man. Anytus himself was a tanner and, although his business was for the most part operated by slaves, this was by no means in itself something ignominious. So this remark of Socrates in Xenophon's account is wide of the mark for us, and it must have been so for the Athenians too. Socrates became acquainted with the son of Anytus and noticed his good abilities. Socrates then prophesied to the father that his son would | not remain in the 158
work befitting a slave to which the father restricted him but that, because the youth had no upright man about him to provide guidance, he would fall prey to evil desires and succumb to passions. Xenophon declares that the youth did indeed succumb to drink and became a wastrel.[77] He had abilities and so developed mental discord, becoming discontented with the condition in which he lived and which he could not exchange for any other. This vexation gives people a feeling of incompleteness that is the path to wickedness when they think of themselves as above their occupation—where they are at odds with themselves. So we find nothing surprising about the prophecy of Socrates and its accuracy.

To this specific charge that he misleads sons into disobedience to their parents Socrates replies by asking whether, in choosing public officials, generals, and the like, preference is given to those suited for office or to those experienced in the military art, or whether it is given based on one's parents. In all cases the more able one is given preference. So is it not surprising that he should be dragged to court because he is preferred to

the expert there, as the physician is expert in the area of health and others are expert in other areas of life). Xenophon also reports (*Memorabilia* 4.8.4; Marchant, pp. 354–5) that, when Meletus told Socrates he should prepare to defend himself, Socrates said: 'Don't you think that I have been preparing for it all of my life?' Cf. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.49–53 (Marchant, pp. 36–7) and Plato, *Euthyphro* 2c–d (Fowler, pp. 8–9).

77. Xenophon tells of Anytus and his son in *Apology* 29–33 (Todd, pp. 658–63). According to Plato, *Apology* 23e–6b (Fowler, pp. 88–97) Socrates offered a somewhat different and more complex defense against the charge of leading the youth astray than we find in this simple story of Anytus. Xenophon does not say that the business operations of Anytus were carried on mainly by slaves, so this element from the transcripts may be a presumption based on separate references to Anytus. The statement that Anytus 'should educate his son ... in a manner worthy of a free man' also appears in *W.* xiv. 108 as attributed to Xenophon, who actually quotes Socrates (*Apology* 29) thus: 'I said that he ought not to confine his son's education to hides.' Hegel evidently thinks this remark is both important in the trial and 'wide of the mark'. He may be influenced by Tiedemann (*Ueber den Process des Socrates*, ii. 3), who says Anytus was offended that Socrates said such a respected man in the state should not occupy his son with a lowly trade. On Anytus in extended conversation with Socrates, see Plato, *Meno* 89e–95a (Lamb, pp. 334–51).

parents when it comes to attaining the highest human good, namely, being educated to become a noble human being? From one angle this may well be quite a good reply. We do prefer the instruction given by intelligent men to that given by our parents. But it is not an exhaustive reply, for the point of the accusation is in fact the moral intrusion of a third party into the absolute relationship between parents and children. This is the first, the ethical and immediate, relationship. Every educator must respect this relationship so as to keep it pure and also to develop further the sense of being thus connected.
159 So if a | third party is appealed to or by chance brought into this relationship between parents and children, it is essential that the intrusion should not result in the parents losing the trust of their children, in the children being for their own good weaned away from trusting in their parents. The worst thing that can happen to children morally and mentally is when this bond uniting the child with its parents is loosened or even severed.

In the instance Socrates cites we can also fairly presume that, in consorting with the young man, Socrates singled out his rudimentary feeling of incompatibility, that he developed, intensified, and fortified it. Socrates noticed and even stressed the aspect of the youth's ability and in this way intensified the discord in the relationship between him and his father, which thus became the seed of his own ruin. The youth's consciousness of this lack of compatibility was certainly aroused by the impact Socrates had on his mind. Consequently we cannot say about this accusation too that it appears to be unfounded, for, on the contrary, it appears to be fully substantiated. We can only ask whether such points as irreligious conduct or disobedience to one's parents—the first principle of unethical behavior—belong before the courts, whether the courts can capably and properly deal with such things.

The reply to the question about the state religion is that if anyone, orally or in writing, attacks the positive religion, the courts or the government can indeed intervene. We can grant this not merely on the basis of positive law
160 but in | and of itself. In the case of freedom of thought and of speech there is a limit that is difficult to specify; [this freedom] rests upon tacit agreement, but there is a point beyond which it does not extend. The government rightly takes notice when insurrection is portrayed as legitimate, because the state, the corporate life of its citizens, rests upon human thought and conviction. The state is a spiritual realm, not a physical realm, for spirit is what is essential; in keeping with this there are maxims or fundamental principles that give the state stability and these must not be overturned. When an attack is made upon the general outlook and upon the law, then it is fitting for the government to intervene. That is how we do it. But in Athens circumstances were still quite different. The foundation of the Athenian

state was religion, custom as such or unconscious custom, unquestioned belief, familiar routine. If anyone sought to make a new god, the spirit of consciousness, into his principle and to provide the occasion for disobedience, it was necessary for the people to oppose him.

So Socrates was found guilty, and it was inevitable that the Athenians should find him guilty. Tennemann says that, although the indictment contained the most palpable falsehoods, he was nonetheless condemned to death because he scorned bribery of the judges, which was the common practice.[78] But this is not true. He was only found guilty but not, as Tennemann says, condemned to death, for this was a separate aspect of the proceedings.[79] According to Athenian law he could appeal to the people. He had first to determine his own punishment and then to induce the people to remit the punishment (just as in England the jury pronounces the verdict of 'guilty' and then the judge determines the nature of the punishment). Athens had the humane law that the delinquent himself could determine the punishment, though not arbitrarily but in conformity with the crime. | This 161
punishment could consist in a fine or in banishment.[80]

Socrates then refused to determine the punishment, to set the price on himself (αὐτὸν τιμᾶσθαι), because he would have acknowledged guilt by doing so.[81] The issue, however, was no longer one of guilt but merely one of the mode of punishment. To some extent this contradicts what he said in prison, that he sat there because that seemed better to the Athenians and it seemed better to him to submit to the laws.[82] Had he been consistent he would also

78. See Tennemann, *Geschichte*, ii. 41.

79. According to Plato (*Apology* 35e–8b; Fowler, pp. 126–35) Socrates was free to propose an alternative penalty to that of death; he declined to do so in seriousness, discarding such options as imprisonment, exile, or payment of a significant fine, and instead proposing in jest that he be given his meals at public expense (as was done for Olympic victors) or that he pay a trifling fine; this left only the option of death, which he freely embraced. According to Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 2.41–2; Hicks, i. 170–3), however, the judges, angry at his proposals as to penalties, sentenced him to death. According to *W.* xiv. 113, Hegel referred to these accounts too.

80. Hegel bases this explanation of Athenian legal process on Tiedemann (*Ueber den Process des Socrates*, ii. 40–5, especially the first and last parts), although, as multiple transcripts confirm, abbreviating and distorting it. Tiedemann actually says that in British courts 'the laws' determine the punishment, and that in Athens the accuser sets the punishment and the accused can propose a milder alternative if it seems too harsh, with the judges making the final decision on it. See also August Böckh, *Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener*, 4 books in 2 vols. (Berlin, 1817), i. 368 ff., especially 406–11.

81. This remark is based on Xenophon, *Apology* 23 (Todd, pp. 654–7). In place of Xenophon's ὑποτιμᾶσθαι ('to propose for oneself a lower penalty') our text has Greek with a somewhat different meaning; Lw.'s ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι may represent an error in deciphering it; Tiedemann (*Ueber den Process des Socrates*, ii. 45 n.) has Xenophon's term.

82. See Plato, *Phaedo* 98d–e (Fowler, pp. 338–41); see also n. 267, p. 104 above.

have thought it better to set his own punishment, because doing so would have been submission to the laws too. Because he did not want to determine his own punishment, because he thus disdained to acknowledge the juridical authority of the people, his fate was death.[83] Socrates surely acknowledged the authority and sovereignty of the people and the government generally, but not in this single case. Yet these must be acknowledged not only in general but in every single case. His lot was therefore death.

We presuppose the competence of our courts and so we condemn the criminal without further ado. For the Athenians, however, we can see that the act of assessing one's own penalty was necessarily at the same time an express acknowledgment and sanction of the judicial verdict of guilt. The English still observe a similar formal procedure of asking the accused by what law and by what court he wishes to be judged. The answer is, 'By the laws of the land and by the courts of the people'. So in Athens this recognition expressly precedes the legal procedure. Socrates pits his conscience, the fact that he did not feel himself to be guilty, against the judicial verdict. But the Athenian people do not have to acknowledge a tribunal of conscience. The court of justice *is* the universal legal conscience and it need not accept at face value [*anerkennen*] the particular conscience of the accused, it need take no cognizance of whether the subject has his own consciousness of having
162 done his duty. | It remains the prerogative of the court to investigate whether what the subject's conscience tells him is in fact what is true.

It is well known that Socrates met death steadfastly and in a noble manner. Plato's narrative of the beautiful scenes of his last hours is an uplifting image and will forever be the portrayal of a noble deed.[84]

The Athenian people upheld the right of their law, of their own custom and religion, against this attack, against this offense on the part of Socrates. [On the one hand,] Socrates offended against the spirit or against the ethical and juridical life of his people, and this positive offense was necessarily punished. On the other hand, Socrates is no less the heroic figure who holds to the right, the absolute right of self-consciousness on its own account, the right of his own self-certain spirit. Now that the new principle has come into collision with the ethical life of his people, with the conviction of the day, this reaction by [him as] an individual was necessarily bound to take

83. See nn. 79 and 80 just above. Hegel's stress on this circumstance again follows Tiedemann (*Ueber den Process des Socrates*, ii. 48–9, 56). More than disrespect for the court's authority on the part of Socrates, Tiedemann emphasizes the resentment of the judges at the pride and obduracy of the defendant, especially after his provocative counter-proposal that he be punished by support at public expense.

84. See Plato, *Phaedo* 59c–118a (Fowler, pp. 206–403).

place. What has been annulled and done away with is above all the individual alone and not the principle that this individual embodied; the spirit of the Athenian people did not recover from this offense nor from its annulment. From this moment on the principle will gradually raise itself up to its authentic shape, that of the world spirit, for the authentic mode of this principle is the universal mode in which it did emerge later on. The wrong that is present in the aspect at hand is that the principle emerged only as the property of one individual. The truth of the principle is its emergence as the shape of the world spirit, as universal.

We can perhaps imagine that this fate was unnecessary, that the life of Socrates did not necessarily have to end in this way. Socrates could have lived privately as a philosopher and died a natural death; his teachings could have been quietly adopted by his pupils and disseminated more widely without the state and the general populace taking notice of them. In this light the accusation against him appears to be a contingent event. Yet we have to | say that this principle received the honor due to it only because of 163
the way that his demise occurred. The result was the creation of a new actuality, the production of a higher level of conscious spirit; it constitutes an absolutely essential and higher moment in [spirit's] self-unfolding consciousness of itself, one pregnant with a new actuality. The higher right, the honor due to it, is that this principle also makes its appearance forthwith in relation to actuality and not, as people usually say, merely as a doctrine or philosophical opinion. Instead it arises in direct relation to actuality. This relation to actuality is itself inherent in the principle, the very standpoint of which is that it *is* so related and that it is in *opposition* to the actuality of the Greek principle and of Greek life. This [opposition] is its authentic stance and it is fitting that it should also be present, should make its appearance, in existence too. Hence the Athenians did the principle the honor of recognizing that it has this hostile relation to their actuality. It is a principle or a new actuality of spirit to which the Athenians were sensitive and of which they were cognizant; so the sequence of events is not contingent but is necessarily conditioned in light of this principle.

The historical fact is that the Athenians subsequently repented of the condemnation and punished some of the accusers with death and others with exile, for according to Athenian law those found bringing a false accusation were subjected to the same fate as that prescribed for the accused.[85] So the Athenians repented of the condemnation. In doing so the

85. On this transfer of the penalty onto the bringer of a false accusation, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 2.43 (Hicks, i. 172–3).

Athenians are acknowledging the individual greatness of this man. But they are also acknowledging the further point that the principle hostile to the spirit of their true condition has itself become *their own*, that they are themselves already inwardly torn, since in proscribing Socrates they have therefore only proscribed what is their own, they have proscribed themselves. The principle of the explicit internalization of consciousness is what caused subsequent philosophers to withdraw from civic affairs and to con-
164 fine themselves to the elaboration of an ideal world. | They dissociated themselves from the general aim of the ethical improvement of the populace and showed themselves in this way to be hostile to the spirit of Athens and to the Athenians.

Particular (private) purposes and interests now became paramount in Athens. What this has in common with the Socratic principle is that right and duty, what one has to do, all depend on their inward definition by the subject and not upon public laws, constitution, and customs—one inwardly may choose and settle for oneself what is right, good, and useful, both with reference to oneself and with reference to the state. This spells the ruin of the Athenian people. It is none other than the principle of self-determination for the individual. It appeared as ruinous because the principle was still heterogeneous, it was not yet integrated [*geeinigt*] with the life of the people and with the [political] constitution. The higher principle appears as the ruin of the one that precedes it because the principle is not yet integrated with the substantial [essence] of the people. Athenian life became weak and the state became outwardly impotent because the inner [life] or the spirit was divided within itself; hence the state finally became dependent on Sparta and on Macedon.

We are finished with Socrates. I have spoken at greater length here because all the features are in harmony, and this is, after all, the great historical turning point. Socrates died in the first year of the ninety-fifth Olympiad—one Olympiad after the end of the Peloponnesian War, 400 years before Christ, and twenty-nine years after the death of Pericles. He experienced the glory of Athens and the beginning of the people's ruin; he witnessed the
165 greatest flowering of Athens and the onset of its misfortunes. |

## 3. The Socratic Schools

### *Introduction*

I understand 'Socratics' to be those disciples who remained relatively close to Socrates in their ways of philosophizing. Leaving aside Plato, we find in them only a more abstract grasp of the Socratic mode, one more definite but

therefore more one-sided, and appearing in a diversity of types. People even reproached Socrates because such conflicting philosophies issued from his teaching. That result is a function of the dialectical approach; it is inherent in the abstractness and indefiniteness of his principle itself. It is only more definite forms of this principle itself that are recognizable in the philosophical outlooks and modes that we designate as Socratic in the more specific sense.

There are three of these Socratic schools. What is [merely] of literary interest I shall pass over. Diogenes Laertius mentions many Socratics who carried on conversations with Socrates himself or who composed writings in his spirit. These include Aeschines and Simon, who belong to the school of tragedy and whom we shall pass over. But the Megaric (or Eristic) school did issue from Socrates, as also did those of the Cyrenaics and Cynics.[86]

The immediate consequence of the death of Socrates was that his friends fled from Athens to Megara, where Plato went too. Eucleides of Megara was resident there and received them hospitably.[87] During the period of most fervent hostility between Athens and Megara, Eucleides had often secretly gone to Athens disguised in women's clothing, in order to be in the company of Socrates.[88] Eucleides was the founder of the Megaric school, which is also

86. At the end of the second book of his *Lives* Diogenes Laertius follows his discussion of Socrates with chapters on the philosopher's disciples and friends, though without any threefold division of schools or any other strict principle of organization. These disciples and friends whose thought and writings contain echoes of their conversations with Socrates are, in order: Xenophon (*Lives* 2.48–59); Aeschines, a writer of dialogues (2. 60–4); Aristippus the Cynic (2. 65–104); Phaedo, founder of the school of Elis (2. 105); Eucleides of Megara, founder of the Megaric school (2. 106–12); Stilpo, another Megaric (2. 113–20); Crito, the devoted friend of Socrates and reputed author of dialogues (2. 121); Simon, an Athenian cobbler whose actual existence is uncertain (2. 122–4); Glaucon (2. 124); Simmias (2. 124); Cebes (2. 125); Menedemus (2. 125–44). See Hicks, i. 176–275, for this sequence. Diogenes postpones treatment of Antisthenes and the other Cynics to the sixth book. Tiedemann and Tennemann each adopt the threefold division of schools, but they present them in a different sequence from the one Hegel adopts in our text. Tiedemann mentions first the 'School of Eretria (or Elis)' but says it is too insignificant to have attracted the attention of historians.

87. On this exodus, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 2.106, 3.6 (Hicks, i. 234–5, 280–1). Diogenes refers to their alarm at 'the cruelty of the tyrants', meaning by this not the Thirty (whose rule ended in 403 BC) but the current leaders of the democratic party in Athens. Diogenes does not actually say that Eucleides received them hospitably, but Tennemann does (*Geschichte*, ii. 137).

88. The source of this report is Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 7.10.2–4; *The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius*, trans. John C. Rolfe, 3 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1927), ii. 118–19. Here Eucleides is said to have sneaked into Athens in this way at nightfall, to have passed the night by receiving advice and instruction from Socrates, and at daybreak to have begun the long journey back to Megara, a distance of more than 20 miles; the penalty for a citizen of Megara setting foot in Athens was death. Although Hegel possessed an edition of Aulus Gellius (Cologne, 1533), he may have taken this report from Brucker (*Historia*, i. 610–11) or from Tiedemann (*Geist*, ii. 49).

called the Eristic school owing to its zest for disputation; and for this reason it was even reproached for not being a σχολή but a χολή.[89]

The principle of the Megaric school was the simple good or, abstractly, the good in simple shape, the principle of simplicity in general. The Megarics linked the dialectic to their affirmation of the simplicity of the good, and to
166 that extent they are the same as the Eleatics, except | that for the Eleatics *being* is and everything particular is nothing true. So the Megaric school held to a definite being, which according to its *simplicity* is the *good*; and along with it this school had a dialectic that discloses that everything particular, limited, or determinate is nothing true.

The principle of the Cyrenaic school seems to be far removed from that of Socrates; it seems the opposite to Socrates. Its principle was ἡδονή or pleasure [*Vergnügen*], what is pleasing. We imagine the principle of pleasurable existence or of pleasurable sensation to be utterly opposed to the good. But that is not the case for the Cyrenaics. What is the good? The Cyrenaics made *pleasure* alone, which seems to be one definite thing, into the content of the good, but in such a way that the requisite of satisfaction is a cultivated spirit. By this they do not mean sensuous pleasure but pleasure as grasped by thought, as it is defined by the understanding.

The third school is that of the Cynics. The Cynics too relegated all limited human interests to a subordinate role as something undesirable. Their principle is the good [too], but with what content, how defined? Their definition of the good was that human beings have to keep to what is in conformity with nature, to what is *simply natural* and not to what is subjective. [Subjective] pleasure is something abstractly natural that people find suits them, but it is only abstractly natural.

### *a. The Megarics*

Eubulus [i.e. Eubulides] figures later on as a renowned Eristic.[90] Eucleides is considered to be the founder of the school. Stilpo, Diodorus, and

89. Diogenes Laertius reports that Eucleides made a thorough study of the works of Parmenides, and that at first his followers were called Megarics, later on Eristics, and later still Dialecticians. He also reports that Diogenes the Cynic called the school (σχολή) 'bile' or 'bitterness' (χολή). See *Lives* 2.106, 6.24 (Hicks, i. 234–5, ii. 26–7).

90. Eubulides of Miletus is sometimes called Eubulus; cf., for instance, Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 6.20, 6.30; Hicks, ii. 22–3, 32–3). Diogenes gives a formal account of him in *Lives* 2.108–9 (Hicks, i. 236–7); there he lists by name some of the famous dialectical arguments attributed to him and repeats the following from an unidentified comic poet: 'Eubulides the Eristic, who propounded his quibbles about horns [of dilemmas] and confounded the orators with falsely pretentious arguments, is gone with all the braggadocio of a Demosthenes.' Diogenes also says that Eubulides engaged in controversy with Aristotle, and was probably the one who taught

Menedemus are also famous Eristic figures.[91] Despite his stubborn manner of disputation Eucleides was a most placid man. The story goes that on one occasion his opponent in a dispute was so irritated that he cried out: 'I shall die if I do not | revenge myself upon you!' To this Eucleides replied: 'And I 167
shall die if I do not soften your anger by the mildness of my words (τῶν λόγων), so that you love me as before.'[92]

The general point is that the Eristics held the good to be something simple and so to be what is true in general, to be the identity of what is true.[93] With this position the Eristics combined a highly developed dialectic, a philosophical dialectic that was applied even to [popular] representations or to everyday life and modes of speech. They displayed all manner of subtlety in exposing contradictions and entangling others in them so as to throw them into confusion. We are told little about their dialectic proper but more about the perplexity that they introduced into ordinary consciousness and views, by latching onto quite ordinary things and expressions from public life. There are numerous anecdotes about this, many of them humorous, but others that certainly take some decided form of thinking as their topic. They seize upon it and show how we fall into contradictions or into self-contradiction when we accept its validity.

Diogenes Laertius mentions many such instances, and so does Aristotle in his ἔλεγχοι σοφιστικοί, where he shows great patience in providing the

Demosthenes to pronounce the letter rho (r) correctly. Tennemann (*Geschichte*, ii. 135, 137, 143–6) says that the fame of Eubulides rests solely on the sophisms he invented.

91. On Eucleides (*c.*450–380 BC), see nn. 86–9 just above. Diodorus Cronus of Iasos (fl. *c.*300 BC), Stilpo of Megara (*c.*380–300 BC), and Menedemus of Eretria (*c.*339–*c.* 265 BC) are treated in that order by Diogenes Laertius (*Lives*, 2.111–20, 125–44; Hicks, i. 238–49, 256–75), who says some credit Diodorus with several of the sophisms attributed to Eubulides. Hegel lumps Menedemus with the Megarics because Diogenes says he was a pupil of Stilpo for a while in Megara, whereas Diogenes himself puts him in the school of Elis; presumably it moved to Eretria, for it was also called the Eretrian school after the arrival of Menedemus, although Diogenes draws a distinction between the two schools (*Lives* 1.18; Hicks, i. 18–19). On the two, see Tiedemann (*Geist*, ii. 48–9) and Tennemann (*Geschichte*, ii. 164–5); Tennemann distinguishes the Elians from the Megarics even though they seem to share the same principles and outlook. On Menedemus, see also n. 99 just below.

92. Possibly Hegel took this anecdote from Brucker (*Historia*, i. 611), who in turn bases it on passages in Plutarch (*De fraterno amore* 489D)—in *Opera Omnia*, ed. Guglielmo Xylander (Paris, 1624)—and Stobaeus (*Sententiae*, Sermon 209)—p. 654 in the edition of Conrad Gesner (Tiguri, 1559). Whereas *W.* xiv. 132 presents Brucker's Latin phrase (*lenitate verborum*—'by the mildness of the words'), the Greek (τῶν λόγων) of our text, taken from Lw., indicates that Hegel consulted the Greek sources.

93. This is probably a reference to Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 2.106 (Hicks, i. 234–5): 'He [Eucleides] held the supreme good to be really one, though called by many names, sometimes wisdom, sometimes God, and again Mind, and so forth.'

solutions.[94] We find jests of this sort, and ambiguities of expression and of representation, in Plato too, where they are employed for the purpose of making the Sophists ridiculous and showing how they spent their time on trivialities.[95] Aristotle finds fault with the Sophists for jesting and for keeping to everyday expressions and seeking contradictions [in them]. The Eristics from the school of Socrates were much more irritating in this respect than were the Sophists.[96] They were the jesters at the court of the Ptolemies.[97] The Greeks were utterly fascinated with the discovery of the kinds of contradictions that we fall into in our speaking and ordinary representa-
168 tions. Simplicity | became established as the principle of what is true. Among us, for instance, this takes the form that a proposition is either true

94. In the second book of his *Lives* Diogenes Laertius mentions anecdotes of this sort about the Megarics but does not resolve the puzzles they embody; see, for example, 2.111, 119, and 134–5 (Hicks, i. 238–41, 246–9, 264–7), as well as n. 99 just below. On Aristotle's solutions in his *De sophisticis elenchis* [*Sophistical Refutations*] see n. 96 just below, as well as p. 260 in the discussion of Aristotle later in this volume.

95. See Plato's treatment of two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, in his dialogue *Euthydemus*. They teach the science or σοφία (wisdom) of ἐριστική or disputation (272b; Lamb, pp. 382–3). In the course of the dialogue they present some twenty-two sophisms, becoming entangled in them and making themselves look ridiculous to the other participants. The sophisms rest upon verbal ambiguities in certain terms (275a–7c; Lamb, pp. 390–9) or turns of phrase (300a–d; Lamb, pp. 478–83), or upon more significant logical errors resulting from the nature of language. The latter include treating the quality of an individual as interchangeable with the individual itself (298a–d; Lamb, pp. 470–1) or absolutizing a capacity—equating 'knowing' with 'omniscient'—in a way that the dialogue makes look particularly ridiculous (293b–7b; Lamb, pp. 454–69); treating the reality of a term as interchangeable with the reality of the thing it expresses as, for instance, in maintaining the impossibility of false expressions and contradictions (284 ff.; Lamb, pp. 420 ff.); arbitrarily bringing together two different predicates of the same object so as artificially to infer from them a third, illegitimate predicate (298d–e; Lamb, pp. 474–5; see n. 102 shortly below); interchanging subject and predicate in a grammatical but nonsensical sentence, as in the most ridiculous example of the dialogue—'Heracles is a "bravo" [exclamation]' (303a–b; Lamb, pp. 490–1).

96. In his *Sophistical Refutations* (164b.27–65a.24; Barnes, i. 278–9) Aristotle points out that lapses in reasoning can occur because a name or term can apply to a number of (sometimes different) things, and that the Sophists capitalize on this by seeming to be wise in their deductions and refutations when they actually are not; see also n. 102 just below. He also says there (171 b.29–34; Barnes, i. 291) that contentious arguers (Eristics) and Sophists use the same arguments but with different motives—the former to gain apparent victories and the latter to appear wise.

97. Diogenes Laertius links the Eristics with various Hellenistic rulers and not just with the Ptolemies, but he does not cast them in the role of intentional jesters, although their replies are often ironic and clever. According to *Lives* ii. 111–12 (Hicks, i. 238–41) Diodorus, while at the court of Ptolemy Soter, failed to answer dialectical questions put to him by Stilpo, was shamed, and despondently took his own life. According to *W.* xiv. 133, Hegel referred to this story. See also *Lives* 2.115–16 (Hicks, i. 242–5), on Stilpo's role at this same court; cf. Plutarch's *Lives* (*Demetrius* 9.5–6; Perrin, ix. 22–5). See also Diogenes 2.129–30 (Hicks, i. 260–3), on Menedemus at the court of Nicocreon.

or not true, and that one must answer either yes or no to a given question—that an object cannot have two opposite predicates. This is the principle of simplicity.

The Eristics did not just speak in general terms about such things, for they sought out examples in everyday life that they could use to bring about confusion and they did this systematically. For instance, when someone confesses that he is lying, is he telling the truth or is he lying?[98] The Megarics (Eristics) held fast to the good as what is universal. Our interest relates to the principles of this school. Their dialectic is especially directed to the breaking-down [*auflösen*] of what is particular and to extracting the universal from it, always pointing to the universal. As I said, we have many anecdotes about their arts of disputation. In particular, the Megarics set forth puzzles relating principally to bringing to light some contradiction that resides in consciousness and calling attention to it—holding consciousness firmly to the definitions that it accepts and so bringing it into contradiction with something else that it also grants. Many of these stories relate to the form of universality too, for the mandatory answer to a question is supposed to be either yes or no. Diogenes and Aristotle mention many examples of this sort, some deriving from the ancient Sophists but also some from the Megarics. For instance, Menedemus was asked whether he had stopped beating his father. To answer yes is to admit to having beaten him; to answer no is to admit that he beats him still.[99] (According to the basic law that A is either positive or negative, there is no third option. These puzzles fall under this law.) Other examples involve taking due account of the universal. The cabbage that is sold here is not [cabbage], for cabbage existed many thousands of years ago, and so cabbage is not this cabbage.[100] This seems trivial because | cabbage 169
is such a trivial material, but in other forms the issue appears more important.

98. Diogenes attributes this famous 'paradox of the liar' to Eubulides, but without stating what it involves (*Lives* 2.108; Hicks, i. 236–7), although Cicero does so (*Acad.* 2.95; Rackham, pp. 586–7); based on the assumption that every proposition is either true or false, a simple yes or no answer to this question is demanded, yet neither answer will do. See also its presentation in Brucker (*Historia*, i. 613) and Tennemann (*Geschichte*, ii. 145).

99. In the passage about this in Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 2.135; Hicks, i. 266–7) Menedemus refuses the terms of the question, namely, to give a simple yes or no answer. Cf. *W.* xiv. 137 (MS?). So, contrary to Hegel, Menedemus does not seem to have been a Megaric or to have accepted the rules of that school, or at least he was an Eristic only in some broader sense. See n. 91 just above, as well as Klaus Döring, *Die Megariker: Kommentierte Sammlung der Testimonien* (Amsterdam, 1972), 30 (fragment 106).

100. Diogenes Laertius gives this as an illustration of how Stilpo did away with the validity of species (*Lives* 2.119; Hicks, i. 246–7). Both here and in *W.* xiv. 142 Hegel gives this example an opposite interpretation, one conformable to his own dialectic, in which the universal sublates

When, for instance, I say 'I', I mean myself, this particular person distinct from all others. All others say 'I' too, and so a universal is expressed simultaneously in the particular. Speech essentially expresses only the universal as such, although what speakers mean is the particular or the single individual. So we are quite unable to put into speech what we mean. 'I' is everyone, and everyone else can say 'I, the one who stands here' just as readily as I can say it. Everyone is in a 'here', for everything that we say expresses what is universal as well. This is the nature of the universality that validates itself in speech. We have recourse to [proper] names, but the name as such is no expression embodying what I am; it is a sign and a contingent sign at that.

Jests of the type illustrated above involve the form of universality. The universal is sought out in the particular and in this way the particular is refuted. Many witticisms of this kind are ascribed to Diogenes of Sinope; some of them have an important point, while others are quite insignificant.[101] Aristotle recounts one of these insignificant cases, a contradiction brought about by the form of speech; it is a journeyman's witticism such as we find in [Till] Eulenspiegel, which was not in itself a popular romance although it does contain journeymen's pranks. Aristotle makes an honest effort to clear up the confusion. [The witticism goes as follows:] you own a dog, *habes canem*, and the dog has offspring, so the dog is a father; so you have a father whose offspring are dogs, which makes you the brother of dogs
170 and so you are a dog yourself.[102] |

Other witticisms of this kind are more significant, such as the line of argument known as the Heap (σωρείτης, *cornutus*), or as the Bald Man

the single individual. For the Megarics, however, the example serves to show that the species is external and alien to the being of the individual to which it is referred, and is therefore no longer valid. The Megaric view is reproduced correctly by Tennemann (*Geschichte*, ii. 161). In any event, the anecdote that follows in Diogenes and also appears in *W.* xiv. 142 (MS?) clearly shows the primacy of the individual; in it Stilpo walks away from an argument with Crates in order to buy fish, saying that the argument will keep but the fish will soon be sold.

101. Diogenes of Sinope (*c.*400–*c.*325 BC), the founder of the Cynic school, is treated below in our text. The anecdotes about him in Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 6.20–81; Hicks, ii. 22–85) are clearly not interpretable in the sense Hegel suggests—refutation of the particular by the universal—but rather in an opposite sense, as in his demonstrating the actuality of motion by walking about (6.39; Hicks, ii. 40–1). But, since the first part of this sentence in our text is found only in Gr., it is not impossible that Hegel was instead speaking of Diogenes Laertius.

102. Only Gr. and Lw. expressly attribute this example to Aristotle, although an unclear formulation in Pn. points in the same direction. Actually it occurs in Plato, *Euthydemus* 298d–e (Lamb, pp. 474–7). Till Eulenspiegel is a prankster featured in a collection of popular German stories who traveled from town to town playing clever and amusing tricks on the gullible townsfolk.

(φαλακρός, *calvus*); these refer to how the quantitative changes over into the qualitative.[103] One grain does not make a heap; yet one grain does make a heap when I say it makes a heap, and when in saying so I am always putting down another grain, and finally there is a large heap. The proposition states that one grain does not make a heap; the repetition makes a few grains, then many, come together.[104] The converse is φαλακρός or *calvus* [the Bald]. Tearing one hair from a horse's tail does not make the tail bare; but if I pull out another and go on doing that, then the tail end does become bare.[105] 'Many' is at first only a quantitative distinction, but ultimately it changes over into a qualitative distinction, and we are not immediately conscious of the changeover. We always separate quantity and quality from one another, and yet the [qualitatively] indifferent distinction of number or size changes over into quality, as when water is made ever hotter until at 80 degrees on the Reaumur scale it suddenly turns into steam. This distinction of quantity from quality, their opposition, is very important, but our understanding fails to recognize the dialectical nature of their transition into one another, adhering as it does to the conviction that the qualitative is not the quantitative, and vice versa.

The quite simple examples that look like jests involve a fundamental consideration of the categories in question. The Greeks of later times were indefatigable at devising conundrums of this sort.

### *b. The Cyrenaics*

Aristippus of Cyrene is regarded as their head. His studies involved a long association with Socrates. He had come to Socrates by chance, in the

103. Only Lw. contains the erroneous juxtaposition of *cornutus* ('horned')—which refers to a separate argument—with 'sorites' ('heap'); Hegel may have spoken of both arguments. Diogenes Laertius reports (*Lives* 2.108, 111; Hicks, i. 236–9) that the dialectical argument known as the 'Horned One' was variously attributed to Eubulides and to Diodorus Cronus. The argument maintains that, since you still have whatever you have not lost, and you have not lost horns, therefore you still have horns. The Latin equivalent of 'sorites' would be *acervalis* ('proceeding by accumulation'); see Cicero, *De divinatione* 2.11; *De senectute, De amicitia, De divinatione*, trans. W. A. Falconer (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1923), 380–3.

104. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 2.108; Hicks, i. 236–7) attributes this particular sorites argument to Eubulides. Hegel could have found the formulation of it in Cicero, *Acad.* 2.49, 92–4 (Rackham, pp. 528–31, 582–7). Cf. Brucker (*Historia*, i. 614) and Tennemann (*Geschichte*, ii. 144).

105. The more familiar version of 'the Bald' concerns plucking hairs from someone's head; see in particular Brucker (*Historia*, i. 614 with note s). Its classical expression occurs in Aspasius (*c.* AD 100–50), *In Ethicam Nicomacheam* 56.32–7.3 (ed. G. Heylbut; Berlin, 1889), but Hegel may not have been familiar with this text. The version involving the horse's tail is found in Horace, *Sermones* ('*Epistles*') 2.1.45–7; *Satires, Epistles and Ars Poetica*, trans. H. Ruston Fairclough (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1929), 400–1.

171 company of his | father, a merchant who had been making business trips to Greece.[106]

Simply put, the Cyrenaic principle is that our vocation as human beings, what is supreme and essential for us, is to seek pleasure, ἡδονή, pleasant [*angenehm*] sensation.[107] For us 'pleasure' [*Vergnügen*] is a trivial term. We are accustomed to assuming that there is something superior to pleasure and that pleasure is something devoid of content. We can have pleasure in countless ways; it can result from the most diverse circumstances. In our consciousness this very diversity is quite important and a highly essential feature. So at first this principle appears to be trivial and in general it is so. Prior to Kant's philosophy the doctrine of happiness was in fact the universal principle, and viewing things in terms of pleasant or unpleasant sensations took the form of an ultimate, essential determination for philosophers at that time such as Mendelssohn and Eberhard, so that even a tragic drama was supposed to awaken pleasant sensations through the medium of the unpleasant ones portrayed in it.[108]

106. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 2.65; Hicks, i. 194–5) says that Aristippus (*c.*435–366BC) 'was drawn to Athens by the fame of Socrates'. We have no source for Hegel's statement about the merchant father unless we assume that he confused this passage with a different report (7.31; Hicks, ii. 142–3) about the father of Zeno the Stoic, a traveling merchant who brought books about Socrates back to Cyprus from Athens for his son; see also p. 265 below. Diogenes reports on the succession of pupils of Aristippus, who were known as Cyrenaics (2.85–6; Hicks, i. 214–17).

107. Hegel probably bases this summary on Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 2.86–8 (Hicks, i. 216–19), although it is not entirely consistent with that passage. Diogenes says that the Cyrenaics distinguish two states, pleasure and pain, but they do not distinguish degrees of pleasure nor do they agree with the Epicureans (as Hegel suggests below in our text), who view pleasure as the absence of pain. They say that our end or our vocation is to seek particular pleasures, which are desirable for their own sake and are things we instinctively seek. Scholars today doubt that Aristippus founded a school of hedonistic philosophy in which pleasure was expressly and methodically elevated to the status of principle and highest good. Plato's *Theaetetus* and *Philebus*, and Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, works dedicated to opposing hedonism, make no mention of Aristippus, but instead criticize only the hedonism of Eudoxus of Cnidos. In his *Praeparatio evangelica* (14.18.31) Eusebius of Caesarea confirms that only in later times was Aristippus said to be the founder of an expressly hedonistic philosophy.

108. On the doctrine of happiness, see Vol. III of this edition. According to *W.* xv. 530, Hegel directed strong criticism at the theory of tragedy held by Friedrich Nicolai and by Moses Mendelssohn in particular, a theory that would have been familiar to him from the correspondence between these two and Lessing published in Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. C. G. Lessing, J. J. Eschenburg, and C. F. Nicolai, 31 vols. (Berlin, 1771–1825), xxvii, xxviii. Cf. Moses Mendelssohn, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Ismar Elbogen, Julius Guttmann, and Eugen Mittwoch, 16 vols. (Berlin, 1929), xi. 20. The supposition criticized by Hegel is put forward in particular by Nicolai in his *Abhandlung vom Trauerspiele*, in the *Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freien Künste* (Leipzig, 1757), vol. i, pt. 1, pp. 20–1. There Nicolai states that tragic drama does not produce actual pain in us but an imitation of it, which

The most important thing about Aristippus is his character and personality. He sought pleasure for himself, but only in the way that a highly cultured person would do it, as one who, precisely by cultivating his thought, had elevated himself to a complete indifference toward everything particular, toward passions and ties of every kind. We have an image of those who make pleasure their principle, as by this principle becoming the most dependent of persons, for pleasure seeking is contrary to the principle of freedom and involves making sensuous or intellectual enjoyment into one's principle. But neither the Cyrenaic nor the Epicurean doctrines, which by and large share the same principle, should be represented in this way. | 172

Two moments are essential here. One is the principle by itself, the definition of pleasure. The other moment is that the human being is a cultivated spirit and so through this spiritual culture has gained a perfect freedom that cannot be gained in any other way; and yet, the other side is that it is only through freedom that spiritual culture can be acquired—and only through that culture of the spirit is a human being capable of finding what affords pleasure. We can call this principle unphilosophical, [even] call it the antithesis of philosophy to posit pleasure as the principle. But the turn it takes is that the cultivation of spirit and of thought is itself made the very condition for gaining pleasure.[109] In Aristippus we find no further elaboration of the principle; that was done by those who came later—Theodorus, Anniceris, and Hegesias.

Many anecdotes are told about the personality of Aristippus. He sought pleasure but he did it prudently, not yielding to a desire from which a greater evil can arise, and with a cultured spirit that is free of all apprehension or

finally vanishes, leaving us with only a pleasurable quivering from having our passion aroused. Johann August Eberhard later joined in this discussion begun in the 1750s. See his *Theorie der schönen Wissenschaften*, 2nd edn. (Halle, 1786), §§6, 65, 141–8, where he calls 'beautiful' whatever gives rise to pleasure or pleasant sensations. See also his *Handbuch der Aesthetik für gebildete Leser aus allen Ständen*, 3 vols., 2nd edn. (Halle, 1807–14), i. 49, 291. For his general theory of sensation, see his *Allgemeine Theorie des Denkens und Empfindens*, rev. edn. (Berlin, 1786).

109. Hegel's positive portrait in this and the preceding paragraph contrasts sharply with the very pejorative characterization of Aristippus by Tiedemann (*Geist*, ii. 50 ff.) and Tennemann (*Geschichte*, ii. 103–5). Hegel portrays Aristippus as one of the 'plastic individuals' of antiquity, even though he does not expressly refer to that concept here. On this point, as well as on the distinction between modes of life of ancient and modern philosophers respectively, see *W.* xiv. 53–4, and Vol. III of this edition. Diogenes Laertius reports three anecdotes about Aristippus that concern how spiritual cultivation and freedom take precedence over pleasure; see *Lives* 2.68, 75, 91 (Hicks, i. 198–9, 202–5, 220–1). In the second passage Aristippus says: 'It is not abstinence from pleasures that is best, but mastery over them without ever being worsted.'

anxiety about bad consequences, and also free of all dependence, of all ties to anything of a changeable nature. We are told that he fitted into every situation, that he remained the same whether at the peak of good fortune, in the courts of kings, or even in the most wretched state. He was always unperturbed. Plato said to him: 'To you alone has it been given to wear royal robes or rags [happily].' He set no store by the possession of money despite the seeming need for it consequent on the principle of pleasure. He frittered it away on delicacies. Thus he is said once to have bought a partridge for 50 drachmas (or 12 talers), and when someone reproached him for doing so he replied, 'Would you not have bought it for an obol? Yes.
173 Well, 50 drachmas are no more to me | than an obol is to you.'[110] One hot day when he was traveling in Africa with his slave and saw that the heavy pack the slave carried was a burden to him, he told the slave to throw it away. Dionysius is said once to have spat upon him; he endured it patiently and, when reproached for doing so, said: 'Fishermen allow themselves to be drenched by the sea in order to catch a few miserable fish, yet ought I not to endure this in order to catch such a whale?' Diogenes the Cynic called him the royal dog. He is said to have been the first of the Socratics to take money from those he taught. Once he demanded 50 drachmas for this purpose from the father of one of his pupils. When the man replied that for that amount he could buy a slave, he responded: 'Do it then, and you will have two.' On being asked the difference between cultured and uncultured persons, he answered: 'The difference is as great as that between a human being and

110. The anecdotes in this paragraph are particularly significant in light of Hegel's statement above that the personality of Aristippus is more important than his teaching. On his prudence, *W.* xiv. 149–50 cites a story from Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 2.67; Hicks, i. 196–7) in which he paid for all three courtesans offered to him rather than choosing one, saying, 'Paris paid dearly for giving the preference to one out of three'; cf. 2.69 (Hicks, i. 198–9). Paris chose Aphrodite over Hera and Athena because he was promised Helen if he did so, and this set in motion the chain of events leading to the Trojan War. Hegel's remark about avoiding what leads to a greater evil aligns the position of the Cyrenaics too closely with that of Epicurus; see Diogenes (10.142; Hicks, ii. 666–7) as well as pp. 289–90 below, on Epicurus. His remark about independence from anything of a changeable nature goes too far and does not take into account the Cyrenaic doctrine that bodily pains and pleasures are worse and better respectively than are their mental counterparts; see Diogenes, 2.90 (Hicks, i. 218–19). Diogenes reports on the adaptability of Aristippus to diverse social circumstances (2.66–7; Hicks, i. 194–5) but supplies no anecdote indicating that he was ever in a wretched state; in stressing his equanimity in good and bad fortune alike, perhaps Hegel has in mind certain elements from the later ethical philosophies of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics. The statement about royal robes and rags is, according to Diogenes, 'the remark of Strato, or by some accounts of Plato'. The same passage of Diogenes tells of the expensive partridge; on his attitudes toward money, see also 2.77–8, 81–2 (Hicks, i. 204–11).

an animal.'[111] This is not altogether incorrect, for it is only through culture that human beings are human, only then are they what they as such are supposed to be; culture makes them spirit—it is their second birth. Only in this way do they take possession of what they have and the animals lack, and that is how they exist as spirit, or as *human*. We should not in this context think of the uncultured persons whom we know, for by virtue of their entire situation—structured by custom, religion, and constitution—they share in a wellspring of culture that places them on a higher plane than those who are not living in a situation governed by law.

In its theoretical aspect this [Cyrenaic position] is on the whole very simple. A distinction is drawn between the true, the theoretical, what is valid for insight, what has being in and for itself, and the good, that which is supposed to be the goal, the practical. The Cyrenaics make sensation the determining factor with regard to what is true theoretically and to what is true practically. | Pleasant sensation is what is good and unpleasant 174
sensation is what is evil. Sensation is the criterion in both theoretical and practical domains.[112] In this sphere we encounter two categories that are especially weighty for the ensuing philosophies, in particular for the Stoics, the New Academy, and the like. The first is that of determination itself, what determines or is the criterion [of truth], and the second is what the determination of the subject is, what the human vocation is—and here we get the representation of the sage, what such a person does, who counts as one, and

111. All of these anecdotes, beginning with that of the slave instructed to discard his heavy pack, are found in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, bk. 2. Hegel does not mention that money is what made the servant's pack so heavy and what Aristippus told him to throw away until the load became manageable (2.77; Hicks, i. 204–5). The version of Gr. shows that Hegel was thinking of the anecdote in its form in Horace (*Epistles* 2.3.99–102), who places the scene in the Libyan desert; Fairclough, pp. 160–1. In the anecdote about spitting, the tyrant Dionysius I of Syracuse is in fact referred to as a blenny (a small kind of fish) rather than as a whale (2.67; Hicks, i. 196–7). Aristippus spent time as a courtier of Dionysius, which is why Diogenes the Cynic called him the king's lapdog (2.66; Hicks, i. 194–5). On his charging of fees, see 2.65, 72 (Hicks, i. 194–5, 200–1), where the fee demanded in the anecdote is said to have been 500 drachmas. His reported statements about culture and the lack of it (2.69–70, 72; Hicks, i. 198–201) compare trained horses with untrained horses, educated beggars with uneducated persons, but not (as does Hegel) human beings with animals.

112. This account is based on Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 7.199–200 (Bury, ii. 106–9), a passage that also speaks of intermediate states neither pleasant (good) nor unpleasant (evil); cf. *W.* xiv. 152 (MS?). Hegel's interpretation may be influenced by Tennemann (*Geschichte*, ii. 121–2), who presents most of the same passage. See also *Adv. math.* 7.191–2 (Bury, ii. 102–5), which says that our sensations as apprehended are infallible but the things that cause them are neither apprehensible nor infallible; put in modern terms—our statements about our sensations are incorrigible, whereas our statements about their causes are not. There is a free and condensed translation of this latter passage in *W.* xiv. 151–2 (MS?); Tennemann (*Geschichte*, ii. 118) gives it in the original Greek.

so forth. These two points are of primary interest in the ensuing philosophies exclusive of Plato and Aristotle. The reason why these two issues emerge is connected with what has gone before. The Socratic good is what is universal and the concern now is to find a definition for the universal, to find a definition of the good. Again and again the question asked is: 'What is the good?' That is the problem: what is the more precise definition? The answer is the criterion. The other concern is: what should the subject adopt as its vocation, what is the interest of the subject that now comes on the scene?

The revolutionary overturning of the Greek spirit is what emerges here. When the religion, constitution, and laws of a people are valid, when the individual members of the people stay within that context and identify with it and are one with it, then the question of what the individual as such is to do does not arise. The answer is already given, and it is given within oneself. But, once this assurance vanishes, once individuals no longer find their place within the customary ethos of their people, and in the religion, laws, and so forth of their land, they no longer have what is substantial for them; then
175 they begin to ask questions on their own account. ¦ They no longer find there what they want; they no longer find satisfaction in the present [world], in their own present. This [dissatisfaction] is the more precise cause for the emergence of the question: what is essential for the individual? What should the goal for self-cultivation be? What should the individual strive for? In this way an ideal for the individual is set up, and at this point the ideal is that of the sage. In a condition based on custom and religion, the human vocation is given ready to hand; one's vocation is to be law-abiding, ethical, and religious, and what that entails is present in the religion and laws of the people. But, once the split has occurred, individuals must deepen their self-awareness and in that depth seek their vocation.

The main principle of the Cyrenaic school, therefore, is sensation, which is supposed to be the criterion of what is true and good. Further reports relate to later Cyrenaics such as Theodorus, Hegesias, and Anniceris.[113] It is

113. Diogenes Laertius distinguishes the genuine Cyrenaics among the pupils of Aristippus (*Lives* 2.86–93; Hicks, i. 214–23) from those other followers who went off in somewhat different directions (2.93–103; Hicks, i. 222–31). The latter were influenced by Hegesias (fl. late fourth century BC?), who advocated indifference to life and death, and thus suicide, by his successor Anniceris, who stressed sympathetic pleasure, and by Theodorus 'the atheist', a student of Anniceris. The different sequence of names in our text replicates that in Tennemann (*Geschichte*, ii. 116 ff.) but also reflects the influence of Kant's practical philosophy; Tennemann sees a radicalization in the direction of the consistent Eudaemonism of Theodorus and Hegesias, with Anniceris attempting to counter them and return the school closer to the original position of Aristippus. Hegel, however, as our text just below shows, takes this same sequence as the progressive replacement of the contingency and sheer subjectivity of Aristippus by a principle of universality and of thought. See also the following note.

particularly interesting to consider the further development of the Cyrenaic principle, because this development led thought beyond the principle through the necessary implications of the topic itself. What is pleasant is still something indeterminate or contingent. But when thinking, prudence, and spiritual cultivation are properly validated in this principle, then through the principle of the universality of thinking that [original] principle of contingency, of immediate singularity, and of sheer subjectivity disappears.

Theodorus is said to have denied the existence of the gods and for that reason to have been banished from Athens.[114] This is a fairly common occurrence and such goings-on are by themselves of no particular interest for our topic. | He developed Cyrenaic philosophy along more theoretical 176
lines, [distinguishing] joy and grief, pleasure and pain, pleasant and unpleasant; under his definitions pleasure or what is pleasant belongs to understanding or thought, while what is unpleasant belongs to want of understanding. He defined the good, or what is true, as justice.[115] This is a more formal definition. Other Cyrenaics such as Hegesias attached more weight to what is universal or constant, the nature of which is that in this very connection [*Verbindung*] it transcends and sublates the single individual.[116]

The universal element comes before us in the following shape. It is what we mean when we say that there is no perfect happiness. The body is plagued with suffering and the soul suffers along with it. Nothing is inherently pleasant or unpleasant, and sensation is nothing objective. The pleasant and the unpleasant are supposed to serve as the criterion, but the upshot of that principle of Hegesias is that pleasure itself is made into something wholly indeterminate, for rarity, novelty, or superfluity can evoke or dispel pleasure; all depends upon circumstances such as these. Pleasure is not determined by poverty or wealth. Freedom or slavery, noble or ignoble birth, fame or the lack of it, and so forth—all of them are matters of indifference, as are life and death themselves. Only to a fool can being alive seem consequential, whereas to one who is wise it is a matter of indifference. All things determinate-—even life and death as something momentous of themselves—vanish in the face of the universal held fast in this way. That is the ideal of the sage; the main thing is to live for oneself, for

114. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 2.97, 101–2 (Hicks, i. 226–31), a passage that also mentions two other versions—that he escaped being tried before the Areopagus, and that he was condemned to drink hemlock.

115. According to Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 2.98; Hicks, i. 226–7), Theodorus held joy and grief to be the supreme good and evil respectively, the former resulting from wisdom and the latter from folly; pleasure and pain are 'intermediate to good and evil'.

116. In other words, suicide presents itself as the rational course.

one's own sake. No benefits from without can equal those one gives to oneself.[117]

Hegesias and his friends have also set aside [*aufgehoben*] sensation because it affords no actual cognitive knowledge. They say that whatever is rationally the best is what should be done. Mistakes must be forgiven, for one
177 who is wise harbors no hatred. The wise man's aim | is to live free from infirmities and sorrows.[118] This thinking is carried through to its logical consequences with the result that the sum total of pleasant experiences, of enjoyment and the like, [even] life [itself], vanishes as something non-essential. It is said that Hegesias, who lived in Alexandria, was forbidden by the king to continue teaching because he had filled his listeners with such indifference and weariness of living that many of them committed suicide.[119]

With Anniceris this philosophy takes another direction, one that we shall see emerging later on with the Aristotelians too—what we can call a popular culture. Anniceris acknowledged friendship in everyday life, gratitude, honor paid to one's parents, and patriotic deeds, to be fitting and proper. The wise man submits to hardships and toil, and yet can live happily and contentedly. Friendship is to be pursued not for the sake of its utility but in order to be of service to one's friend.[120] Thus the teaching of Anniceris passes over into moralism. The theoretical or speculative element disappears and there arises a moral philosophizing of the sort that became paramount with Cicero and the later Peripatetics—the guise assumed by the Aristotelian philosophy in Cicero's day. What gets attention here are particular moral situations.[121] Thus one tendency annuls the principle itself (or goes beyond

117. See Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 2.94–5; Hicks, i. 222–5) for the account of Hegesias in this paragraph—although he does not speak explicitly, as does Hegel, about this being a shift toward universality; the closest to that is one short statement—'whatever is rationally the best is what should be done'—that appears in the following paragraph of our text. See the fuller presentation of the passage in *W.* xiv. 155–7, where Hegel more clearly interprets it in light of the dialectic of universal and particular.

118. This paragraph up to this point continues to draw upon Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 2.95–6; Hicks, i. 222–5); see the preceding note.

119. See Valerius Maximus, *Dictorum factorumque memorabilium libri IX* (Amsterdam, 1632), 8.9 (Externa 3); *Scriptores Latini* (London, 1819ff.), cxix. 782–3. Hegel could have drawn upon Brucker's presentation of this text (*Historia*, i. 600 with nn. f and g); our text fits Brucker's version better than it does the terse account in Cicero, *Tusc. disp.* 1.83 (King, pp. 98–9).

120. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 2.96–7; Hicks, i. 224–5) furnishes this information about the teachings of Anniceris; cf. *W.* xiv. 158 (MS?). Diogenes contrasts the high value Anniceris places on friendship with its devaluation by the followers of Hegesias and of Theodorus (2.93, 98; Hicks, i. 222–3, 226–7), but sees it in partial continuity with the position of Aristippus (2.89, 91; Hicks, i. 218–21).

121. On the moralistic and popular form taken by Aristotelian (Peripatetic) philosophy in Cicero's day, see pp. 231 and 262 below. On its carryover into the modern era, see Vol. III of this edition, concerning the Scottish moral philosophers.

it), while the other goes [down] to the popular level. For the consequential development of thought there is no longer anything of interest in it.

*c. The Cynics*

Not much about the Cynics deserves particular notice. Like the Cyrenaics, the Cynics sought to specify the direction to be taken, what the principle ought to be for consciousness in both its cognition and its actions. | At 178
least initially the principle erected by the Cynics for governing the human vocation was one of freedom and indifference on the part of thought and of actual living, over against all particular ends, needs, and types of enjoyment. In accordance with this principle, the aim of culture was not only to lead to inward independence from and indifference to such things, as with the Cyrenaics, but also expressly to dispense with them, to confine one's needs to what was necessary, to the immediate requirements of nature.[122] Here, then, we have a flight from enjoyment, a flight from the pleasant element in sensation, for the negative attitude toward it is the determining factor, just as it is later when this opposition between the Cynics and the [early] Cyrenaics re-emerges as that between Stoics and Epicureans.[123] It is evident here already that the Cynics made this negative attitude toward sensation into their principle and that this same negative attitude is also to be found in the further development undergone by the Cyrenaic philosophy.

Antisthenes was the first head of the Cynic school. He lived and taught in Athens. His mother was a Thracian, a fact that was often held against him—this is a reproach that we find quite out of place. His own answer was that the mother of the gods was a Phrygian and that the Athenians, who prided themselves on being native born, were no nobler than mussels and grasshoppers, which were αὐτοχθόνοι too. He studied with Gorgias and [later] lived in the company of Socrates. He is credited with having a cultured spirit, and several titles of books that he wrote are mentioned. He was noble and

122. Hegel distinguishes the earliest Cynics—Antisthenes and Diogenes of Sinope—from later ones such as Crates and Hipparchia, whom he characterizes in *W.* xiv. 168 as 'swinish and shameless beggars who found their gratification in the impudence they displayed toward others', and as 'worthy of no further philosophical attention'. On these later Cynics, see Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 6.85–105; Hicks, ii. 88–109), who does not contrast their austere lifestyle with the teachings of Antisthenes as sharply as does Hegel, for he speaks of that Cynic's simple and deliberately shabby clothes (6.8, 13; Hicks, ii. 8–15). Anecdotes of the time stress even more the shabby dress of Diogenes of Sinope.

123. When he comes later on to discuss the Stoics and Epicureans, Hegel interprets the opposition between them by analogy to that between Cynics and Cyrenaics; see p. 264 below. See also how Diogenes Laertius depicts the Stoics as similar to Antisthenes (*Lives* 6.14–15, 104–5; Hicks, ii. 14–15, 108–9) and how he introduces the Stoics in his seventh book directly after the Cynics in bk. 6.

austere, being the first to set a value on poverty in the outward circumstances of life.[124]

The principles and teachings of Antisthenes are simple and understandable. Virtue is sufficient of itself. All it requires is strength of character. Virtue consists in works and requires no doctrine or reasoning. The human vocation is to live a virtuous life. Being self-possessed, the sage possesses all
179 that others | seem to possess. Lack of fame is to be seen as a blessing. One who is wise is at home anywhere in the world, and so forth.[125] Here begins once more all of the general talk about the sage and about the ideal—talk about the [human] subject, its vocation and satisfaction, and in which the human vocation is set down as the simplification of one's needs. The shape that the Cynic philosophy takes with Anthisthenes is still noble and cultured, although it is not far removed from the crudity and vulgarity of behavior, from the shamelessness, to which the later Cynics made the transition.[126] When Antisthenes turned a hole in his robe to the outside, Socrates said to him: 'I can see your vanity through the hole in your robe.'[127]

Simplicity of dress is part of the Cynic philosophy. The Cynics carried a rough staff of wild olive wood, a sack for provisions, and a vessel for drinking water. Thus they placed the highest value on simplifying their needs and restricting them to nature.[128] It appears superficially plausible to follow nature alone in this way, for needs are seen as a dependence on nature that is contrary to the freedom of spirit. Reducing dependence in this

124. These remarks of Antisthenes about his origins, and this information about his teachers and his attitude, are reported by Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 6.1–2; Hicks, ii. 2–5). The mother of the gods who is said to be a Phrygian is presumably Semele, the mother of Dionysius by Zeus. Lw. has the Greek αὐτοχθώνοι ('autochthonous', 'of the land') in place of the term γηγενεῖς ('earthborn') used by Diogenes; this may be due to a failure of Hegel's memory. Diogenes enumerates his many writings, contained in ten volumes (6.15–18; Hicks, ii. 14–21). The notes just below pertain to the character of Antisthenes and to his deliberate poverty, on which see also Diogenes, 6.13 (Hicks, ii. 12–15),

125. On these general features of the position of the Cynics, see Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 6.10–11, 63, 98, 104; Hicks, ii. 10–13, 64–5, 102–3, 108–9), who says that Antisthenes taught that virtue by itself is sufficient for happiness and that for it one needs only the strength of a Socrates. Diogenes of Sinope is the Cynic reported to have described himself as 'a citizen of the world'; Crates took a similar view.

126. See n. 122 just above.

127. See this anecdote in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 6.8 (Hicks, ii. 8–9) as well as its repetition in the chapter on Socrates (2.36; Hicks, i. 166–7).

128. Hegel's account of their simple gear follows that of Tennemann (*Geschichte*, ii. 89), who in turn is drawing upon Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 6.13, 71; Hicks, ii. 14–15, 72–3) and also Apuleius, *Lucianis Dialogis Mortuorum*, ed. Bipont, iii. 168; *The Golden Ass*, trans. W. Adlington, rev. S. Gaselee (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1915), 11.8 (pp. 552–3). On restricting oneself to natural needs, see *Lives* 6.71 and also the concluding summary of the outlook of the Cynics (6.105; Hicks, ii. 108–9).

way to a minimum, to what is most necessary, appears to be self-evidently commendable. But the extent [of the reduction] is not specified. When we value limiting ourselves to nature we are placing undue value on what is other and on its renunciation. This is what we find in the monastic principle. This renunciation or negative attitude on the part of the monks involves at the same time an affirmative attitude toward what is renounced, and far too much importance is given to this renouncing and to what gets renounced.

Socrates himself indeed declares that making shabby clothes into one's distinguishing mark is itself vanity; this is not a matter for rational determination. | Clothing is regulated by such factors as climate. One must 180
dress differently in the North from the way one does in Central Africa; these things take care of themselves. The fashions of dress do not require to be understood. They are a matter of mere contingency or of taste [*Meinung*]. It is not for me to invent something new; thank goodness that others have already done the inventing, that the cut of our clothing is already determined. We must leave matters of taste to taste as such; the tailor will take care of everything. The main thing is the indifference to be shown toward style. Although old-fashioned German dress has assumed patriotic importance in modern times, it is inappropriate to devote our understanding to such matters; the prevalent viewpoint here must be that of indifference.

But the Cynics applied the same thinking to the other needs as well. A mode of life such as theirs, which is supposedly the result of a cultured spirit, is essentially conditioned by the general spiritual culture. Antisthenes, Diogenes, and the others lived in Athens and could not have existed anywhere else. But culture in general also involves its extension to cover the utmost diversity of needs and of the ways of satisfying them.[129] In modern times needs have increased greatly. Their proliferation is only the splitting of a general need into many particular needs and many ways of satisfying them.

129. See n. 124 just above on the origins of Antisthenes in Athens and his life there. Diogenes hailed from Sinope on the southern shore of the Black Sea and came to Athens as a pupil of Antisthenes; but he also reportedly spent much time in Corinth, where he died; see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 6.21, 76–7 (Hicks, ii. 24–5, 78–81). Monimus and Crates were from Corinth and Thebes respectively (6.82, 85; Hicks, ii. 84–5, 88–9); Metrocles and his sister Hipparchia were from Maronia in Thrace. Diogenes Laertius says nothing about the residence of three of the last four, and says of Crates only that he lived for a while in Athens, Thebes, and Corinth (6.90; Hicks, ii. 94–5). Hegel probably means not that they could have existed only in Athens in the narrow or geographic sense, but only in Athenian culture as contrasted with Spartan culture or with that of the modern world; see the contrast he draws between Sparta and Athens, pp. 97–8 above. Athens gave higher priority to individual freedom and to one's own personal cultivation than did the other Greek states, especially Sparta. As Hegel remarks here, this spiritual culture is the precondition for the mode of life practiced by the Cynics as well as for that of Aristippus; see pp. 118–19 above.

The understanding and its activity are the basis of this splitting, and [our notions of] luxury, for instance, are relative to this activity of the understanding. We can declaim against luxury in a moralizing fashion, but in cultured circumstances all the abilities, tendencies, and modalities that
181 belong to human life must have full | rein—it must be possible to indulge them and for individuals to pursue them as far as they wish—provided only that they are directed on the whole by universal factors. The main criterion is to attach no greater value to such things than is called for, or to attach no value to them whatever, whether it be to possessing them or to renouncing them.

Diogenes [of Sinope] distinguished himself particularly by the mode of his outward life and by his biting, sarcastic remarks. But he also drew apt retorts to what he said. He lived in all sorts of places on the streets and usually slept on the [paving] stones in the Stoa of Jupiter, so that he said the Athenians had built him a splendid place of residence.[130] All that we have are the anecdotes told about him. On a sea voyage he was captured and sold as a slave. This happened when he was traveling to Aegina. When asked what he understood, he said it was how to give orders to men, so that whoever wanted to purchase a master could have him. Xeniades of Corinth bought him and made him tutor to his children, and he educated them well.[131] Many stories are told about his residence in Athens.[132] He got into conflict with Aristippus. Aristippus passed by as Diogenes was washing cabbage and he called out to Aristippus: 'If you knew how to wash your own cabbage yourself, you would not run after kings.' Aristippus countered: 'If you knew how to get along with human beings, you would not be washing cabbage.'[133] While stomping around on Plato's thick carpet he said to him: 'I am stomping down Plato's pride.' Plato answered: 'Yes, but with pride of another kind.' One chilly day Plato came upon Diogenes in cold water. The bystanders pitied him, but Plato said: 'If you want to be compassionate, then

130. On the simple circumstances of his life in the streets, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 6.22–3, 37 (Hicks, ii. 24–7, 38–9). On his verbal repartee, see 6.74 (Hicks, ii. 76–7) and n. 137 just below.

131. Diogenes Laertius recounts this anecdote of his capture and sale in two separate passages (*Lives* 6.29–31, 74; Hicks, ii. 30–3, 76–9); the first gives details about the education he provided for those placed in his charge; the second says that he himself pointed out Xeniades as the one to whom he ought to be sold.

132. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 6.20–2; Hicks, ii. 22–5) tells of the circumstances under which he came to Athens—he was exiled from Sinope because he, or perhaps his father, debased the coinage there—and how he persisted until Antisthenes took him on as a pupil.

133. Diogenes Laertius presents this anecdote twice (*Lives* 2.68, 102–3; Hicks, ii. 196–7, 230–1), the second time as an exchange between Theodorus the Cyrenaic and Metrocles the Cynic.

go away and he will come out of it.'[134] He received witty and apt replies to things he said, and often he got a beating. On the plaster covering his wounds he wrote the names | of those who had beaten him. He tried to 182
eat raw meat, but it did not agree with him because he could not digest it.[135] He proved to be a sponger too. Someone threw him a bone, whereupon he lifted his leg and pissed on it.[136] He gave a good answer to a tyrant who asked him what metal statues must be cast from, saying: 'The same metal from which Hermodius and Aristogiton were cast.'[137] He died at a very advanced age just as he had lived, on the streets.[138]

## C. *THE GREAT SYSTEMS: PLATO AND ARISTOTLE* 1

### 1. Plato

#### *a. Life and Place in History*

The preservation of Plato's works is one of the finest gifts of fate. They are both engaging and important, in form and content alike. Plato is one of the 'world-historical' [*welthistorisch*] individuals, and his philosophy is one of the 'world-historical' phenomena [*Existenzen*] that, from their very inception onwards, have had the most significant influence on the formation and development of spirit in all subsequent eras. The Christian religion, which

134. Diogenes Laertius recounts these anecdotes about Plato's carpet (*Lives* 6.26; Hicks, ii. 26–9) and about Diogenes the Cynic in cold water (6.41; Hicks, ii. 42–3). *W.* xiv. 167 has a more faithful account of the latter anecdote than does our text; Diogenes got soaked in a rainstorm, and Plato suggested that to show true pity for such a vain person would be to ignore him.

135. Diogenes Laertius says (*Lives* 6.33–4; Hicks, ii. 34–7) that he was roughly handled by young rowdies and so wrote their names on a tablet he hung around his neck to discredit them. *W.* xiv. 167 says (following Diogenes Laertius) that 'he once got a beating', and then offers the parenthetical remark 'just as the anecdotes often tell it'; the transcripts underlying our text probably merged these two elements. The same passage in Diogenes Laertius tells of his eating raw meat.

136. The point of this anecdote is that people were treating him like a dog, so he responded crudely with a dog's behavior; see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 6.46 (Hicks, ii. 48–9).

137. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 6.50 (Hicks, ii. 50–1). Harmodius and Aristogiton were killed in trying to overthrow the Athenian tyrant Hippias in 514 BC; bronze statues by famous sculptors were erected in their honor on several subsequent occasions, sacrifices were made to them, and their descendants were fed at public expense.

138. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 6.31–2, 76–7; Hicks, ii. 32–3, 78–81) gives various accounts of his death—in one it results from colic caused by eating raw octopus, in another from voluntarily holding his breath, and in a third from a severe dog bite on his foot—and says that he reached nearly 90 years of age. We cannot tell from our text, or from *W.* xiv. 168, which account Hegel thought was most likely to be correct.

contains this sublime principle [of spirit] within it, came to be the means of organization of the rational domain, became the supersensible realm that it is, because the soil of the supersensible domain had already been tilled by the great beginning that Plato made. The characteristic feature of the Platonic philosophy is its orientation toward the intellectual or supersensible world, its elevation of consciousness into the spiritual realm, so that the intellectual domain takes on importance for consciousness in the shape of the supersensible, the spiritual element that belongs to thinking; the supersensible is introduced into consciousness in such a way that consciousness gains a permanent foothold in this soil. The principle of the Christian religion is, then, that the human vocation is for blessedness. In other words, it has, in its own distinctive fashion, made into its universal principle the fact that our inner or spiritual being is our true being. But Plato and his philosophy played the greatest part in the systematizing of this principle and in its organization into a spiritual world.

We have to consider first the circumstances of Plato's life. Plato is an Athenian who was born in the third or fourth year of the eighty-seventh
2 Olympiad (429 BC), the year when Pericles | died, in the first phase of the Peloponnesian War. Ariston, his father, traced his lineage from Codrus. Perictione, his mother, was descended from Solon. So Plato came from one of the most respected families in Athens. His maternal great-uncle Critias, a friend of Socrates, was one of the Thirty Tyrants, the most talented and clever of them and hence the one most dangerous and most hated; a poem found in Sextus Empiricus accuses him of atheism. Plato was born into this family and had the very best resources available for his education; he received instruction in all of the skills befitting a free Athenian. His name was in fact Aristocles, and only later on did he acquire the name Plato, owing to his broad forehead or to his sturdy body.[1] In his youth he studied poetics in particular and he wrote tragedies—just as our young poets today start out writing a tragedy—and also elegies and epigrams; a few of the latter, which are still extant, contain charming notions. For instance, one addressed to a beloved youth, Ἀστήρ, reads: 'To the stars thou look'st, mine Aster. Oh,

1. Diogenes Laertius (*De vitis* ('On the Lives and Opinions of the Philosophers') 3.2–3), drawing upon Apollodorus, puts Plato's birth in the eighty-eighth Olympiad; see *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, trans. R. D. Hicks, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1925, 1938), i. 277–9. Hegel had various editions of Diogenes Laertius in his library, including several with annotations on the text by Henricus Stephanus [Henri Estienne], Isaac Casaubon, and others. To arrive at the birth date he gives, Hegel may have counted back eighty-one years from the year of Plato's death (see n. 21 just below). Or he may have taken this date from Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 11 vols. (Leipzig, 1798–1819), ii. 190; cf. *W.* xiv. 171–2, as well as references to Plato's birth occurring in the same year

would that I were the sky, with as many eyes to gaze on thee.' We find the same thought expressed in Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*.[2]

Later he wished to devote himself to public affairs.[3] Early on his father brought him to Socrates. The story goes that, on the night before, Socrates had dreamed that he held a young swan on his knees and that it quickly grew wings and soared aloft, singing sweetly.[4] There are many such indications [in ancient authors] of the love and reverence felt for Plato. He was even called 'the divine Plato'. His contemporaries already recognized the quiet greatness and sublimity [manifest] in his utmost simplicity and sweetness.[5] The company of Socrates by itself did not suffice for Plato. Previously he had occupied himself with the teaching of Heraclitus. He associated also with famous Sophists, and studied the Eleatics and the Pythagoreans.[6] After he had

as the death of Pericles (429 BC), found in Tennemann (i. 416) and this passage from Diogenes. Many today put Plato's birth in 427 BC. Hegel follows Tennemann (ii. 190), not Diogenes, in having Ariston himself claim descent from Codrus. *W.* xiv. 171–2 adds a third possible reason (taken from Diogenes, 3.4) for Plato's name—his broad powers of speech. Hegel's comment on Critias reflects the account of Xenophon; see p. 145 above. *W.* xiv. 171–2, citing Sextus Empiricus, situates Critias in the company of diverse atheists, including those such as Euhemerus who regard the idea of God as a human invention. According to Sextus (*Adversus mathematicos* 9.50–4), Critias said that 'the ancient lawgivers invented God as a kind of overseer of the right and wrong actions of men, in order to make sure that nobody injured his neighbors privily through fear of vengeance at the hands of the Gods'; see *Sextus Empiricus*, trans. R. G. Bury, 4 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; New York and London, 1933–49), iii. 28–33. This passage contains the poem expressing this atheism and attributes it to Critias, but not in an accusatory manner.

2. Diogenes Laertius states that Plato took up painting and wrote dithyrambs, lyric poems and tragedies (*Lives* 3.5; Hicks, i. 280–1); he also presents the epigram to Aster (3.29; Hicks, i. 302–3). See *Romeo and Juliet*, Act II, Scene i, lines 57–64. Hegel's library contained two German versions of Shakespeare: the revised edition of Johann Joachim Eschenberg's translation (Mannheim, 1779)—see ix. 278; the edition of Johann Heinrich Voss and his sons, Heinrich and Abraham (Leipzig, 1818)—see i. 251–2.

3. This is probably a reference to Plato's Seventh Epistle (324b–5d), in which he reflects on the rule of the Thirty and the fate of Socrates; see Plato, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Cleitophon*, *Menexenus*, *Epistles*, trans. R. G. Bury (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1929), 476–81.

4. Diogenes Laertius, in recounting this story (*Lives* 3.5; Hicks, i. 280–1), does not say that Ariston, Plato's father, brought him to Socrates; that statement occurs in Jacob Brucker, *Historia critica philosophiae*, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1742–4), i. 631.

5. Diogenes Laertius presents several epigrams about Plato that verge on attributing 'divinity' to him (*Lives* 3.43–5; Hicks, i. 314–17), as well as references to Apollo's role in Plato's conception and birth (3.2; Hicks, i. 276–9). See also n. 21 just below.

6. In saying that Socrates did not suffice for Plato, Hegel may be influenced by Aristotle's remark that Socrates dealt with ethics but not with nature as a whole (*Metaphysics* 987b.1–2); see *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1984), ii. 1561. In a preceding passage (987a.32–5) Aristotle had noted Plato's early interest in the philosophy of Heraclitus (Barnes, ii. 1561). Diogenes Laertius, however, places Plato's interest in Heraclitus

3 immersed himself thus in philosophy | he gave up participation in public affairs and devoted himself wholly to the [philosophical] sciences, while still fulfilling his civic obligations. He had to go on military campaigns, and he went on three of them.[7]

Following the death of Socrates, he went to [see] Euclid in Megara, after which he went to Cyrene in Africa, where, under the guidance of Diodorus, he applied himself in particular to mathematics, at which he soon became highly proficient.[8] Plato is said to have solved the 'Delian problem', which pertains to the cube in a way similar to the Pythagorean theorem. The problem involves drawing a line the cube of which equals the sum of two other given cubes. Plato solved it by means of the hyperbola.[9] It is worth noting the type of task that oracles were now setting. People turned to the oracle in time of need, and the oracle posed that wholly scientific task as the way to ward off plague. This indicates a great change in the spirit of oracles, a change that is most remarkable.

Plato is said to have traveled from Cyrene to Egypt, but the account is obscure. He went most notably to Magna Graecia, where he made the acquaintance of Archytas of Tarentum, a Pythagorean with whom he studied mathematics and Pythagorean philosophy, and from whom he bought at a high price some writings of the earlier Pythagoreans. In Sicily he formed a friendship with Dion. Upon returning to Athens he began to teach in the Academy—a promenade in which there was a gymnasium. This

after the death of Socrates (*Lives* 3.6; Hicks, i. 280–1), and says that he mixed together the doctrines of Heraclitus, the Pythagoreans, and Socrates, concerning sensible things, intelligible objects, and political matters respectively (3.8; Hicks, i. 282–5). Plato's concern with Eleatic philosophy is evident in his dialogue *Parmenides*, and his familiarity with famous Sophists is clear in the titles and content of the *Hippias*, the *Gorgias*, the *Protagoras*, and in the speeches of characters in the *Symposium*. On his study of Pythagorean philosophy, see n. 10 just below.

7. Plato's Seventh Epistle, Hegel's likely source, attributes Plato's turn away from participation in Athenian civic affairs to his disenchantment with the tyranny of the Thirty and the subsequent condemnation of Socrates—events that nevertheless heightened his desire to unite philosophy with governance (324d–6b; Bury, pp. 478–83). Diogenes Laertius, citing Aristoxenus, names the three military campaigns in which Plato served (*Lives* 3.8; Hicks, i. 282–3).

8. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 3.6; Hicks, i. 280–1) speaks of Theodorus, a mathematician who later taught in Athens and is depicted as a character in Plato's *Theaetetus*. Perhaps Hegel misspoke, for two of our sources (Gr., Lw.) made the correction to 'Theodorus'.

9. Hippocrates of Chios (*c.*470–400 BC) and Archytas of Tarentum (fl. fourth century BC) were among the Greek mathematicians who sought to solve the 'Delian problem', so named from a traditional account of the Delians' effort to double the size of a cube-shaped altar. Hegel may have known about it from Eutocius' commentary on Archimedes, as treated in the annotated translation by Hegel's fellow student at Tübingen, Karl Friedrich Hauber, *Archimeds zwey Bücher über Kugel und Cylinder* ... (Tübingen, 1793), 67 ff., a volume cited in the *Science of Logic* (p. 209); see *GW* xxi. 200. Actually the solution by means of the hyperbola is credited to the geometer Menaechmus, one of Plato's friends.

establishment had been set up to honor the obscure hero Academus, but in fact Plato is the hero who stepped into his place.[10]

Plato's stay in Athens and his activities there were interrupted by three trips to Sicily, to see Dionysius the Younger, the tyrant of Syracuse. This was a significant point in Plato's life and work. His friendship with Dion was partly responsible for these journeys, although the main impetus was his hope of seeing a genuine constitution set up in actuality by Dionysius.[11] On the surface this goal looks at first to be quite feasible. It is the basis for a hundred political | novels—a young prince with a wise man standing 4
behind or beside him, a philosopher who instructs and inspires him.[12] But the vision is quite empty. The friends of Dionysius hoped that he would benefit greatly from his acquaintance with Plato, and that his nature—as yet uncultured though not seemingly evil—would be so altered by Plato's influence that, through him, the idea of a genuine constitution could become a reality in Sicily. Dionysius the Elder had allowed the young Dionysius to grow up quite uncultured; but his friends [and] Dion had awakened in him a respect for philosophy, and the desire to pursue it. That is why Plato was induced to take the basically misguided step of journeying to Sicily. [The younger] Dionysius was pleased with Plato, esteemed him, and wished to be held in esteem by him. But he was one of those mediocre natures incapable of any true depth and seriousness—who have the semblance of it but not, in the proper sense, the character for it. His was a half-hearted character, and so we

10. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 3.6–7; Hicks, i. 280–3) gives Plato's travel sequence as Cyrene–Italy–Egypt, and recounts his contacts with Egyptian priests. Tennemann (*Geschichte*, ii. 197) highlights Plato's friendship with Pythagoreans and especially with Archytas of Tarentum. Diogenes (*Lives* 3.21–2; Hicks, i. 296–7) and Plato's Seventh Epistle (338c–9e; Bury, pp. 520–7) mention Plato's acquaintance with Archytas only in connection with his second trip to Sicily. The ancient sources do not expressly state that Plato studied mathematics and Pythagorean philosophy with Archytas, and Diogenes (3.8; Hicks, i. 284–5) says that Dion purchased the writings for him, from Philolaus; *W.* xiv. 173–4 treats the study and the purchase as distinct enterprises. The Seventh Epistle (327a–b; Bury, pp. 484–7) recounts Plato's acquaintance with Dion on his first trip to Sicily. Diogenes (3.7; Hicks, i. 282–3) tells of the founding of the Academy, named for the grove honoring Hecademus.

11. According to the Seventh Epistle, Plato's first trip to Sicily (389–388 BC) occurred in the reign of Dionysius the Elder (who died in 367 BC). The second trip (366–365 BC) came at the request of Dion, who sought to gain Plato's influence on Dionysius the Younger; for this account and Plato's reasons for accepting the invitation, as well as the circumstances of a third trip (361–360 BC), see 327c–8c and 338b–9e (Bury, pp. 486–91, 520–7).

12. See *Les Aventures de Télémaque*, a novel by François de Fénelon widely read and imitated in the eighteenth century, which links this Homeric figure (the son of Odysseus) with the tradition of the Platonic philosopher-king; see *Telemachus, Son of Ulysses*, ed. and trans. by Patrick Riley (Cambridge, 1994). Hegel refers to Fénelon in discussing this theme in his *Philosophy of World History* (*GW* xviii. 180; *W.* ix. 56; Sibree, pp. 44–5).

can picture the only kind of relationship [someone of this type] can have who is beloved of someone like Plato and inspired by him.[13] Half-heartedness needs guidance. But half-heartedness is itself destructive of the plan that it calls forth, making it impossible; it gives rise to plans of this kind and at the same time makes them impracticable.

The involvement of Dionysius in philosophy was every bit as superficial as his attempts at poetry. He needed to be guided. He wanted to be all things—poet, philosopher, statesman—but could not abide being guided by others.[14] He quarreled with his relatives and with Dion, and Plato became involved in the quarrel. Plato did not want to give up his friendship with Dion, and Dionysius could not bear the fact that Plato did not firmly ally himself with his side. He wanted Plato all to himself, and this was asking
5 more than Plato could allow. So they parted, and yet both still felt | the need to be reunited. At one point Dionysius intended to restrain Plato forcibly from leaving Sicily because he felt honored by Plato's presence there; his departure was made possible only by the Pythagoreans of Tarentum, by Archytas himself guaranteeing his safe return. Dionysius saw that Plato put him in an unfavorable light, and yet he did not want the reputation of being on bad terms with Plato. Their relationship fluctuated between closeness and separation.[15]

Plato's hopes foundered, for through Dionysius he had not succeeded in putting into effect the Idea of the state. Other states that turned to him for that express purpose, such as Cyrene, invited him to become their lawgiver,

13. Neither Diogenes Laertius nor the Seventh Epistle states that Dionysius the Elder had left his son to grow up uncultured, although the Epistle does say that he had not been provided with education or suitable social intercourse (332c–d; Bury, pp. 502–3). This may refer to the statement (327b–e; Bury, pp. 486–9) that his desire for philosophy was awakened only after his father's death. On Dionysius' mediocre and 'half-hearted' character, see 338d–e, 340d–1a (Bury, pp. 522–3, 528–9). On Dionysius' wish to gain Plato's esteem, see n. 15 just below.

14. Hegel's ancient sources do not confirm these statements about Dionysius' attempts at poetry or dislike of being guided. The Seventh Epistle (341b; Bury, pp. 530–1) says he wrote a philosophical treatise presenting Plato's views as if they were his own invention.

15. The Seventh Epistle tells of Dionysius' quarrel with Dion (329b–c) and his effort to win Plato's friendship (330a–c); see Bury, pp. 492–7. The latter of these passages presents Plato as wanting to achieve his own purpose of making Dionysius into a philosopher, rather than as having a particular need for his friendship. On the first occasion of Plato's departure Dionysius sought to prevent it mainly by force, on the second occasion first by trickery and then by force (Seventh Epistle 329d–e, 346a, 350a–b; Bury, pp. 492–5, 544–7, 558–9). Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 3.21–3; Hicks, i. 294–7) tells of Archytas securing Plato's release at the conclusion of his second trip, and of the third trip being motivated by Plato's wish to reconcile Dion and Dionysius—an erroneous account of the reasons for the trip. The Seventh Epistle is the source for this report about Dionysius' ambivalence toward Plato (338d–e; Bury, pp. 522–3).

but Plato declined the offers.[16] (At that time several Greek states were no longer satisfied with their constitutions, but they did not find a good type of constitution anywhere else either.[17]) We have seen many constitutions drawn up in the past thirty years, and anyone who takes the trouble to do it will find it easy to devise one. An a priori constitution, however, is far from adequate; and individuals are not the ones who make the constitution. The constitution is something divine, something higher; it is historically necessary, irresistible, and strong, so that the thoughts of one individual signify nothing over against the power of the world spirit and the strength of the national spirit; if those thoughts do have some significance, if they can be realized, then they are nothing other than the product of this power of the universal spirit. It was a false notion for those times that Plato should be the lawgiver in the state. Yes, Solon and Lycurgus could be lawgivers;[18] but in Plato's day this was no longer possible. Plato refused to do it because they did not consent to the first condition he set for them, which was the abolition of all private | property, because there could be no such thing in a genuine 6
state. We will deal with this principle later on, in his practical philosophy.[19] The Arcadians turned to Plato in similar fashion, but he rejected their request too.[20] Plato lived in Athens in the greatest honor, on into the one hundred and eighth Olympiad; he died in his eighty-first year, on his birthday, while at a wedding feast.[21]

His philosophy is set down in the works that we have from him. We may, of course, regret that we do not have one purely philosophical work of his, namely, the one Aristotle seems to have had in front of him when he describes the Platonic philosophy or speaks about it, the one entitled 'On

16. See Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 3.23; Hicks, i. 296–9), who mentions Arcadia and Thebes. Hegel's mention of Cyrene may derive from Plutarch. See Plutarch's *Ad principem ineruditum* 1, which states that the invitation came from Cyrene, not from Arcadia or Thebes, and that Plato refused because the Cyrenaeans were so prosperous that it was difficult to make laws for them. See *Plutarch's Moralia*, vol. x, trans. H. N. Fowler (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1936), 52–3.

17. This may refer to Plato's own judgment that all existing states were badly governed (Seventh Epistle 326a–b; Bury, pp. 482–3).

18. See p. 18 above, for the account of the lawgiving activities of the seven sages.

19. This point about the refusal of his views on property goes beyond Hegel's main sources and may come from Aelian (*c.* AD 170–235), *Variae historiae* 2.42, which connects equality of possessions (τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν) with political equality (ἰσονομία), but without mentioning abolition of private property. Reference to Aelian at 3.23 appears in various editions of Diogenes Laertius. See also pp. 223–5 below.

20. See n. 16 just above.

21. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 3.2 (Hicks, i. 278–9). Brucker (*Historia*, i. 653), citing Seneca, states that it was Plato's birthday.

Philosophy' (περὶ φιλοσοφίας) or 'On the Ideas' (περὶ ἰδέων); for then we would have his philosophy before us in a simpler form.[22] We have only his Dialogues, and the way they are constituted makes it difficult for us to construct a portrait or a definite presentation of his philosophy. It seems so difficult to do this because in the Dialogues Plato never comes on stage in person; he leaves the talking to Socrates and to many others, with the apparent result that we often do not know whether what is being expounded is in fact Plato's own view. We can figure out more readily [what positions are held by] the persons in Cicero's dialogues, although Cicero offers no firm decision in favor of any of the diverse views. In Plato, however, this outward difficulty is only apparently the case, since what his own philosophy was emerges clearly from his Dialogues. One thing to note in any event is that philosophies even more ancient are to be found in Plato too: there are Pythagorean, Heraclitean and Eleatic dicta and modes of treatment—the Eleatic in particular.

But we should not look upon Plato's Dialogues simply as aiming to show the validity of various philosophies. His is no eclectic philosophy derived
7 from | them, but is instead the knot in which the abstract and one-sided principles now find their authentic union, in a concrete fashion. Nodal points such as this must arise in the line of progression of philosophical development, because the truth is concrete. The concrete is the unity of distinct determinations or principles. For them to be developed and to come before consciousness in specific form, they must first be established and elaborated on their own account. In this way they do, of course, take on the shape of one-sided philosophies set against the higher stage that follows them. But this higher stage does not nullify them nor does it put them to one side; instead it takes them up as moments in its deep and concrete principle. So in the Platonic philosophy we see many different philosophical dicta from an earlier time, but they are taken up into Plato's principle and united in it.

### *b. Mythos and Thought*

The mythic form of the Platonic Dialogues makes them attractive, but it is also the source of misunderstandings if we take these myths to be what is most excellent in the presentation.[23] Myth is always a [form of] presentation

22. This remark is perhaps based on comments by Tennemann (*Geschichte*, ii. 220, 222) about views he attributes to Aristotle.

23. In agreement with his friend Creuzer, Hegel opposes those who disparage myth. See Friedrich Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders der Griechen*, 2nd edn., 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1819–21), i. 95, which states: 'Plato set down in myth the highest results of his philosophizing.'

that employs sensible modes and sensuous images directed to representation and not to the concept in itself; it is an impotence of thought that does not yet know how to express itself in its own terms [*für sich*]. On the one hand, it is for the people [*populär*]; but, on the other hand, there is the inevitable danger of taking what belongs only to representation, and not to thought, as the essential element. A great host of propositions or dicta from Plato get trotted out in this way, ones that belong exclusively to representation and its modes. Because of these myths, many propositions are presented as doctrines of Plato that are really [*für sich*] nothing of the sort. For instance, when in the *Timaeus* Plato speaks of the formation of the world, saying that God formed the world and gave the daemons a certain share in the work, he says this wholly in the representational mode.[24] We can declare it to be a dogma of Plato's that God created the world and that there exist daemons and higher spirits to which God relegated the creation of [particular] things. This is what Plato's text literally says; | but it is not to be looked upon as 8
part of his philosophy. Or again, when he speaks of the rational and the irrational parts of the soul, this is to be taken in a general sense; but Plato is not asserting that the human being is made up of two kinds of substance.[25] His speaking of learning as a recollecting has been interpreted as maintaining that the human soul exists before the person's birth, as the assertion of the pre-existence of the soul.[26] But that cannot be found in Plato's philosophy. He speaks of the Ideas as a cardinal point, and they are in fact the cardinal point of his philosophy. He speaks of them as independent [*selbständig*], which makes it easy to go on to portray them in the manner of the modern philosophy of the understanding, as separate actualities, as substances, as daemons or as angels; whereas they were indeed more in the nature of philosophical views [*Ansichten*].[27] Plato's myths are the occasion

24. *Timaeus* 40d–1d (Bury, pp. 86–91) discusses the origin or generation of the 'other divinities' or daemons, in a passage that seemingly leaves Plato's position open to a charge of polytheism, an accusation Dieterich Tiedemann explicitly rejects; see his *Geist der spekulativen Philosophie*, 6 vols. (Marburg, 1791–7), ii. 142 ff.

25. Plato, *Republic* (439c–e), speaks of 'something in the soul' that bids one to satisfy one's desires and 'something' also there that seeks to control them. In fact it speaks of a third aspect in the soul too. See *The Republic*, trans. Paul Shorey, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1930 and 1935), i. 396–9. See also the discussion below, p. 223.

26. See *Meno* 81c–d and *Phaedo* 72e–7a. See Plato, *Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus*, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1924), 302–3; also Plato, *Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus*, trans. H. N. Fowler (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1914), 252–69.

27. *Phaedo* 74e–5b and 76d–e discuss the prior knowledge of the Ideas and their real existence, with its implication for the pre-existence of souls; see Fowler, pp. 260–1, 266–7. See also *Republic* 517a–c (Shorey, ii. 128–31).

for things of this sort being put forth as his doctrines. In any event, we have to pass on now to our discussion of the Platonic philosophy.

Our first point is Plato's view of the value of philosophy as such—philosophy being the cognition through thinking of what is in and for itself. Plato declares everywhere the high value he sets on philosophy; in the *Timaeus* he says it is humanity's highest possession. Speaking there about the most excellent things, he begins as follows: 'With our eyes we distinguish everything—beginning with day and night, we have arrived at distinctions involving the months, the seasons, the years. This gave us knowledge of time
9 and of history, and so we progressed | to philosophy. No greater gift has ever come from God, or ever will come.'[28]

His most famous and at the same time most disparaged statement about philosophy is in the *Republic*, where he is expressly conscious that what he has to say contradicts the commonly accepted viewpoint.[29] What he says here about the relation of philosophy to the state is all the more striking because it expresses the more precise relation of philosophy to actuality; for, even though we too of course attribute value to it, for us it stays in the thoughts of the individual, whereas for Plato it bears on the constitution, on government, on actuality. In the *Republic* Plato has Socrates expound on the true state. Glaucon, one of the other participants, interrupts him by demanding that Socrates should show how it is possible for such a state to come into existence—how it is to be actualized. Socrates beats about the bush and is evasive; he says that in giving the description of justice he is not obliged to indicate also how it is to be actualized. Finally he says: 'Let me tell you then how a genuine state can come into existence, even though my doing so will be greeted with a flood of laughter and utter disbelief. Unless either philosophers rule in the state or else kings and those in authority truly and fully engage in philosophizing—and thus sovereign power and philosophy coincide and the different sorts of disposition, which are [mutually] isolated, turn toward a common goal [*auf eins*]—there will be no end of evils for the people or the human race. The state of which I speak, however, will not come about or see the light of day until it happens that either philosophers are kings or kings are philosophers. I hesitated for long to say this because it

28. In this close paraphrase taken from *Timaeus* 47a–b (Bury, pp. 106–7), Hegel puts 'history' (*Geschichte*) in place of Plato's 'the nature of the universe'.

29. Brucker (*Historia*, i. 726–7) is unusually critical of Plato's political philosophy. So is Tennemann (*Geschichte*, ii. 516), who finds its fundamental error in its relating all elements to the principal idea of harmony or of agreement with the law of reason while not distinguishing public law from moral law, legal freedom from moral freedom; he does, however, concede that it embodies several excellent ideas.

goes so much against the general viewpoint.' Glaucon | replies: 'You must 10
realize that, in response to what you have said, many people—not bad people either—will roll up their sleeves, take up weapons, and close ranks to attack you; and if you do not produce arguments with which to mollify them you will pay dearly for it.'[30]

Plato here establishes the link between philosophy and government, and the necessity of this link. We may look upon it as highly presumptuous to say that rulers [ought] to be philosophers or that the government of states ought to be put in the hands of philosophers. But, in order to evaluate this statement, we must surely reflect on what was understood by 'philosophy' in the Platonic sense or that of his day, and on what counted as philosophy. The word 'philosophy' has had different meanings at different times. Some time ago, whoever did not believe in ghosts or in the Devil was called a philosopher. When disbelief of that sort has become widespread, it no longer enters anyone's head to call somebody a philosopher for that reason. The English call 'philosophy' what we call 'experimental physics and chemistry'; for them a philosopher is anyone who carries out experiments of that sort, anyone who possesses theoretical knowledge of chemistry and of the mechanical arts. When we speak of Platonic philosophy and see what it comprises, we mean by it the consciousness of the supersensible domain, of what is true and right in and for itself; and, secondly, we mean the validity of universal ends within the state. The whole of history from the migration of the peoples, when the Christian religion became the universal religion, is simply a matter of validating this consciousness of the supersensible and envisaging [*einzubilden*] it in [the domain of] actuality. To envisage this supersensible realm in actuality too, or to determine actuality in accordance with it—this realm that [in Plato] was initially by itself, namely, in and for itself, universal and true—has | been the long-term concern of culture as 11
such. For this reason a state, a government or a constitution of modern times is something quite different from a state in ancient times (and especially in Plato's day); it is built on quite different foundations. Several peoples implored Plato to give them a perfected constitution. We find, in general, that the Greeks at that time were altogether dissatisfied with democratic constitutions, that they rejected and condemned them and the conditions of the

30. Socrates' exposition of justice in the state begins in *Republic* 369a. After much ground has been covered, Glaucon demands to know how the just state is to be actualized (471c), and Socrates hesitates to reply (472a–e); see Shorey, i. 500–5. The abbreviated paraphrase in our text is the substance of Socrates' eventual answer (473c–4a; Shorey, i. 506–11). Cf. *W.* xiv. 192 (MS?).

day that arose from them, those that were forerunners of constitutional decline.[31]

What is universally best, which is the goal of the state, is immanent and authoritative in our states in a quite different sense from what it was in antiquity. Frederick II was called a philosopher-king; he busied himself with Wolffian metaphysics and French poetry, and according to the prevailing opinion this made him a philosopher. This philosophy seems to have been merely a private object of his particular inclination, and his royal occupation was separate from it. But he was also called a philosopher-king in the sense that, in his actions and in all measures he took, he adopted as his principle a wholly universal goal, the well-being and best interests of his state. He made private rights and negotiations with other states comply with this end that is universal in and for itself.[32] Later on, when such procedures have become customary and habitual, sovereigns are no longer called philosophers even though the same principle is in force and the government and institutions are built pre-eminently upon it. Plato's requirement that philosophers should rule, and that institutions should be modeled after universal principles, is carried out far more completely in modern states. Universal principles are the essential bases of modern states—not of every one but of most. Some states are already at this stage while others are struggling to reach it, and it is more or less acknowledged that principles of this sort ought to constitute the essential element in the constitution. To this extent we can say that, as things
12 stand now, what Plato demanded | is in place. What we call philosophy, the concern with pure thoughts, pertains to its form, which is something

31. See nn. 16 and 17 just above. Hegel may be referring to the time after the Peloponnesian War when a number of Greek city states experienced attempts to restore aristocracies, as with the Thirty in Athens. 'Constitutional decline' probably refers to the Macedonian domination of Greece.

32. As a young man, Frederick II took up Christian Wolff's metaphysics; see his first letter to Voltaire (8 August 1736), in *Briefwechsel Friedrichs des Grossen mit Voltaire*, ed. Reinhold Koser and Hans Droysen (Leipzig, 1908), i. 1–2. 'That taste for philosophy which you display in your writings encourages me to send you a translation I have had made of the accusation and justification of M. Wolff, the most celebrated philosopher of our days, who has been cruelly accused of irreligion and atheism because he carried light into the most shadowy recesses of metaphysics and because he treated this difficult subject in a manner as elevated as it was clear and precise ... *A Treatise on God, the Soul and the World* ... I am sure you will be struck by the force of evidence in all its propositions, which follow each other geometrically and are connected together like the links of a chain' (*Letters of Voltaire and Frederick the Great*, trans. Richard Aldington (London, 1927), 20). Pierre Bayle and Cicero also caught his interest, and he called upon Christian Garve to translate Cicero's *De officiis* into German, which he did (Breslau, 1792). See Vol. III of this edition. Frederick II also wrote poems in French, published under the titles *Œuvres du philosoph de Sans Souci*, 3 vols. (Potsdam, 1750), and *Poësies diverses* (Berlin, 1760).

distinctive. But, whether or not the universal, freedom, or right is made the principle in a state is not dependent on the form alone.

In the *Republic* Plato has more to say about the difference between the condition of philosophical culture and the lack of it, by employing an image or a kind of myth; his extended analogy is striking and brilliant. The simile he employs is as follows. We are to envisage a subterranean abode or cave, with a long passageway open at the front, through which a dim light reaches into the cave. The inhabitants are chained, with their necks immobilized so that they are only able to see the rear part of the cave. Behind their backs a certain distance, in the direction of the opening, there is a low wall, and behind that, in the direction from which the light comes, are other people. These others hold up in the air all manner of images—statues of human beings, animals and the like—in such a way that their shadows fall onto the rear of the cave. Sometimes they speak and sometimes they remain silent; the sound they make falls upon the rear of the cave, which is illuminated by a fire. The chained ones can see only the shadows and not what truly is [*das wahre Wesen*]; what the others—those who carry the images about—speak from behind the wall they hear as echoes; and they take the echoes to be the shadows speaking. If one of the prisoners got free from his chains and turned around and caught sight of what [truly] is, he would believe that what he was now seeing was merely insubstantial dreams and that the shadows are what is true. And, if he finally emerged into the light, he would be blinded, and the one who led him out to the light he would hate, as someone who had robbed him of the knowledge of truth and had introduced him to pain and woe.[33] | 13

This myth fits in with the characteristic perspective of Platonic philosophy, according to which the sensible world and the operation of human representational thinking are defined as being in contrast to consciousness of the supersensible domain, or consciousness of the Idea. We must now speak about this more precisely. First there is our sensible consciousness; this is the familiar element from which we begin. Plato defines the distinctions within our consciousness or our knowing more precisely, and presents the first mode of it as sensible consciousness. He defines reflection as another mode, insofar as thinking gets involved in what is, to begin with, sensible consciousness; this, he says, is the place where the sciences originate. The sciences rest altogether upon διάνοια (thinking), upon the determining of

33. Hegel abridges the Allegory of the Cave, up through 516a, but without omitting anything essential to it. In Plato's version of the last sentence (517a) it is those prisoners still chained below who, seeing the state of the one who had returned from above, would try to kill anyone who sought to release them. See *Republic* 514a–17a (Shorey, ii. 118–29).

universal principles, foundations and hypotheses, and these are not dealt with by the senses themselves; they are not of themselves sensible, but belong instead to thinking. What we have so far, however, is still not genuine [philosophical] science, for that consists in dealing with what is universal of itself, τὸ ὄντως ὄν.[34] Plato embraced sensible consciousness and especially sensible representations, opinions and immediate knowing, under the term δόξα (opinion). Midway between δόξα (opinion) and science in and for itself there lies argumentative cognition, inferential reflection or reflective cognition, which develops for itself universal categories or classes. But the highest [knowing] is νόησις, thinking in and for itself, which is directed to τὰ ἀνώτατα (what is highest).[35] This is the distinction that is most notably fundamental
14 for Plato, and he brought it to sharper consciousness. |

For Plato the cultivation of this cognition is not a learning process as such; its foundation is immanent in the human spirit or soul, so that what we know develops from within ourselves. We noted this earlier, in the case of Socrates, and it is a topic to which Plato often returns; he discusses it very well in the *Meno*. Plato seeks to develop [the position] that nothing is learned, and that 'learning' is only a recollecting of what we already possess.[36] In one sense this is not an apt expression, because 'recollecting' means reproducing a representation that we have already had at another time, one that has already been in us as consciousness. But 'recollection' [*Erinnerung*] also has another sense given by its etymology, that of 'going within oneself, making oneself inward', and that is the profoundly thoughtful meaning of the word. In this sense we can say that cognitive knowledge of the universal is nothing other than a recollection, a going-into-oneself; what shows itself initially in an outward mode, and is determined as a manifold, we make into

34. In this paragraph Hegel summarizes the Divided Line analogy in *Republic* 509d–11e (Shorey, ii. 108–17), probably by recourse to a manuscript that may underlie *W.* xiv. 218–20. Here he just touches on the sensible domain and considers more carefully the intelligible world and our grasp of it. This passage of the *Republic* does not contain the phrase τὸ ὄντως ὄν; *Phaedrus* 247e (Fowler, pp. 476–7) does have τὰ ὄντα ὄντως, referring to the soul's objects in the higher realm.

35. Hegel's account of the Divided Line here reduces Plato's four modes of apprehension to three, unlike *W.* xiv. 220 (MS?), which presents all four: νόησις (thinking what is highest), διάνοια (reflective cognition), πίστις (belief), and εἰκασία (imagining). Here he combines the last two as δόξα (opinion), which he links with what, in discussing recent philosophy, he calls 'immediate knowing' (see Vol. III of this edition). Plato in another passage (*Republic* 476d–9d; Shorey, i. 518–33) presents opinion as intermediate between knowing and not-knowing, as a kind of third mode that is neither the one nor the other; cf. *W.* xiv. 201–2 (MS?).

36. On Socrates and recollection, see p. 183 with n. 26 above. The classic passage on learning as recollection is *Meno* 81e–6b (Lamb, pp. 302–23), in which Socrates elicits from a slave boy an intuitive proof of the Pythagorean theorem.

something inward, something universal, by virtue of going into ourselves and in this way bringing what is within us to consciousness.[37] We cannot deny that for Plato the term 'recollection' often has the former, empirical meaning. The myth in the *Phaedrus* employs this ordinary sense of recollection—that the human spirit has seen previously what unfolds once again in its consciousness.[38] One of Plato's principal endeavors is to show that spirit, soul, or thinking is in and for itself; and that is why this definition gets the form that [philosophical] science is not learnt but is only a recollecting of what is already present in the spirit or the soul as such. [That is what is] implicit in this affirmation.

That the soul is what thinks, and that thinking is free on its own account, is for the ancients, and particularly in the Platonic view, | immediately 15
connected with what we call the immortality of the soul. Plato speaks about this in the *Phaedrus* in order to show that ἔρως [Eros] is a divine madness [that draws] us toward the greatest bliss; it is an enthusiasm, an intense and overwhelming drive toward the Idea, not toward sense experience. He says that in order to show us Eros he must expound the nature of the divine and human soul.[39] What comes first is the concept of soul, namely, that the soul is immortal, for whatever is self-moving is [a first] principle and immortal, [whereas] whatever has its movement from another is transitory. What is self-moving is [a first] principle, it has its origin and beginning within itself and from no other; it cannot cease to be self-moving, for the only thing that ceases is what has its movement from another.[40]

37. The noun *Erinnerung*, with the everyday sense of 'something remembered or called to mind' (verb *erinnern*), indeed has in German the overtone of 'going within oneself', for it is compounded of *er* (indicating the beginning or the accomplishing of an action) and *inner* ('inward' or 'interior'). German sometimes contrasts *inner*, in the sense of 'spiritual', with various words indicating one's outer or physical being. So the twofold sense of 'recollection' that Hegel proposes here would be directly intelligible and plausible to his German auditors.

38. This myth in the *Phaedrus* tells of the gods' perpetual vision of absolute truth and justice, the different degrees to which individual human souls ascend toward that vision after death, and these souls' consequent reincarnation in the world in a hierarchy of existence based on this knowledge, ranging from the philosopher to the tyrant (247c–9c; Fowler, pp. 474–83).

39. The *Phaedrus* myth speaks of three kinds of madness given to human beings by the gods (244a–5c; Fowler, pp. 464–9), and later a fourth kind of divine madness or inspiration (249d–50c; Fowler, pp. 482–5) based on recollection of beauty beheld once before. The *Phaedrus* says that this proof of divine madness is believable to the wise but not to the (merely) clever (δεινός) person—*Vernünftler* in the German translation of Plato. Hegel omits this point, perhaps in accord with his tendency to see Platonic and Plotinian (see p. 334 below) 'enthusiasm' as directed toward the Ideas and not toward experience, and also to insulate it from Enlightenment suspicion of it as *Schwärmerei* (a label given to various non-rational or anti-rational stances associated with religious or Romantic enthusiasm, ecstasy, or fanaticism).

40. This account of the soul's immortality derives from *Phaedrus* 245c–6a (Fowler, pp. 468–71).

When *we* speak of the immortality of the soul we frequently and customarily have in our minds the image of the soul as a physical thing that has properties—a thing with all manner of properties. Thinking is included among them too, and so thinking is defined as a thing, and as if it were capable of passing away or ceasing. This is the interest representation has concerning this issue. But for Plato the immortality of the soul directly depends on the fact that the soul is what thinks, though not in such a way that thinking is the soul's property.[41] We suppose that the soul is able to be or to subsist, to have imaginative fancies and the like, without thinking, and to that extent the soul's imperishability is considered to be the imperishability of something portrayed as an immediate thing, as subsisting being.

For Plato, however, it is of great importance to define the soul's immortality, because thinking is not the soul's property but its substance. The very thinking itself *is* the soul. The case of the body is similar, for the body is mass [*ist schwer*], which is its substance; the body only is so far as it is mass. Mass
16 is not | the body's property but its substance; the fact that a body *is* comes about only through mass; if the mass were taken away, the body too would be taken away. And, if thinking is taken away, the soul ceases to be.[42]

Thinking, then, is the activity of the universal. But the universal is not an abstraction; it is inward self-reflection, or the positing of self-equivalence. This takes place in all representations. In my outer intuition I am at the same time reflecting into myself. But, since thinking is in this way the universal that reflects itself into itself—since it is, within itself, a being-present to itself—it is this identity with self, an identity that is precisely what is immutable, what is imperishable. Change is when one thing passes over into another and hence is no longer present to itself in the other. But the soul is self-preservation in the other, for instance, in [sensible] intuition; the soul deals with what is other, with external stuff, and is at the same time present to itself. Thus immortality does not have for Plato the sort of interest it holds

41. Here Hegel connects the *Phaedrus* arguments for the soul's immortality with the *Meno* argument (81e–6b; Lamb, pp. 302–23) that the soul's immortality is evident from its participation in knowing.

42. Hegel imputes to Plato the Cartesian view of soul as *res cogitans* (a thing that thinks), colored by Spinoza's view (which Hegel attributes to Descartes) of two attributes, thought and extension, each of which is the whole; see Vol. III of this edition. Hegel is speaking here not of individual souls but of spirit (as such) and body as totalities. See *Phaedo* 79d–80b (Fowler, pp. 276–9) for Plato's views on soul's affinity for thinking and its consequent distinction from the body. Plato does not, however, say that thinking is the soul's substance but only that the soul is similar to the Ideas and related to them. Hegel does not try to harmonize with his interpretation Plato's view of the soul's tripartite nature, either here or in discussing its presentation in the context of the political philosophy of the *Republic*.

for us in a religious context; on the contrary, it is bound up with the nature of thinking, with the inner freedom of thinking, with determinations that constitute the foundation of the outstanding feature of Platonic philosophy—the supersensible realm [*Boden*]. So the first point is that the soul is immortal.

To expound the idea of the soul, he continues, involves a lengthy inquiry, one that befits a god.[43] Here there follows in Plato that [well-known] myth, though it unfolds in a rather colorful and inconsistent fashion. He says that the soul is like the combined energy of a chariot and a charioteer; this image has no appeal for us. The wise one who rules—the charioteer—holds the reins. One of the horses is well behaved and the other one is restive, which makes driving them difficult. We must now say just how the soul comes to be called a living thing both mortal and immortal. | Every soul becomes 17
preoccupied with what is inanimate and it wanders throughout the whole of heaven. If a soul is perfect and winged, then it thinks in a sublime manner and gives order to the world; but the soul with drooping wings seeks and descends until it reaches something solid (στερεοῦ), and thus it takes on an earthly body, a corporeal form, and the whole [person] is then called a ζῶον [living thing] and has the designation 'mortal'.[44] So the one state is the soul as thinking, or being-in-and-for-itself, and the other is its joining with a material element.

This passing-over from the supersensible to corporeality is a thorny topic, and it was too difficult for the ancients to conceive or to know cognitively. From what has been said, we can derive the basis for the view that, according to Platonic philosophy, the soul subsists of itself, that it already existed prior to this life, and then it fell into the realm of matter, uniting itself with matter and thereby contaminating itself, and that its vocation is to leave matter behind once more. The connecting link, the fact that what is spiritual realizes itself out of itself and becomes body, this point of transition, appears to the ancients to be an external happening. They have two abstractions, soul and matter, and the joining of the two is expressed only in the form of a fall on the soul's part.[45]

43. This is an abbreviation of the *Phaedrus* transition from the proof of immortality to the main myth (246a; Fowler, pp. 470–1).

44. This account of the differing souls is from *Phaedrus* 246a–c (Fowler, pp. 470–3). Cf. *W.* xiv. 208–9 (MS?). The sentence about showing 'how the soul comes to be called a living thing...' is not in *W.* xiv. 209. Plato actually says 'why a living being is called mortal or immortal'.

45. On the soul's self-subsistence, see Tiedemann (*Geist*, ii. 163, 170–1); cf. Brucker (*Historia*, i. 717–18) and Tennemann (*Geschichte*, ii. 462–4).

Plato goes on to say that the immortal—expressed not in the mode of a cognitive thought but according to representation—is God; it is what has soul and bodily form [*Leib*]. These [two aspects] are, however, always begotten together and are by nature together; they are εἰς ἀεὶ συμπεφυκότα [eternally united in one nature]—a body and a soul that, in and of themselves, are ever one, and so are not bound together in external fashion.[46] This is a great definition of God, a great idea, and one that is none other than the definition given in modern times, namely, that the absolute is the subjective in identity with the objective—it is inseparability of the ideal
18 and | reality, of soul and body, of the objective and the subjective.[47] Plato expresses mortality or finitude correctly. Finitude is when reality, objectivity, or existence is not absolutely adequate to the Idea or, more precisely, to subjectivity.

Plato then goes on to describe what takes place within the life of divine being [*Wesen*]. He describes the drama that unfolds before the soul and how its wings drop away from it. Jupiter leads the array of the gods, with the others following, marshaled in eleven ranks. In fulfilling their functions, they all enact the most splendid scenes. The soul, in a substance devoid of color and feeling, there beholds the life of the gods, but only as thought. This is where genuine [philosophical] science originates; its object here is what *is*, τὸ ὄν. The soul lives in contemplation of the truth, and in these circles of the gods going to and fro it beholds justice, temperance, and knowledge [*Wissenschaft*].[48]

This is expressed as an actual happening. When the soul comes back from this vision [*Anschauung*], the horses are fed on ambrosia and nectar. The soul, however, turns away from the heavenly region and comes to [the level of] opinion; in this way it falls and comes to earth. Depending on how much or how little it has 'seen', it assumes on earth a higher or a lower state. But the recollection of its former condition remains with it, and,

46. On the union of soul and body, see *Phaedrus* 246c–d (Fowler, pp. 472–3). Cf. *W.* xiv. 210 (MS?).

47. This formulation refers to Spinozism's view of God as the identity of thought and extension (see Vol. III of this edition), and more precisely to the shape Spinozism assumes in Schelling's philosophy (especially with reference to definition 6 of Spinoza's *Ethics*). See Vol. III also on the identity of objective and subjective, designated as the absolute I.

48. The images of the soul as a charioteer with a pair of winged horses, of its ascent and descent and the drama it beholds, are all recounted in the same *Phaedrus* myth Hegel has been discussing. On the falling-away of the soul's 'wings', see 246d–7a (Fowler, pp. 472–5); cf. *W.* xiv. 210–11 (MS?). Hegel says that the soul is devoid of color, form (in *W.* only), and feeling; whereas Plato says (247c–d; Fowler, pp. 474–7) that the mind, which is the soul's pilot, has as its object what is devoid of color and bodily form.

whenever it glimpses something beautiful, good, or just, it becomes fired with 'enthusiasm'—it is reminded of that beholding of beauty or justice that was granted to it. What it saw there was not something beautiful or something just, but beauty itself and justice itself;[49] and hence in the soul as such there is, in and for itself, the idea of the beautiful, the good, and the just, as what has being in and for itself, what is universal in and for itself. This constitutes the foundation or general basis of the Platonic viewpoint as a whole.

The soul's education or cultivation is connected with this idealism. We must not, however, | think of Plato's idealism as subjective idealism, as a 19
defective idealism of the sort that is pictured in modern times, according to which the human being generally learns nothing and is not determined from without because all representations are instead engendered from the subject itself. The meaning of idealism is often said to be that individuals engender all of their representations, even the most immediate ones, from themselves, that they posit everything from out of themselves.[50] [To the contrary,] Fichte is reputed to have said that, if people would don boots, they have first to make the boots.[51] In any event, this depiction of idealism is not historically accurate and is quite incorrect. Not even in the most recent idealism do we find actually asserted [*wirklich existiert*] the absurdity or silly view that freedom or one's own activity posits everything. In any event, Platonic idealism is far removed from this pattern [*Gestalt*].

With regard to learning in particular, Plato presupposes that what is true and universal—the Idea of the Good, the Beautiful, and the True—resides beforehand in spirit itself and simply develops from it. He speaks about this (in the seventh book of the *Republic*) in connection with a prior image of how education, learning, or παιδεία is acquired. He says that science or learning is not to be represented as it is by some (and here he means the Sophists), who speak of cultivation as if the science is not contained within the soul but is put there just as one imparts sight to blind eyes from

49. Elements in this paragraph are taken from *Phaedrus* 247e–8e and 250a–b (Fowler, pp. 476–85), and are presented in abbreviated form in comparison with Plato's fuller account. *W.* xiv. 211 (MS?) gives them a more extensive treatment.

50. Hegel here opposes an erroneous view about recent idealism, a contrary position going under the name of 'realism' and found in the critique of Fichte's transcendental idealism made by the circle of Jacobi and Reinhold. See 'Realismus vs. Transzendentaler Idealismus', in *Transzendentalphilosophie und Spekulation: Der Streit um die Gestalt einer Ersten Philosophie (1799–1807)*, *Quellenband*, ed. Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg, 1993), 1–181.

51. Similar expressions, but none identical to this one, can be found in Jean Paul [Novalis], *Clavis Fichtiana seu Leibgeberiana* (Erfurt, 1800); see pp. 81–109 of the volume cited in the previous note.

without—as in a cataract operation.[52] This view that knowing comes wholly from without has been advanced by recent philosophers of experience who
20 think crudely and abstractly and who | have maintained that everything human beings know of the divine or take to be true comes to them by means of outer intuition, tradition, and education, or through the medium of 'habit'. They represent the human spirit as wholly indeterminate possibility. The extreme case is revelation, in which everything is given from without. This crude representation is not present in its abstract form in the Protestant religion, for here an essential feature of faith is the witness of the spirit, namely, the fact that the individual or subjective spirit, in and of itself, contains, posits, and brings about within itself this determination that comes to it in the form of something external or merely given.[53]

[We are dealing with the familiar] doctrine that the faculty and energy of soul dwells in each of us, that each of us has an inward organ for learning. The soul needs only to be turned about, to be turned away from what is mere happening or what is contingent, away from the sphere to which outer intuition and sensation belong; it must be turned toward what is, toward what subsists, until it is capable of enduring it and of beholding its clarity and brilliance. But what subsists is what is genuine, it is the Good. So teaching or instruction is simply the art of reorienting the soul in this way. It is not a matter of implanting sight or putting it in (ἐμποιεῖν), but only of causing the soul that is not pointed toward suitable objects to be turned the way it needs to go. Other virtues stand in closer connection with the body and are acquired through practice and habit. Thought (φρόνησις), however, as something divine, never loses its strength, and it becomes either good or evil only by virtue of the way it is oriented.[54] This is a more precise account of the relationship that Plato establishes with regard to the inner and the outer. We are quite familiar with views of this kind, according to which spirit

52. See *Republic* 518b–c (Shorey, ii. 132–5) for this statement, which comes in the explanations following the Allegory of the Cave. For this reference to the Sophists, see Plato, *Protagoras* 324d–8b (Lamb, pp. 140–51), on the ability to impart virtue by teaching it; see also pp. 115–16 above, and *W.* xiv. 215 (MS?).

53. Locke provides the basis for the crude empiricism criticized here; see Vol. III of this edition. But the application of Hegel's remarks to revelation rather than to epistemology shows that he has in mind Hume's views on religion and morality—where the source of our knowing is external—in relation to positivistic views of revelation. See, for instance, Hume's well-known and frequently republished *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, as well as *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, and the essay *Of Miracles*. Hegel's own contrary understanding about 'the witness of the spirit' is abundantly expressed in his *Philosophy of Religion*.

54. This view of learning and instruction is presented in *Republic* 518c–19a (Shorey, ii. 134–7); cf. *W.* xiv. 216 (MS?).

engenders itself from | itself; but Plato was engaged in establishing this 21
[position] for the first time.

It is evident in the Platonic philosophy that a distinction among the different branches of science comes into clearer focus. We find in Diogenes Laertius, and in other ancient authors too, the view that the Ionians originated the philosophy of nature, or physical philosophy, that Socrates originated moral philosophy, and that Plato added the dialectic.[55] This dialectic of his is not the sort we have seen before, not that of the Sophists; on the contrary, it is the movement of the logical.[56] What comes second in Plato is a philosophy of nature (in particular, in the *Timaeus*), and third there is the philosophy of spirit. With regard to the theoretical aspect of spirit we have already noted in general terms how Plato distinguishes the kinds of cognition.[57] So what remains in this third topic is for us to emphasize the practical [side], and essentially his portrayal of a perfect state. We propose to consider the Platonic philosophy in more detail, in accord with this threefold distinction.

*c. Dialectic*

First we have the logical or dialectical [element]. We have already remarked, with reference to Socrates, that part of the concern of Socratic education was first of all to make people consciously aware of the universal.[58] From here on we can regard this as settled and just note that the aim of many of Plato's dialogues is simply to bring to consciousness a general viewpoint that we can entertain without effort, which is why we often find Plato's protracted discussions tedious. The point that the subsistent is what is | universal 22
may seem to be an insignificant insight. What our consciousness contains initially is what is singular, the immediately single [thing] that we call a sensible reality; or else it contains abstract categories of the understanding, which we take to be something ultimate, something true. We thus seize upon what is external, sensible, or 'real' in contrast to the ideal, to what is in fact wholly real, to what alone is real. Plato's insight is that the ideal is the only

55. Diogenes Laertius is the source of this threefold schema; he compares it to a three-stage development of tragic drama (*Lives* 3.56; Hicks, i. 326–7).

56. On dialectic as such and on its two tendencies—subjective, external, negative; in itself objective, immanent, authentic—see pp. 65–6, 73 and 112 above. There Hegel refers to the dialectical art of the Sophists, which he characterizes as a mastery of τόποι (topics) and therefore comparable to the program of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Topics*. According to *W.* xiv. 5, Hegel also stressed that the external, negative aspect of dialectic is to be understood as a manifestation of the harshness of the concept.

57. See pp. 13–14 above.

58. Socrates did this in his role as a 'midwife of ideas'. See p. 133 above.

reality—the ideal is what is universal. Initially the universal is indeterminate; it is an abstraction and, as such, it is not inwardly concrete. But everything hinges essentially on the further determination of the universal within itself. It must be grasped as concrete.

Plato generally calls the universal εἶδος or ἰδέα. The former term we can translate as 'species' or 'kind', for that is surely what it is; ἰδέα is 'species' or 'kind' too, but more precisely its being grasped by thought, or more as it is for thought.[59] That is why we must not represent 'Ideas' as something transcendent or lying wholly outside [the world], for they are known as species or the universal—for instance, goodness, truth, or beauty for its own sake—so that they are simply universal species. Of course, if our understanding supposes 'species' to be merely [the product of] our grasping what is external as held together under some sign, for our convenience—if we suppose that a 'species' is produced by our reflection holding together the like characteristics of several single individuals—then indeed we have the universal in a wholly external form. The species of [all] animals is organic life [*Lebendigkeit*]; this is their species, for organic life is their substantial nature, what is real [*Reelle*] in them; and, if one deprives an animal of life, then it is nothing.

To bring the universal to consciousness was what Socrates and Plato
23 strove to do. The first step is the insight that what is sensible | or has immediate being—the thing that appears to us—is nothing true, because it changes and is determined by another rather than through itself. This is a key point to which Plato returns on many occasions or which he takes as his starting point. What is sensible, limited, and finite is what only is in relation to another, what is only relative; so it is nothing true, it is not true in itself. The true representation of the finite is that, within itself, it is nothing true; it is only relative, for it is both itself and the other too, and the other also counts as subsisting being. So the finite is contradiction, and unresolved contradiction [at that]—arising and perishing; it is, but what is other has power within it. The fact that the sensible is nothing true in itself is one

59. For εἶδος or ἰδέα as 'kind' or 'class', and as 'thought', see *Republic* 507b (Shorey, ii. 96–7). On the identity of the two terms, see *Euthyphro* 6d (Fowler, pp. 22–3). Nevertheless, *Phaedrus* 265d–e (Fowler, pp. 532–5) draws a distinction between them, such that εἶδος involves the principle of 'dividing things by classes where the natural joints are ...' and ἰδέα involves 'perceiving and bringing together in one idea the scattered particulars, that one may make clear by definition the particular thing he wishes to explain ...'. See also the *Meno* passages cited in the following note. *Phaedo* 78d–9a (Fowler, pp. 272–5) discusses identity and homonymity as categories only for thought. See also Plato, *Parmenides* 129c; see *Cratylus, Parmenides, Greater Hippias, Lesser Hippias*, trans. H. N. Fowler (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1926), 208–9.

aspect of the Platonic dialectic. This dialectic even has the purpose of bringing people's finite views into confusion and dissolution, in order to serve the needs of scientific knowledge and to direct their consciousness toward what *is*. Many of Plato's dialogues have this aim, and they conclude without an affirmative content.

In this respect one of the main themes is Plato's demonstration, regarding the virtues and sciences, that one virtue only, one thing only, is what is true; here he lets the universal good emerge from the particular virtues.[60] The first concern of dialectic, or its effect so far, is to confound the particular, to refute its validity, since what gets exhibited is the finitude of the particular, the negation within it, the fact that it is conditioned, that it is not in fact what it is but passes over into its opposite—that it has a limit, a negation of itself that is essential to it. When | this negation of it is exhibited, the particular 24
perishes; it is something other than what it was taken to be. This dialectic is the movement of thought, an essential movement necessary [even] to the external mode or to reflective consciousness if the universal—what subsists in and for itself, or the immortal—is to be allowed to emerge. This dialectic, which is designed to dissolve the particular and in so doing produce the universal, is not yet the authentic dialectic; it is not yet given its true direction. It is a dialectic that Plato has in common with the Sophists, who understood very well how to dissolve the particular.

The dialectic that goes further than this consists in taking the universal that emerges from the confounding of the finite, in defining it within itself and resolving the antitheses within it. The outcome is the resolution of contradiction, it is the affirmative; this is the universal defined as what inwardly resolves—and has resolved—the contradictions or antitheses, and it is thus defined as the concrete, as what is inwardly concrete. In keeping with this definition, the dialectic is Platonic in the proper sense; it is speculative dialectic because it does not culminate in a negative result but exhibits the unification of the opposites that have nullified themselves. Here is where the difficulty for the understanding begins. Even Plato himself is still dialectical in an argumentative fashion, for the method and form is not yet elaborated in a pure, undiluted way; instead it sets out from individual perspectives and affirms the validity of other perspectives in an argumentative way. Often it has only a negative result and often no result at all. But Plato himself is, on the other hand, opposed to the argumentative dialectic, though we can see

60. Meno enumerates particular virtues in answering the question 'What is virtue?'; but Socrates insists on a definition of virtue as such (*Meno* 71e–4a; Lamb, pp. 268–77). See also 79a–e (Lamb, pp. 294–7), as well as *Protagoras* 349a–c (Lamb, pp. 214–17).

that this has its difficulties; it is an effort for him to pinpoint the distinction
25 [between it and his dialectic]. |

Plato's speculative dialectic—something that originates with him—is the most interesting but also the most difficult [element] in his work; those who study Plato's writings often do not become versed in it. We need a wholly unbiased, impartial, dispassionate spirit in order to study Plato's Dialogues. His beautiful introductions are the first things we read; they are very charming indeed. Then, of course, we read about the Ideas, about 'enthusiasm'.[61] What we find here is uplifting; it is congenial to the young. But what comes after that is the dialectic in the proper sense. After we have been transported by the beautiful scenes, by the beautiful reunion in the *Phaedo*, and finally by the worthy end [of Socrates],[62] the middle or speculative part often gets left to one side. Mendelssohn modernized this speculative part by transforming it into Wolffian metaphysics; but a comparison of the two works shows that Wolffian metaphysics is vastly inferior to that of Plato.[63]

When we have allowed ourselves to be uplifted by the idea of what is higher and divine, then we must suddenly be dispassionate and be led, as it were, into the thorns and thistles of the dialectic.[64] The reading of the Platonic Dialogues calls for quite a range of mental attitudes and an absence of any passion or bias directed toward the diverse concerns presented in them. If general edification and uplift is what we wish, then we skip over the
26 speculative | element as irrelevant; whereas, if our interest lies in this [speculative element], then we skip over what counts as the most beautiful.

61. See nn. 59 (on Ideas) and 39 (on 'enthusiasm') just above.

62. See the opening and closing scenes of the *Phaedo* (57a–61c and 115b–18a; Fowler, pp. 200–13, 392–403), about Socrates' final conversations with his followers. Hegel may also have in mind the beginning of the *Phaedrus* (228d–30e; Fowler, pp. 416–25) and the final scenes of the *Symposium* (212c–23d); see *Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias*, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1925), 208–45.

63. See Moses Mendelssohn, *Phädon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, in drey Gesprächen*, rev. edn. (Berlin and Stettin, 1768), especially the preface; see *Mendelssohn: Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. iii, pt. 1, *Schriften zur Philosophie und Aesthetic*, ed. Fritz Bamberger and Leo Strauss (Berlin, 1932; r.p. Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt, 1972), p. 8. Here Mendelssohn says he is emulating Plato's *Phaedo* while bringing the metaphysical proofs more in tune with contemporary tastes. In the beginning of his dialogue Mendelssohn refers expressly to *Phaedo* 78b ff., in constructing his argument for the immortality of the soul based on the principle that only what is composite is perishable whereas the non-composite is not—an argument later criticized by Kant. See *Phädon*, pp. 100–22; *Ges. Schr.*, vol. iii, pt. 1, pp. 65–77. See *Moses Mendelssohn: Selections from his Writings*, ed. and trans. Eva Jospe (New York, 1975), 177–204; the statement occurs on p. 183. Plato's text can be regarded as an ancient source for Christian Wolff, *Psychologia rationalis*, which in turn serves as the conceptual framework for Mendelssohn's proof of immortality.

64. 'Thorns and thistles' alludes to the toil that, according to Gen. 3: 17–19, was to be the human lot after expulsion from Eden.

We are like the young man in the Bible who asked Christ what he should do in order to follow him; when the Lord commanded him, 'Sell your possessions and follow after me', that was not what he had in mind.[65] In like fashion we may well find the 'enthusiasm' in Plato's works to our taste, although we do not mean to grapple with the dialectic too.

Plato has to fight mainly against two things. [The first] is the 'common dialectic', the term he sometimes uses for dialectic in the usual sense. We have seen this dialectic in the Sophists, and Plato often reverts to it.[66] For instance, Protagoras is of the opinion that there is nothing in and for itself; what is bitter to one person is not so to another.[67] Plato explains his own views about this in numerous passages, for example in the *Sophist*.[68] After giving an account of the concept of dialectic, he says: 'It is not hard to drag thought from one determination to another, and anyone who takes pleasure in that has done nothing praiseworthy.'[69] The dialectic that annuls one determination in the process of substantiating another is a misguided dialectic. It is no genuine insight to show that some thing is in some fashion something else, that what is other is the same, that like is unlike and that large is also small, and to take pleasure in perpetually producing something antithetical in thought. | This is one aspect of dialectic; it is manifestly a 27
brainchild of those who are just beginning to make contact with what is essential [*das Wesen*], manifestly a brainchild of neophytes.[70] That is why Plato speaks out definitely in opposition to dialectic in this sense (knowing how to refute something from some viewpoint or other, and the like).

The second thing Plato combats is the dialectic of the Eleatics and their thesis (shared by the Sophists) that only being is, and non-being is not at all.[71] For the Sophists this thesis, as Plato presents it, has the sense that the

65. See Matt. 19: 16–22.

66. On the dialectic of the Sophists, and the discussion of Plato's criticism of it, see above, pp. 111–24, 162, and 195 n. 56, as well as text passages that follow here. On the relation of the Sophists to rhetoric, see W. xiv. 25.

67. *Theaetetus* 151e–2d (Fowler, pp. 38–43) presents Protagoras as the proponent of the famous thesis that 'man is the measure of all things ...', a thesis that Plato illustrates by saying that what seems warm to one person is cold to another. The bitter-sweet example occurs in the tropes of the Skeptics. See also pp. 121–2 above, with nn. 19 and 20.

68. See *Sophist* 224e–6a, 240c–d, 259ff. (Fowler, pp. 294–9, 350–1, 422 ff.).

69. This statement is a paraphrase from *Sophist* 259d (Fowler, pp. 424–5).

70. *Sophist* 258d–9d (Fowler, pp. 420–5) discusses quibbles about antithetical statements (that, in various relations, things both are and are not), and concludes that all this 'is plainly the newborn offspring of some brain that has just begun to lay hold upon the problem of realities'. Cf. W. xiv. 232–3 (MS?).

71. See p. 59 above, on this Eleatic thesis. Hegel's contention that the Sophists shared this thesis with the Eleatics follows Plato's *Sophist*, which says that, in order to expose and refute the

negative is not at all, for only what has being *is*; that is, there is nothing false; what has being—everything—is something true. In other words, everything that we perceive or imagine, the purposes we espouse, are purely affirmative determinations and, as such, are all something true and not something false. Plato reproaches the Sophists for doing away with the distinction between true and false by their saying that there is nothing false, so that for the Sophists everything is right, everything is true.[72] The true/false distinction is present in consciousness at various stages of development. [But] the Sophists wished to impart the higher culture, and the chief lesson acquired in the course of it is that everything is true; whatever individuals make into their purpose, whatever they aim at in accordance with their beliefs and opinions, is affirmative, is something valid, is something true. Thus we cannot say that a certain thing is a vice, a wrong, or a crime, for these are nothing, they are the negative. We cannot say that a certain opinion is deluded, for in the Sophists' sense their thesis entails that every purpose and every interest, insofar as it is one's own, is something affirmative and so is, as such,
28 something true. In itself this thesis looks quite abstract and harmless; | but but it is only when we see abstractions of this sort in concrete shape that we observe what they involve. So in its concrete meaning this harmless thesis holds that there is no false opinion, no vice, no crime, and so forth.[73] The Platonic dialectic is essentially different from this mode of dialectic.

The Idea is what is universal—the good, the true, the beautiful—and this universal element has first of all to be apprehended by itself. We must not just consider a good action, a beautiful painting, an attractive person—the sort of subject to which predicates such as 'good', 'just', and 'beautiful' are attached. On the contrary, what occurs in representations of this sort only as a predicate, a property or a quality, must be apprehended on its own account; and this is what is genuinely in and for itself.[74] This tallies with the mode of dialectic introduced [by Plato]. An action, viewed empirically, can be said to be just, whereas from another aspect it can be shown to have quite the opposite character. The good or the true, however, is to be

Sophists, by showing that there is falsehood in representation and in speech, it is necessary to link non-being with being and so to revise the Parmenidean thesis. See *Sophist* 241d–9d (Fowler, pp. 354–87).

72. See *Euthydemus* 285d–8d (Lamb, pp. 428–39), especially 287a, which says, tongue in cheek, that on the Sophists' view there cannot even be such a thing as making a mistake. See also nn. 67 and 71 just above.

73. *Theatetus* 166a–8c (Fowler, pp. 92–101) attributes this view to Protagoras; see especially 167d. See also the preceding note.

74. See the Plato texts cited in n. 59 just above, as well as *Greater Hippias* 286 ff. (Fowler, pp. 352 ff.).

apprehended by itself, devoid of individuality or empirical concretion of this sort; it alone is what *is*. What happens in the myth is that the soul, having enjoyed the divine drama and then fallen to earth, delights in seeing something beautiful or good. What is genuine, however, is virtue, justice, or beauty in and for itself; this alone is what is true.[75]

This element that, of itself, is universal and true, gets defined more precisely in Plato's dialectic; we encounter several forms of this dialectic, but they remain very general and abstract. For Plato the highest form is the identity of being and non-being.[76] The true is what has being, τὸ ὄν, τὸ ὄντως ὄν. But this actual being is not devoid of negation. On the contrary, non-being is [too], and what is simple or self-identical partakes of the other, | unity partakes of multiplicity (μετέχει, μέθεξις).[77] This seems to 29
be the case in the viewpoint of the Sophists too. But that is not all there is to it. Plato says definitively that what is other—τὸ ἕτερον—is also the same (ταὐτόν) or the self-identical, and what is the same (self-identical) is the other too, and indeed in one and the same respect (and not in such a way as to confute and contradict one another), and according to the same aspect, so that they are identical.[78] This is the main characteristic of the dialectic that is peculiar to Plato.

That the Idea of the divine, the eternal, or the beautiful is what has being-in-and-for-itself—this is the beginning of the elevation of consciousness into the spiritual realm and into the awareness that what is universal is true. Representational consciousness can be content with the inspiration and satisfaction derived from the image of the beautiful, the good, and so forth. But the essential goal of thinking, or thoughtful cognition, is definition

75. See p. 193 above.

76. Hegel attributes this identity to Plato's philosophy, based on Plato's contention (in *Sophist* 241d; Fowler, pp. 354–5) 'that after a fashion not-being is and on the other hand in a sense being is not'. See also n. 71 just above and the following three notes just below.

77. Plato employs these Greek terms in his theory of the 'participation' of particular things in their eternal form or Idea, namely, how they instantiate (albeit imperfectly) features of the Idea that is the basis of their actuality. Here, however, Hegel employs them in an account of how abstract properties themselves 'participate' in one another. See *Phaedo* 78d (Fowler, pp. 272–5) for the concept of true being (τὸ ὄν) in its equivalence with absolute equality, beauty, and so forth. A comparable statement concerns being's equivalence with absolute justice, temperance, and knowledge (*Phaedrus* 247d–e; Fowler, pp. 476–7). On the following sentences in our text, see *Sophist* 255d–7a (Fowler, pp. 408–15), which treats of sameness and difference in relation to being, non-being, and the multiple kinds, classifications or relations of things. Hegel treats 'the same' (ταὐτόν) as equivalent to 'simple' or 'self-identical', and so he says that 'unity partakes of multiplicity'. In these 1825–6 lectures he apparently did not mention the important summary statements of *Sophist* 258e–9b, which are present in *W.* xiv. 236 (MS?).

78. See *Sophist* 259c–d (Fowler, pp. 424–5) and note 70 just above; cf. *W.* xiv. 233 (MS?).

of the eternal or of the divine, and this definition is essentially free determination; it is the sort that does not annul its universality; it is a delimiting—for all definition is delimitation—that at the same time lets the universal in its infinitude be free on its own account. Freedom is the return into self; it is self-differentiation. Whatever is undifferentiated is lifeless; hence the active,
30 living, | concrete universal is what differentiates itself inwardly but remains free in doing so. This freedom of differentiation consists in the fact that in its own other, in the many, in what is differentiated, the One is identical with itself. This constitutes the truth—the sole truth and point of interest for knowing—in Platonic philosophy; unless we know this about Platonic philosophy, we do not know the main thing.

Plato says that what is other is the same, that it is what is identical with itself; that the other, what is not identical with itself, is also the same; that what is equal to itself is also what is other, and indeed in one and the same relation. This is not the identity obtaining when we say, for example, that I am one or that Socrates is one, for each of us is one but is also a many; each has multiple limbs, organs, attributes, and so forth—each is one and also many. So we can say of Socrates both that he is one, is inwardly the same, and also that he is what is other, that he is many and not selfsame.[79] This is an insight or an expression that we encounter in everyday consciousness; we accept the fact that he is one and in another respect he is also a many, and we keep the two thoughts separate. But speculative thinking consists in bringing the thoughts together, and they must be brought together—that is the whole point. The heart and true greatness of Platonic philosophy lies in its bringing-together things that in representation are distinct from one another (being and non-being, one and many, and so forth), so that we are not just passing over from one to the other. Even so, Plato does not reach this destination in every one of the Dialogues.

The *Philebus* is a dialogue of the higher type. This is the esoteric side of Plato's philosophy and the other side is exoteric—but we must not understand this to mean that Plato had two philosophies, one for the world and
31 the masses, with the other and inner philosophy reserved | for his trusted friends. The esoteric side is the speculative element that is written and in print but that remains still something hidden for those who have no concern

79. These statements about Socrates being one and many are loosely based on similar statements made by Socrates and Protarchus in *Philebus* 14c–e; see *Statesman, Philebus, Ion*, trans. H. N. Fowler and W. R. M. Lamb (only the *Ion*) (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1925), 212–15. See also *Sophist* 251b–e, 254ff. (Fowler, pp. 390–3, 402 ff.).

to grasp it; it is not a secret and yet it is hidden. In addition to the *Philebus*, the *Parmenides* belongs to the higher type of dialogue too; everything in it refers to the determination of the Ideas.

The primary topic in the *Philebus* is the sensuous domain or pleasure, which it defines as something infinite, as ἄπειρον. The understanding values the infinite as what is noble and highest; but the infinite is in fact the inherently indeterminate as such, ἀπέραντον; it can, of course, be defined or delimited in several ways, but that is its other aspect.[80] Under the heading of 'pleasure' we picture to ourselves something immediately singular or sensuous; it is something indeterminate, however, in the respect that it is not self-determining. Only the Idea is what determines itself, is identity with self. Pleasure is then the indeterminate, and to this infinite Plato opposes the πέρας, the limit as such; his particular concern, therefore, is with the opposition of finite and infinite.[81]

Perhaps we do not think right away of the fact that knowledge of the nature of the infinite or of the indeterminate also enables us to decide directly about the nature of pleasure; for pleasure seems to belong to the sphere of the concrete. We must know, however, that these pure thoughts themselves are the substantial criterion for decisions about everything, no matter how concrete or remote. Plato sets pleasure and wisdom in mutual opposition, and he also opposes infinite and finite in this way. The infinite is what is indeterminate and susceptible to change, what can be increased or diminished, what can be more or less intensive—cold, warm, dry, | moist, 32
and so forth. The finite, on the contrary, is limit, proportion, measure, the

80. Pleasure is in fact only one of the topics of the *Philebus*, although the dialogue's subtitle is 'On Pleasure, Ethical'; see 11b–d (Fowler, pp. 202–5), which indicates that wisdom is to be pitted against pleasure as the alleged condition of the happy life. On pleasure as something infinite, see 27e–8a (Fowler, pp. 258–9). Hegel's critical comment about the infinite being regarded as what is highest and noblest for the understanding may be directed against the position accorded to the infinite in modern metaphysics from Descartes to Wolff, and even in Kant's critique of metaphysics, particularly in the modern contention of the unknowability of God as the infinite. But W. xiv. 239 indicates that Hegel has in mind ancient philosophers—probably Anaximander; see p. 23 above. With regard to the manifold ways of delimiting the infinite, Hegel probably is thinking of Plato's doctrine of the mixing of the unlimited and the limited, found in *Philebus* 25d–6d (Fowler, pp. 250–5).

81. On the concept of the indeterminate as not self-determining, see the specification (W. xiv. 238) 'that it is the merely elemental, such as fire or water', which probably refers to the fact that the indeterminate is capable of a 'more' or 'less', for instance, being warmer or damper—on which, see *Philebus* 24c–5d (Fowler, pp. 246–51). That the idea alone is what is self-determining, namely, identical with itself, may be connected with *Sophist* 253d (Fowler, pp. 400–1), but this terminology is entirely that of Hegel's conceptual scheme. Also, the preceding *Philebus* passage sets the unlimited (ἄπειρον)—all that is capable of more or less, including pleasure—over against whatever belongs to the family of what is limited (πέρας).

immanent and free determination in which freedom abides and through which freedom gives itself its very existence.[82]

He goes into this point further. The infinite is implicitly a passing-over to the finite, and that which limits requires matter or the finite in order to posit itself or to realize itself. The finite, in that it posits itself, is self-determining within the formless. So it is something distinct, is something other than what limits. The infinite or the ἄπειρον is what is formless, and free form as activity is what is finite. Everything beautiful and perfect originates from the unity of the two; health, for instance, [derives from the unity] of warmth and cold, dryness and moisture, and so forth. And musical harmony too [arises] from the combination of high and low notes, from fast and slow tempos. In short, everything beautiful and perfect is a unity of contrasts such as these. Health and the like are something begotten, to the extent that opposites are to that end brought into relation; so health appears as a mixture of opposites.[83] Plato uses the expressions 'mixture' and participation', expressions that for us are indefinite and imprecise.[84] So health, happiness, beauty, and so forth appear to be things that are brought about through the binding-together of such opposites.

But Plato says that what is begotten in this way presupposes something—the cause—through which the third thing is made. This cause is more excellent than those factors whose effective action brings about such a third thing. So we have four categories: (1) the unlimited or the indeterminate (pleasure); (2) the limited, limit, measure, or definition (wisdom belongs in this category); (3) the mixture of these two, something that only comes to be; (4) the cause, which in itself is the very unity of these distinctions—
33 subjectivity, or the power and supremacy over these opposites, | the force that endures these opposites within itself.[85] It is, then, the powerful, forceful, spiritual [element] that can endure the antithesis within itself. This power is spirit. It can endure within itself the supreme contradiction. What is weak or

82. On the mutual opposition of pleasure and wisdom, see n. 80 just above. On the more precise characteristics of the indeterminate and of what is limited, see *Philebus* 24a–5e (Fowler, pp. 244–51). In this paragraph Hegel seems to lump the family of what is limited together with the product of its union with the unlimited; but see the following note.

83. The expression at the beginning of this paragraph, about the infinite passing over to the finite, is Hegel's translation of Plato's presentation into his own conceptual scheme. What comes after refers to *Philebus* 25e–6b (Fowler, pp. 250–3).

84. On 'mixture', see *Philebus* 23d and 26a–c (Fowler, pp. 242–3, 250–3). On 'participation', see p. 201 above, as well as *Sophist* 255b, 256a (Fowler, pp. 406–11), and also 259a (Fowler, pp. 422–3), which employs the two terms together. See also above, p. 199 n. 70, and p. 40.

85. See *Philebus* 26d–7c (Fowler, pp. 254–7); Hegel employs his own concepts in presenting Plato's fourth point, the cause or creative agent. *Philebus* 30a–b (Fowler, pp. 266–7) gives a summary statement of the four categories.

corporeal cannot do so; it perishes as soon as another comes on the scene. The cause we are speaking of is νοῦς, which presides over the world. It is νοῦς that produces the beauty of the world.[86]

The most famous masterpiece of Platonic dialectic is the dialogue *Parmenides*. Parmenides and Zeno are introduced there as they encounter Socrates in Athens.[87] The main topic, however, is the dialectic, with Parmenides and Zeno presented as its spokesmen. Right from the outset the nature of this dialectic is indicated in the following way. Parmenides praises Socrates, who, together with Aristotle, endeavors to define (ὁρίζεσθαι, ὅρος, *finis*, definition) the nature of the beautiful, the just, the good, and all the other Ideas. (Aristotle was one of those present. Chronological factors show that this was not the famous Aristotle, but another; otherwise he could well have been our Aristotle.) This is a pursuit that can be called noble and divine. He [Parmenides] says that he [Socrates], while a young man, should keep on practicing this seemingly useless pursuit, what the crowd calls metaphysical babbling (ἀθυρογλωττία, ἀδολεσχία), or else the truth will escape him. He should examine what it is that thinking apprehends, for that is the sole or the proper definition [of beauty, and so forth].[88]

I have remarked previously that from time immemorial people have believed it is only through reflection that we find what is true. In reflecting we come upon thought; what we have before us in the mode of representation or of belief we transform into | thought. So Socrates replies to 34
Parmenides: 'In examining equal and unequal and the other universal categories in this way, I believe that I obtain the correct insight.' Parmenides answers: 'If you start out from a category of this sort, you must not only take into account what follows from a premise such as likeness or equality, but also bring in what follows from presupposing its opposite. If you presuppose that "the many is", then you have to investigate the status of the many in relation to itself and in relation to the One.' The category will have become its own converse, the One. The many vanishes when we consider it according to its characteristics, for it resolves itself into One. 'In the same way you must consider what happens to the One in relation to itself and to the many. What does your proposition "the many is not" entail for the One and for the many, for each by itself and for both reciprocally? It is the same with regard

86. On the role of νοῦς as cause of all, see *Philebus* 30a–e (Fowler, pp. 266–9).

87. See Plato, *Parmenides* 127a–c (Fowler, pp. 200–3), as well as p. 55 above.

88. For this conversation, see *Parmenides* 135c–e (Fowler, pp. 230–1); cf. *W.* xiv. 241 (MS?). Hegel's remark that, were it not for chronological difficulties, the Aristotle mentioned here could be the famous Aristotle, may arise from the fact that what he regards as 'Aristotle's way of philosophizing' (see p. 232 below) jibes with what Plato says here about this Aristotle.

to identity and non-identity, rest and motion, arising and perishing. And you have to take account of the same thing with the categories of being and non-being: what happens to being in relation to itself and in relation to non-being? By exercising yourself fully in these [studies] you will find the essential truth.'[89]

Plato attaches this great value to dialectical examination. It is the examination not of externals but only of what should count as determinative. Here we have pure thoughts. They are what is alive, they are not dead; they are self-moving and active, and the activity of pure thoughts consists in
35 making themselves into | their own other, and in this way showing that only the unity of the opposites is something steadfast and true.

The result of the dialectic of the *Parmenides* has a strange look: whether the One (τὸ ἕν) is or is not (either itself or the other Ideas, rest and motion, arising and perishing, and so forth—taken not only in isolation but also in relation to another), all of this together both is and is not, appears and appears not, and the One, or what is, both is and is not, appears and appears not.[90] In our ordinary view we are very far from taking these wholly abstract categories—the One, being, non-being, appearing, rest, motion, and so forth—to be Ideas. But for Plato the Ideas are what is wholly universal. They show that they are dialectical, in that only identity with its other is what is true. The 'becoming' of Heraclitus, which is the truth of being and non-being, belongs here. The truth of both is becoming; it is the unity of the two as inseparable.[91] In the One, being is non-being and non-being is being; the unity of the two is in becoming.

The *Parmenides* seems, therefore, to have a result of a rather negative sort, such that the very thing that is truly first, or the prius, is not affirmative. Only the third stage, the negation of the negation, is what is affirmative. But that is not yet expressed here. So far as that goes, the result of the *Parmenides* may perhaps appear unsatisfactory to us. [But] the Neoplatonists (Proclus) regarded this very exposition in the *Parmenides* as the authentic

89. See *Parmenides* 135e–6c (Fowler, pp. 230–3). Hegel's quotations in this paragraph—and in *W.* xiv. 241–2 (MS?)—are free and only partial renderings of Plato's text. The transcripts do not distinguish here between paraphrase of Plato and Hegel's interpolations; *W.* and our English translation do, by the use of quotation marks.

90. See the conclusion of the dialogue (*Parmenides* 166c; Fowler, pp. 330–1); cf. *W.* xiv. 243 (MS?), of which this is a paraphrase, with the part within parentheses being Hegel's interpolation. Once again, this distinction is explicit in *W.* but not in our transcripts. Mention of the 'other Ideas' comes earlier in the dialogue.

91. See pp. 73–4 above. This reversion of Parmenides' dialectic to Heraclitus' perspective may reflect the 'third hypothesis' of the dialogue; see *Parmenides* 155e–7b (Fowler, pp. 296–301).

theology, the authentic unveiling of all the mysteries of the divine essence.[92] For the divine | essence is the Idea as such; but this Idea in and for itself, 36
thinking as absolute, inasmuch as it is what absolutely thinks itself, is the activity and the movement of thinking within itself. Likewise, the dialectic is none other than the activity or vitality of what thinks itself within itself. The Neoplatonists look upon this connection as exclusively metaphysical, and through it they have come to cognitive knowledge of theology, the unfolding of the mysteries of the divine essence.

We may as well acknowledge that this dialectic of Plato's in the *Parmenides* is not complete in every respect. Its particular concern is to demonstrate that, if we posit the category of the One by itself, the characteristic of multiplicity is directly contained in it and vice versa; this is the aim of the enterprise. In dealing with the many we saw that it is active and that it passes over into its opposite, into unity. This unique way of proceeding is not a feature of every dialogue of Plato's, for outside factors often exert an influence on his dialectic. He frequently juxtaposes two viewpoints and develops the ensuing discussion from that juxtaposition. For instance, in the *Parmenides* he accepts that 'the One is'. It is implicit in this proposition that the One is not synonymous with 'is', for the One and being are distinguished; the two are distinct. Therefore distinction is implicit in the proposition, 'The One is'. This reflection leads to multiplicity, which is inherent in it; thus in saying 'One' I already say 'many'.[93] So this dialectic is correct, of course, but it is not wholly pure, since it starts out from a conjunction of two categories—the One, and being. | 37

### *d. Philosophy of Nature*

It is contained in the *Timaeus*. We cannot, however, go into its details or special features, which in any event are of little interest. What we must note is the manner in which he arrives at the speculative ideas and other forms. The *Timaeus* is no doubt the further reworking of a text composed by a Pythagorean. Others have turned this around, saying that Timaeus the

92. Hegel makes this connection with the Neoplatonic interpretation of the *Parmenides* because he understands the Dialogues to be examples of Platonic dialectic proper; for him the *Parmenides* is not an initial practice exercise in dialectic but is instead the most comprehensive and highest level of the Platonic presentation of dialectical truth. See Proclus, *Theologia Platonis* 1.7.16; see *The Platonic Theology*, trans. Thomas Taylor, 2 vols. (repr. Kew Gardens, NY, 1985), i. 20. Below in his presentation of Proclus' philosophy Hegel goes into this interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides*, and he emphasizes how Plato's negative dialectic has a positive significance for Proclus. Cf. *W.* xv. 76–7.

93. A reference to *Parmenides* 142b–c (Fowler, pp. 250–3). In what follows Plato develops the categories 'whole' and 'part', 'number', and so on.

Pythagorean just made extracts from Plato's *Timaeus*; but the former view is more probable. Aristotle too speaks of the thoughts of Timaeus the Pythagorean that occur in Plato's *Timaeus*.[94]

Plato begins the dialogue with a representation of how the world comes into being. God is the Good; and, because the Good has no jealousy within itself, God wished to make the world as much like himself as possible.[95] Here 'God' is still indeterminate. Here an unmediated beginning is made from God. That God is devoid of jealousy is an important thought, a beautiful and true thought. The earlier concepts of νέμεσις [Nemesis], ἀνάγκη [Necessity], and δίκη [Justice] too, still involved the attribute of divine jealousy, the fact that the gods put down what is great and cannot abide what is worthy and sublime.[96] In the bare representation of νέμεσις there is as yet no ethical character—namely, that the gods cannot permit what is
38 inherently evil. | Punishment, or vindicating the ethical over against the unethical, is a putting-down of what oversteps the prescribed measure; but this measure is not yet represented as the ethical. According to Plato and Aristotle, the Good is devoid of jealousy.[97] The modern view that God is a hidden god, that we cannot know God cognitively, also implies divine jealousy, for why should God not reveal himself? But, if people are instead serious about God, then they cannot ascribe jealousy to God, saying that God is unknowable; for this means only that we wish to disregard the higher aspect of God and to pursue our own petty concerns or prospects and the like.

So Plato says that the Good is devoid of jealousy. He continues: 'God came upon the visible or the material element, not at rest but in disorderly

94. Hegel refers to the intermediate position of Plato's *Timaeus*, which is of more recent date than a Pythagorean dialogue antedating it but is older than the περὶ φύσεως, a text bearing the name 'Timaeus Locrus' that became known in the second century AD. Three of Hegel's most-utilized sources (Buhle, Tennemann, and Tiedemann) do not discuss the issue of a literary connection between Plato's *Timaeus* and Pythagorean sources or later works; however, Brucker alludes to the reported purchase of the works of Philolaus (*Historia*, i. 640, 813, 1102, 1127–8); see also Johann Albert Fabricius, *Bibliotheca Graeca*, 14 vols. (Hamburg, 1705–28), iii. 21–4.

95. See *Timaeus* 29d–30a (Bury, pp. 52–5).

96. This refers to the imaginative world of Homer and Hesiod, because in the subsequent tragedies Nemesis and Dike are already thought of as principles of just measure and right order. On these principles see *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 141–7 (with nn. 112 and 114), 183–4, 465–6, 646–9, 665–9. See also Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1108a.35–b.1 (Barnes, ii. 1750), where Nemesis has entirely lost its ancient mythological significance.

97. On God's lack of jealousy, see *Timaeus* 29d–e (Bury, pp. 52–3) and *Phaedrus* 247a (Fowler, pp. 474–5), as well as n. 168, p. 234 below (on Aristotle). The transition from poetry or mythology to philosophy also completes the transition from the older image of the gods' envy to the confirmation of their envy-free nature. See also *Philosophy of Religion*, i. 382–3.

motion.'[98] According to this expression, Plato decreed that God just gave order to matter, which he encountered as something independent of him. But these relationships are not to be taken as dogmas or philosophical tenets of Plato himself. Plato is not serious about this; it is only the prelude, serving to introduce definitions of the nature of matter. We must realize [*wissen*] that when we make a beginning in philosophy with God, or with being or with space and time, and speak of these things in an immediate fashion, this content itself is by nature immediate, it is at first only immediate; and we must realize that these initial and immediate characteristics are at the same time inwardly indeterminate. So God is as yet indeterminate, is as yet empty for thought.

As he proceeds, then, Plato comes to further specifications, and these first give us the Idea. He continues: 'God prized order as more excellent than what is disorderly, which is why God brought chaos to [a state of] order.'[99] This is a naive way of putting it. Today we would demand forthwith that [the existence of] God first be proven, and we would not just decree [the existence of] the visible realm. But Plato assumes | without further ado 39
that 'God is' and 'matter is', and he does so in a very naive, artless fashion. Only later on does the definition of the Idea come in.

He proceeds: 'Considering that in the visible realm what lacks understanding cannot be more beautiful than the rational aspect and that, without soul, understanding cannot participate in anything, God placed understanding in the soul and the soul in what is bodily because, without body, understanding cannot participate in the visible realm. God conjoined them in such a way that the world became an ensouled and living animal.'[100] This 'animal' is just the whole, or what is genuinely real.

Plato now passes over directly to the Idea of corporeal being. 'Because the world was to become corporeal, visible and tangible, and because nothing can be seen without fire and nothing can be felt without earth or something solid, in the very beginning God made fire and earth as two extremes. But two cannot be united without a third, for their unity requires a middle or a bond that holds them together. The fairest of bonds, however, is the bond that in the highest degree makes itself one with what it binds together.' This is one of Plato's finest expressions. 'This brings into play in the most beautiful way the analogy or the constant geometrical relationship. If the

98. *Timaeus* 30a (Bury, pp. 54–5); cf. *W.* xiv. 250 (MS?).

99. This statement likewise is from *Timaeus* 30a (Bury, pp. 54–5). The word 'chaos', which is not in this passage of Plato nor in *W.* xiv. 250, occurs only in An.'s transcript.

100. This is a paraphrase of *Timaeus* 30a–c (Bury, pp. 54–5). Cf. *W.* xiv. 251 (MS?).

middle one of three numbers, masses or forces is related to the third as the first is to it and, conversely, it is related to the first as the third is to it (*a* is to *b* as *b* is to *c*), then, since this middle term has become the first and the last and, conversely, the last and the first have become the middle term, they have then all become one.'[101] With this the absolute identity is established. This is the syllogistic conclusion known to us from logic. It retains the form in which it appears in the ordinary syllogism, but here it is the rational; the distinctions are the extremes, and the identity makes them one in the Idea. The whole of rationality—the Idea—is presented in the conclusion, at least outwardly; hence it is incorrect to disparage the conclusion and fail to recognize it as the
40 highest, absolute form. |

In the syllogism of the understanding there are two extremes and a middle term, but the extremes have the value of independent characteristics, and so a particular form belongs to each of these terminal points. The first [term] is the singular, the second is the particular, and the third is the universal. This, the understanding's [form] of the syllogism, is sublated in the Platonic presentation, and the speculative aspect constitutes the syllogism's properly authentic form and nature; the bond, or middle term, makes the extremes one in the highest degree; they do not remain independent of one another or of the middle term. The middle has become first and last, and these two extremes become the middle. That is how it first comes about that all of them are of necessity the same, and their unity is constituted in this way. In the syllogism of the understanding, in contrast, the unity of the terms is only the unity of things that we held to be essentially distinct and to remain so. At this point the speculative syllogism loses the meaning that some subject or concept (representation, or category of the understanding) is brought together with another determination through a middle term; what we say instead is that the subject in each of the extremes is linked with itself and not with the other. In the syllogism of reason a subject or a content is represented as joining itself with itself through the other and in the other. This is because the extremes have become identical; each therefore joins itself with itself in the other.

This is God's nature. If God is made the subject, this means that God begets his Son, the world, that God realizes himself in this reality, which appears as an other, but in doing so God remains self-identical, nullifies the fall, and is only uniting himself with himself in the other; in this way God is
41 for the first time spirit, the absolute syllogism. | There is good reason for holding the immediate to be above what is mediated and then saying that the

101. These two quotations are paraphrases from *Timaeus* 31b–2a (Bury, pp. 56–9).

operation of God is immediate; but the concrete determination, the fullness of content, is that God is a syllogism that joins itself with itself by means of the other. In these Platonic determinations we find what is supremely important. Abstractly speaking, however, these determinations are pure thoughts, ones that do nonetheless contain everything within themselves; in all concrete forms, and in the case of God too, everything hinges on these abstract thought-determinations.

Plato continues: 'In this visible domain, then, there were, as extremes, earth and fire, or the solid and what is filled with life. What is solid requires more than one medium because it has not only breadth but also depth; so God set air and water between earth and fire, and God did so according to twofold relationships, so that fire is related to air as air is to water, and air is to water as water is to earth.'[102] The middle term is therefore a broken one. Hence the number 4, which crops up here and which is a principal or basic number in nature, is the cause for what is one in thought entering into separation in nature. In other words, the middle term, considered as antithesis, is a doubled term. One extreme is God, the second or mediating element is the Son, and the third is the Spirit. Here the middle term is simple [*einfach*, onefold], whereas in nature the antithesis, in order to exist as antithesis, is itself a double term. If the antithesis is one of the three terms and this term itself is doubled, then when we count we have four. This happens in our representation of God too; when we apply this representation to the world we have as the middle term both nature and finite spirit—nature as such, and finite | spirit as nature's 42
return to unity, the path of return; and the state of being returned is spirit, what is living and active—it is the process of positing this differentiating, and what gets differentiated, as identical with itself. This process is the living God.

Plato goes on to say: 'Air and water are what mediates. It is through unity that the entire visible and tangible world was made. Because the elements were given to it whole and undivided, it is perfect, it does not age or suffer ills. Illness and aging come about when an excess of elements acts upon something from without. In the world's case, that cannot be, for it contains all elements wholly within itself. The world has the perfect shape, that of a sphere, and so forth'—we find this in Parmenides as well.[103] So illness and

102. The first sentence within these quotation marks corresponds to no known text of Plato's; the rest is an abridged paraphrase of *Timaeus* 32a–b (Bury, pp. 58–9). Gr. is the source for the phrase 'twofold relationships'; Plato's text and *W.* xiv. 254 read 'one relationship' (or ratio).

103. Hegel greatly abridges and paraphrases *Timaeus* 32b–3c (Bury, pp. 58–63); cf. *W.* xiv. 255 (MS?). On the reference to Parmenides, see p. 64–5 above. According to *W.* xiii. 297 (MS?), Hegel also referred in this context to Plotinus, *Enneads* 5.1.8, a passage without, however, a thematic link to the Platonic *Parmenides*.

aging come about owing to such elements acting upon a body from without. Finitude consists in some object or other having a determination, something external [to it]. In the Idea too there is determination, delimiting (πέρας) or distinguishing, the other-being that is at the same time resolved, is contained or kept within the One—thus bounded.[104] So this is a distinction in which no finitude arises, one in which instead the finitude is by the same token sublated. It is, therefore, an infinity that does not become finite through [relation to] the finite—and this is a great thought.

Well, God gave the world the most fitting motion, a circular motion, and set apart from it the other six motions that are subordinate to this one.[105] Since God wanted to make the world like unto himself, to make it a god (so the account is a theogony), he bestowed soul on it, putting soul in the
43 center, | although it also suffuses the whole and envelopes it. The center is what mediates and is at the same time totality. In this way God created the self-sufficient beings, known to themselves and friends to themselves. By all these means God made this itself into the blessed God.[106] Hence the center is what is true. So, despite how it seemed at first, Plato does not take matter to be independent—that is just the introduction; only now do we have the truth. What has being-in-and-for-itself, what is eternal—that alone is this blessed God or this identity.

Plato continues: 'Although we have spoken of the soul last it is nevertheless not last, something produced or something dependent, for this last position is but a consequence of our way of speaking. Soul is what rules and is kingly, whereas the bodily element is what obeys it.'[107] So, as we have already noted, we can point out contradictions in these presentations of Plato's; but everything hinges on those elements that get expounded as the truth.

What follows will show us the nature of the Platonic Idea in greater detail. Plato has this to say: 'The being [*Wesen*] of the soul has been created in the following way. From the undivided being that remains ever self-same, and from the divided being, which is corporeal, he [God] made a union as a

104. The phrase 'thus bounded' renders 'also Verendlichen', an unusual term transmitted by Pn. It could be rendered alternatively as 'brought to an end'.

105. See *Timaeus* 34a (Bury, pp. 62–3). On the 'six subordinate motions', which tend to cause the progress of the world (as living creature) to be 'disorderly and irrational', see 43b (Bury, pp. 94–5); cf. *W.* xiv. 255 (MS?).

106. The second sentence of this paragraph begins by alluding to *Timaeus* 30d, and what follows is drawn from 34a–b (see Bury, pp. 56–7, 62–5), which describes the world as a self-sufficient being (singular).

107. This quotation is an abridgement of *Timaeus* 34b–5a (Bury, pp. 64–5).

third thing.'[108] So we have two determinations: one is what is undivided, or [self-]identical; the other is what is utterly divided, or corporeal. From the two he created a third kind of being, united at the midpoint. | It has 44
the nature of the self-same and the nature of the other (and what is other is the corporeal). The divided sort Plato also calls 'the other as such', not the other of something else. 'In keeping with this, he made this third kind to be the midpoint between the indivisible and the divided.' These three are still posited as distinct. 'Taking these three natures [*Wesen*], he [God] then united them all in one Idea, with the extremes becoming the midpoint and vice versa, by incorporating the nature of the other forcibly within the self-same—forcibly, since the other is resistant to mixing.' This is the forcible action of the concept, which idealizes the many, or mutual externality, and posits it as ideal.

'Having made all three to be one, he [God] once again separated the whole into parts, into as many as is fitting.' This whole is for the first time genuine matter, or substance as such—authentic actuality. Thus he divided the substantial in turn, and the manner of the division is indicated as follows. It is expressed in numerical categories. Here, then, we encounter the famous Pythagorean numbers, which Cicero, who understood nothing, in his *Somnium Scipionis* calls 'the Platonic numbers'.[109] I mentioned this numerical mode already, in connection with the Pythagorean philosophy. These are simple relationships that, in their simple origins as numbers, surely do involve something that can seem to be more nearly suited to thought. But, when we go further, something indeterminate promptly enters into the [numerical] juxtapositions. The basic series is quite simple: 1, 2, 3; then come 4 (the square of 2), 9 (the square of 3), 8 (as cube of 2), and 27 (as cube of 3). Plato now articulates this series again according both to geometrical relationships and to arithmetical | relationships. He says that the whole 45
series is cut into two parts, laid one on top of the other and bent back upon themselves to form two circles, an inner one and an outer one, and so

108. The quotations in this paragraph, and the one at the beginning of the next paragraph, paraphrase *Timaeus* 35a–b (Bury, pp. 64–7). Cf. *W.* xiv. 256–8 (MS?). Hegel seems to identify 'divided being' with the nature of what is distinct or different. By 'the other' he could be referring to *Sophist* 257c and 258d–9b (Fowler, pp. 416–17, 420–3).

109. This expression occurs not in *Scipio's Dream* but in the *Letters to Atticus* 7.13; see Cicero, *Opera*, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1737); *Letters to Atticus*, trans. E. O. Winstedt, 3 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1913), ii. 64–5—which, however, gives it in the singular ('Plato's number'), and the translator refers the allusion to *Republic* 545c, not to Pythagoras. According to *W.* xiv. 259, Hegel referred in this context to August Böckh's 'Ueber die Bildung der Weltseele im Timäos des Platon', in *Studien* (Heidelberg), ed. Carl Daub and Friedrich Creuzer, 3 (1807), 1–95, especially 42–3—which cites the *Letters to Atticus*.

forth.[110] But we do not get very far with these numerical relationships; they are of no avail for presenting the concept or the idea. Natural relationships or laws of nature do not lend themselves to expression by these barren numbers; they involve an empirical relationship, and [pure] numbers are not basic determinants of the dimensions of nature.

Plato goes on to say that the inner circle itself belongs to soul, that it is the essence or the system of the soul. Soul is the middle, permeating these circles and surrounding them; it has within itself the eternal ground of a perpetually rational life.[111] Since the material element is kept separate from soul, the soul appears as what is true. This is the general characteristic of the soul that is set into the world and rules over it; and, insofar as its substantial element, which is matter, resembles it, their inherent identity is maintained. Thus for Plato the Idea of the world is an image of the inwardly blessed God.[112]

To this divine world he now juxtaposes a second one—the copy [*Abbild*] of it—the world where generation occurs, the visible world.[113] What involves generation and becoming could not be made just like the primary Idea. But a self-moving image of the eternal has been provided—one that is made according to number; this eternal image that moves according to number is what we call time. We speak of 'was' and 'will be' as divisions of time. But authentic time is eternal, it is the eternal present; time as immediate image of the eternal does not have future and past. The 'real'
46 moments of time, or of the principle of the ¦ movement actually inherent in the temporal, are the sun, moon, and planets. These [heavenly bodies] serve as delimiter and custodian (διορισμὸν καὶ φυλακήν) of the numerical relationships of time; they bring about time's 'realization'. So the eternal world has a copy in the world that belongs to time.[114] But the latter has a counterpart in a second world, one having changeableness as an essential, inherent feature. That initial image of the eternal remains within the unity or the determination of the self-same. 'Self-same' and 'other' are the most abstract antith-

110. On the significance of Pythagorean numbers, see pp. 38–40 above. *Timaeus* 35b–d (Bury, pp. 66–73) discusses these mathematical relationships; cf. *W.* xiv. 259–60 (MS?). Böckh's essay in *Studien* elaborates on the Pythagorean character of these relationships (pp. 53–4). He presents various forms of the Pythagorean tetractys, constituted by addition and by multiplication, in much the same way as Hegel does in our text.

111. See *Timaeus* 36d–e (Bury, pp. 72–3). See *W.* xiv. 260 (MS?), which correctly speaks of the 'system of the soul' (Plato says: 'construction or organization of the soul') as embracing the whole, in contrast to our transcripts, which erroneously speak only of the 'inner circle' belonging to the (world-)soul.

112. See *Timaeus* 34b (Bury, pp. 64–5).

113. See *Timaeus* 48e–9a (Bury, pp. 112–13); cf. *W* 14:262.

114. Plato's well-known discussion of time as the moving image of the eternal realm occurs in *Timaeus* 37c–8c (Bury, pp. 74–9); cf. *W.* xiv. 262–3 (MS?).

eses we have had so far. As set into time, the eternal world is present in a double form—in that of the self-same and that of the other, of what is gone astray.[115]

This principle of other-being or of the changeable is a universal principle in the second world.[116] It is like a wet-nurse (τροφός) who sustains all things, who makes everything subsist and gives it free rein. Hence this principle is the formless, which is receptive to any and every form, is what we call 'matter' or 'passive matter' (which at first had a substantial character).[117] It is in the world of the changeable that what we call 'matter', the relatively substantial, what is subsistence in general or external being, is found; that is where there is abstract being that is only for itself. In our reflection we distinguish 'form' from it, and, according to Plato, form first comes to subsist by means of the wet-nurse. So, in this world of changeableness, matter is what is universally substantial; the forms in it are the spatial figures, and at this point Plato proceeds to elucidate the kinds of figures. The triangle is the foundation. Hence he speaks here in a Pythagorean fashion, saying that the [kinds of] triangles are combined or placed together according to | the primordial numerical relationships. This combining of 47
triangles according to numerical relationships constitutes the sensible elements. So this is the foundation.[118]

Plato goes on further, into the specifics of physics and into a physiology, but we do not intend to follow his lead.[119] This is a beginning, an immature endeavor; speculative thought is often recognizable here too, but for the

115. See *Timaeus* 48e–9a (Bury, pp. 112–13). Plato does not speak, as does Hegel, of a second world (actually, a 'third') standing over against the copy-world in time, but only of a third *eidos* that is a component of the copy-world—namely, the 'receptacle' or 'wet-nurse'. Hegel takes up this thought in the final sentence of this paragraph, which distinguishes two forms of the copy-world.

116. Plato presents this principle of changeability explicitly in the context of the basic elements. See *Timaeus* 49b–d (Bury, pp. 112–15).

117. See *Timaeus* 50b–c (Bury, pp. 116–17). Hegel's remark about matter 'at first having a substantial character' might refer to the principles of the Ionian philosophy of nature; see pp. 26–7 above.

118. On these figures and numerical relationships, see *Timaeus* 50b, 50e–1b and 53c–5c (Bury, pp. 116–21, 126–35). In the latter passage Plato expounds his theory that all triangles have their origin in two fundamental right triangles, one of them isosceles, the other the innumerable scalene forms of right triangles—of which the most beautiful are those that, when joined in pairs, yield an equilateral triangle. He also indicates the construction of the four most beautiful bodily or three-dimensional forms from the various triangles, these being the tetrahedron, octahedron, icosahedron, and cube (which constitute fire, air, water, and earth respectively). A fifth form is the dodecahedron, made the basis (or 'used up') for the shape of the whole universe. These solids are said, in Pythagorean fashion, to be formed according to combinations of prime numbers and their powers. See also *Timaeus* 55d–7d (Bury, pp. 134–41).

119. He treats the elements and manifold natural phenomena in *Timaeus* 57d–61c, and the physiology of organisms in 61c–92c (Bury, pp. 140–253).

most part the treatment proceeds in such wholly external modes as outward purposiveness and the like.[120] The empirical information here is still imperfect too, [but] a few moments contain something universal. When he comes to colors, Plato passes over to a universal mode of treatment.[121] In the *Timaeus* it is noteworthy that he begins all over again several times; this is attributable partly to the circumstance that the *Timaeus* is an aggregation of several [separate] parts,[122] but it is [also owing to] the inner necessity of the subject matter, which is admittedly not at all apparent in the Platonic account. We must begin from the abstract and only then pass on to the concrete, to what is true; this comes in only later, and when we have arrived at that point it has once more the semblance and the form of a beginning, particularly in Plato's loose way of putting things.

Next he discusses how, in considering nature as a whole, we must distinguish between two causes—first, the necessary cause, defined as external necessity, and, secondly, the divine cause. 'We must search out the divine cause everywhere, for the sake of the blessed life; to be so occupied is [the] end in and for itself, and therein lies happiness to the extent our nature is capable of it. We have only to discern the necessary cause for the sake of the things that cannot be cognized without it'; this is the external consideration
48 of objects, of their connection, | their relation and the like. The divine consideration is for its own sake. 'God himself is the author of the divine'; the divine belongs to that first, divine world, not as an 'other world' but as one that is present.[123]

God handed over to his [divine] creations the task of producing and managing mortals.[124] (This is a facile way of making the transition from

120. These critical remarks have in view the 'irrational sensation' that the 'engendered gods' blended into the mortal kind of soul, and the account of the neck as a boundary separating the 'divine' and mortal parts of the person (*Timaeus* 69d–e; Bury, pp. 178–81). Earlier in the *Timaeus* (29c–d; Bury, pp. 52–3) Plato had indicated that accounts of things in the world of becoming can only be probable accounts and not exact; that is the nature of the world, according to Plato, and the nature of the myth that sets out to describe it.

121. Hegel singles out Plato's color theory, owing to his interest in the dispute between Goethe and Newton about color, especially the importance of Plato's attempt to show the basic colors as arising from psychological and physiological aspects of various mixtures of 'dark' or black with 'bright' or white. See *Timaeus* 68b–9a (Bury, pp. 174–9), which follows up the remarks on color with comments on a 'universal mode of treatment'.

122. This is probably a reference to *Timaeus* 69a–b (Bury, pp. 178–9), which speaks of reverting to the starting point and repeats statements made initially. On the possibility of diverse literary sources for the *Timaeus*, see n. 94 above.

123. The quotations in this paragraph are paraphrases from *Timaeus* 68e–9a and 69c (Bury, pp. 176–9); the rest is Hegel's gloss on the text. Cf. *W.* xiv. 266–7 (MS?).

124. See *Timaeus* 64c (Bury, pp. 178–9); cf. *W.* xiv. 267 (MS?), which erroneously has 'helpers' instead of 'creations'.

the divine to the finite or the earthly—but it is a most difficult topic.) These [divine creations] imitated the divine, and because they have received within themselves the immortal principle of soul they thus made a mortal body, and they placed within it a mortal image, or εἶδος, of the Idea of soul. This mortal image comprises pleasure, the powerful and requisite passions—sadness, worry, fear, courage, hope—and so forth; these sensibilities all belong to the mortal soul. In order not to tarnish the divine they gave this mortal aspect another part of the body to dwell in, and they made an isthmus or narrow connection between head and breast—the neck. These sensibilities, passions, and the like dwell, of course, in the breast, in the heart; but, in order to make the heart as perfect as possible, they gave it the assistance of the bloodless lung, and also hollow tubes so that air and fluids are conducted to the heart and by that means it is calmed down.[125]

What Plato says about the liver is particularly noteworthy. The irrational part of the soul is given over to the desire for food and drink, and it does not listen to reason. The liver, however, is created so that, from the νοῦς, the power of thinking too may descend into this irrational part, which is given over simply to desire; | in this way it can be frightened by images, examples, 49
and εἴδωλα (bogeymen). If the irrational part is calmed in sleep, visions appear to it; for those that made us, being mindful of the heavenly father's eternal commandment to make the mortal frame [*Leib*] as good as possible, constructed the worst part of our body [*Körper*] in such a way that after a fashion it too can partake of the truth—μαντεία [prophecy or divination] belongs here.[126]

Thus Plato ascribes prophesying to the irrational, bodily aspect of human being. People often believe that Plato ascribes revelation and the like to reason; but this is quite false. Revelation is rationality only in the mode in which it has a place in irrationality. No human being in full possession of rational powers participates in authentic and divine prophesying. Prophesying occurs only when the power of the understanding is shackled in sleep or is altered by sickness or enthusiastic possession. But something of that sort has to be expounded and interpreted by one who has his wits about him, for whoever is still bereft of sense cannot be the judge of it. There is an old saying that only one who has his wits about him can know, and tend to, his affairs and himself. Such a person *thinks* [the meaning of] what someone

125. These characteristics of the 'mortal image' are set forth in *Timaeus* 69c–70d (Bury, pp. 178–83); cf. *W.* xiv. 267 (MS?).

126. Material in this paragraph is drawn from *Timaeus* 70d–1e (Bury, pp. 182–7); cf. *W.* xiv. 267–8 (MS?).

who sleeps, is witless, or the like, [only] *says*.[127] These are the principal moments in Plato's philosophy of nature.

*e. Philosophy of Spirit*

We do not yet find in Plato a definite presentation of the organization of
50 theoretic spirit. The distinctions he makes with regard to | cognitive knowing are very important, to be sure, but we have already indicated them. What we may find noteworthy under the heading of spirit is Plato's idea about the human being's ethical nature. He explains this ethical nature in the books of his *Republic*. The ethical nature of the human being seems to us quite remote from the organism of the state; but in Plato we find the important insight [*Bewusstsein*] that someone who wants to treat the human being's ethical nature, so as to give it its due and see it in operation, will find it only in the organism of the state; the upshot is that an authentic treatment of ethical nature leads to the examination of the state.

Hence Plato provided in his *Republic* a so-called ideal constitution that has come to be commonly regarded as a chimera. What this means is that such an ideal can indeed be entertained in one's head and that it may even be put into practice, albeit, so they say, only on condition that human beings be of an excellence perhaps found in the heavens; but that it is not practicable for human beings as they in fact are, and hence that, after all is said and done, such an ideal is something wholly useless. What I have already said about philosophy's relationship to the state shows that Plato's ideal is not to be taken in this sense. Whenever, by virtue of the idea or of the concept, an ideal has truth within itself, it is no chimera. The ideal is then what is true; an ideal of this kind—one truly known in the idea—is not something useless or lacking force, but is what is actual; the true ideal is not what *ought* to be actual, for it *is* actual.

But we must *know* what 'actual' is. What passes daily before our eyes we call 'actual' too; but it belongs merely to the so-called phenomenal world. What is temporal or transitory does of course exist, and it can certainly cause
51 us plenty of anxiety; but, despite this, | it is no genuine actuality any more than is an individual subject's private concerns, wishes, and inclinations. In this context we should be thinking about the distinction made earlier, concerning the Platonic philosophy of nature.[128] As the self-contained,

127. *Timaeus* 71e–2a (Bury, pp. 186–7) assigns this role to divination; Hegel adds his own commentary to the basic points from Plato. Cf. *W.* xiv. 268 (MS?).

128. See pp. 212, 214, and 216 above. In the next sentence in our text, in keeping with his distinction between the two forms of the actual world, Hegel erroneously identifies the eternal world, as 'blessed God', with the first form of the world posited in time; see pp. 214–15 above.

blessed God, the eternal world is the actual world—not 'up above' nor 'the beyond', but the present, actual world considered in its truth and not as it can be touched and, as such, impinges on the senses of hearing, sight and the like.

If we examine the content of the Platonic Idea in this way, we shall find that Plato in fact presented Greek ethical life according to its substantial mode. Greek civic life, this Greek ethical life, is what constitutes the true content of the Platonic Republic. Plato is not one to dally with abstract theories and principles; his truthful spirit discerned and presented what is true, and this could not be anything but what was true about the world in which he lived—what is true in the one spirit that was living in him no less than in his people. One cannot overleap one's own time; the spirit of one's age is one's own spirit too; but a great deal depends upon knowing this spirit of the age cognitively, as absolute content.

We have to note first that, in the books of his *Republic*, Plato approaches his topic by setting out to show what 'justice' is. Then—in his simple, artless fashion—he says that we are situated in this investigation just as we would be if we were given the task of reading small and distant handwriting, and were told that it can be found in larger strokes in another and nearer place; we would much prefer to read the larger script first, and afterwards we would be able to read the small script easily as well. That is how it is with justice, which is to be exhibited not only in the individual but also in the state; | justice as shown forth in the state will be expressed on a larger scale, 52
and it will be more easily known cognitively and then transferred to the individual.[129] By this comparison he transposes the question about justice into an examination of the state.

So the main thought that underlies the *Republic* is the one we regard as *the* principle of Greek ethical life. It is true that the ethical has the condition of what is substantial, so that each individual subject acts, lives, and finds enjoyment only within this spirit, and the subjective has its second, or spiritual, nature in a natural mode or as the custom and habit of what is substantial. This is the basic determination. The determination that stands over against it—against this substantial relationship of individuals to custom—is the individual's subjective free will, the moral viewpoint that individuals [should] not perform their actions out of respect and reverence for

129. After first setting forth the problem of justice (in 331c–54c, 358b–d), the *Republic* then proposes in this way (368c–9a) to investigate the nature of justice in the state first, before proceeding to justice in the individual; see Shorey, i. 18–107, 110–13, 146–9; cf. *W.* xiv. 270 (MS?).

the institutions of state or fatherland, but that they should reach their own decisions in keeping with a moral conviction and should determine their actions according to their own decision and conscience.

This principle of subjective freedom is a later development; it is the principle of the modern, cultivated era. This principle did enter into the Greek world too, but as the principle that destroyed the Greek states and Greek life generally. It first emerged as something destructive, precisely because the Greek spirit, constitution, and laws were not, and could not be, so constituted as to allow this moral principle to take root within them. The two are not compatible [*homogen*], and so Greek custom and habit had
53 to perish. Plato | recognized and comprehended the spirit or authentic element of his world; and he imparted more precise definition to it in his *Republic* by seeking to exclude and banish this new principle, to preclude all possibility of it. That is the absolute standpoint of Plato's philosophy, inasmuch as its foundation is what is substantial for his age; but it is also only *relatively* absolute, since it is only a Greek standpoint and the later principle of subjective freedom is consciously excluded from Plato's state. This is the general nature of the Platonic ideal of the state, and we must examine it from this point of view.

Inquiries as to whether such a state is possible and is the best, inquiries that are based on modern viewpoints, only lead one astray. What matters in a modern state is freedom of conscience and the fact that, when it comes to their own particular interests, individuals demand the right to be able to pursue them in their own way. This, however, is excluded from the Platonic Idea.

I will now indicate the principal moments in greater detail, insofar as they are of philosophical interest. First, the point of departure concerns what is 'just'. Plato says that it is convenient to take up justice in the state. But it is not convenience that sets him on this course. On the contrary, it is precisely the Idea that constitutes the foundation of the whole, according to which the practice of justice is possible for human beings only insofar as they are members of the state, which is, as such, essentially ethical. It is this Idea alone that leads him to present justice as he does. The just person exists only as an ethical member of the state.

The more detailed treatment consists of an analysis of the organization of the ethical commonwealth, namely, the distinctions inherent in the ethi-
54 cal | substance—the unfolding of the moments inherent in the concept. They are not independent, but are upheld only in their unity. These moments of the organization appear in three forms: first, the social classes; secondly, the virtues; thirdly, the virtues as moments in individual subjects. It is

important to recognize that these specific features are present in the whole and are present here as distinct entities, which we call 'classes'. Without social classes the state has no organization. They are the organization of what is substantial. Plato introduces three social classes: (1) the class of guardians as such, who are, essentially, philosophically cultivated statesmen possessing genuine knowledge; (2) the class of the courageous [warriors]; (3) the class of artisans, inclusive of agriculture, animal husbandry, and so forth.[130] Internally, this state is a system of these systems.

From this point Plato then passes over to singular specifications that are in part trifling and are better dispensed with. For instance, he elaborates on the titles of rank of the classes, and he speaks of education, of how wet-nurses should suckle the children, and so forth.[131] One of the main things is the education of individuals for the state and, in particular, for their being able to be a member of the first class, the leaders; in this connection he expatiates on the different means of education, the religion, poetic art, and science.[132] He banishes Homer and Hesiod from his state, for at that time people were beginning to take a serious look at belief in Jupiter and in the Homeric tales. He expounds on gymnastics and music, and especially discusses philosophy.[133] At this point his discourses are the most profound and excellent.

130. Plato goes into greater detail than this about the permanent organization of the state. Hegel's account here refers to *Republic* 414b (Shorey, i. 300–1), which distinguishes those guardians educated in philosophy (whom Hegel calls 'guardians as such') from guardians in the wider sense, namely, the courageous class. See 414a and 428d (Shorey, i. 300–1, 350–1) on the philosophically educated guardians, nn. 132 and 135 just below on the courageous class, and 369b–73d (Shorey, i. 148–63), together with n. 136 just below, for a detailed account of the artisan class.

131. *Republic* 463a–b (Shorey, i. 472–3) states how members of the various classes would refer to one another, not with emphasis on titles *per se* but on what they indicate about the political relationships among classes in the state. On provisions for the rearing of children, see 460b–d (Shorey, i. 462–9).

132. On the education of the guardians, see *Republic* 376c–412b (Shorey, i. 172–295). On the role of religion, see the following note. On the poetic art, see 392c–8b (Shorey, i. 224–45). The scientific training includes medicine and jurisprudence (404d–12b; Shorey, i. 268–95). On the selection of members of the highest class, see n. 130 just above, and the prescription for philosophical training in 502c–34e (Shorey, ii. 76–209).

133. See *Republic* 377b–92a (Shorey, i. 176–223). Plato opposes the teaching of myths, especially the fictitious narrations about the deeds and fates of gods and heroes, which should be suppressed because they are not only unfounded but also immoral in their disseminating harmful images of the divine. On Homer and Hesiod in this regard, see 377d, 378d–e, and 599b–608b (Shorey, i. 176–83, ii. 434–69). In speaking of a hidden sense in Homer's accounts of divine doings (378d–e), Plato is, according to Hegel, part of a new approach to Homer, one based on allegorical interpretation (along ethical or physical lines). This marks a changing attitude toward traditional religion, one going beyond the (simpler) critiques made by individuals such as Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, and Protagoras. see., above. On the training of guardians in gymnastics and music, see 398c–412b (Shorey, i. 244–95).

Having distinguished the classes in this fashion, he states as his result that by means of a [social] organism of this sort the virtues would exist in a vital way.

These virtues, which he now lists, are four in number, and we refer to them as the 'cardinal virtues'. The first is science and wisdom—[philosoph-
55 ical] science, which does not pertain to singular characteristics | and is not something the multitude possesses, but which provides counsel for the whole; this corresponds to the first class, the class of guardians.[134] The second is courage—a steadfast maintenance of upright and lawful opinion concerning what is correct and authoritative; this takes firm hold in the mind and does not allow itself to be swayed by desires or passions. Corresponding to this virtue is the class of courage.[135] The third virtue is temperance, which has mastery over the passions and pervades the whole like a harmony, so that even the weaker members contribute to the whole and work together for it. Although a universal virtue, it has particular application to the third class, which at first is only to be brought into harmony because it lacks the absolute harmony that the other classes have within themselves.[136] The fourth virtue is justice. It consists in all individuals directing their efforts only to the sort of thing (or pursuing only the sort of occupation) that relates to the state and meshes with the whole and for which they are by nature best fitted, so that one does not ply a multitude of trades but only that to which one is suited.[137]

Thus justice appears fourth, or as the final virtue; but it constitutes, more precisely, the foundation of the whole.[138] Justice comes about of itself inasmuch as the whole is present. For us, 'justice' according to its true concept means 'freedom' in the subjective sense; [whereas] here it means that the rational attains its determinate being or receives its existence, that the rational will or rational freedom attains existence. For this reason Plato gives justice an elevated position, as attribute of the whole and as freedom in the

134. The four virtues are presented systematically in this way by Cicero in *De finibus* 1.13–16, 2.16; trans. H. Rackham, 2nd edn. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1931), 46–59, 138–41. They first get designated as 'cardinal virtues' by the fourth-century AD theologian Ambrose (*De Sacramentis* 3.2). Plato's statement of the four together comes in *Republic* 427e–8b, 428e–9a (Shorey, i. 346–51), with special emphasis given to wisdom. Cf. *W.* xiv. 281 (MS?).

135. The courage that is the special virtue of the second class Plato expounds in *Republic* 429a–30c (Shorey, i. 350–7); cf. *W.* 281–2 (MS?).

136. On temperance, the special virtue pertaining to the third class, see *Republic* 430d–2b (Shorey, i. 356–65); cf. *W.* xiv. 282 (MS?).

137. On the assignment of people to suitable occupations, hased on their classes and aptitudes, see *Republic* 432b–4d (Shorey, i. 364–75); cf. *W.* xiv. 282–3 (MS?).

138. See *Republic* 433b–c (Shorey, i. 368–9); cf. *W.* xiv. 283 (MS?).

sense that the ethical gains its existence through the | organism of the state. 56
So this existence is a necessary mode of nature, not something arbitrary.

The third form in which these very same moments are exhibited, the way they are in the subject, Plato defines as follows. First we have needs and desires—hunger and thirst—each of which is directed toward some definite thing and it alone. This is an attribute of the subject that corresponds to the artisan class. Found in every consciousness, however, is something that arrests the satisfying of these needs; this is the logos, the rational element, to which corresponds the class of leaders. In addition to these two there is present a third element, mettle [*Zorn*] or θυμός; on one side it is related to desire, but it is also capable of resisting desire and taking the side of reason, and is [something that] can subdue the passions. Someone who has done wrong and whom we expose to hunger and cold [as punishment] will bear up under the hardships, which run counter to desire; but a mettlesome person will, in addition, not surrender what is right, short of meeting with conquest or death, and so forth. This mettle or θυμός corresponds to the courageous class. We take up arms in defense of the fatherland. This mettle therefore guides the passions. In this way the wisdom of the state is the same in the single individual, and likewise with courage and moderation.[139] So this is how Plato provides for the arrangement of the whole; the elaboration is just detail that is of no further interest for its own sake.

But the other aspect, the exclusion of the principle of subjective freedom, is a major feature of the Platonic Republic. In conformity with this specification, the exclusion of the principle of subjectivity, Plato at the outset does not allow individuals to choose a class for themselves, something on which we insist as necessary for freedom; instead the leaders | of the state assign 57
to each one a particular occupation, to each the office commensurate with their judgment concerning that person's talents, capabilities, education, and so forth.[140] A further consequence of this specification is that Plato permits

139. See *Republic* 434d–44a (Shorey, i. 374–417) for a general discussion of the virtues as exhibited in the state. In this passage we find accounts of the needs and desires felt especially by the artisan class (437b–e), the rational element that restrains them (439a–d), and the intermediate quality of 'mettle' that marks the second class (439e–41c); cf. *W.* xiv. 285 (MS?). Plato does not set forth the analogy of the three aspects of the individual soul with the three classes in the state as explicitly as does Hegel, here and in *W.* xiv. 285, although it is expressed in 441c, which says: 'we are fairly agreed that the same kinds equal in number are to be found in the state and in the soul of each one of us' (Shorey, i. 405). See *Republic* 441c–d (Shorey, i. 404–7); cf. *W.* xiv. 285 (MS?).

140. Plato describes this assignment to classes and occupations as a selection process based on natural attributes, inclinations, and capabilities (413e–14a; Shorey, i. 298–301). See also the 'noble lie' that is to be told, about people having inborn traits ('metals') that suit them for particular classes (414c–15c; Shorey, i. 300–7).

no private property in his state.[141] Private property is a possession that belongs to me as *this* person, and in it my personality as such—the abstractly free subject—comes to existence, to reality; and for this reason he excludes private property.

Thirdly, in his state Plato annuls family life—the private character through which a family constitutes a whole by itself. 'The family' is a closed circle of personality, an ethical relationship, but one that stands within natural ethical life and that at the same time excludes others; hence one in which individuality is given essential weight. From our viewpoint, in keeping with the concept of subjective freedom, the individual must have property; and the family is likewise necessary, indeed sacred. In Plato's view, children should be taken from their mothers right after birth. He would have the children brought together and fed by wet-nurses chosen from the set of mothers who have given birth, none of whom knows her own child. Wives are apportioned by lot, so that this cohabitation of husband and wife presupposes no personal preference, and individuals cannot give any weight to their particular preferences, likes, and so forth.[142] Children receive a communal education.[143] Women, whose essential vocation is family life, are deprived of this, their home ground. Hence Plato allows them to go along into battle, putting them on an almost equal footing with the men. But he has little confidence in their courage and for this reason positions them in
58 the rear—not | as reserves but instead to serve as a rear guard, in order to frighten and impress the foe through force of numbers.[144]

141. Plato bans private property only for the guardians, not for the rest. See *Republic* 416c–17b (Shorey, i. 308–13). Hegel does not mention that Plato's later political treatise, the *Laws*, while repeating the theme that according to the best laws 'friends have all things really in common' (739c), nevertheless seems to allow for certain inequalities in property holdings (739e, 744d–5a, 775e–8a); see *Laws*, trans. R. G. Bury, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1926), i. 362–5, 378–81, 470–9.

142. On provisions for the newborn, see *Republic* 460b–d (Shorey, i. 462–9). Plato would have the rulers determine the most suitable pairings of men and women for purposes of marriage and procreation, in a process compared to the selective breeding practiced in animal husbandry. The 'lottery' is bogus, the pairings being secretly prearranged; but the appearance of chance is supposed to make the participants content with the procedure and its outcome. See *Republic* 458c–60b (Shorey, i. 456–63).

143. Male and female children of the guardians are educated together and in the same subjects, since they have the same capabilities and are preparing to perform the same tasks. The only differences between the sexes lie in their different procreative roles, and in that Plato thinks women on average tend to be 'weaker' than men. See *Republic* 451c–7c (Shorey, i. 432–53).

144. Plato assigns no particular domestic or family role to women as such. He says that they should receive the same physical training as do men, and be assigned the tasks of warfare and guardianship in common with men—although with lighter tasks assigned to them (457a–b; Shorey, i. 450–1). But, contrary to Hegel's statement here, Plato says that women's role in warfare may be 'in the ranks or marshalled behind ... or as reserves' (471d; Shorey, i. 500–1).

By excluding private property and family life, by doing away with free choice of social class, by all these specifications relating to the principle of subjective freedom, Plato believes that in his state he has barred the door to all passions, hatred, conflicts, and dissension. He knew very well that the ruin of Greek life ensued from individuals as such bent on asserting their own purposes, their preferences, their interests—interests that gained the upper hand over the communal spirit.

But, since this principle is necessary because of the Christian religion—in which the soul of the individual is the absolute end—so that it has entered the world as necessary in the concept of spirit, we can see that the Platonic constitution is of a lower order; it cannot fulfill the higher requirements of an ethical organization. The opposite to Plato's principle is the principle that in later times was given primacy, particularly by Rousseau—that what counts is the will of the individual, *as* individual.[145] In Rousseau the principle is accentuated to an extreme degree and emerges in its complete one-sidedness. | 59

## 2. Aristotle

Here we take leave of Plato, and we do so with regret. In coming to Aristotle, however, we must be even more apprehensive about having to run to great length, for he was one of the most highly endowed, most learned, most comprehensive, and most profound of geniuses ever to appear; and the fact that we still possess so wide a range of his works makes our material all the more extensive. Unfortunately I cannot give Aristotle the detailed exposition that he deserves. We shall have to confine ourselves to a general view of Aristotle's philosophy, and take note in particular only of the ways in which Aristotle went further in his philosophy than the Platonic principle did.

One reason for treating Aristotle at length is that no other philosopher has been so wronged by thoughtless traditions about his philosophy that have been kept alive and are still the order of the day.[146] Plato is widely read but Aristotle is little known today; hardly anyone knows his speculative, logical works; twenty years ago in particular he was hardly studied at all. His [formal] logic and his poetics were still the only works more fully

145. In other courses of these lectures Hegel treats Rousseau's conception of the individual's freedom in greater detail. See *W.* xv. 527–8 (MS?), where he refers to *The Social Contract*, book one, chapter four ('On Slavery') and chapter six ('On the Social Contract'). See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discourse on Political Economy and The Social Contract*, trans. Christopher Betts (Oxford and New York, 1994), 49–56.

146. See n. 148 just below.

known. Quite recently greater justice has been done to his writings on natural history but not to his philosophical views.[147]

The usual erroneous view is that the Aristotelian and Platonic philosophies are diametrically opposed, that Platonic philosophy is idealism and Aristotle's is realism—and indeed realism in the most trivial sense, namely, that the soul
60 is a *tabula rasa* | (Locke) and receives its concepts from the external world; that his philosophy is empiricism, and so forth.[148] But we can show that Aristotle surpassed Plato in speculative depth, in that he was familiar with the most fundamental speculation and that, with all his most far-reaching empirical breadth, he stands essentially, and deeply rooted, in the idealist tradition.

### *a. Life and Works*

Aristotle is from Stagira in Thrace, on the Gulf of Strymon, a Greek colony that was under Macedonian rule. He was born in the first year of the ninety-ninth Olympiad, in 384 BC. Plato was born in the third year of the eighty-seventh Olympiad, so Aristotle was forty-eight years his junior and was born twelve years after the death of Socrates. His father, Nicomachus, was personal physician to Amyntas, the Macedonian king and the father of Philip. Aristotle lost his parents at an early age, and after his father's death he was brought up by Proxenus, whose memory he honored throughout his life. He adopted Proxenus' son Nicanor as his own child and made him his heir.[149]

147. Hegel is thinking ('twenty years ago') of the circumstances of his Jena Lectures on the history of philosophy (1805–6). The decline of Aristotelianism in the course of the seventeenth century led, in the eighteenth, to a neglect of Aristotle's texts, which in turn affected the availability of editions. Hegel subsequently complained that he had to work up his knowledge of Aristotle's philosophy from the edition of Erasmus of Rotterdam (Basle, 1531). Owing to political circumstances, the edition begun by Buhle—*Aristotles: Opera omnia graece*, 5 vols. (Strasburg, 1781–1800)—remained incomplete, and Immanuel Bekker's edition, which was eventually to become the standard edition, had not yet appeared at the time of these 1825–1826 lectures. On the medieval reception of Aristotle, especially the logical writings, see Vol. III of this edition. On the reception of the *Poetics* in French aesthetics, see n. 161 just below. We do not know to what Hegel is referring in his remark on the natural history texts.

148. Tennemann (*Geschichte*, iii. 47–60) juxtaposes Aristotle's empiricism and Plato's rationalism and says that each is one-sided owing to not undertaking a critical inquiry into the faculty of knowing. Hegel clearly opposes this interpretation of Aristotle in the account that follows.

149. Stagira's location is in Chalcidice, a peninsula extending from Macedonia. Hegel probably followed Brucker (*Historia*, i. 778) in locating it in Thrace; the introduction to Buhle's Aristotle edition gets the location right (pp. 81–2). Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 5.9; Hicks, i. 452–3) gives this year for Aristotle's birth. Plato was only forty-four years older than Aristotle; even Hegel's erroneous report on Plato's birth year (see p. 176 above) would make the age difference just forty-six years. Aristotle's birth actually came fifteen or sixteen years after Socrates' death. Diogenes (*Lives* 5.1; Hicks, i. 444–5) is Hegel's source for this information about Aristotle's father as physician to Amyntas. What follows in our text came either from Ammonius, *Aristotelis vita*, in Buhle's Aristotle edition (i. 43–4) or from Brucker (*Historia*, i. 779).

In his seventeenth year Aristotle came to Athens, where he spent twenty years in the company of Plato.[150] So he had the opportunity to become thoroughly conversant with Platonic philosophy; and, when we are told that he did not understand it, we see, even from the outward circumstances, that this is an arbitrary and quite unfounded assumption. Plato did not name Aristotle as his successor in the Academy, but instead Speusippus. In Diogenes Laertius a great number of anecdotes are recounted about this turn of events.[151] Plato did in any event have Aristotle for a successor, but a successor who also gave further development to Plato's philosophy.

He left Athens and lived for a few years at the court of Hermias, who was the | ruler of Atarneus in Mysia and who had been his fellow student 61
under Plato. He spent three years with Hermias, who, although an independent prince, was sent as a prisoner to Artaxerxes in Persia and there was crucified. Aristotle erected a statue in Delphi honoring him and bearing a still-extant inscription, one that has come down to us and from which we learn that it was by a trick that Hermias fell under Persian dominion. Aristotle also honored him by a beautiful hymn to virtue. Aristotle married the daughter of Hermias, but he fled to Mytilene in order not to become caught up in the fate of Hermias.[152] Here he received the invitation from Philip of Macedon, in the well-known letter that asked him to undertake the education of Alexander, who was then 15 years old. In this letter Philip says: 'I have a son, but I am less grateful to the gods that they have given him to me than I am grateful that they caused him to be born in your lifetime.' He set his hopes on Aristotle, who was to educate Alexander to be worthy of his father and of his kingdom. At the court Aristotle enjoyed the affection of [the queen,] Olympia.[153] It appears a splendid historical destiny to have been

150. The source for this sentence is Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 5.9; Hicks, i. 452–3); cf. Buhle's Aristotle edition, p. 44 (*Aristotelis vita*).

151. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 5.2; Hicks, i. 444–5) says Aristotle left the Academy while Plato was still alive, and mistakenly says that Plato's successor was Xenocrates (actually it was Speusippus, Plato's nephew); see *Lives* 4.1 (which gets it right), and other dubious anecdotes about this matter in 4.3 and 4.10 (Hicks, i. 374–7, 384–5); cf. *W.* xiv. 301, which refers to 'a host of useless and self-contradictory anecdotes'.

152. *W.* xiv. 301, following Tiedemann (*Geist*, ii. 215) attributes Aristotle's departure from Athens to his displeasure at being passed over for leadership of the Academy. (The departure may also have been owing to the victory of Demosthenes and the anti-Macedonian party at the time of Plato's death.) In contrast, our text, following Tiedemann (*Geist*, ii. 215) or Brucker (*Historia*, i. 782), refers in this context only to Aristotle's fellow-student days with Hermias. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 5.9; Hicks, i. 452–5) is the source for the three years' duration at Atarneus. Brucker (*Historia*, i. 782–3) is the source for Hermias' fate, for Aristotle's marriage to Hermias' (actually) sister or niece, and for his flight to Mytilene.

153. This apocryphal letter is in Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 9.3.4–6; see *The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius*, trans. John C. Rolfe, 3 vols., rev. edn. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge,

Alexander's tutor, for everybody knows what became of his pupil. Alexander's spirit and deeds furnish the highest testimonial for Aristotle—should he need one—with regard to the business of education. Aristotle had a more worthy pupil in Alexander than Plato had in Dionysius. Here we have a refutation of the idle chatter about the practical uselessness of philosophy.

From the outward circumstances we see that Aristotle worked with Alexander in a fundamental way and not in the customary manner of instructing princes; and we must not suppose that Aristotle himself was
62 capable of that sort of superficiality. When, | in the midst of his conquests deep in Africa, Alexander heard that Aristotle had published writings with a speculative content, he wrote him a reproachful letter, saying that what the two of them had worked on together ought not to be published for the common folk. Aristotle replied that its publication did not change anything with regard to its being known.[154] What in Alexander's personal development can be attributed to Aristotle and to philosophy is that Alexander's natural [endowment], the characteristic greatness of his natural capacities, was raised to the height of perfect freedom and completely self-conscious independence. We see this expressed in Alexander's deeds and purposes.

For Aristotle the specific effect of Alexander's campaigns in Asia was to enable him to become the father of natural history, about which he is said to have written a work consisting of fifty parts. Just as commanders in modern times have given thought to the arts and sciences, so Alexander arranged for plants and animals to be sent to Aristotle from all locations during the campaigns. Several thousand people are said to have been so occupied, assigned to hunting, fishing, and the capture of birds.[155]

---

Mass., and London, 1946–52), ii. 160–1. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 5.10; Hicks i. 452–3) gives Alexander's age as 15. The report about enjoying the queen's affection is in *W.* xiv. 302 in fuller form; its source is Ammonias, *Aristotelis vita* in Buhle's Aristotle edition (i. 48).

154. See Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 20.5.1–12 (Rolfe, iii. 430–5), which mentions the twofold method of Aristotle's instruction (exoteric and esoteric) and illustrates the point with the (apocryphal) letter, taken from Andronicus, and Aristotle's reply. Cf. *W.* xiv. 303 (MS?). Hegel probably said (erroneously) 'Africa' instead of 'Asia'.

155. See Tennemann (*Geschichte*, iii. 23) on Aristotle's natural-history studies during Alexander's campaigns. Modern commanders Hegel may have in mind include Prince Eugene of Savoy, Frederick II, and Napoleon. The ancient source here is Pliny, *Historia naturalis* 8.17.44; see *Natural History*, vol. iii, trans. H. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1940), 34–5. See also Buhle's Aristotle edition (i. 96). Cf. *W.* xiv. 306 (MS?). Today Pliny's report about the role of Alexander's campaign in this enterprise is regarded as legend. In Aristotle's works the fauna of Asia play only a small part. In his *History of Animals* Aristotle mentions Ctesias, the physician of Artaxerxes, who wrote a report on India that was well known to the Greeks before the time of Alexander's military campaigns (see 523a.26; Barnes, i. 830). Aristotle wrote his *History of Animals* before his other works on biology; today its composition

When Alexander began his march to Asia, Aristotle returned to Athens and taught there in a public place called the Lyceum, a site Pericles had built as a place for exercising recruits. There stood a temple to the Lycian Apollo, as well as tree-shaded walks. From these walkways or περίπατοι—and not from Aristotle's habit of strolling about—the Aristotelian philosophy came to be called the 'Peripatetic' school.[156]

He lived in Athens, teaching in this way for thirteen years. But after Alexander's death a storm came down upon Aristotle; it had been brewing beforehand, but had been kept in check owing to fear of Alexander. | Aristotle 63
was accused of ungodliness, and various points are alleged to be the more specific basis of this accusation; for instance, his hymn to Hermias and the inscription on the statue of Hermias were brought against him. When he saw the storm approaching Aristotle fled to Chalcis in Euboea, on what we now call the Negropont, saying that he was leaving in order to give the Athenians no opportunity for sinning against philosophy once again. A year later (322 BC) he died, in the sixty-third year of his life.[157]

I cannot go into detail about his writings. Diogenes Laertius lists a large number of titles, but we cannot know exactly which titles refer to the works that are still extant. He gives the number of lines as 44 myriads, 5,270. If a myriad is comparable to our [printer's] alphabet, then his works consisted of 44 alphabets; what we now have of his works runs to about 10 or 11

is dated in the time of his travels with Theophrastus (owing especially to the place names in it) and prior to the founding of the Lyceum—thus in the period from 347 on, when Alexander was still a child and Aristotle not yet his tutor. Not even in Aristotle's later treatises do we find references to Alexander's campaigns or to observations made by scholars participating in these expeditions.

156. Various elements in this paragraph are taken from Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.2, 4, 10 (Hicks, i. 444–9, 452–3). Diogenes has Aristotle returning to Athens in 335 BC, which is when Alexander marched first to the Danube and then, in the next year, to Asia. See Buhle's Aristotle edition (i. 100) on the origin of the name 'Lyceum'. The rejected explanation of 'Peripatetic' as meaning 'strolling' comes from Cicero, *Academicae quaestiones* 1.4.17; see *De Natura Deorum and Academica*, trans. H. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London), 426–7; cf. Diogenes, 5.2. Hegel (as does Tennemann, *Geschichte*, iii. 21) follows the comment of Aegidius Menagius on Diogenes' text, namely, that the term refers 'to the place no less than to the action'. See also Brucker, *Historia*, i. 78–9; cf. *W.* xiv. 307.

157. Pn. says he died in his sixty-fourth year, Lw. in his sixtieth; our text follows An. and Gr. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.5–6 (Hicks, i. 448–9) for these charges against Aristotle. Diogenes does not say that Aristotle had the statue erected but only that he authored the inscription on it, the text of which Diogenes gives; nor does he make a connection between Alexander's death and the accusation against Aristotle. Brucker (*Historia*, i. 789–90) does make this connection and gives a further reason for the accusation, namely, that Peripatetic natural philosophy undercuts the rationale for, and utility of, prayer and sacrifice; he also recounts this anecdote about 'sinning against philosophy'. Diogenes 5.10 (Hicks, i. 452–3) is the source for this date for Aristotle's death.

alphabets, therefore about a quarter of the whole.[158] A reader of the story of the fate of Aristotle's manuscripts could hardly entertain any hope of something being preserved for us, and doubts must arise about the authenticity of what we do have. His successor, Theophrastus, was reputed to have had a considerable library; they [the manuscripts] were taken from it to Alexandria and were burnt when Caesar was in that city.[159] Another manuscript is supposed to have lain in a moldy state in an Athenian cellar and to have become part of the booty Sulla took back to Rome; much of it may well have been altered and damaged by the mold and by the next owners.[160] Nonetheless, what we do have puts us in a sufficient position to draw up in broad outline a definite picture of the Aristotelian
64 philosophy. |

158. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.22–8 (Hicks, i. 464–75) for an enumeration of 146 titles, taken from Hermippus' life of Aristotle. He concludes the list with the comment, 'In all, 445,270 lines'. Hegel's explanation refers to the custom of designating printed sheets by letters of the alphabet. An 'alphabet' consists of 23 sheets (a few letters such as 'j' drop out of the tally), with 16 pages to an uncut sheet. If each page contains 27 lines, then an 'alphabet' consists of approximately a myriad, or 10,000, lines ($23 \times 16 \times 27 = 9936$). Hegel's reckoning of the extent of the lost writings is fairly accurate; see Ingemar Düring, *Aristotles: Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens* (Heidelberg, 1966), 25 n. 149. About a fifth of those titles on the list are both extant today and genuine; in Hegel's day a few pseudo-Aristotelian works were thought to be genuine.

159. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 5.42–50; Hicks, i. 488–503) catalogues the works attributed to Theophrastus (225 writings, some with the same titles as Aristotle's works) but says nothing about their fate. Eudemos brought some of the Aristotelian writings to Rhodes. As a perpetuator of the school, Theophrastus took over the greater part of Aristotle's library and later bequeathed it to Neleus (Diogenes 5.52; Hicks, i. 504–5), who in turn probably conveyed the preponderance of it to the library at Alexandria, while keeping some of it for himself and bringing those works to his home city of Skepsis; see the following note. Caesar wanted the library brought from Alexandria to Rome and had it packed up; but in a time of political unrest it perished in a fire; see Brucker (*Historia*, i. 799–800). Dio Cassius tells of the fire (*Historia Romanae* 42.38.2); see *Dio's Roman History*, vol. iv, trans. Earnest Cary (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1916), 174–5. So does Aulus Gellius (*Attic Nights* 7.17.3; Rolfe, ii. 138–9). Seneca's account, in *De tranquillitatae* 9.5, disparages the library as 'learned luxury' and 'a show'; see *Moral Essays*, vol. ii, trans. John W. Basore (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1932), 246–9. Cf. *W.* xiv. 309.

160. Brucker (*Historia*, i. 800) tells about the fate of this part of the collection (not just of a single manuscript) that Neleus had taken to Skepsis; cf. the report of Strabo 13.1.54, cited in the lives of Aristotle presented in Isaac Casaubon's edition of Aristotle (Lyons, 1590); see *The Geography of Strabo*, trans. Horace Leonard Jones, vol. vi (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1929), 108–11. Cf. *W.* xiv. 308–9. At the beginning of the first century BC, Apellikon bought this part of the library and brought it to Athens. Upon seizing Athens in 86 BC, Sulla took the collection to Rome as booty, where it was, however, carefully preserved and made accessible; cf. Plutarch, *Life of Sulla* 26; see *Plutarch's Lives*, trans. Bernadotte Perrin, vol. iv (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1916), 406–7.

*b. Diverse Views of his Thought*

The first thing to note concerning his philosophy is that what has been called 'Aristotelian philosophy' has had different configurations—quite different ones at different times. Even today we know Aristotle more from tradition than from the study of his writings; this holds good especially for his aesthetics. For instance, the French in particular cite 'the unity of time, place and action' in tragedy [as being] from Aristotle. [But] Aristotle [himself] mentions the unity of time only in passing, and the unity of place not at all, though he does indeed speak of the unity of action.[161]

In Cicero's era the Peripatetic philosophy was more a form of popular philosophy related mainly to morals. It seems not to have involved the properly speculative philosophy of Aristotle. We find in Cicero no concept of the speculative aspect of the Aristotelian philosophy. Another form [of Peripatetic tradition] is the Alexandrian philosophy; this is also called Neoplatonic philosophy, but it could just as well be called Neoaristotelian. Then there is Scholastic philosophy, which is also called Aristotelian philosophy. The Scholastics surely did busy themselves very much with Aristotle, but the shape that the philosophy of Aristotle assumed in them is not at all the authentic shape of it; all their elaborations and wide-ranging metaphysics of the understanding and formal logic have nothing Aristotelian about them at

161. See Corneille, *Trois discours sur le poème dramatique*, the third part of which is 'Discours des trois unités, d'action, de jour, et de lieu' (1660); see Pierre Corneille, *Œuvres complètes*, vol. iii, ed. Georges Couton (Paris, 1987), 174–90. Corneille mentions this doctrine, but with more reservation than does the tradition associated with his name (see pp. 176–7, 183, 187). Jean Racine held the view that the tragic catharsis (the sole aim of tragedy, according to Aristotle) is necessarily a product of the application of these rules. Racine's works were in Hegel's library. But this rule of 'threefold unity' derives not from Aristotle himself but, via Italian and French commentators, from Horace, *Epistola ad Pisones*, which is considered to be his *Ars poetica*. Julius Caesar Scaliger seems to have introduced the rule of threefold unity into France through his *Poetica libri* (Vincennes, 1561)—which in turn had been influenced by the *Ars poetica* of Marcus Hieronymus Vida (1517), a work that itself was translated into French in the eighteenth century. Its final French formulation occurred in the *Bref discours sur la thêatre* (1562) of Jacques Grévin, as well as in several other authors of poetics and criticism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Alongside this French tradition, Corneille also directly received Italian commentaries, such as the *Poetica d'Aristotele vulgarizzata, et sposta* by L. Castelvetro (Vienna, 1570). An important link in the eighteenth century is the translation with notes by André Dacier, *La Poétique d'Aristote* ... (Paris, 1692). This whole tradition transformed what in Aristotle was a recommendation into a rigid rule. Hegel's criticism of this threefold rule (see also *W.* xiv. 299) is in the tradition of Lessing; see *Stück* 46 (6 October 1776) of his *Hamburgische Dramaturgie*, in *Gotthold Ephraim Lessing: Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. Karl Lachmann, 3rd edn. prepared by Franz Muncker, 31 vols. (Stuttgart, 1886–1924; repr. Berlin, 1968), ix. 377–8. For Aristotle's own remarks on the unity of action and of time, see his *Poetics*, books 5–8, but especially 1449b.12–14, 24–5, 1450a.15–19, 1451a.30–5 (Barnes, ii. 2320, 2322).

all.[162] The older Scholastic philosophy derives simply from traditional reports about Aristotle's doctrines; only when the writings of Aristotle had become known in the West did an Aristotelian philosophy take shape, one that was in part opposed to Scholastic philosophy. The great Tennemann is
65 endowed with too little philosophical sense to | be able to comprehend Aristotelian philosophy. His translation has the Greek text beneath it and wholly contradicts it—often twisting it into the opposite [of the true sense].[163]

The general image that most people have of the Aristotelian philosophy is that it rests on empiricism, and that Aristotle has made what we call experience into the principle of knowing and cognition as such. This viewpoint is, on the one hand, quite false; nevertheless, what gives rise to it is to be found in the Aristotelian mode of philosophizing. A few particular passages, which have been singled out in this regard and are almost the only ones that people have understood, get employed to substantiate this view; we shall come to them in due course.

First we have to speak about the character of Aristotle's way of philosophizing. Aristotle appears as a thoughtful observer of the world who attends to all aspects of the universe—one of the most richly endowed geniuses there ever has been. Every aspect of knowledge gained access to his mind; everything interested him, and he dealt with it all in depth and exhaustively. Aristotle's principal procedure is to survey an object under study and consider what sort of characteristics are to be found in it. He says, for example, that being (οὐσία) or the category of 'co-origination' [*das Zugleich*] consists of such and such determinations, [that the term] has this sense and that one. It is somewhat tedious to go through descriptive lists of this sort. After giving this series of determinations, he proceeds to consider them at the level of thought, and, in this defining of the object from these different aspects, so

162. See n. 147 just above, as well as Vol. III of this edition on Thomas Aquinas, on the ban on Aristotelian texts, and on Albert the Great. In *W.* xv. 180, Hegel contrasts the increase in dialectical hairsplitting on the part of the Scholastics by the use of Aristotelian logic, with 'the properly speculative element in Aristotle' that the Scholastics had forgotten. By the 'properly Aristelian philosophy' Hegel understands Averroism and Pomponazzi (see Vol. III). In another context (*W.* xv. 215) Hegel finds some of the Reformation partisans to be in fact Aristotelians who are supposedly against Aristotle but are in truth contending against the Scholastics.

163. There is no instance of this sort in which Tennemann 'twists' the sense of Aristotle's Greek text in his translation. Hegel could have in mind Tennemann's interpretation (*Geschichte*, iii. 50–1 with n. 21) of *Metaphysics* 1086b.5–13 (Barnes, ii. 1717), which employs Aristotle's criticism (taken to be an empiricism) of Plato's theory of Ideas, whereas Aristotle is in fact only objecting (in Hegel's 'speculative sense') to Plato's severing of the universal from the singular instance—which makes philosophical science impossible and also leads to a doubling of universal and singular being (or substance).

that the concept results from it, so that the simple, speculative concept or ὅρος is made to stand out—this is where Aristotle becomes properly philosophical and at the same time highly speculative.[164] He admittedly lacks Plato's beautiful form, his charming method of portrayal, and his conversational tone, but we do right away get to know the object in its definition and | its determinate concept. Aristotle is great and magisterial precisely in 66
this bringing-together of the determinations of the concept, as he is in the simplicity of his procedure and in his concisely expressed judgments.

This is a highly effective method of philosophizing, one that is frequently employed in our day too, especially by the French; it deserves to come into wider use.[165] It is perhaps the best method of philosophizing, that of bringing into thought the determinations from the ordinary representation of an object and then combining them in unity, in the concept. This procedure does, however, have an empirical aspect, namely, that involved in the apprehension of objects the way they are in representation, and to this extent there is no necessity in the method. But the latter is the essential thing, this necessity in the passage from one characteristic to another. It is inherent in the progress of philosophy.

Aristotle handles the whole in the same way as he does the single cases. Thus he treats the whole universe, the spiritual and sensible world, but he presents this aggregate only as a series of objects. Designing [of arguments], demonstration, deduction had not yet emerged in the conception of philosophy at that time. There is an empirical aspect in the consideration of objects sequentially, but this belongs more to the outward style. The end toward which Aristotle progresses is speculative in the highest degree.

The second point is the determination of his idea. In general we can say that Aristotle declares the most essential knowing to be the cognition of purpose. But the good of each thing is its purpose.[166] | So in the second chapter of the 67
first book of his *Metaphysics* he has this to say about the value of philosophy: 'People began to philosophize in order to escape from ignorance. From this it follows that knowing was pursued for the sake of knowledge and not only for

164. On the concept of 'being' or 'substance', see Aristotle, *Categories* 2a.11–4b.19, especially the opening sentences (Barnes, i. 4–8). 'Co-origination' (ἅμα—'together with') belongs in the strict sense not to the categories but to the 'postpredicamenta'; see 14b.24–9 (Barnes, i. 8). In saying that Aristotle passed over from these enumerations to the speculative concept, Hegel seems to have in view primarily the *Metaphysics*; see 1028b.33–6, 1030a.6–11 (Barnes, ii. 1624, 1626).

165. As in Vol. III of this edition, Hegel here is thinking of Destutt de Tracy, *Eléments d'idéologie*.

166. See *Metaphysics* 982b.4–7 (Barnes, ii. 1554); cf. *Physics* 200a.30–5 (Barnes, i. 342) and *W.* xiv. 315–16 (MS?).

the sake of utility, not for the sake of any other application. One moves on to knowledge of this sort only after being done with external necessities. Just as free human beings exist for their own sakes and not for the sake of another, so, too, philosophy is the only one among the sciences that is free; it exists for its own sake. Hence we rightly look upon it not as a human possession, for human nature is in many ways dependent, δούλη, whereas philosophy is free.'[167] Aristotle says further: 'Simonides attributes this prize to God alone, but it is unworthy of human beings to fail to seek this knowledge that is suited to them. Although the poets say that it is the nature of the divine to be envious, so that it is not granted to human beings that they should attain knowledge, the poets tell many lies, and it is unworthy for human beings not to want to seek the highest thing for which they are suited.'[168]

I will speak first about his metaphysics, about its characteristics, and then I will indicate the basic concept of nature as it takes shape for Aristotle; thirdly, I will mention a few things about spirit, about the soul, and finally I
68 will speak in particular about his logical concept. |

*c. Metaphysics*

The Aristotelian philosophy distinguishes itself from the Platonic philosophy with respect to its principle. Plato of course defines the Idea as the Good, as end, as what is altogether universal. But Aristotle goes beyond this. We have spoken of how for Plato the Idea, within itself, is essentially concrete, is inwardly determinate.[169] Now, inasmuch as the Idea is determinate within itself, the relationship of the moments within it has to be grasped and highlighted with greater precision; the mutual relation of these moments has to be grasped as activity in general. What is lacking in the Idea, in the universal, in thought, in the concept, in what is only implicit, lies in our representations. In the very fact of its universality the universal has as yet no actuality; the activity of actualization is not yet posited. What has merely implicit being is inert, so that reason and law are what is abstract. But the rational must also be determined as what is active.

The Platonic Idea is in general what is objective; but the principle of vitality [*Lebendigkeit*] or the principle of subjectivity is not yet emphasized. This principle of vitality or of subjectivity—in the sense not of a contingent or only particular subjectivity but that of pure subjectivity—is characteristic of Aristotle. For Aristotle too the Good, the τοῦ ἕνεκα, the end and the

167. Hegel rather closely paraphrases *Metaphysics* 982b.19–30 (Barnes, ii. 1554–5).

168. This is a paraphrase of the first part of *Metaphysics* 982b.30–983a.11 (Barnes, ii. 1555). On the topic of God's freedom from envy, see p. 208 above, with n. 97. Cf. *W.* xiv. 316–17 (MS?).

169. See pp. 196 and 208–9 above.

universal, is the foundation or what is substantial (οὐσία), and Aristotle gives great weight to this universal or end; he holds fast to it in opposition particularly to Heraclitus and to the Eleatics. The 'becoming' of Heraclitus is of course an important and essential | characterization; but change still 69
lacks the attribute of identity with self, of constancy and universality. For instance, a stream is ever-changing but it is also ever the same, and even more so it is an image [of life], a universal existence.[170]

So Aristotle inquires into the agent of motion [*das Bewegende*], and this is the logos or the purpose. Hence, just as he holds fast to the universal over against the principle of sheer change, so he gives weight to activity, contrary to Pythagoras and Plato and to the Pythagorean numbers.[171] 'Activity' is change too, but what was [called] 'change' previously Aristotle posits as self-preservation within identity with self, or as what is active within the universal—as self-identical change. 'Activity' is a determining that is a self-determining in keeping with the distinctions in what acts. Sheer alteration, on the contrary, does not yet involve self-preservation in the change. What is universal is active and self-determining, and purpose is self-determination, self-realization. These are the main determinations on which the issue turns for Aristotle.

To be more specific, there are two principal forms, namely, that of potency (δύναμις) and, secondly, that of actuality or, more precisely, energy (ἐνέργεια), and more definitely still, entelechy.[172] These are characteristics that crop up everywhere in Aristotle, and we must be familiar with them in

170. For Aristotle's criticism of the Eleatics and Heraclitus, see *On the Heavens* 301b.17–18 (Barnes, i. 494), which says that a cause of movement or becoming is in the nature (φύσις) of the thing itself. Although natural being (φυσικὴ οὐσία) includes matter within it, *Physics* 194a.28–9 (Barnes, i. 331) says that the nature of the thing is its end, 'that for the sake of which'. For this reason Aristotle opposes the Eleatics, because they do away with arising and perishing and thus with nature as such; and he opposes Heraclitus for one-sidedly granting validity to arising and perishing. On the Eleatics, see *On the Heavens* 298b.14–17 (Barnes, i. 490). On Heraclitus, see p. 73 above. On Aristotle's criticism of the ancient philosophers and of Heraclitus in particular, for omitting from becoming the principle of the good and of purpose, see p. 74 above, with n. 197, and p. 86. Cf. *W.* xiii. 347, according to which Hegel approves of Heraclitus for having grasped the universal as a process that reverts into itself. On the stream as image of life, see p. 68 above, with n. 170. From the perspective of Aristotle's criticism, the saying that 'one cannot step into the same stream twice' is plausible only in the absence of a principle of purpose.

171. On holding fast to the universal, see the preceding note. On the intellectual affinity of Plato with the Pythagoreans, see *Metaphysics* 987b.9–14 (Barnes, ii. 1561). Aristotle calls 'imitation' or 'participation', as terminology for expounding Pythagorean number theory or Plato's theory of Ideas, just 'empty words' (κενολογεῖν) that do not explain the operative principle; see 991a.19–22, 1079b.24–6 (Barnes, ii. 1565, 1707). On activity as self-determining, see the following note.

172. On the relationship between potency and energy, see *Metaphysics* 1045b.32–5, 1047a.24–b.1 (Barnes, ii. 1653–4). On the difference between energy and entelechy, see 1050a.21–3 (Barnes, ii. 1658).

order to grasp his meaning. Specifically, potency (δύναμις) is not 'force' but rather what we can perhaps call 'capacity' or 'potentiality'. The Scholastics translated it as *potentia*. It is not an indeterminate possibility but is for Aristotle what is objective, what is implicit. The implicit is the idea, which is also just *potentia*; for only energy (ἐνέργεια) or form is what is active or that which actualizes. In saying 'essence' [*Wesen*], we have not yet posited activity. 'Essence' is only implicit, is only potency or δύναμις, that which is
70 objective without subjectivity, | without infinite form. 'Energy' is infinite form in its truth, thought of as active.

Whereas in Plato the affirmative principle or the Idea, which is only abstractly identical with itself, is what is paramount,[173] Aristotle adds, and stresses, the moment of negativity, though not as change and also not as 'nothing' but instead as what differentiates, what determines. Substance or οὐσία is one of Aristotle's main concepts; substance is 'what is' and then matter or ὕλη—more precisely, the relationship of form to matter, of potency to actuality, to energy or entelechy—provides the different modes of substances.[174] In Aristotle these substances are examined sequentially as they appear, rather than being brought together into a system.

So, according to this form [of thinking], a finite substance, a sensible or perceptible [*empfindbar*] substance, is the sort of thing that has a ὕλη, a matter for which the [actualizing] form is something external and from which it is something distinct; this constitutes the nature of the finite as such—separation of the form, of what is external, from the matter. Its form is also the effective element. In the case of a statue we distinguish matter from form. Here the 'form' is the active element, but it is outwardly distinct from the matter of the statue itself.[175] Aristotle says that sensible substance has change in it, but in such a way that the substance passes into its opposite. One color emerges, another vanishes. The enduring element in change is the matter, the subject, the foundation or ὑποκείμενον in which the change or the form is operative.[176]

173. Hegel's previous discussion of Plato (p. 196 with n. 59) had not yet formulated the criticism expressed here, about the abstractness and self-identical nature of the Platonic Ideas.

174. On substance as 'what is', see *Metaphysics* 1003b.16–19, 1028a.10–15, 1069a.18–24 (Barnes, ii. 1585, 1623, 1688–9). On matter, see 1042a.24–34 (Barnes, ii. 1645). On the enumeration of individual substances, see 1070a.9–13 (Barnes, ii. 1690). On energy and entelechy, see n. 172 just above.

175. On the (three) kinds of substance, see *Metaphysics* 1069a.30–b.2 (Barnes, ii. 1689). Hegel does not mention the first kind, the eternal, sensibly perceptible kind, namely, the heavens and the heavenly bodies. On the separation of form from matter, see 1069b.32–1070a.2 (Barnes, ii. 1690). On the statue, see 1033a.5–7 (Barnes, ii. 1631).

176. Matter as foundation is discussed in *Metaphysics* 1069b.3–9 (Barnes, ii. 1689). See also n. 174 just above.

The main categories named by Aristotle are the following distinctions. | 71
The first concerns the 'what' (τὸ εἶδος, κατὰ τὸ τί εἶναι)—the end, or simple determinacy: human being equals living rationality. The second categorial determination is quality (τὸ ποῖον); this pertains to the different properties. The third is quantity (τὸ πόσον) and the fourth the 'where?' (ποῦ). These [last two] are the categories of increase and decrease, of coming to be and passing away, of change of place, and here matter is the substrate of these changes; the subject or the matter suffers changes. In the case of sensible substance, matter is the subject of change. Activity or energy, ἐνέργεια—the *actus*—insofar as it contains what ought to come to be, is understanding or νοῦς. In the case of sensible substance there is only alteration, the passing-over into the opposite. So, insofar as the activity contains what ought to come to be, it is understanding or νοῦς, and the content is the end, and the end is this—the coming to be posited or actualized through the activity, through the energy.[177]

This energy or ἐνέργεια also presents itself as entelechy, ἐντελέχεια, which is energy as determined more precisely, but insofar as it is free activity and has the purpose within itself, posits it for itself and is active in so doing—determining as determination of the goal, realizing of the purpose. The soul is essentially entelechy, logos, universal determining, moving itself and giving rise to what posits the purpose.[178] The absolute substance, what truly has being in and for itself, is accordingly what is unmoved, immovable, and eternal, but is at the same time pure activity, *actus purus*. The Scholastics rightly regarded this as the definition of God, namely, that God is the *actus purus*. God is pure activity; God is what is in and for itself. This can also be expressed in another way: | God is the substance that in its potency also has 72
actuality, whose being (δύναμις, *potentia*) is activity itself—where the two are not separate.[179] So in this instance potency is not distinct from form, for it is what itself produces its content, what itself posits its own inner character.

177. Aristotle enumerates these principal categories in *Metaphysics* 1069b.9–18 (Barnes, ii. 1689). Here Hegel identifies the 'what' with form (εἶδος) and relation (τὸ τί εἶναι). See also 1028a.10–15, 30–1, 1030a.17–20, 1033b.16–19, as well as *Posterior Analytics* 92a.6–9 (Barnes, ii. 1623, 1626, 1632, i. 151). Cf. *W.* xiv. 323–4 (MS?). Hegel's statements about activity in this paragraph are summary in nature, not references to specific passages, as is confirmed by the fuller version in *W.* xiv. 324–5 (MS?). See also n. 175 just above.

178. On energy as entelechy, see *Metaphysics* 1050a.21–b.3 (Barnes, ii. 1658–9). On the soul's purposive activity, see *On the Soul* 415b.7–21 (Barnes, i. 662). Cf. *W.* xiv. 373 (MS?).

179. On the absolute substance, see *Metaphysics* 1069a.30–3, as well as 1071b.3–5, 1072a.21–6, 1072b.7–11 (Barnes, ii. 1689, 1692–4); the last of these passages sums up the attributes of the absolute substance or first mover, which Hegel calls, on the one hand, in Spinozistic fashion, 'absolute substance', and, on the other hand, in Scholastic fashion, *actus purus*. See also *Physics* 256a.13–21 (Barnes, i. 428) and also, from the Scholastics, Thomas Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, ch. 5—a text Hegel probably knew from Tiedemann (*Geist*, iv.

This substance is devoid of ὕλη,[180] which is precisely what is passive or is the locus of change and is not immediately one with pure activity. In this regard Aristotle remarks: 'For this reason we are not to say, as the theologians do, that first of all there was chaos, Kronos or night. That is false, for activity, energy, or entelechy is instead what is prior, τὸ πρότερον, although it is not to be thought of as temporally prior to potency, for primary being is what remains ever self-identical, in self-same efficacy.'[181] In the case of chaos we posit an efficacy directed not at itself but at something other. We should posit as genuine οὐσία what moves itself within itself, what moves in a circle. We see this not only in reason but also through the deed, ἔργῳ.[182] The visible, absolute being is the eternal heaven. As heaven it appears in motion, but it is also the mover, as a circle described by reason reverting unto itself. The unmoved is itself the [primary] being, and this is energy; the unmoved is what imparts movement; this is an important definition. The idea, that which is self-identical, imparts movement and stays in relation to itself. The heavens and nature depend totally on this principle of the unmoved that imparts movement to all; the system persists eternally and remains this way, and the individual is allotted a brief sojourn in it.[183]

The principal moment in the Aristotelian metaphysics is the fact
73 that | thinking and what is thought are one—that the objective element and thinking, the energy and what is moved [by it], are one and the same. Aristotle has this to say about thinking: that possessing it *is* activity, that it is active inasmuch as it has [energy], ἐνεργεῖ ἔχων.[184] He distinguishes between two kinds of νοῦς, active νοῦς and the passive or 'suffering' kind, παθητικός. As passive, νοῦς is none other than implicit being, the absolute idea as considered in itself, the Father; however, it is posited only as active.[185] This first, unmoved element, as distinct from activity, or as passive, is

490–1); see *Concerning Being and Essence*, trans. George G. Leckie (New York and London, 1937), 28–32. Cf. *W.* xv. 183. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I/1, q. 3, art. 2, and q. 9, art. 1; see vol. ii of the Blackfriars edition, trans. Timothy McDermott OP (London, 1963), 24–7, 126–9. On the substance whose essence is actuality, see *Metaphysics* 1071b.17–20 (Barnes, ii. 1693).

180. See *Metaphysics* 1071b.20–2 (Barnes, ii. 1693); cf. *W.* xiv. 326–7 (MS?).

181. Hegel's paraphrase is from *Metaphysics* 1071b.26–9 (Barnes, ii. 1693), followed by 1049b.4–5, 10–13 (Barnes, ii. 1657); cf. *W.* xiv. 327–8 (MS?).

182. These next sentences approximate to *Metaphysics* 1072a.19–22 (Barnes, ii. 1694). The last one (*W.* xiv. 328 has 'thinking reason') shifts the meaning of Aristotle's text inasmuch as it sets the circular motion of the heavens into an analogy with the movement of reason.

183. See *Metaphysics* 1072b.13–16 (Barnes, ii. 1695); cf. *W.* xiv. 330 (MS?).

184. See *Metaphysics* 1072b.18–23 (Barnes, ii. 1695). Cf. *W.* xiv. 330 (MS?).

185. See *On the Soul* 430a.10–15 (Barnes, i. 684) on these two kinds of νοῦς; see also n. 229, p. 253 below. On this reference to 'the Father', see *Philosophy of Religion* (iii. 283–5, 361–4), where Hegel treats the religious dogma of the Trinity as the idea of God set forth in

nevertheless, as absolute, itself activity too. For νοῦς is active too and not merely 'suffering'. For this reason νοῦς is everything implicitly, but it is actuality only through activity.

The rest of his metaphysics investigates these principles in more detail—the nature of 'idea', 'principle', and so forth, or the ἀρχή, αἰτία, and the like.[186] All this appears in loose succession, although it is then unified into a thoroughly speculative concept as he goes through the individual details.

### *d. Physics and Philosophy of Nature*

Aristotle's physics is contained in a whole series of works, which amount to a complete ordering of the constituent parts of the philosophy of nature.[187] The first work, his eight books on *Physics*, contains the doctrines of motion and of space and time; in it he first of all covers the topics that are wholly general in nature.[188] There follow, in the second place, the books *On the Heavens*, [dealing with] the nature of bodies generally and the primary real bodies, the earth and the heavenly bodies, and then the relation of bodies to one another or the topic of weight and lightness. He proceeds then to consider the elements.[189] In the third place come the books *On Generation and Corruption*, about the physical process, after which he takes up the various moments that play a part in it—such as heat and

representational form. 'The Kingdom of the Father' signifies that, 'As spirit, God is the activity of free knowing present to itself; as an activity this must posit itself in [different] moments ...' (p. 363). The Father's eternal begetting of the Son remains within this first sphere. 'The Kingdom of the Son' advances beyond this sphere to the Son's being posited as actual other-being to the Father, so that God can be active self-relation. 'Spirit relates itself to the other; this means that it is no longer absolute but finite spirit that is posited ...' (p. 365).

186. This is a summary reference to *Metaphysics* passages in books 13–14, on the theory of ideas (1078b.6–1080a.10; Barnes, i. 1705–7), the nature of the principles (1086b.14–1090a.15; Barnes, ii. 1717–22), and causation (1092a.9–b.25; Barnes, ii. 1725–7).

187. In *W.* xiv. 337–9 we find an overview of the writings on natural philosophy comparable to the one that follows in our text, but without the sevenfold classification found here. See *Meteorology* 338a.20–6, 339a.5–9 (Barnes, i. 555) for Aristotle's enumeration of the first four writings, and mention of the works on animals and plants.

188. Hegel's emphasis on the doctrine of motion could echo the title justifiably given to this work in the index to Casaubon's edition of Aristotle: Φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως, ἢ περὶ κινήσεως ('Lectures on Physics, or, Concerning Motion'). The doctrine of space and time is in the fourth book. In *W.* xiv. 337 (MS?) Hegel gives the title as: φυσικῇ ἀκρόασις, or, 'On the Principles' (περὶ ἀρχῶν), which is how it reads in the text of Casaubon (i. 196) and in Erasmus' edition (i. 158–94).

189. These topics occur in the books of *On the Heavens* as follows: the nature of bodies generally (I. 1); the primary real bodies (I. 2); the earth (II. 13–14); the heavenly bodies (II. 1–12); weight and lightness (III. 2 and IV. 1–6); consideration of the elements (III. 3 is probably meant). See Barnes i. 447–9, 470–89, 492–5, 502–11.

cold.[190] In the fourth place he next offers a *Meteorology* and deals with
74 the | physical process in its most particular forms—rain, ripening, wind, rainbows, hail, snow, boiling, cooking, roasting, and so forth.[191] Nothing is left out. Here the presentation becomes more empirical. He then passes over to organic nature and hence—in the fifth place—to the *Progression of Animals*. In the sixth place he provides the *History of Animals*, a *Parts of Animals* or an anatomy, and he discusses the birth and coming to be of animals [*Generation of Animals*]—a physiology.[192] Then he comes to the distinction between youth and old age [*On Youth, Old Age, Life and Death, and Respiration*], to sleep and waking [*On Sleep*], and addresses the topics: *On Breath*; *On Dreams*; *On Length and Shortness of Life*, and so forth.[193] There is also, in the seventh place, a treatise concerning the physiology of plants [*On Plants*] that is attributed to him.[194] So the philosophy of nature is treated in the whole compass of its outward content.

I will mention at least the principal concept from his physics. We have to say that in Aristotle the concept of nature is portrayed in the most authentic way, a way that has only recently been recalled anew by Kant—admittedly in the subjective form that constitutes the essence of the Kantian philosophy, but the concept is nevertheless authentically established in it.[195] For Aris-

190. The physical process indicates the three changes a thing can undergo: coming-to-be (γένεσις) and perishing (φθορά), alteration (ἀλλοίωσις), and growth and decrease (αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις). See *On Generation and Corruption* 317a.25–7, 321a.26–9; Barnes, i. 518, 525. Hegel's 'various moments' refers to Aristotle's view that change in the pairs of elementary qualities is what constitutes each of the 'four elements', the possibilities being heat or cold, and dry or moist, with the elements as follows: earth (cold and dry), air (hot and moist), fire (hot and dry), and water (cold and moist). See *On Generation and Corruption* 329b.7–331b.4 (Barnes, i. 539–42). Also see *Meteorology* 378b.10–26 (Barnes, i. 608).

191. All of these topics, and more, get discussed in the four books of the *Meteorology*.

192. Just as in *W.* xiv. 338–9 (MS?), Hegel here emphasizes the *Progression of Animals*; there he also mentions the *Movement of Animals*, but he says nothing about the themes of these two works or their relation to one another. He seems to be influenced by the Aristotle editions he had at hand. In the *W.* version of the second of the two titles he follows Casaubon's presentation of it, including the adjective *communi* (κοινῆς), which is missing in Erasmus and modern editions. However, when in our text after this point he does not link *On Youth* ... with *On Breath*, he is apparently following Erasmus' arrangements, not Casaubon's.

193. These are among the shorter writings on psychological and physiological topics that are grouped under the collective name of *Parva naturalia*. Hegel omits mention by name of: *Sense and Sensibilia*; *On Memory*; *On Divination in Sleep*. The whole series appears in Barnes, i. 693–773 (436a.1–486b.4).

194. Hegel is aware that this last-named treatise is probably not by Aristotle. Today it is assigned a probable date at the end of the first century BC.

195. See the teleological treatment of nature in the second half of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*. Hegel's remark about the inner purposiveness of nature being given a subjective form refers to Kant's distinction between determinative and reflective powers of judgment; see Vol. III of this edition.

totle there are two different moments that we must take into account in the elucidation of the natural domain. The first mode of treatment is in terms of external necessity, where everything natural is taken to be outwardly determined according to natural causality. The second is the teleological treatment, although that too does not initially go beyond outward purposiveness. His discussion oscillates between the two. What is sought is either the external cause or else the sort of purpose that a particular character, relationship, and so forth has—so that one is trying to pin down the form of external teleology. Aristotle locates the goal of things outside the natural domain.[196] These | characteristics were well known to Aristotle, and he 75
investigates them in a fundamental way.

Aristotle therefore says: 'Nature operates [*verhält sich*], or there is an operating within nature. For instance, Jupiter rains—not so that the corn may grow, for it rains of necessity and it is merely a chance occurrence that the corn benefits from it.' That it is chance means there is a necessary connection, but one of external necessity, which is sheer chance. Only relatively speaking is the effect necessary. 'If the corn rots, the rain is not for that purpose but only happens to be a contributory factor. What obstacle is there to something that appears as parts—for instance, the parts of an animal or a plant—also operating in this fortuitous way in keeping with its nature, but according to this fortuitous necessity? Thus the fact that the front teeth are sharp and suited for biting, while the back teeth are wide and adapted for masticating or crushing, may also be fortuitous, owing to external necessity and not to this end, with the result that it is only fortuitous that this comes about as though it were purposive, and once things are this way they remain so. Empedocles especially put forward this way of thinking; he portrayed the first creation as a world of the most varied monstrosities, ones that supposedly could not maintain themselves as such but became extinct instead because they were not purposively adapted to their environment.'[197] A philosophy of nature can readily come to hold this view, that the

196. On the distinction between treatment according to external necessity and that according to teleology, see *Physics* 194a.27–30 (Barnes, i. 331), after which Aristotle gives examples of external purposiveness pertaining to artisans' work. On nature considered according to external necessity, see *Physics* 198b.10–199a.8 (Barnes, i. 339). On the good as the goal of things, see *Physics* 195a.23–6 (Barnes, i. 333). See also *Metaphysics* 988b.6–16 (Barnes, ii. 1563). Here in our text Hegel is perhaps referring to the highest and primary cause of motion and change, the unmoved mover, which eternally moves (things) although it is devoid of matter and transcends nature; see *Metaphysics* 1072b.1–1073a.13 (Barnes, ii. 1694–5); see also p. 238 above, with n. 182.

197. For the paraphrases in this paragraph, see *Physics* 198b.16–32 (Barnes, i. 339). On Empedocles in relation to Aristotle's criticism that he did not introduce purpose as cause, see p. 85 above, with n. 228. See also *W.* xiv. 343–4 (MS?).

initial productions are, as it were, experiments on nature's part, with those not shown to be purposively adapted being unable to survive.

Against this Aristotle says: 'This view cannot possibly be entertained, for what happens according to nature happens always or for the most part; but this is not the case with anything that occurs by chance. In what involves a purpose or τέλος, both what precedes and what follows are shaped by this
76 purpose; the former | is the condition, the latter what is produced. That something is made in accord with a purpose and by means of the purpose is constitutive of its nature; this very purpose—the purpose that realizes itself—*is* its nature. It is formed in keeping with its nature, and the parts that comprise it—for instance, limbs, teeth, and so forth—exist for the sake of that which is the purpose. Whoever subscribes to the [theory of] chance formation does away with nature and the natural. The natural is what has a principle within it, is active, and through its own activity attains its end or the principle. When the swallow builds its nest or the spider spins its web, when trees take root in the earth, there is in all this a self-maintaining, self-producing cause or a purpose.'[198]

All these expressions from Aristotle involve the proper concept of life, and this Aristotelian concept of nature or of organic life has gotten lost, [for] it is missing from the examination of things organic when we rely upon pressure and reaction [or] chemical relationships, or when external relationships in general are made foundational. The Aristotelian concept emerges again only in Kantian philosophy, namely, in the view that the living thing is the purpose for itself, and must be judged to be its own end. Of course in Kant it has only the subjective form, as if it were said on behalf of our subjective reasoning; but nonetheless there is the truth in it—[the living thing] is its own end, is what brings forth, it brings itself forth or attains itself, and this is the [self-] maintenance of the organic creature. What we call end or τέλος is Aristotle's ἐνέργεια, efficacy, and ἐντελέχεια.

Aristotle says, moreover, that in this regard the same thing happens in nature as in human art. 'Grammarians make mistakes, doctors sometimes prescribe incorrectly, pharmacists often grab hold of the wrong container and so fail to achieve their goal for the patient. Nature makes mistakes too and gives rise to monstrosities and deformities, but these are mistakes made by the sort of thing that acts with purpose.'[199] We usually have external

198. The paraphrases in this paragraph derive, in this order, from *Physics* 198b.34–6, 199a.8–12, 199b.13–17, 199a.26–30 (Barnes, i. 339–40). Cf. *W.* xiv. 344–6 (MS?). In discussing the making of something according to a purpose, Hegel does not take into account Aristotle's important analogy between purposiveness in nature and in artisanship.

199. See *Physics* 199a.33–b.4 (Barnes, i. 340); cf. *W.* xiv. 347–8 (MS?).

purposiveness in view in this sort of teleological | consideration. Aristotle 77
speaks against this when he says: 'If nature is what is active in accordance with an end, then it is absurd not to want to think of an action as purposive when we observe no consultation and deliberation taking place on the part of the agent.' The builder sketches silently in his head the plan for a house. We transfer this representation of external purposiveness to nature. But it is incorrect, says Aristotle, to want to recognize purposive action only where we observe deliberation. Art is not a consultative affair either, and the operations of nature most resemble those of art. Caring for oneself is a matter of inner instinct or impulse and not one of conscious purpose, even though it is productive and actually accomplishes its end.[200] In this discussion we find the full, authentic, and profound concept of nature or of organic life.

Aristotle directs another remark against the other side, against sheerly external necessity. He says: 'What is sheerly necessary is envisaged as if we were to imagine that a house has arisen through necessity, and that this is because heavy things, such as stones, have, according to their nature, situated themselves at the bottom and light things, such as wood, at the top.' Of course a house did not come into being without these materials; but it did not come into being thus for the sake of these relationships, or for the sake of the weight and lightness. This is the case with everything that has a purpose within it. Nothing that has a purpose exists without what is necessary; but it does not exist by virtue of this, for the necessary element serves only as material or as a presupposition [*Hypothese*] for it.[201] | 78

The purpose is the λόγος or the authentic ground, and this logos is the agent. There are two principles, but the λόγος is the higher principle in contradistinction to matter. The logos has need of the necessary element, to be sure, but it remains dominant over it, does not give it free rein but keeps it under its own control.[202] Purpose or free activity can be portrayed as a circle, as an activity returning into itself. External necessity is like a line extending forward or backward as far as it may, because the relationship is sheerly irrational; it is external only and lacks self-determination. The purpose or the circle makes this relationship its own and guides it back into itself; it transforms the necessity, assimilates it, and in this way maintains

200. The quotation beginning with 'If nature ...' is a paraphrase from—and what follows is very loosely based on—*Physics* 199b.26–32 (Barnes, i. 341); cf. *W.* xiv. 348 (MS?).

201. See *Physics* 199b.34–200a.14 (Barnes, i. 341), which is a more expansive version of this statement. Cf. *W.* xiv. 349–50 (MS?).

202. On the 'necessary element' or matter, see *Physics* 200a.14–15, 30–3 (Barnes, i. 341–2); cf. *W.* xiv. 350 (MS?).

itself as a circle that returns within itself. The main thing, and what is difficult, is to combine these two principles in thought. This is the principal concept of what is natural.

From this Aristotle passes over to space and time, and so on. His examination of these topics is very weighty and very penetrating. With the utmost patience he investigates every view that can be entertained about them—concerning, for instance, empty space, whether space is corporeal, and so forth. The final result of investigating these characteristics is the speculative concept, grasped as a unity and led back to the εἶδος, to fixed determinacy. He examines motion, the elements, and so forth in just this patient fashion, always leading the empirical back again to the speculative.[203]

*e. Philosophy of Spirit*

We find Aristotle's philosophy of spirit expounded in a whole series of works that I shall mention. We have [first of all] three books *On the*
79 *Soul*, | concerning the soul's abstract, general nature. In the main this is a refutation of other views and then an examination of the soul's nature in itself, but not yet of its particular modes of operation. On its operations we have from Aristotle—in the second place—these particular treatises: *Sense and Sensibilia*; *On Memory*; *On Sleep*; *On Dreams*; *On Divination in Sleep*; *Physiognomonics*.[204] With regard to the practical domain [there is]—in the third place—a work on *Economics*, for the householder. In the fourth place there are moral writings: the *Ethics*, an inquiry into the absolute good; then *On Virtues and Vices*; finally a *Politics* or presentation of the true constitution of a state, viewed empirically and based on Aristotle's survey of the different [kinds of existing] constitutions. It is a great loss in every respect that we do not possess this last book in its entirety. On the other side, we

203. On space and time, see *Physics* 208a.27–224a.17 (Barnes, i. 354–78); 'empty space' is treated in 213a.12–217b.28, and the corporeality of space in 209a.2–30. An example of the speculative concept in these investigations is 212a.20–1: 'Hence the place of a thing is the innermost motionless boundary of what contains it' (Barnes, i. 361). Motion or change is one of the constant themes of the *Physics*, in particular of books 3 and 5–8. On treatment of the elements in the context of the *Physics*, see 204a.8–206a.8, as well as *On the Heavens* 268b.11–13 and *On Generation and Corruption* 328b.26–335a.23 (Barnes, i. 347–51, 448, 538–49 respectively).

204. The three books of *On the Soul* (402a.1–435b.25; Barnes, i. 641–92) include discussion and refutation of the views of Leucippus, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Plato's *Timaeus*. The operations of soul are treated in these essays mentioned in our text, which are from the collection known to Aristotelian scholars as the *Parva naturalia* (see p. 240 above, with n. 193). The *Physiognomonics* (805a.1–814b.8; Barnes, i. 1237–50) is a pseudo-Aristotelian work. On the relation of character to physical features, see *Prior Analytics* 70b.7–38 (Barnes, i. 113).

have—in the fifth place—logical books by Aristotle, grouped together under the name *Organon*.[205]

So Aristotle defines the general nature of the soul. In his teaching about it we must not expect to find a particular metaphysics of the soul, such as whether or not it is simple, and so on. A dry-as-dust metaphysics of this sort is foreign to our profound thinker. He says: 'It seems that the soul must be treated partly on its own terms, as separable from the body, by itself in its freedom, because it is a thinking on its own account; but it must also be treated partly with reference to the body, since in the affections it appears as bound up with the body.' He says about the affections that they are the λόγος ἔνυλος, or the materialized modes of spirit.[206]

At this point there comes into play a twofold way of considering the soul, a physical way and a logical or rational way; the main characteristics | are 80
those of potency or δύναμις, and ἐνέργεια. Aristotle also distinguishes what makes something what it is, with this being the efficacy, ἐντελέχεια, or energy, whereas the matter or ὕλη, which is nothing of itself, is only potentiality. We speak of matter as actual, but in this case it is only the potential, and what is actual is the form (μορφή, εἶδος) that makes something what it is. Here form is *active* form, the ἐνέργεια or ἐντελέχεια.[207] From our own viewpoint we are accustomed to speak of matter as what is actual. But for Aristotle matter is only δύναμις or potency, and what is actual is the form [viewed] as active form or energy, ἐνέργεια.

What he says about the soul is that it is the οὐσία, the substance as form, indeed the form of the physical, organic body, and that the body has the potential for life. So corporeality is but potentiality. The entelechy is the εἶδος or the form of the body, by which the body as such is enlivened and ensouled. The soul is either awake or sleeping, with the waking state corresponding to awareness and speaking, and sleep just to having [capacities] but not employing them. This 'having' may indeed seem pre-eminent, but the πρότερον [what is prior] is the [actual] science, consciousness, or form of thinking. The soul is therefore the ἐντελέχεια or efficacy of an organic physical body.[208]

205. See *Economics* 1343a.1–1353b.1, plus book 3, which has no Bekker reference numbers; Barnes, ii. 2130–51. See pp. 255–7 below on the moral writings and pp. 257–8 below on the *Politics*; cf. *W.* xiv. 369 (MS?). Hegel discusses the works of the *Organon* as well, pp. 258–61 below.

206. The sentence in quotation marks is a paraphrase taken from *On the Soul* 403a.3–11, 16–19; the following sentence is based on lines 24–5; see Barnes, i. 643; cf. *W.* xiv. 370 (MS?).

207. See *On the Soul* 403a.29–b.16 and 412a.4–11 (Barnes, i. 644, 656) on these relations of potentiality, energy, and actuality in the soul; cf. *W.* xiv. 370–1 (MS?).

208. *On the Soul* 412a.19–b.6 (Barnes, i. 656–7) discusses the soul as form and efficacy of the body; cf. the more precise rendition of this passage in *W.* xiv. 371 (MS?).

In the context of defining the soul as being the entelechy and what is truly first, Aristotle comes to the question of whether soul and body are one. He says that we should not ask about that, just as we do not ask whether wax and the form it has are one. 'One' is a wholly indeterminate expression, and identity is a wholly abstract characteristic, hence one that is superficial and empty. Essential being is actuality or efficacy, and that is the entelechy. Hence body and soul are not to be considered as one; they are not of equal worth in regard to being, for authentic being is the entelechy,
81 ἐντελέχεια.[209] |

'From the standpoint of substance the soul is the concept; in other words, for substance the λόγος is the being itself. As an example let us take an axe, and take its being an axe to be its [bodily] substance, its οὐσία; then the soul of the axe would simply be its axe-form. If the thing ceased to be an axe there would no longer be an axe and only the name would remain. However, the soul is not the form or concept of a body of this sort, for the soul is the form of the sort of thing that has the principle of motion and rest within itself.' An axe does not have the principle of form within itself; its form is not immanent, it is not what is inwardly active. 'If the eye by itself were a living thing, then vision would be its soul, for vision is the οὐσία of the eye from the standpoint of its concept or its λόγος. But the outward eye is only the material basis for vision; if vision be lost, then it is an eye in name only. This is how things stand for the whole, just as they do for the individual case.' The corporeal element in the eye is not what is real but is only its potentiality. Vision is the eye's being, its entelechy, its substance, its soul. According to this relationship, the eye is vision and the eyeball is only potentiality. In the same way, soul and body constitute the living thing and are therefore inseparable.[210] This is a genuinely speculative concept.

Aristotle goes on to state that soul is to be defined in a threefold way, as nutritive soul, sentient soul, and intelligent [*verständig*] soul. The nutritive or vegetative soul is, by itself, the soul of a plant. The soul that is sentient as well is the soul of an animal. The soul that is nutritive, sentient, and intelligent too is the soul of a human being. So human beings unite within themselves the vegetative and the sentient natures. This is a thought that finds expression in the most recent philosophy of nature too—that the

209. The issue of whether we should say that soul and body are 'one' (with the reference to wax and the shape given to it) appears in *On the Soul* 412b.6–9 (Barnes, i. 657); cf. *W.* xiv. 371 (MS?).

210. The sentences in quotation marks in this paragraph are paraphrases of *On the Soul* 412b.9–23; see also 413a.2–5; Barnes, i. 657. Cf. *W.* xiv. 372–3 (MS?).

human being is also animal and plant—and it is directed against isolating and separating the distinctions between these forms.[211] | 82

The soul is the purpose, the productive agent or cause [present] within the body; and, more precisely, it is the final cause [*die Ursache dem Zweck nach*], namely, a cause that is a self-determining universality. The soul is the λόγος precisely inasmuch as the latter is the ἐντελέχεια of what is just *potentia*, of what only *is* from the standpoint of potentiality. As for the relationship of these 'three souls', as they can be called (although it is wrong to separate them in this way), we ought not to seek One Soul that would be common to the sentient and nutritive souls—one that would correspond to a simple logical form of one of these two souls.[212] This is a fine observation, one through which truly speculative thinking distinguishes itself from merely logical, formal thinking.

If we take geometric figures as our example, then triangle, square, parallelogram, and the like are each something actual. But the figure they have in common, or figure in general, is nothing—it is nothing genuine; it is only an abstraction. And yet the triangle is the first figure; it is the truly universal figure just because it is the first figure—it is figure brought back to its initial universality because it is the first figure. On the one hand, the triangle stands on a par with the square, pentagon, and so forth, as one particular figure among others. But—and this is the great import for Aristotle—the triangle is the authentic figure, the truly universal figure.[213] In this way too the nutritive

211. See *On the Soul* 413a.20–415a.13 (Barnes, i. 658–60); cf. *W.* xiv. 373–4 (MS?). The philosophy of nature of German Romanticism echoes this theme of the gradation of powers of soul in plants, animals, and human beings (who include them all). Hegel may have in mind Schlegel and Schelling. See Friedrich Schlegel, *Philosophische Lehrjahr*, 'Philosophische Fragmente' III, nos. 265, 284, 326, 332, in *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe*, vol. 18, ed. Ernst Behler (Munich, Paderborn, and Vienna, 1963), 145, 147, 150–1. See also Schelling, *Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie* (1799), in *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. K. F. A. Schelling, 14 vols. in 2 divisions (Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1856–61), division 1, iii. 206. 'The plant is what the animal is, and the lower animal is what the higher is. In the plant the same force acts that acts in the animal, only the stage of its *appearance* lies lower. In the plant it has already wholly dispersed into the force of reproduction, which is still distinguishable as irritability in the amphibians, and in the higher animals as sensibility, and conversely. Therefore, there is one organism that is gradually attenuated through all of these stages down to the plants, and one cause acting uninterruptedly which fades from the sensibility of the first animal down to the reproductive force of the last plant' (*First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature*, trans. Keith R. Pierson (Albany, NY, 2004), 149).

212. See Aristotle, *On the Soul* 414b.19–28 (Barnes, i. 660); cf. *W.* xiv. 374 (MS?).

213. This discourse expands on Aristotle's juxtaposition of the concept of figure as such to particular figures (see the preceding note), the former being only an abstraction. It is Plato, however, and not Aristotle, who in the *Timaeus* speaks of the triangle as the 'truly universal figure', in the context of cosmology and with a Pythagorean connection; see p. 215 above, with n. 118.

(vegetative) soul is also there within the sentient soul, and we must not seek for soul as an abstraction. By itself it is the plant-nature, but this nature also is present in the mode of potentiality within the sentient soul, and the sentient soul is likewise within the intelligent soul in turn, as is the nutritive or vegetative soul, potentially;[214] the nutritive soul is soul implicitly, but also
83 only implicitly. This implicit being is not to be rated so highly as | it no doubt is in formal thinking, for it is only *potentia* or the universal, it is only potentiality. What has explicit being is what returns endlessly into itself; to it belong energy and entelechy.

We can define this expression too with greater precision. For instance, we speak of the objective, of the real, of soul and body, of sentient, organic body and vegetative nature, and in doing so we call what is corporeal 'objective' and soul 'subjective'. The objective as such is what is able to be only potentially, what is only implicit (the body), and nature's misfortune is precisely its just being the concept only implicitly and not explicitly. Entelechy is present within the natural or the vegetative domain too, although this entire sphere is also only the objective or the implicit being within the higher sphere. These are the general definitions, those of greatest importance and the ones that, once developed, would lead to all true insights into the organic domain, and so forth.

Aristotle also speaks expressly about sensation. Within sensation he distinguishes the change [that gives rise to sensing] and what takes place on account of that which generates the sensation. This is the passivity of sensation; once sensation is generated it becomes the soul's possession, like a kind of knowing. So there are two aspects, one being the passivity and the other that according to which the sensation is in the soul's possession. Here sensing operates like cognitive knowing. The difference [between them] is that what gives rise to sensing is outside [the soul] and [sensation] is directed to what is single, external, whereas knowing is directed to universality. Knowing exists as substance, so to speak, within the soul. For this reason people can *think* as they choose, whereas *sensing* is not up to them, for it
84 requires the existence of what is sensed.[215] This is quite correct. |

214. See Aristotle, *On the Soul* 414b.28–415a.9 (Barnes, i. 660), on how the sensitive soul includes within it the nutritive soul, and so forth; cf. *W.* xiv. 374–5 (MS?). The reverse relation as Hegel expresses it here—the nutritive soul being potentially sensitive, being soul implicitly—is not based on Aristotle. In *W.* xiv. 376 (MS?) we find expressed more clearly Hegel's characteristic interpretation, namely, that 'the nutritive soul is the concept of soul'.

215. For Aristotle's account of the nature of sensing and its contrast with thinking, see *On the Soul* 416b.33–417b.26 (Barnes, i. 663–5), especially the latter part of the passage. Cf. *W.* xiv. 377 (MS?).

Sensing, therefore, involves a passive aspect. Beyond that it can be expounded as one chooses, along the lines of subjective idealism or in some other way. In other words, there are single things to which we are passively related and that exert an influence on us; that is, in sensing we find ourselves determined, we are determined. I find myself determined, or I am determined from without—both expressions contain this element of passivity. The monad of Leibniz is an opposite way of viewing things, for the monad is one, an atom, something individual and indivisible that unfolds everything within itself. Each monad, each tiny bit of my finger, is an entire universe that evolves only by its own agency and out of itself. The monad stands in no connection with any other monad; monads never act reciprocally upon one another.[216] This seems to be an affirmation of the loftiest idealistic freedom, and yet it makes no difference at all if I represent what I sense [as] coming from without to be [instead] developing out of myself; for what is developed within me in this way is something passive, something unfree.

This moment of passivity does not make Aristotle inferior to idealism. In one aspect sensation is always passive. It is one thing when the subject matter, and so forth, is conceived on the basis of the idea, for then it is shown to be posited on the basis of the self-determining idea. But it is otherwise when, so far as I exist as an individual subject, the idea exists within me as this single individual—here we have finitude, the standpoint of passivity.

Aristotle also expresses himself as follows: 'What senses is in potentiality with respect to what the sensed [object] is, but only in potentiality. It is passive insofar as it is not in a state of equality with self. After having been affected [*gelitten*] or having received sensation, however, it is | made 85
equal.'[217] This is activity within receptivity—the spontaneity that annuls that initial passivity in sensation. In this way what senses is made equal to itself, and while it seems to be posited through being acted upon, *it* has posited the self-sameness.

There now follows a comparison that is so often misunderstood. Sensation is the reception of the sensed form without the matter. In sensation, says Aristotle, only the form reaches us, without the matter.[218] In our practical behavior, however, things are different. In eating and drinking we ingest the

216. On the characteristics of the monads of Leibniz, see Vol. III of this edition.

217. See Aristotle, *On the Soul* 417b.29–32 and, for the paraphrased quote in our text, 418a.3–6 (Barnes, i. 665). The term for 'equal' (*gleich*, Greek ὅμοιος) in our text could also be rendered by 'like' or even 'identical' (Barnes does so for Aristotle).

218. See *On the Soul* 424a.17–21 (Barnes, i. 674).

matter along with the sensed form. In the practical realm as such we conduct ourselves as single individuals, and as single individuals in an existence [that is] itself an outwardly material existence; we behave toward matter itself in a material fashion. We can behave in this way only insofar as we are material ourselves; what happens is that our material existence comes actively into play. Sensation as such is, in contrast, the receiving of the sensed form without matter. The form is the object or what is universal, as opposed to what is sensible or material.

To elucidate this Aristotle offers an example, a comparison. In sensation we place ourselves in relation to the form alone and receive it apart from matter, just as wax receives the imprint of a golden ring—merely the form without the gold itself.[219] If we stick strictly to this example and pass from it to the soul, we shall say that the soul behaves like the wax. Representations, sensations, and the like are imprinted in the soul. Many accusations based on this simile have been raised against Aristotle, namely, that the soul is a *tabula rasa*, that he says the soul is something completely empty and external things only make an imprint, and so forth. We are told that this is Aristotle's philosophy. In short, Aristotle is an empiricist of the crudest sort.[220] After
86 all, this is how most philosophers fare. | If they chance to offer an example from sense experience, everyone understands it and accepts the content of the comparison in all of its ramifications, as though everything that this sensible relationship involves is also supposed to hold good for its spiritual counterpart. The only definite statement involved in the comparison in our example is this: in sensation only the form of what is external is received—it is all that exists for the sentient subject, only this form comes to the sentient subject.

The accusation against Aristotle overlooks the main circumstance that distinguishes this image from the soul's behavior. In fact the wax does not itself take up form, which remains on it merely as an external trace; were the form [to become] the essence of the wax, then that would be wax no longer. The soul, on the contrary, takes up into itself the very form and assimilates it to itself in such a way that the soul is, in a certain fashion, in itself everything it senses. [As he noted,] it is as though in an axe the form of being an axe were its *ousia*, so that this form—being an axe—would be its soul. Aristotle's simile has a restricted application, namely, that only the form comes in the

219. See the preceding note as well as Aristotle, *On Memory* 450a.30–2 (Barnes, i. 715), which repeats the seal example in another context.

220. For the image of the blank tablet, see *On the Soul* 429b.29–430a.2 (Barnes, i. 683), as well as its recurrence in Locke's philosophy (see Vol. III of this edition). For the contention that Aristotelianism is empiricism, see p. 226 above.

soul; and there is no question of the soul being like passive wax and receiving determinations from without. Aristotle says that the soul is in itself and that it contains all forms itself.[221] Taking up these forms is not a passive stance as in the case of the wax, for it is the soul's own activity.

He explains this further in what follows. Each one—seeing, hearing, and the like—is a unitary operation [*nur eine Wirksamkeit*], but with regard to existence each involves a distinction. There is a body that makes a sound and a subject that hears; the being is of two sorts, although in itself the hearing is inwardly one and is a unitary operation.[222] When I touch something with my finger, sensation occurs. In the sensation as such the occurrence is unitary, | but in subsequent reflection there are two isolated moments. 87
When I see a color, the seeing of this color is the simple and sole determination, and yet the color is present and my eye is too. My seeing is red *and* the thing. Speculative [thinking] turns upon this identity and this difference, and that is precisely what Aristotle shows most emphatically and holds to consistently.

With regard to time he speaks about distinct temporal moments, about motion, and so on. On the one hand, the 'now' is like the point in space; on the other hand, the 'now' is also a division involving future and past; it is something other and is also one and the same.[223] This identity is always present. The 'now' is one and the same and it is also division and union, both of which are one and the same in one and the same regard. In this way sensation too is one and is also division. Aristotle proceeds from sensation to thinking. In this context too he brings in number as an example. 'One' and 'two' are different, and at the same time 'one' is also used and posited as 'one' in both of them.

From sensation Aristotle proceeds to thinking, and here he becomes essentially speculative.[224] He says that νοῦς is unalloyed [*unvermischt*]; it thinks all things and hence it is free of admixture in order that, as Anaxagoras says, it may prevail, namely, may know cognitively. As emergent, it fends off what is alien to it and guards itself from it. Its nature is potentiality

221. For the axe example, see p. 246 above. *On the Soul* 429a.27–9 says: 'It was a good idea to call soul "the place of forms", though this description holds only of the thinking soul, and even this is the forms only potentially, not actually' (Barnes, i. 682).

222. See *On the Soul* 425b.25–8, 426a.15–19 (Barnes, i. 677–8); cf. *W.* xiv. 381–2 (MS?).

223. At this point in *On the Soul* (426b.21–427a.14; Barnes, i. 678–9) we do not find Aristotle's doctrines of time and space as such but only remarks on temporal and spatial moments in the process of perception. Cf. *W.* xiv. 382–3 (MS?).

224. In discussing *On the Soul* Hegel passes over Aristotle's account of representation or phantasy (bk. 3, ch. 3), and goes directly to the treatment of thinking in the following chapter, thereby relating thinking to sense perception but without the intervening stage of φαντασία.

or δύναμις itself; it has no ὕλη, no matter, for the potentiality belongs to its
88 substance (οὐσία). | The corporeal includes matter and external form; ὕλη is potentiality over against form, whereas soul, to the contrary, is potentiality itself, is devoid of matter. But νοῦς is nothing until it thinks; it *is* only through the activity of thinking.[225] Implicitly νοῦς is everything; but, as long as it does not think, it is nothing. Actually, however, it is absolute activity; only so does it exist, and it *is* when it is active.

He continues: 'If thinking is in and for itself and has nothing in common with what is other than itself, if it is not passive, and yet thinking *something* involves a passive aspect, how then should we think about νοῦς coming upon something and acquiring an object, for that appears at any rate to involve a certain passivity in νοῦς?'[226] What gets thought is something passive and yet this passive element is in νοῦς; hence there is within it something distinct from it, and yet it is supposed to be pure and unalloyed. Aristotle solves this problem in the following way. 'This very νοῦς or thinking is itself everything thought; object or content—it is itself everything, πάντα νοητά. But at the same time it is in actuality nothing before the thinking takes place.'[227] This is an excellent statement.

Now this is Aristotle's great principle, and here he offers the notorious illustration that νοῦς is like a book in which nothing is actually written so far. Here we have the well-known *tabula rasa* that can be found wherever Aristotle is mentioned; the writing upon it supposedly comes from outside. But the comparison is confined to the point that the soul has a content only insofar as something actually gets thought. The soul is the blank book; in other words, it is everything implicitly, it is the mere, or general, idea. Inherently it is not this totality itself. We do not yet have what is genuine, for we do not have that until there is actual activity and νοῦς is νοητός or what
89 comes to be thought, | for in what is devoid of matter, in spirit, what thinks and what comes to be thought are one and the same. Theoretical knowing and what comes to be known are one and the same. In what is material, what thinks is present only as potentiality, only implicitly; nature contains the idea and is νοῦς but only implicitly, and consequently reason is not a feature of the material domain.[228] In nature what thinks only *is* in

225. See *On the Soul* 429a.22–4 (Barnes, i. 682); cf. *W.* xiv. 385 (MS?).

226. This is an expanded paraphrase of *On the Soul* 429b.23–5 (Barnes, i. 683), which attributes to Anaxagoras the view that thought has nothing in common with what is other than itself.

227. See *On the Soul* 429b.30–2 (Barnes, i. 683).

228. For topics in this paragraph, see *On the Soul* 429b.32–430a.9 (Barnes, i. 683); cf. *W.* xiv. 387 (MS?).

connection with matter; in nature what thinks is not at the same time what comes to be thought, although that is indeed the case with νοῦς. For νοῦς is not the material element but is actual only inasmuch as it thinks. It is obvious from this that the above illustration, taken in the sense described, has been understood quite wrongly and even contrary [to the true meaning].

Aristotle says that thinking is everything, by which he means νοῦς as expressive [*pathetisch*] νοῦς, παθητικός. But as object, as object to itself or to the extent that it is only implicit, it is only potentiality. It *is* only as entelechy. Just as the hand is the tool of tools, so νοῦς is the form of forms.[229] What we nowadays call the unity of the subjective and the objective gets expressed here in the most definite way.[230] Νοῦς is subject, it is the active element, or thinking, and the object is what comes to be thought. Aristotle distinguishes the two very well, but he also expresses their identity no less rigorously and emphatically. In our parlance, what is absolute or true is only that whose subjectivity and objectivity are one and the same, are identical. This is of course the modern way of putting it, but we find the same thing in Aristotle. Absolute thinking—*De mente divina* is the heading of the chapters in which Aristotle speaks about spirit in its absoluteness—is a thinking of what is the best, of what is the end in and for itself.[231] This end in itself, however, is thinking itself. | 90

This antithesis or distinction within activity, and its sublation, Aristotle expresses in the following way: νοῦς thinks itself and does so by taking up thought or the νοητόν, what is thinkable or comes to be thought. Νοῦς thinks itself by taking up what is thinkable. This νοητόν first comes to be as an affecting and a thinking. It is itself first generated when it affects. Thus it first is in thinking, in the activity of thinking. This activity is likewise a generating, [namely] a dividing-off of thought from object—something no less necessary for the actuality of thinking than is the affecting itself. This separation or distinction, and the relation to the subject of what is made distinct, are one and the same, with the result that νοῦς and νοητόν are the same, for νοῦς is what receives the οὐσία or essence. It receives, and what it

229. On νοῦς as passive, see p. 228 above, with n. 185. On the relationship of potentiality to entelechy, see n. 220 just above. On the comparison with the hand, see *On the Soul* 432a.1–3 (Barnes, i. 686). Cf. *W.* xiv. 388–9 (MS?).

230. On Schelling's concept of the absolute indifference of the subjective and the objective, see Vol. III of this edition. See also Hegel, *Encyclopedia* (1830 edn.), paras. 213–15, 236; cf. *W.* vi. 385–91, 408; see *The Encyclopedia Logic*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1991), 286–91, 303.

231. 'De mente divina' is the title of the ninth chapter only, of bk. 12 of the *Metaphysics* in Casaubon's Latin edition (ii. 564), which also gives the Greek title—as does Erasmus in his edition—as Περὶ τοῦ νοῦ.

receives is the *ousia*, the thought. But its receiving is action [*Wirken*], and by the receiving there is first brought about what appears as that coming-to-be or presence that is received; in other words, it 'acts' inasmuch as it 'possesses', ἐνεργεῖ ἔχων. Its possession is agency [*Wirksamkeit*]. It is incorrect to take thought's content, the object, for something divine; on the contrary, the very acting itself is what is divine. Aristotle says that 'theory' is what is best and most blessed, for it is thinking's being occupied with what is received by the activity, and by virtue of this there is produced what comes to be thought. If God finds happiness in this occupation, everlastingly as we do occasionally, then God is what is most worthy of admiration.[232]

Aristotle then proceeds to more precise definitions and to difficulties that can arise in this regard. Were νοῦς grasped simply as capability or δύναμις, were it not νόησις or the active element, then sustained thinking would be laborious and the object, what comes to be thought or the νοούμενον, would be more excellent than is νοῦς. Thinking and what is thought, the νοούμενον, would be present in one who thinks what is worst of all. Such a person
91 would have thoughts | and would at the same time also be the activity of thinking. But that is incorrect, for νοῦς thinks only itself because it is what is most excellent, because it is the thought of thought; it is the thinking of thought, νόησις νοήσεως, and the absolute unity of subjective and objective is expressed in it. This is what is most excellent in and for itself.[233] *Noῦς* that thinks itself is the absolute end-in-itself, the Good; and this *is* only as present to self and for its own sake.

This, then, is the pinnacle of the Aristotelian metaphysics—the most speculative thought there can be. It only seems as if he is speaking about thinking a particular thing alongside something else. Sequential treatment of that sort is indeed found in Aristotle. What he says about thinking, however, is of itself what is absolutely speculative and bears no relation to anything else such as sensation; that is clear from what we have said, for sensation is no more than δύναμις [potentiality] for thinking. *Noῦς* is everything implicitly, is totality, the true as such according to its implicit being, and therefore what is thought, but also true being in-and-for-itself, or thinking—the

232. This long paragraph expounds and enlarges upon *Metaphysics* 1072b.18–26 (Barnes, ii. 1695); cf. *W.* xiv. 331, 390–1 (MS?). Hegel's statement in our text, that the acting of thought is what is divine, not thought's object (see also *W.* xiv. 331), is a rendition in agreement with the text in the editions of Erasmus and Casaubon. But the newer editions of Jaeger and Ross have Greek that should be rendered differently; see 1072b.23–4, which in the Barnes translation has thought's object as the divine element, not the thinking itself.

233. On thought thinking itself, see *Metaphysics* 1074b.28–35 (Barnes, ii. 1698); cf. *W.* xiv. 334 (MS?). On this state as absolute unity of the subjective and the objective, see n. 230 just above.

activity that is being-for-self *and* being-in-and-for-self, the thinking of thinking, which is thus defined in abstract fashion and of itself constitutes the nature of absolute spirit.[234] These are the main points to be noted in Aristotle with regard to his speculative ideas, and we must refrain from going into greater detail and giving further particulars about them.

The practical philosophy is also to be assigned to the philosophy of spirit. Aristotle set it down in a number of ethical works. We have the *Nicomachean Ethics* in ten books, the *Magna Moralia* in three, and lastly the *Eudemian Ethics* in seven.[235] The first named contains more general investigations concerning principles. Until the most recent times our best account of | psychology has been the one we have from Aristotle, and the same 92
holds good for Aristotle's thoughts on the will, on freedom, on the further determinations of imputation, intention, and the like.[236] We just need to take the trouble to become familiar with these points and to translate them into our way of speaking, of representing, and of thinking—which is certainly no easy task.

So here we shall introduce the principal definitions pertinent to the will and to the concept of virtue. In defining the concept of virtue from a practical standpoint Aristotle distinguishes the soul's rational side from its irrational side. To the rational side belong judiciousness, prudence, knowledge, and wisdom in general. The other or irrational side encompasses sensation, inclination, and passion. And virtue consists in the unity of the rational side with the irrational side. When the inclinations, passions, and the like are so disposed toward λόγος or reason as to do what it commands, then we have virtue. Even though the inclinations may be good in and for themselves, there is no virtue if insight is wanting [or] the λόγος is inferior, because *logos* is requisite for virtue.[237] Socrates locates virtue simply in knowledge,

234. Hegel's statement that 'νοῦς is everything implicitly . . .' refers to Aristotle's conviction that we can think about anything ('everything'), and that in thinking about something the mind becomes one with it.

235. See Barnes, ii. 1729–1981 for these three works in the sequence that Hegel names them. Pn. and Lw. indicate that Hegel, in a slip of memory, said the *Magna Moralia* is in three books, whereas the correct number is two, as is evident from the Erasmus edition of Aristotle that Hegel possessed.

236. This sentence may refer to *Nicomachean Ethics*, bk. 3, which deals with these topics. See especially 1111b.3–1112a.18 (Barnes, ii. 1755–6). Hegel refers to a passage just preceding this one (1110b.27), in para. 140 of his *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (*W.* viii. 189–90); cf. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H. B. Nisbet, ed. Allen W. Wood (Cambridge, 1991), 171.

237. On the rational and irrational sides of the soul, and the characteristics of each, see *Magna moralia* 1185b.3–13 (Barnes, ii. 1874) and *Eudemian Ethics* 1219b.27–1220a.4 (Barnes, ii. 1931).

whereas Aristotle says that goodness requires the presence of an irrational drive even though reason judges and determines the drive.[238] Drives, sensations, and inclinations are the impetus or the particular element with regard to the practical domain; or, more precisely, they are the subject's motive power [*das Gehende*] toward realization. As active, the subject is particular, and in its particularity it must be identical with the universal. The subject is particular so far as it has drives and inclinations. The unity in which the rational side is the governing factor is virtue.

93 This is the correct definition. On the one side it involves suppression | of the passions and on the other side it is directed against the ideal of virtue and also against the view that the inclinations, drives, and so forth are intrinsically good. Both these extreme views have [nevertheless] been put forward often enough in recent times. So, what is simply natural is no virtue, [even though] there is a saying that 'a human being who is fine and noble by nature is nobler than duty and far above it'. On the other side we find the view that duty should be done 'as duty', without taking other factors into account and without defining the particular as a moment of the whole.[239]

Aristotle goes on at length about the particular aspect of the virtues, especially in the *Eudemian Ethics*. Here he locates the virtues in a mean for which he gives only a quantitative definition. The fact that he defines virtue in this way—simply as a mean between two extremes—may appear insufficient. For instance, he defines the correct behavior with regard to the use of wealth, namely, liberality, as the mean between avarice and

238. This mention of Socrates probably refers not to some particular expression of his but to Aristotle's general statement about him in this respect, in *Magna moralia* 1182a.15–23 (Barnes, ii. 1868–9). See also p. 139 above in this volume, as well as *Nicomachean Ethics* 1144b.1–1145b.12 (Barnes, ii. 1807–8) and *Magna moralia* 1196b.4–1198b.20 (Barnes, ii. 1893–6). While the *Magna moralia* distinguishes between rational and irrational parts of the soul, *Eudemian Ethics* 1219b.27–32 (Barnes, ii. 1931) also draws a distinction between the rational part and a non-rational part that is subordinate to it, from both of which any irrational aspect is to be set apart: 'if there is a part without reason in some other sense, let it be disregarded.' See also 1219b.40–1220a.2 (Barnes, ii. 1931).

239. The ideal of virtue that Hegel finds to be too sweeping he sees expressed in Kant's requirement that duty be done for duty's sake; see Vol. III of this edition. See also Hegel's earlier criticism in his treatise, *Ueber die Wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts*, in *GW* iv. 435 ff; trans. T. M. Knox, *Natural Law* (Philadelphia, 1975). The opposing stance, that the inclinations human beings have by nature are good in themselves, he links with Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men*; see trans. by Franklin Philip, ed. Patrick Coleman (Oxford and New York, 1994), p. 94: 'Men are wicked; doleful and constantly repeated experience spares us of any need of proof for it; yet man is naturally good, as I believe I have demonstrated.' See also Rousseau's *Emile*, which had been translated into German (Berlin, Frankfurt, and Leipzig, 1762) with the title *Aemil, oder Von der Erziehung*.

profligacy.[240] But the nature of the particular virtues is actually such that they do not admit of any more precise definition. They can be spoken about only in general terms; for them there is no fuller definition than an indeterminate one of this sort.

We still have to mention Aristotle's *Politics*. Aristotle defines the human being as a political animal endowed with reason. He looks upon political philosophy as the genuinely practical philosophy. He says that good and evil, the just and the unjust, exist for human beings alone and not for animals, because animals do not think; and yet in modern times people locate the distinction between good and evil in sense experience, which animals have too. There is indeed sense experience of good and evil, | and the like; but 94
thinking is what makes it not animal sense experience. Aristotle is well aware of this point. A sense experience must be determined by what is universal, by thinking.[241]

Aristotle makes happiness or εὐδαιμονία the goal in the practical domain; but rational insight is the essential condition for it. For him [the] essential moment in virtue is agreement between the aspect of inclination and that of reason.[242] Having defined the human being as a political animal, he says that the community of these political animals constitutes the family and the state. According to its nature the state or the whole is essentially substantial, and according to its concept it is prior to the family. The state is what is true; it is the absolute prius or what is substantial, as opposed to the family and the individual. What has first place is the whole in contrast to the part. In the case of a human being, for instance, if the whole is done away with, then there is neither hand nor foot [left] save in name only. There may indeed still be a hand, a foot, and so forth, but only as a hand of stone. In this way the state is the οὐσία of the individual; the two are essentially one. The individual

240. See *Eudemian Ethics* 1220a.38–1221a.13 (Barnes, ii. 1932–3), which concludes with a three-column table listing fourteen virtues with the corresponding extremes of which each is a mean. Liberality, with the extremes of lavishness and meanness (thus Barnes), occupies the seventh position in the columns. See also *Nicomachean Ethics* 1106a.14–1107a.27 (Barnes, ii. 1747–8) and *Magna moralia* 1190b.9–1196b.3 (Barnes, ii. 1882–93).

241. See *Politics* 1253a.1–18 (Barnes, ii. 1987–8), which says that human beings are more political animals than are bees or other gregarious animals, owing to our power of speech and our sense of good and evil. Our text explains (just below) why political philosophy is the truly practical philosophy.

242. The *Nicomachean Ethics* explains why happiness, or living well, is the goal of life (1095a.14–22; Barnes, ii. 1730–1), also that the function of a human being is an activity of soul in accord with reason (1098a.7–8; Barnes, ii. 1735), and that noble actions are pleasant to perform (1099a.17–21; Barnes, ii. 1737). See also 1100a.1–1101a.21 (Barnes, ii. 1738–40) and *Eudemian Ethics* 1219a.35–9 (Barnes, ii. 1930).

is not something on its own account, any more than is any other part when separated from the whole.[243]

This is the direct opposite of the modern principle that we start with the individual, such that each one casts his vote and only thereby does a commonwealth arise.[244] The principles of Plato and Aristotle are directly opposed to this. For Aristotle the state is what is substantial, it is the main thing, and the most excellent δύναμις is the political sort, actualized by means of subjective activity, which thus has its vocation and its essence in the political sphere. So the political is what is highest, for its goal is the highest
95 purpose in the practical domain, and the higher the | purpose the more excellent is the good [it seeks].[245] 'Whoever is unfit for this bond provided by the state or does not need it, owing to self-sufficiency, must be either a wild animal or a god.'[246]

Incidentally, Aristotle did not attempt to describe such an [ideal] state as did Plato. He specified only that the best, the ἄριστοι, must rule, for it would be an injustice to the best were they to be placed on a par with those not their equal in virtue and political abilities. An exceptional person of this sort, the ἄριστος, is like a god among human beings. There is no law for such persons, who can be cast out of the state but not ruled over any more than can Jupiter. It is natural for all to obey them. These 'best ones' are the perpetual kings in states, the ἀΐδιοι βασιλεῖς.[247] Perhaps Aristotle has Alexander in mind here. At that time Greek democracy had already fallen into utter ruin, so that Aristotle could set no store by it.

### *f. Logic*

Aristotle's logic is contained in the writings embraced under the name *Organon*, ὄργανον, of which there are five. The first is an ontology; it deals with the categories, namely, the simple, essential statements that can be made about a thing. Here these categories are listed but not completely

243. See *Politics* 1253a.18–27 (Barnes, ii. 1988), on the priority of the state over the family; also see n. 246 just below.

244. By 'the modern principle' Hegel refers to Rousseau and Fichte. See *Philosophy of Right*, para. 258 (*W.* viii. 314–15, and Wood, p. 277) as well as n. 145, p. 225 above.

245. See *Magna moralia* 1182a.35–b.2 (Barnes, ii. 1869). Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1094a.1–b.12 (Barnes, ii. 1729–30).

246. A quotation from *Politics* 1253a.27–9 (Barnes, ii. 1988).

247. See *Politics* 1284a.3–11 (Barnes, ii. 2037) for this account of the 'exceptional person'. Aristotle discusses the practice of ostracism, but rejects it in the case of the perfect state and of the individual who is pre-eminent in excellence (1284b.17–34; Barnes, ii. 2038–9); such a person should be neither expelled nor made subject, but instead should be made a ruler.

expounded. Aristotle accepts twelve: (1) οὐσία, substance or being; (2) τὸ ποῖον (quality); (3) τὸ πόσον (quantity); (4) πρὸς τί (relationship); (5) ποῦ (place); (6) πότε (time); (7) κεῖσθαι (position); (8) ἔχειν (possession); (9) ποιεῖν (doing); and (10) | πάθειν (being affected).[248] Then kinds of predicables [*Prädikabilien*] are added to the classes of predication [*Prädikamente*].[249] So he sets them side by side. 96

The second text is *On Interpretation*; it is the doctrine of judgments and propositions.[250] Third comes his *Analytics*, comprising two books that deal with demonstration and the syllogism.[251] Fourth comes the *Topics*, consisting of books concerning *loci* or points of view that Aristotle expounds and that you can adopt regarding your object or proposition, or a problem and so forth.[252] These *loci* are, as it were, a schema by which to consider and investigate an issue. This is considered to be requisite for the training of an orator, because the awareness of viewpoints makes it possible to get

248. Here, and in *W.* xiv. 403–4, Hegel understands 'categories' to mean 'ontology' or 'metaphysics'. Aristotle addresses this issue (*Metaphysics* 1028a.10–13; Barnes, ii. 1623) by giving, among the various senses of 'to be', the meaning 'what a thing is' and the predications asserted of it; see also n. 177, p. 237 above. Aristotle's ten categories are expounded in *Categories* 1a.1–15b.33 (Barnes, i. 3–24), and summarized in 1b.25–7; Aristotle's tenth in the list is, however, πάσχειν. In our text Hegel says 'twelve', probably in recalling Kant's table of categories in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 106; see Norman Kemp Smith's translation (London, 1929, 1933), 113.

249. By 'predicates' [*Prädikabilien*] Hegel means the five additional so-called post-predicates found in *Categories* 11b.15–15b.30 (Barnes, i. 18–24), which are: opposition (ἀντικεῖσθαι), priority (πρότερον), coexistence or simultaneity (ἅμα), movement or change (κίνησις), and having (ἔχειν). The term 'predicables' comes from Kant (*Critique of Pure Reason* B108; Kemp Smith, p. 114), although Kant himself uses it for the 'pure but derivative concepts of the understanding' that can be added to the (Kantian) categories—such as appending to the category of causality the further predicates of force, action, and passion (i.e. passivity). In Aristotle the same term—ἔχειν—is used for the eighth category and also for the last of the 'post-predicates'. As a category (rendered 'possession' in our text), it seems to mean 'being in a certain circumstance, state or condition' (see 1b.25–2a.4; the account of the same point in 11b.11–15 is regarded by some as the addition of a later editor of Aristotle). As a 'post-predicate' (rendered as 'having') it is employed in cataloging various uses of the verb 'have' as it serves to attribute properties to things, as in 'he has armor on'. There does not seem to be any sharp distinction between the two uses of ἔχειν.

250. *On Interpretation* 16a.1–24b.9 is found in Barnes, i. 25–38. Hegel points out here (as also in *W.* xiv. 408) that, the title notwithstanding, this treatise is actually an investigation of affirmative propositions, those expressing judgments.

251. The *Prior Analytics* (24a.10–70b.38; Barnes, i. 39–113) deals with syllogisms, the *Posterior Analytics* (71a.1–100b.17; Barnes, i. 114–66) with demonstration, or the conditions for arriving at knowledge.

252. The *Topics* (100a.20–164b.19; Barnes, i. 167–277) deals with syllogistic arguments that are less than conclusive.

command of an issue from various angles.[253] General *loci* of this sort are difference, similarity, antithesis, relationship, comparison, temporal duration, the authority of those who do things in a particular way, genus, purpose, and so on.[254] The fifth text is the *Sophistical Elenchi*, or turns of phrase and contradictions, and in it Aristotle elucidates the way to resolve contradictions of this kind. As we have seen, the Sophists and, in particular, the Megarics were especially adept at inventing such turns of phrase, for the sake of leading thoughtless representation astray and ensnaring it in them.[255] Aristotle elucidates these *elenchi* very patiently and resolves them.

The Aristotelian logic—particularly in the first parts (*On Interpretation* and the *Analytics*, which are presentations of the forms that get treated in ordinary logic)—involves the universal thought-forms or the foundation for what has been known as logic right down to most recent times. It is Aristotle's undying merit to have recognized and drawn attention to these forms and to have brought them to light. His approach is an empirical
97 observation | of the twists and turns that thinking takes in us. For what occupies our conscious interest is, as a rule, concrete thinking or thinking immersed in outer intuition; the forms of thinking are, so to speak, immersed in it. It is an endlessly mobile network, and to have pinpointed these forms, this fine thread permeating all, to have brought this to consciousness, is a masterpiece of empiricism, and this consciousness is something of absolute importance.

The other thing to note is that, with reference to these forms of judgment, of the syllogism and the like, the best elements in systems of logic are already contained in Aristotle. The Scholastics spun out the individual points in arid detail, but what is genuine we already encounter in Aristotle.

But these forms, which are set forth in the Aristotelian books as logical forms, are still only the forms of thinking at the level of the understanding; they are not the forms of speculative thinking or of rationality as distinct

253. Aristotle says (*Topics* 101a.26–b.4; Barnes, i. 168) that his treatise is useful for three purposes: 'intellectual training, casual encounters, and the philosophical sciences'. Hegel does not take note of the third purpose and, in stressing oratorical training, he puts the *Topics* together with the *Rhetoric*.

254. See *Topics* 105a.21–5 (Barnes, i. 175), which mentions four means for obtaining deductive arguments: securing propositions, distinguishing ways in which expressions are used, discovering differences, and investigating likenesses. Hegel's list includes only the last two, and the other items on it are in no systematic order. Those to be found explicitly in the *Topics* include antithesis and relationship (112b.27–114a.25), comparison (114b.25–115a.24), temporal duration and authority (116a.1–117a.4), and genus (120b.12–128b.10); see Barnes, i. 188–95, 202–16.

255. The *Sophistical Refutations* (164a.20–184b.1) is in Barnes, i. 278–314. On the Sophists and the Megarics, see pp. 112–13, 158–63.

from the sphere of the understanding. This is a logic of the finite; but we must familiarize ourselves with it, for we encounter it everywhere in the finite domain. In mathematics, for instance, there is continual syllogizing. Jurisprudence and the other specific sciences involve subsuming the particular under the universal and conjoining them. These are the forms that pervade finite consciousness; and there are many sciences, branches of knowledge, and so on that know, and need, no other forms of thinking, that employ only the forms of finite thinking. They constitute the general method for everyday knowing and they are its foundation. | 98

Nevertheless, they are only relationships among finite determinations, and the syllogism is the whole, the totality of these determinations. That is why the syllogism is [already a] syllogism of reason, because it is the form of the rational that is accessible to the understanding. Three terms or determinations make up the syllogism; this threefoldness constitutes its totality, and the syllogism is in fact the form of everything rational. Rendered for the understanding, as this takes place in ordinary logical form, the import of the syllogism is that some content or other gets conjoined [*zusammenschliessen*] with another determination. The import of the absolute syllogism, however, is that an object, a subject, or whatever it is, conjoins itself with itself—[and there results] a third element, which is the unity of the first two. God as Spirit is the [absolute] syllogism, or what conjoins itself with itself; [whereas] the syllogism of the understanding concludes from one determination to another. That [absolute] unity constitutes the essential moment of the speculative content, or the speculative nature of the rational syllogism.

Aristotle brought to light the ordinary logic of the understanding; his forms pertain only to the relationship of finite elements to one another. But it is notable that his own logic is not grounded in this, that he does not base it upon this relationship of the understanding, for he does not proceed according to these syllogistic forms. Had Aristotle taken this path, he would not be the speculative philosopher that we have recognized him to be. None of his theses or any of those speculative ideas could be framed or asserted, nor could they be valid, if one were to keep to those forms of thinking that are accessible to the understanding. We certainly must not suppose | that Aristotle thought, proceeded, or carried out demonstrations 99 according to this [formal] logic of his, according to these forms in the *Organon*. Had he done so, he would not have arrived at any speculative thesis.

This is where we have chosen to end our examination of Aristotelian philosophy. It is hard to tear ourselves away, for the more we go into detail the more interesting it becomes and the more we find that it all hangs

together. Aristotelian philosophy also acquired the label 'Peripatetic philosophy', and in Cicero's day, for example, it became increasingly a kind of popular philosophy rather than one that elaborated Aristotle's profound and speculative approach and brought it to [general] awareness.[256] If we have tarried too long in this first period we can now make up for lost time, because in the next period we can be brief.

256. On the term 'Peripatetic philosophy', see p. 229 above. Tennemann may have influenced Hegel to say that in Cicero's day it had become 'popular philosophy'. He writes (*Geschichte*, iii. 345) that Lyco, Hieronymous of Rhodes, Ariston of Ceos, and Critolaus (all Peripatetics of the third and second centuries BC) constricted the scope of philosophy, and that they, and Straton of Lampsacus too (also a third-century Peripatetic leader), advanced the science of the basis of human knowing not one whit. Tennemann's characterization of it as a 'doctrine of happiness' accords with Hegel's portrait of eighteenth-century popular philosophy; see Vol. III of this edition. What Hegel neglects to mention is that Cicero's era was marked by renewed study of Aristotelian philosophy, and not just because Aristotelian writings were rediscovered and brought to Rome. The first scholarly edition of the Aristotelian corpus was prepared by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century BC.

## II. DOGMATIC AND SKEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY

### *INTRODUCTION*

The first period of Greek philosophy extended down to Aristotle, to his way of shaping [philosophical] science. The need that now arises has to stem from, or be comprised in, the point to which philosophy developed under Plato and Aristotle. This immediate need is in fact none other than the need for the universality of the principle—the need that one principle be emphasized and be made valid in a universal way. We have seen the [definition of] science found in Aristotle, but there the speculative element was not brought to consciousness as the concept on its own account; still less was it established as the universal from which the particular | was to be developed. 100
Aristotle and Plato both proceeded in the main empirically; they took up various representations and examined them thoroughly. This informal style is particularly prevalent in Aristotle. The most profound need, then, is for the universal to be grasped freely on its own account, the need for a universal principle for all particularity; and this is the standpoint that we reach in this second period. Here we have to treat Dogmatism and Skepticism—a dogmatism that divides into two philosophies, Stoicism and Epicureanism, and the third philosophy, in which they both participate but which is nonetheless their 'other', or contrary, Skepticism.

Two characteristics constitute the chief interest in all the many emergent Socratic schools. One of them is the criterion—a principle in accord with which everything must be determined and everything can be judged; this is the universal principle on its own account, a principle that at the same time also is determinative of the particular. We have already encountered some abstract principles of this sort before, for instance, the principle of pure being, which states that only being *is* and the particular, which begins with negation—for the particular does, after all, begin with the negative—or with the distinguishing from others, *is not*.[1] That principle of being is universal, although it is posited as not in any way existent. But now, on the contrary, the need is for a universal that would at the same time be what determines the particular, one that has to be within the particular. What is particular is not just left to one side, for it too is valid as something determined by the universal.

1. For the Eleatic version of such abstract principles of pure being and negation, see pp. 57–66 above.

The second paramount characteristic is the figure of the sage. Thinking, the criterion, the principle in its immediate actuality, is precisely the self-contained subject. Thinking and the thinker are immediately connected. So what we need to make provision for is the subject. It should be free and
101 independent; it should be in conformity with | the criterion, that is, with the wholly universal principle. The subject should elevate itself into this universality and freedom, this independence. These are then the basic concerns and basic characteristics of the philosophies that follow. Our next task will be to present the principal theses; but it serves no purpose and is of no interest to go into details.

## *A. DOGMATIC PHILOSOPHY*

### Introduction

So we shall examine dogmatic philosophy first. Dogmatic philosophy sets up a determinate principle or criterion, and indeed only a single principle of this sort. The one principle, then, can be only the principle of universality itself, and the other the principle of singularity—in one case, the principle that thinking is the determinant, and, in the second, sensation (Stoicism and Epicureanism [respectively]). In contrast, the third position is the negation of every criterion, of all determinate principles, whatever kind they may be—the negation of representing or knowing, whether of a sensuous, a reflective, or a thoughtful sort. This is Skepticism.

We have already come across these principles before, with the Cynics and the Cyrenaics.[2] Stoicism is nothing but Cynicism more clearly elaborated by thought, and Epicureanism in like fashion has in common with Cyrenaic [philosophy] the principle of sensation—but in such a way that this principle is more freely established on its own account. In Cicero it is extremely difficult to distinguish the principle of the Stoics from that of the Cynics and, likewise, to distinguish what the principle of Peripatetic morals is. One
102 aspect, therefore, is the principle or the | criterion; the other is the fact that the subject conforms to this principle and by so doing acquires for itself the freedom and independence of spirit—the inner freedom of the self-contained subject. This freedom of spirit, this impassibility, this ἀδιαφορία or ἀταραξία, indifference or imperturbability, this independence or complete unshakeableness of the spirit that has ties to nothing and is affected by nothing—this is [what we recognize as] the shared goal of all these philosophies, no matter

2. For Hegel's discussion of the Cyrenaics and the Cynics, see pp. 163–75 above.

how cheerless our image of Skepticism or how low our opinion of Epicureanism. This imperturbability is the actual effect in all of them.

The shared standpoint of all these philosophies is that spirit's satisfaction consists only in indifference, in freedom over against all else. They are Greek philosophies, to be sure, but they are transposed into the Roman world. The concrete element—the concrete ethical life we find in Plato and the concrete science in Aristotle—recedes into the background or vanishes here. In the unhappiness of the Roman world everything noble and beautiful in spiritual individuality had been destroyed by the cold, rough hand of violence, and in this world of abstraction individuals had to seek within themselves in an abstract way for the satisfaction that outward life did not afford them. They had to escape to the abstraction of thought, to the abstraction of self as existing subject, namely, to this inner freedom of the subject as such. | So 103
these Greek philosophies were fitted in with the mode of the Roman world.

## 1. Stoicism

### *a. The Principal Stoics*

The founder of the Stoic school is Zeno, from Citium, a city in Cyprus. His father, a merchant, travelled to Athens, the seat of philosophy, and from there he brought back books by the Socratics. This awakened in Zeno the desire for philosophy, whereupon he travelled to Athens himself. (Incidentally, he is supposed to have lost all his possessions in a shipwreck.) He is said to have been born [in the] 109th Olympiad.[3]

In losing his possessions he did not, however, lose his nobility of spirit or his love for rational insight.[4] He spent much time with Socratics, especially

3. For these biographical details Hegel draws upon Diogenes Laertius, *De vitis*, bk. 7. For his origins and for mention of the shipwreck, see 7.1–2; other information in this paragraph comes from 7.31–2 and 7.38; see *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 2 vols. trans. R. D. Hicks, (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1925), ii. 142–3, 148–9. His year of birth is not given as the 109th Olympiad by Diogenes or by Hegel's other main sources, Brucker, Tiedemann, or Tennemann. Tiedemann says that Zeno died at 73 or 83 years of age, in the 143rd Olympiad (thus, 208–205 BC); see Dieterich Tiedemann, *Geist der spekulativen Philosophie*, 6 vols. (Marburg, 1791–7), ii. 432. By this reckoning he would have been born between 291 and 278 BC, which is surely too late. Hegel could have taken his date from Zeno's being a contemporary of Epicurus (see p. 266 just below), who was born in the 109th Olympiad. According to more recent research, Zeno lived between 354 and 262 BC, a conclusion more nearly in accord with the report of Diogenes (7.6; Hicks, ii. 116–17) that in the 130th Olympiad (260–257 BC), Zeno was already an old man.

4. This sentence is Hegel's interpretation of Zeno's reaction to the shipwreck, as reported by Diogenes: 'It is well done of thee, Fortune, thus to drive me to philosophy' (*Lives* 7.5; Hicks, ii. 114–15).

with Stilpo and with Plato's disciple Xenocrates, and he studied Heraclitean philosophy too.[5] He became very well known owing to the strictness of his ethics. He began teaching in a portico, the στοὰ ποικιλή (called 'decorated' because of the collection of paintings by Polygnotus there). From the portico his philosophy acquired the name 'Stoic philosophy'.[6]

His main concern was to unify philosophy into a whole. He possessed great dialectical skill and cultivation, and extreme acuteness in arguing. He lived according to a strict ethics, but without drawing attention to himself as the Cynics did. His moderation was pronounced, his diet being limited to water, bread, figs, and honey. His contemporaries held him in high regard, and the public placed great confidence in him. Antigonus, king of Macedon, visited him often and dined with him. Diogenes Laertius has preserved a letter from him to Zeno, with Zeno's reply. The Athenians entrusted to Zeno
104 the keys to the citadel of | Athens. He was a contemporary of Epicurus and of Arcesilaus, and he died at an advanced age. Having had his fill of living and being weary of it, he committed suicide with a rope, or else by starvation. He is said to have grown weary of living because he had broken one of his fingers.[7]

Of the subsequent Stoic philosophers, Cleanthes in particular became renowned. He was a disciple of Zeno and was his successor in the Stoa. He composed a famous hymn to God. According to a well-known anecdote, he was summoned before the tribunal in Athens to give an account of his means of livelihood. Cleanthes proved that at night he carried water for a

5. Diogenes Laertius says that Zeno studied with Crates and 'attended the lectures of Stilpo and Xenocrates for ten years' (*Lives* 7.2; Hicks, ii. 110–11). Hegel does not mention Crates here, nor in *W.* xiv. 431. The report on his study of Heraclitean philosophy comes from Ioannes Albertus Fabricius, *Bibliotheca Graeca*, 14 vols. (Hamburg, 1705–28), iii. 413, a text cited by Jacob Brucker, *Historia critica philosophiae*, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1742–4), i. 899; see also Tiedemann (*Geist*, ii. 428).

6. Diogenes Laertius is the source for this remark, which he makes about the ethics of Xenocrates, Zeno's teacher (*Lives* 4.6–9; Hicks, i. 380–5), and for this account of the origin of the name 'Stoic' (7.5; Hicks, ii. 114–17).

7. Brucker (*Historia*, i. 897–8) mentions Zeno's skill in arguing and his moderate diet; cf. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 7.13; Hicks, ii. 122–3), who also refers to the encounters with King Antigonus (including an erroneous report that Antigonus dined with him), and supplies the text of the (apocryphal) correspondence between them (*Lives* 7.6–9, 13; Hicks, ii. 116–25). According to the letters, Antigonus invited Zeno to come and instruct all the Macedonians in the paths of virtue, but Zeno declined owing to his advanced age. The beginning of the same passage (7.6) also tells of this honor that the Athenians bestowed on him. Zeno was about the same age as Epicurus and a generation older than Arcesilaus; see pp. 279 and 295 below. Diogenes says that Zeno died at age 98, by holding his breath after having fallen and broken a toe (7.28); he also mentions, in an epigram, the view of some that Zeno committed suicide by starvation (7.31); see Hicks, ii. 138–43.

gardener and in this way he earned enough to live. Thereupon a donation from the public treasury was given to him, but Zeno did not allow him to accept the gift. He too ended his life of his own free will, by ceasing to take any nourishment.[8] Zeno enjoyed even higher esteem than he did. The people of Athens issued a decree [stating that]: 'Because Zeno has lived in our city as a philosopher, and moreover has proven himself to be a good man, and the youths he instructed he has led into virtue and moderation, showing them the way as well by his own outstanding example, therefore the citizens of Athens grant him a public eulogy and confer on him a golden crown; also, he is to be buried in the Ceramicus at public expense.'[9]

Among the later Stoics we could name many more who became famous. Chrysippus, who was born in the 125th Olympiad and died in the 143rd Olympiad, was a particularly distinguished man. [He contributed greatly to the] widespread dissemination of Stoic philosophy. His distinction rested particularly on his logic and dialectic, which were so outstanding that people said if the gods needed dialectic they would use only that of Chrysippus. He was very industrious, for according to Diogenes Laertius he wrote 705 works. Most of them, however, were | compilations, and partly, too, 105
reiterations, so that it was said of him: 'If we took away all that belongs to others, all that would be left as his would be the blank paper.'[10] At any rate this much is correct, that he especially elaborated the Stoic logic. Prominent later on were Diogenes of Seleucia, and Panaetius, who was Cicero's teacher; and later still came Seneca [and] Epictetus, a Phrygian who started out as a slave. When Domitian banished the philosophers from Rome [in AD] 94, Epictetus fled to Nicopolis in Epirus. His pupil Arrian compiled his [teacher's] *Enchiridion.* Last of all came the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus.[11]

8. Diogenes Laertius is the source for these elements from a longer account of Cleanthes' life and the circumstances of his death (*Lives* 7.168–9, 176; Hicks, ii. 272–5, 282–5); see also 7.37 (Hicks, ii. 148–9) for his place in the succession in Zeno's school. The hymn to Zeus is transmitted by Stobaeus, *Ecologae physicae* 1.1.12; see *Ioannes Stobaeus: Anthologii libri duo priores* ..., ed. Curtius Wachsmuth (1884; repr. Berlin, 1958), i. 25–7.

9. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 7.9–12; Hicks, ii. 118–23) presents a full account, including the text of the decree from which this quotation is excerpted. The Ceramicus was the cemetery of Athens.

10. Diogenes Laertius says (*Lives* 7.184; Hicks, ii. 292–3) that Chrysippus died at the age of 73 in the 143rd Olympiad, from which Hegel inferred a birth date in the 125th Olympiad. Diogenes also speaks about Chrysippus' reputation for dialectic and his voluminous writings, and he is the source for this quotation about his lack of originality (7.180–1; Hicks, ii. 288–91).

11. Diogenes Laertius briefly mentions Diogenes of Seleucia, also called 'the Babylonian' (*Lives* 6.81; 7.39, 55, 58, 71), and Panaetius, one of the most important transmitters of Stoic thought to the Romans (2.64, 87; 3.37; 7.41, 92, 142, 163; 9.20); see Hicks, i. 192–3, 216–17,

The sources on which [the ancients] could rely for the Stoic philosophy are no longer extant. But the sources from which we can derive our knowledge of Stoic philosophy are still well known; they include Cicero, himself a Stoic, and in particular Sextus Empiricus, who devoted a lot of attention to the Stoics. Sextus' presentation is mainly theoretical and is of philosophical interest. But Seneca, Arrian, and Diogenes Laertius are vital to consult too, as is Stobaeus, who is an auxiliary source.

As for the philosophy itself, we see here for the first time the more definite division of philosophy into three parts, namely, logic, physics or natural philosophy, and ethics (philosophy of spirit, particularly in its practical aspect).

*b. Logic*

The issue here is to determine the source of our cognition of what is true,
106 to determine what the criterion is. | Each of the various schools has its own distinctive terminology. In that of the Stoics the criterion is called the representation in thought, the 'cataleptic' phantasy, φαντασία καταληπτική. It embraces the true and the good. The true (and the like) is a representation insofar as it is thought or conceived and conforms on the whole to reason.[12] A more precise distinction is then drawn between the different modes of consciousness and the cataleptic phantasy, inasmuch as the latter is determined by thinking consciousness. Zeno clarifies this by an example. He opens his hand and says: 'That is intuition, sensation, immediate consciousness.

310–11; ii. 82–5, 150–1, 164–7, 178–9, 198–9, 246–7, 266–7, 428–9. See also p. 298 below. On Cicero's acquaintance with Panaetius, see his *De natura deorum* 2.118; trans., together with the *Academica*, H. Rackham, rev. edn. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1951), 234–5. See also his *De officiis* 3.7.33–4; trans. Walter Miller (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1913), 298–301. Panaetius lived in the second century BC and cannot actually have been Cicero's teacher, although he did instruct Posidonius, who in turn instructed Cicero; see *De natura deorum* 1.6 (Rackham, pp. 8–9). Hegel has disparaging things to say about Seneca's tragedies, in the *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 221, 759–60; he owned several editions of Seneca (see the Bibliography of Hegel's Sources). For these remarks on Epictetus and on Domitian, see Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 2.18.11, 15.11.5; see *Attic Nights*, trans. John C. Rolfe, 3 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1927; rev. edn., 1946–52), i. 172–3; iii. 88–9. The statement about Epictetus' flight to Epirus is taken from the unpaginated preface to *Arrians Epictet*, German trans. by J. G. Schulthess (Zurich, 1766). On Marcus Aurelius, see p. 277 below.

12. For Sextus Empiricus, Hegel's source here, the 'cataleptic phantasy' concerns only truth and not, as Hegel says, also 'the good'. See *Adversus mathematicos* 7.227, 248; see *Sextus Empiricus*, trans. R. G. Bury, 4 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1933–48), ii. 122–3, 132–3. Perhaps Diogenes Laertius influenced Hegel with this statement about the Stoics: 'Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it' (*Lives* 7.46; Hicks, ii. 156–7).

The fingers partially curled up express assent, the mind's assent to the representation. The clenched hand or the fist is the concept, κατάληψις.'[13] In German we find the same figurative expression in the word '*begreifen*' [conceive]. The first stage is sensible determination. In the second a spontaneity enters into the apprehending; but any fool can assent too, and assent may be weak and false. In the third stage, however, the conceiving makes the representation into truth as such, and scientific knowledge is then a firm, certain, unshakeable comprehension arrived at by thinking, which is the guiding and controlling element in this knowledge. In the middle, between science and the apprehending, lies the true concept, the cataleptic phantasy.[14]

The concept as such is still not yet scientific knowledge. Science consists of insight into the grounds; it involves determinate cognition of the object by

13. See Cicero, *Academica* 2.47.146 (Rackham, pp. 652–5), from which this paraphrase within quotation marks comes. Cf. *W.* xiv. 444 (MS?).

14. First we have to distinguish sheer imaginings, which can also involve hallucinations, from representations, which derive from an actual impression on the soul; see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.49 (Hicks, ii. 158–9) and Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 7.247–9 (Bury, ii. 132–5). 'Representation' (φαντασία) is the genus and the 'cataleptic representation' or phantasy (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία) is one of its species. What Hegel here calls 'sensible determination' corresponds to 'representation as such', as an impression on the soul caused by sensible objects, in which the soul is thought of as passive. See Diogenes, 7.46 (Hicks, ii. 154–7). Sextus compares it to an impression made on wax (*Adv. math.* 7.228) and further expounds its dependence on that which causes it (7.247, 8.398); see Bury, ii. 122–3, 132–3, 446–7. The second form of consciousness, which Hegel already designates as 'spontaneity', takes place through assent (συγκατάθεσις), a power the Stoics attribute even to animals and to persons who are not wise (slaves, madmen and the like)—so reports Cicero, *Academica* 2.12.38, 48, 144–5 (Rackham, pp. 514–15, 526–9, 652–3). Speaking as an academic (Skeptic) in the dialogue, Cicero shows divergences among the Stoics and denies that the Stoic participants have knowledge (2.46.144; Rackham, pp. 652–5). Next follows Zeno's illustration involving the hand and the fist. Hegel regards conceptual activity proper as taking place only at the stage of the fist, not before. In this paragraph and the next Hegel speaks of comprehension or scientific knowledge as the stage beyond cataleptic phantasy (the fist, or the concept), whereas Cicero places *comprensio* at this level. On the relationships of assent (συγκατάθεσις), conceiving (κατάληψις), and cataleptic phantasy (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία) to one another, see Sextus 7.152–3 and 11.182 (Bury, ii. 82–5, iii. 472–3). Sextus' account is closer to 'middle' Stoicism and that of later Roman times than it is to earlier forms. In earlier Stoicism 'assent' counts as a spontaneous act immediately linked with the cataleptic phantasy; whereas in later forms conceiving (κατάληψις) and the cataleptic phantasy come to be viewed as the final outcome of a carefully thought-out and well-grounded critique of sense experience, one that involves judgment and comparisons. Under the influence of the critique by Carneades, a New Academy Skeptic, the acceptance of immediate sense perception lost favor. The fourth form (for the Stoics—Hegel includes it in the 'third stage') is scientific knowledge, presented in Cicero's version of the analogy as the other hand squeezing the fist. According to Diogenes (*Lives* 7.39; Hicks, ii. 148–9) this science or philosophic doctrine embraces three domains: physics, ethics, and logic. On thinking as the 'guiding and controlling' element, see p. 271 below.

107 thinking. The Stoics say that the truth is contained in thinking; | there is a content or an object that is at the same time being thought, so that thinking gives its assent—an agreement of the object with the subjective element, with thinking, but such that the thinking is what predominates. The truth of objects consists in the correspondence of the objective element with thinking. This does not mean, however, that representations agree with objects, for the object could be altered, false, or contingent, and then it would be untrue, not true for spirit.[15]

This, then, is the principal definition for the Stoics. Sextus Empiricus grasps it as follows: 'The Stoics say that only some of what is sensible and is thought is true, and it is not true immediately. What is sensed is true only inasmuch as it enters into relation, ἀναφορά, with the thoughts corresponding to it.'[16] So immediate thinking too is not what is true, for it is so only insofar as it corresponds to logos and as, through explication of the rational aspect, it is known as corresponding to rational thinking. Then it is what is universal.

As we have already noted, the Stoics occupied themselves in greater detail with logical categories too, with the laws of thinking. Chrysippus especially did so, but he goes too far in the direction of formalism. The first syllogism is a wholly formal mode of reasoning: 'When it is day it is light; but now it is night; consequently it is not light, and so on.'[17] This is thus a wholly formal
108 principle. The universal is what is true. |

Thinking must have a content, it must have reality, a specificity, and this content should correspond to the thinking. This is quite correct and it is also concrete, but it is only a wholly formal determinacy. There should be determinacy, but it remains a specification, one that is said to be specific but is only formally so.

Sextus Empiricus derides the Stoics especially from the following angle. Thinking in the abstract is something simple and incorporeal that neither suffers [effects] nor is active, that is identical to itself. How then, asks Sextus, can an impression be made upon this simple element, how can change take

15. According to *W.* xiv. 451 (MS?), Hegel thinks that for the Stoics the foundational science is logic (dialectic) and the other two sciences, physics and ethics, rest upon it. Diogenes Laertius supports this view (*Lives* 7.83; Hicks, ii. 190–1); see his fuller account of the Stoic sciences (7.39–48, especially 46–7; Hicks, ii. 148–59). That the Stoic theory of knowledge stresses correspondence of the objective element with thinking rather than agreement of representations with objects—an important point for Hegel—gives Sextus Empiricus reason to object to Stoicism; see *Adv. math.* 11.183 (Bury, iii. 472–3).

16. See *Adv. math.* 8.10 (Bury, ii. 244–5).

17. This is Chrysippus' second example of the kind of statement that is indemonstrable because it does not need demonstration; see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.79–80 (Hicks, ii. 186–9).

place in it?[18] This chief difficulty—that of deriving something particular, or a determination, from the universal, of showing how the universal determines itself so as to become the particular and, in doing so, is at the same time identical—certainly attracted the attention of the Skeptics. The basic point here is in a way quite correct, although it is at the same time wholly formal. It is the major consideration of the Stoic philosophy.

*c. Philosophy of Nature*

We have now to treat in more detail the main foundation of the Stoic physics, where the same principle is evident in its formalism. Their physics is an examination of nature. Their view of nature was that the λόγος is the substance and the active principle in nature generally, so that all natural forms [*Naturgestalten*] have it as their foundation and are productions of the *logos* (which in this aspect they called λόγος σπερματικός).[19] It is rationality as seed that develops—self-activating, self-producing *logos*. This too is an expression belonging to Stoic terminology. | 109

With regard to the more specific form of nature, the Stoics followed Heraclitus in particular, just as Zeno too occupied himself with Heraclitus' philosophy. Closer examination shows that they make fire the basic principle, the 'real' λόγος; fire is the self-subsistent deity that is primary in every particular thing, just as the seed is what is primary in all plants. Fire is as such the active principle. They go on, then, to speak in the manner of Heraclitus: 'By fire, being is transformed through air into moisture, and so forth. What is more dense becomes earth; what is more rarified becomes air. The soul too is a fiery sort of thing, and all human souls, the animal principle of vitality, and the plants as well, are parts of the universal *logos* or universal fire, and the σπέρμα is the ἡγεμονικόν, the ruling and activating element.'[20]

Thus the Stoic way of envisaging nature is a thoroughgoing pantheism. God or the world soul is the rational activity of nature.[21] This *logos* they

18. Sextus' criticism occurs in *Adv. math.* 8.400–5 (Bury, ii. 448–51). For a statement of the Stoic doctrine itself—that knowing involves an impression made upon thinking—see n. 14 just above, as well as *Adv. math.* 7.228–9 (Bury, ii. 122–5).

19. For an account of these Stoic doctrines of the λόγος, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.134–6 (Hicks, ii. 238–41); cf. *W.* xiv. 438 (MS?).

20. On Zeno's study of Heraclitus, see p. 266 above. On Heraclitus' cosmology, see pp. 73–82 above, especially n. 210. This 'quotation' is actually a paraphrase of elements drawn from Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.142, 156, followed by 134 and 136 (Hicks, ii. 246–7, 260–1, 238–41). Diogenes does not actually say in this context that the σπέρμα is the ἡγεμονικόν, but only that 'God, who is the seminal reason of the universe', is the active principle in the world (7.136).

21. On equating God with a principle immanent in the world, see the preceding note as well as Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.137–9 (Hicks, ii. 240–3), which says that 'cosmos' has three senses for the Stoics: (1) God as artificer of the universe; (2) the orderly arrangement of the stars; (3) the

called 'God' as well as *physis* and also 'fate' (εἱμαρμένη, necessity), the moving force of the material domain; and, so far as this is a necessity that produces, they called it 'providence' too. They say that all beginning in nature and in the soul springs from this ruling, guiding power; the members and all the energies of individual organs are dispatched by this ruling power as from a source and are set into activity, so that the energy of each part is in the whole as well. So the whole embraces all σπέρματα, all particular principles.[22] Consequently Stoic pantheism attaches itself to the most commonplace representations of the gods, to every kind of superstition and of belief
110 in miracles.[23] Epicurus set out to liberate human beings | from superstition; the Stoics, however, are the most superstitious of all.[24]

Cicero presents a great deal of his *De natura deorum* as Stoic argumentation. Just as we have seen the Stoics speak of God as universal necessity, so too they speak of individual gods. The *logos* is also treated in connection with the human purpose and with human [history], and in this mode of its self-expression it is called 'providence'; this brings them closer to the [ordinary] depiction of the particular gods.[25] Cicero says that the Stoics argue in this way: 'If there are gods and if they do not disclose future happenings to human beings, then the gods do not love them, or the gods themselves do not know what is to come, or the gods suppose it a matter of indifference whether human beings know it, or else it is not in keeping with the gods' majesty to disclose the future to them.' They controvert all these alternatives and, as a result, conclude that the gods must make the future known to

whole embracing the other two. The latter two senses do not undercut the pantheistic character of the first. But see (in 7.139) where Chrysippus is said to hold that the ἡγεμονικόν is 'the purer part of the aether', which is 'preeminently God', and 7.147 (Hicks, ii. 250–3), which presents a more theistic portrait of Stoic theology, including reference to the deities of Greek folk religion. See also pp. 318–19 below.

22. On these attributes of God for the Stoics, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.135 (Hicks, ii. 240–1), as well as the preceding note, and also Stobaeus, *Eclogae physicae* 1.5.178 (Wachsmuth, i. 78), who cites Zeno as equating providence with nature. On the 'ruling, guiding power', see Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 9.101–3 (Bury, iii. 56–7). Cf. *W.* xiv. 440–1 (MS?).

23. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.147, on this connection of Stoicism with folk religion, and 7.149, on superstition and belief in miracles (Hicks, ii. 250–3).

24. Hegel's formulation here echoes the speech of Velleius the Epicurean against Stoic theology, in Cicero's *De natura deorum* 1.54–6 (Rackham, pp. 54–5). See also n. 57, p. 285, as well as pp. 291–2 below.

25. Stoic theology is the theme of *De natura deorum*, bk. 2. In its introduction Balbus the Stoic announces that he will address four issues: (1) the gods' existence; (2) their nature; (3) their governance of the world; (4) their concern for human well-being (2.3; Rackham, pp. 124–5). On God as universal necessity, see just above in our text, together with nn. 22, 24. On the teleological interpretation of the world and on providence, see *De natura deorum* 2.58, 154, 162 (Rackham, pp. 178–9, 270–3, 278–9). On the particular gods, see 2.60–3 (Rackham, pp. 180–5).

human beings in advance.[26] They provide a defense and justification for every sort of external, teleological superstition.

*d. Stoic Morals*

The theoretical side of spirit or of knowing falls under the heading of logic, the investigation of the criterion, and we have already spoken about that. But Stoic philosophy is most famous for its morals; Diogenes Laertius presents the fullest account of this topic. An animal's primary desire is for self-preservation in keeping with its original character. The primary thing is the animal's harmony with itself and its sensibility of that, its sense of self [*Selbstgefühl*], of not relinquishing itself [*sich nicht zu entäussern*]. This sense of self leads it to reject what is injurious to it and to | accept what 111
is useful to it. Human beings act in this way too; their nature and attributes are directed to self-preservation, though with conscious purpose, prudently, in accord with the *logos*. The *logos* is in plants too, as seed, the λόγος σπερματικός, but it is not in them as purpose, it is not what concerns them [*ihr Gegenstand*]; they know nothing of it. In the human case, however, reason is the artist of our impulses. The λόγος makes a work of art out of what in animals is only instinct. For this reason the Stoics' general principle is to live in conformity with nature, namely, to live in accordance with virtue, and that is what nature itself leads us to.[27] But we see at once that with this approach we are only led about formally, in a circle. The *logos* alone determines what is held to be in conformity with nature. What is in conformity with nature has this value only because the *logos* so determines it, and we thus find ourselves merely on a formal footing.

They further define conformity to nature as what experience, or insight into the laws of universal nature and of our own nature, shows to be salutary. This universal nature is the universal law, right reason, or εἱμαρμένη that permeates all things—our own right reason and universal right reason, Jupiter, the director of the system of things.[28] So none of this gets beyond the general formalism of their system.

One of the main forms in morals, one found in Cicero too, is the *summum bonum, finis bonorum et malorum*, the highest good. For the Stoics the

26. See *De divinatione* 2.49.101–2, in which Cicero has an Epicurean spokesperson recapitulate the Stoic position on the gods' disclosure of future events. See the English translation by William A. Falconer, *De senectute, De amicitia, De divinatione*, (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1923), 484–7. See also n. 66, p. 288 below.

27. For Diogenes' account of these characteristics of animals and plants, and of the λόγος operating in nature, see *Lives* 7.85–7 (Hicks, ii. 192–5); cf. *W.* xiv. 453–4 (MS?).

28. For this further explication of life in conformity to nature, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.87–8 (Hicks, ii. 194–7); cf. *W.* xiv. 454–5 (MS?).

universal principle is right reason and the fact that this reason must be adhered to firmly for its own sake. This brings directly into play the contrast between virtue and happiness or, in its abstract form, the contrast between thinking or λόγος in general and its determination.[29]

What we see in the Stoics' case, and what makes them stand out, is that the human being, the sage, acts solely according to reason. This 'acting according to reason' involves more specifically one's inward abstraction, a
112 self-contained concentration such | that one forswears, or is indifferent toward, everything pertaining merely to immediate sensation and to instinct. This wholly formal principle of a cohesiveness that is only inward, a thinking that keeps to pure harmony with itself, involves the renunciation of, or posture of indifference toward, every particular enjoyment, inclination, passion, and interest. In this lies the strength, the inner independence, the inward freedom of spirit and character that is the hallmark of the Stoics.[30]

Much more is then said in detail about where happiness or enjoyment is to be sought. 'Happiness' in the general sense is the consciousness or feeling of harmony with oneself. In sensory enjoyment what is pleasant is agreeable to us; here we find harmony with ourselves. In the opposite case what is unpleasant involves, on the contrary, the negation of our instincts, a lack of correspondence with them. It was, then, this very harmony of the inner aspect of the human being with itself, by means of thinking, that the Stoics posited as essential; enjoyment is then the consciousness, or just the feeling, of this harmony. But for the Stoics this harmony is essentially posited only as the inner aspect being in harmony with itself as inner, so that enjoyment is itself a feature of virtue; yet this enjoyment is a secondary feature or a consequence that in this respect ought not to be made one's goal but ought only to be viewed as something accessory to it.[31]

This Stoic resoluteness [*Energie*], the fact that a human being need only seek to remain identical to self, need only attain and preserve this status, need only be free—this is their hallmark. It derives from the formal principle that we have mentioned. Thus the principle of Stoic morals is the concord of

29. Hegel refers here to Cicero, *De finibus bonorum et malorum*, the third part of which is given to the presentation of Stoic philosophy. On the concept of the highest good (the *summum bonum*) and on the function of right reason, see 3.6.21–7.26, especially 21 and 23 (on right reason); see the English translation by H. Rackham, 2nd edn. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1931), 238–45.

30. This paragraph is based on Cicero, *De finibus* 3.7.26 (Rackham, pp. 244–5). On the ideal of the sage, see also p. 276 below.

31. This paragraph is based on Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.85–6, 88–9, 94–5 (Hicks, ii. 192–7, 200–3). For the Stoics, however, as Diogenes states, the goal is not just inner harmony with oneself but also harmony with the universal reason of the cosmos.

spirit with itself. But what matters is that this principle not remain [just] formal; so there arises forthwith the antithesis between inward cohesiveness and what it no longer embraces, what it excludes. A human being is said both to be free and to be related to what is other; but in being so related one is not free but dependent. My freedom or my unity | with self is only the one 113
side, and for this reason the other side or the particular side of my existence, my happiness, does not yet correspond to it.

So what came to the fore at this time was the ancient issue of the harmony of virtue (morality) with happiness. 'Morality' involves the added characteristic that what I do should not merely be my will as something that has become part of my character, as in the case of virtue; for 'morality' is linked with my conviction arising from insight, or with my subjective reflection, in that what I do conforms to the universal, rational definitions of duty, honor, and the like. In one respect [i.e. subjectively] this is an unavoidable question or problem that has occupied us too, in the era of Kantian philosophy.

The point essential for its resolution is to establish what happiness is. We hear many trivial things said about happiness, for instance, that the virtuous often fare ill while the wicked prosper, are happy, and so forth. In this talk, 'faring well in the world' embraces all sorts of outward, contingent circumstances, and the content generally is something quite trite, namely, the attainment of everyday goals. It consists of intentions and interests; but they are the sort of intentions and interests that transparently are only something contingent and external. We must quickly get beyond this way of posing the problem, beyond such external satisfactions as wealth, rank, and the like. These are not commensurate with the virtue of morality. So the issue hinges on how 'happiness' is to be understood; [and] in any case we must at once put out of our minds what is external or given over to chance.

So the Stoics said that happiness is the enjoyment or sensation of this harmony itself, but it is to be posited only as inner freedom, independence, inner harmony with oneself. The enjoyment of inner harmony with oneself | *is* happiness.[32] They were laughed at for saying that pain is no evil.[33] 114
Toothache and other such pains are irrelevant to this problem. These things are unpleasant, but we must know that all people are subjected to pains of this sort; they are something quite different from unhappiness. We will have more to say about this later on.

32. See the preceding note.

33. Cato, Cicero's spokesman for Stoic ethics in the *De finibus*, says that the sage can endure torture on the rack because 'the intensity of the pain depends on the state of mind of the sufferer, not on its own intrinsic nature' (3.13.42; Rackham, pp. 260–3). See also Cicero, *Tusculanae quaestiones* 2.25.61; *Tusculan Disputations*, trans. J. E. King, rev. edn. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1945), 214–17.

The only possible way of understanding the problem is to see that it calls for a harmony of rational willing with external reality. External reality embraces the sphere of particular existence too, the sphere of subjectivity, of the personal and of particular interests; but only what is universal in these interests pertains to this reality, for only insofar as the interest is universal can it harmonize with rational willing. The Stoics could indeed say that such pains and sorrows are no evil, namely, that there is no evil by which my identity with myself, or my freedom, can be destroyed; that evil cannot separate me from myself; that in my cohesion with myself I am exalted above anything of this sort; that I may indeed be sensible of it, but it ought not to split me asunder. The sensation of my inward self-identity is happiness, and this is not destroyed by external ills, for it does not preclude the sensation of pain. What is great in the Stoic philosophy is the consciousness of inner freedom, the fact that if the will maintains its cohesion then nothing can intrude upon it, that all else is kept outside it and the [removal of] pain cannot become the purpose that is to be satisfied.

The Stoic approach [to ethics] included setting up an ideal of the sage, namely, none other than the will of the subject that inwardly wills only itself, wills only its freedom, and is prepared to give up everything else; the will that cordons off from the inwardness of its consciousness any outward pain
115 or misfortune of which it might be aware. | The sage is uncorrupted by fear or desire. Whatever has to do with desire or fear he does not reckon to be his own but accords it the status of something alien to him. The Stoics say that the sage is the ruler who is not bound to the law and only follows reason, who is absolved from [obedience to] all specific laws.[34] This involves the indeterminateness of abstract freedom, of abstract independence. When the consciousness of my freedom is my goal, then all particular determinations are swallowed up and vanish in this universal goal. These particular determinations of freedom are the laws and duties [of a citizen]; as particular determinations they vanish in the universality of this freedom, in the pure consciousness of my autonomy.

Thus in the Stoics we see the strength of the will that does not reckon what is particular as belonging to its own being, that withdraws from it. We see, on the one hand, that this principle is a true one, but, on the other hand, as well that it remains abstract. So its implication is not that the condition of the

34. On this Stoic ideal, see pp. 273–5 above, as well as Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.116–25 (Hicks, ii. 220–9), which treats the freedom of the sage in relation to fear and desire, and to obedience to laws. In *W.* xiv. 467 (MS?) Hegel mentions freedom to commit incest or engage in cannibalism. Sextus Empiricus includes these in an account of normally forbidden behaviors of which the Stoics are said to approve (*Adv. math.* 9.190–4; Bury, iii. 476–9).

world should be rational and just, but only that the subject as such should maintain its inner freedom. Hence everything that takes place outside, all that is in the world, every circumstance of the sort, takes on a merely negative status as an *adiaphoron* [something indifferent], which I must relinquish.[35] Here there is no demand for the real harmony of rationality as such with the existence of determinate being, nor is there anything that we can express as objective ethical life and justice. Plato established the ideal of a 'Republic', that is, a human condition that would be rational.[36] This rational condition of humanity in the state—the objectivity of right, ethics, and custom—constitutes the *real* side of the rational; and only through a rational condition of this kind is it posited concretely that what is external corresponds as well to what is internal; then this harmony is present in this concrete sense. | 116

From the Stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius we also have the writings *Ad se ipsum* [*Meditations*]. With regard to morality, strength of virtuous will and meditation upon oneself, nothing finer than this book can be found. He was an excellent emperor and he bore himself nobly and justly in his private life too. But the circumstance of the Roman Empire was not altered by having this deep and fundamental thinker as its emperor, and nothing deterred his successor, who was of quite different character, from condoning in turn a state of affairs every bit as wretched as that which marked his own caprice and wickedness.[37]

It is a much higher and an inward principle of spirit or rational will that also realizes itself in a way that gives rise to a state of affairs based on a rational constitution, a state of affairs marked by culture and law. Only when rationality gains this objective status are the attributes that converge in the sage or in the ideal made secure. What we have then is a system of ethical relationships, and these relationships are duties; they constitute a single system in which all the attributes are in their proper places, are subordinated one to another with the higher ones in control.

Then conscience, which is nobler than Stoic freedom, comes to be constrained—the attributes make themselves secure in the mind and the

35. For a list of good, evil, and indifferent or neutral things respectively, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.101–2 (Hicks, ii. 206–7). In one of its two senses, 'indifferent' denotes a class of things that, while not necessary components of either happiness or misery, can afford happiness in certain ways. So Hegel is too extreme in saying that every *adiaphoron* must be relinquished; see 7.104–5 (Hicks, ii. 208–11).

36. See pp. 218–25 above.

37. Tiedemann (*Geist*, iii. 199–200) in particular depicts this political contrast between the reign of Marcus Aurelius and that of Commodus, his son and successor. Hegel's judgment concerning Marcus Aurelius may have been influenced by his *Meditations*, the first book of which has a strongly autobiographical character. Hegel is indirectly contrasting Marcus Aurelius with the 'philosophical king' Friedrich II of Prussia; see p. 186 above, as well as *W.* xiv. 195.

objective relationships that we call duties are not merely an external, legal condition of things but have validity within conscience too, as fixed duties or determinations. 'Conscience' means that these duties do not merely appear to be valid but they also *are* valid within me, as certain; they have the character of what is universal within me, they are acknowledged inwardly. This then is the harmony of the rational will with reality, with what is external. On the one hand, therefore, this reality is ethical; it is a legal and just condition of things, it is objective freedom, the system of freedom that
117 exists as natural necessity; | and, on the other hand, conscience is present, so that the rational is also realized within me.

The Stoic principle has not yet arrived at this concrete configuration, on the one side as *objective* ethical life and on the other as *within me*—one who has a conscience. The internal freedom of self-consciousness is the foundation, but as yet it has no concrete shape; and everything legal or ethical the Stoics defined merely as something negative, indifferent, or contingent that must be renounced. [But] in the concrete principle of spirit it is by no means indifferent what circumstance I am in. This is the universal aspect of the Stoic philosophy; what matters is to be cognizant of its standpoint, the basic attitude it adopts.

In Stoicism, consciousness adopted a posture that was quite consistent and suited to conditions in the Roman world. So the Stoic philosophy was particularly at home in the Roman world. The noble Romans did at least exemplify this negative aptitude, this indifference toward life, toward external compulsion and the like. [But] they were capable of greatness only in a subjective or negative manner—in that of a private individual.

The Roman jurists are said to have been Stoic philosophers. But we find, on the one hand, that our [modern] teachers of Roman law speak most disparagingly of philosophy as something superfluous and confusing, while, on the other hand, they are inconsistent enough to praise the Roman jurists for being philosophers. But, so far as we are acquainted with Roman law, there is to be found among the Romans, in my opinion, nothing of thought or concept, nothing philosophical—just true consistency of the understand-
118 ing but no concepts. In this respect they have a wealth of philosophy, | just as we might say this of Herr Hugo, who does not on that account really claim to be a philosopher.[38] Consistency of the understanding, and the

38. This tension between depending on philosophy and repudiating it is characteristic of the distinct procedures of Gustav Hugo and Friedrich Carl von Savigny in treating the early history of jurisprudence. In the Introduction to the *Philosophy of Right* (note on para. 3) Hegel quotes, as an example of a scholar disparaging philosophy, a passage from Hugo, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte des römischen Rechts*, fifth edn. (Berlin, 1815); see *Elements of the Philosophy of*

philosophical concept, are two different things. In Seneca we find much that edifies, stimulates, and strengthens the mind—clever antitheses, rhetoric, and dialectic; but with these moral discourses we at the same time experience a certain feeling of coldness, a certain tedium.[39]

We pass over now to the antithesis of Stoic philosophy, namely, to Epicureanism.

## 2. Epicurean Philosophy

### *a. Epicurus and his Followers*

Whereas Stoic philosophy consisted in thinking the *logos*, in consciousness of the universal, the principle of the Epicureans was the opposite, namely, the category of sensation, of what is immediately singular.

Epicurus was born at Gargettus in Attica, in the third year of the 109th Olympiad. He died in the 127th Olympiad; Aristotle [had] died in the 114th [Olympiad]. His parents were poor. His father, Neocles, was a village schoolmaster, and his mother, Chaerestrate, was a witch, that is, a woman who occupied herself with exorcisms, sorcery, and the like—a common practice at the time. His parentage was held against him by the Stoics in particular.[40] His father went with colonists to Samos but returned to Athens when [Epicurus was] 18, about the time that Aristotle was living in Chalcis. In Samos and Athens, Epicurus studied the philosophy of Democritus in

*Right*, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1991), 31. In that passage Hugo quotes with approval a negative comment on philosophy in relation to law, from Cicero's *De oratore* (1.44). See also Hugo, *Lehrbuch*, 432–3. Von Savigny places no emphasis on the philosophical education of the Roman jurists; see his *Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft* (Heidelberg, 1814), 114–15. He explicitly criticizes philosophy in his introductory, programmatic essay in the first issue (vol. i, pt. 1) of the 'Zeitschrift für geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft', which he edited together with C. F. Eichhorn and J. F. L. Göschen (Berlin, 1815), 2. There he puts philosophy, together with other approaches of which he disapproves, under the label 'the unhistorical school'.

39. This comment does not do justice to Hegel's fuller view of Seneca. In *W.* xiv. 469–70 we find, together with this same criticism directed at his tragedies (on which, see also n. 11 just above), the observation that in Seneca's abstract spirit and persistent indifference to exernalities there is in fact actualized the principle of the infinity of self-consciousness—which Hegel in another context sets in opposition to the Christian form of this principle; see *Philosophy of Religion*, iii. 137–8.

40. On his origins, his birth, and Stoic slanders against them, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.1–15 (Hicks, ii. 528–43); Diogenes says these disparaging remarks are unwarranted. Hegel disregards other Stoic calumnies against Epicurus found in Brucker (*Historia*, i. 1230–1) as well as in Diogenes (10.3–8). These include alleged excess in sexual matters, in eating and drinking, as well as the shallowness of his writings and his disparagement of other philosophers. On his father's activity as schoolmaster, see Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.72 (Rackham, pp. 70–1).

particular and made the acquaintance of many philosophers of the day.
119 | He described himself as αὐτοδίδακτος [self-taught], and he read many philosophical writings. As the teacher of his own philosophy he emerged first at Mytilene, on the island of Lesbos, and then at Lampsacus in Asia Minor. When he was 36 years old he returned to Athens, the current center of philosophy, purchased a garden of his own—*Horti Epicuri*—and taught there. He lived a regulated and very frugal life, one marked by physical frailty. For many years he could not rise from his chair. He concerned himself exclusively with the sciences, wrote much, taught, and died of kidney stones in his seventy-first year. As he lay dying he bade his friends to remember his teachings.[41]

Even Cicero praises him for his warm friendship, gentleness, and philanthropy. No other teacher has been so much loved and so revered by

41. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 10.1–2; Hicks, ii. 528–31) is Hegel's source for these details about Epicurus' early life on Samos and at Athens. 'He himself says that he first came into contact with philosophy at the age of fourteen' (10.2). His familiarity with the philosophy of Democritus could have come via the Atomist philosopher Nausiphanes of Teos (born about 360 BC), for Teos is on the mainland near the island of Samos. On Nausiphanes, see Diogenes (10.7–8, 13; Hicks, ii. 534–7, 540–1), Cicero (*De natura deorum* 1.73, 93; Rackham, pp. 70–1, 90–1), and Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. math.* 1.2–4; Bury, iv. 2–5). Nausiphanes was a pupil not of Democritus himself but of the Democritean Anaxarchus of Abdera. Nausiphanes is also said to have been a pupil of Pyrrho of Elis, whom he knew personally but who did not have a great influence on his philosophy; see Diogenes 9.64 (Hicks, ii. 476–7) and Sextus 1.2–4. Hegel's sources do not say that Epicurus studied the philosophy of Democritus while in Athens; Hegel seems to have concluded this from Epicurus' conceptual framework; see p. 284 below. According to Diogenes (10.2), Epicurus made the acquaintance of a number of philosophers on his second trip to Athens, not his first (as Hegel seems to suggest); Diogenes specifically names the Platonists Xenocrates and Pamphilus, as well as Praxiphanes, a pupil of Theophrastus; see also Cicero, 1.72 (Rackham, pp. 68–71). Since Praxiphanes was actually younger than Epicurus, perhaps the name is a mistaken textual variant for 'Nausiphanes', on which see W. Aly in *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, ed. Georg Wissowa et al. (Stuttgart, 1954), xxii, pt. 2, col. 1784. Neither Diogenes nor another source mentions in this respect Theophrastus himself, who was a contemporary of Epicurus in Athens. That Epicurus was self-taught is said to be plausible by Cotta, in Cicero's dialogue (1.72), but denied by Diogenes (10.13) and Sextus (1.3). In the passages cited Diogenes mentions the authors Epicurus read (Democritus, Anaxagoras, Archelaos) and puts the beginning of his teaching at age 32 in Mitylene and Lampsacus, with his move to Athens coming five years later. Though he won followers in Colophon, his school was in fact first launched in Athens, which at that time was the locus of the most important philosophical schools and teachers: the Academy (Xenocrates), the Peripatetics (Theophrastus), and the Stoa (Zeno). Diogenes recounts the purchase of Epicurus' garden and the stream of friends and followers who came to it (10.10–11; Hicks, ii. 538–41). Diogenes' reports of his frugal lifestyle as well as his physical frailty (10.7; Hicks, ii. 584–5) contradict the Stoic allegations of his excesses. On his scientific activity, see p. 281 just below. Diogenes (10.15–16; Hicks, ii. 542–5) provides the account of his death.

his students as was Epicurus. They lived in such oneness and intimacy that the students made a resolution to pool their possessions and so to live henceforth in an enduring association. But Epicurus advised against this as being a sign of mistrust, and his thinking was quite correct. His disciples kept an image of him with them wherever they were. They remained wholly faithful to his teachings, so that it came to be viewed as a kind of crime to modify any element of his reasoning.[42] In this respect his school resembled a walled-in state; it stagnated and failed to develop. A certain Metrodorus is the only one said to have given further amplification to the teachings. There is no other noteworthy disciple.[43] Epicurus himself wrote a great deal—more, it is said, than Chrysippus, reportedly 300 works in all. Thank heaven that they are no longer extant, for if they were that would mean much toil for the philologists. Some years ago a fragment of one of his writings was found at Herculaneum and printed in Naples and Zurich; but not much of note is to be learned from it.[44] | 120

The views of Epicurus are sufficiently well known to us from Cicero and from Diogenes Laertius, who treats them at great length. As in the case of the Stoics, we must first speak about the criterion of truth as Epicurus defined it; our second topic is his philosophy of nature and the third, finally, his moral philosophy.[45]

42. In his *De finibus* Cicero presents Epicurus' circle of friendship as logically inconsistent with the implications of his philosophical tenets (2.25.80; Rackham, pp. 170–1); cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.9–11 (Hicks, ii. 536–41), a passage that also mentions Epicurus' rejection of property being held in common—not, however, in response to a proposal of the disciples but simply in contrast to the Pythagorean maxim. Cicero (*De finibus* 5.1.3; Rackham, pp. 392–3) is Hegel's source for the statement about keeping images of Epicurus, and Eusebius of Caesarea (*Praeparatio evangelica* 14.5.3) for the refusal to allow modification of his teachings.

43. Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 10.22–6; Hicks, ii. 548–55) mentions many disciples of Epicurus, including Metrodorus of Lampsacus, who was one of the philosopher's favorites. *W.* xiv. 477 (MS?) indicates that Hegel had in mind here another Metrodorus, of Stratonicea, who went from Epicurus' school over to that of Carneades; cf. Diogenes, 10.9 (Hicks, ii. 536–9). *W.* says that the fact that Metrodorus was the only defector is testimony to the solidarity of Epicurus' followers. Our transcripts agree in the error of garbling this account and so suggesting the wrong Metrodorus.

44. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.26–8 (Hicks, ii. 554–7), attests to Epicurus' prolific authorship and names forty-six works said to be his best. The publications containing the fragment found at Herculaneum are listed in the bibliography to this volume.

45. Epicurus receives extensive attention in Cicero (in *De finibus* and in *De natura deorum*) and in Diogenes Laertius, for whom Epicurus is the only philosopher apart from Plato to have an entire book of the *Lives* devoted entirely to him. This threefold division of his philosophy comes from Diogenes (10.29; Hicks, ii. 558–9).

*b. Logic*

Epicurus calls logic 'canonic', which is the definition or laying-down of the rules that are true for us. According to Epicurus, the criterion of truth has three moments: the first is sensation, the second is πρόλεψις (*anticipatio*), and the third is opinion.[46]

Sensation taken by itself is alogical, devoid of reason [*Grund*]; it [simply] is and nothing else affects it, adds to it, or detracts from it. Nothing else can criticize or refute sensation; one of two like things cannot criticize the other, nor can like refute unlike; each one stands on its own [*ist ein anderes*]. This is indeed how sensations are, for all sensations are valid—each by itself as something distinct. One of two opposed sensations does not refute the other, and even thinking is on its own account; it cannot criticize sensation, because all thinking depends upon sensation. The truth of sensing is certified by the fact that sensation is something persisting, it is confirmed by repetition, and so forth. For this reason too, what is not manifest in appearance [*das nicht Erscheinende*] or is not sensed can be grasped by means of what is manifest. An ἄδηλον [unobservable], something not manifest in appear-
121 ance, | something unknown [*Unbekanntes*], can be represented after the fashion of known sensations. What is persisting [*das Feste*] is what is sensed, what is known. The unknown, the ἄδηλον, must be defined and grasped according to this known element, according to this sensation. Every sensation is on its own account, each is a fixed persistent, and it is true in itself so far as it shows itself to be fixed.[47]

The second moment in the criterion is the πρόλεψις or *anticipatio*, which is nothing but the memory of what has appeared often—in fact, an image. When I see a human being I recognize the human figure by means of the image of a human being that I [already] have in my mind [*vor mir*]. This image must be subsequent to sensation. So each thing has its assigned name, and the evidential force thus possessed by a representation Epicurus calls its ἐνάργεια; in other words, we recognize something sensible, we find it certified as corresponding to the image. In the Stoics' case we had a content given when thinking concurred—but that remained merely formal. Here we have the image or the representation concurring with a present sensation.[48]

The third moment is opinion, δόξα, judgment as such, opinion as to the true and the false. This opinion is nothing other than the relation of the

46. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.30–1 (Hicks, ii. 558–61).

47. This account of sensing and its truth is based on Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.31–2 (Hicks, ii. 560–3).

48. For the Epicurean πρόλεψις, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.33 (Hicks, ii. 562–3); cf. *W.* xiv. 480–1 (MS?). For the Stoic concept of κατάληψις, see pp. 268–70 above.

representation we have within us to an object.[49] These are the three quite simple moments. So an image takes form from sensation; 'image' is sensation in a universal mode. A sensation, subsumed under πρόλεψις, yields an opinion, a δόξα. We have such sensations as blue, sour, sweet, and so on, and general representations are formed from them; we have these general representations, and when an object comes before us again we recognize that this image corresponds to this object. This is the sum and substance of the criterion.

All in all, this is a superficial business. It does not get beyond the first beginnings of sensible consciousness, of intuition, the immediate intuition of an object. The next stage, to be sure, is | one in which the initial intuition 122
assumes the form of an image, something universal. Finally, subsuming under this image the object, which is present, yields the universal image, the opinion. So the starting point here is the external sensation, and affects or internal sensations are distinguished from this external sensation. These affects furnish the criterion for the practical domain. They are of two kinds, either pleasure, delight, satisfaction, or else pain. The pain or the pleasure yields a general representation too; there arise general representations of what causes me pain or pleasure. I make judgments about individual objects, inclinations, desires, and so forth, according to these representations. This is the practical criterion by which the decision to do something or to avoid doing it is determined. I make all judgments according to the experience of what causes me pain or pleasure. This practical criterion guides our will, our souls.[50] This, then, is a general outline of the canonic of Epicurus, his measuring stick for truth. It is extremely simple and abstract, but very superficial too.

### *c. Metaphysics*

Our second topic is the metaphysics of Epicurus. We have sensations and representations or, more precisely, images. The question, then, is how we come to have these representations. In other words, sensations are not directly representations, and they require an external object. Our relation to the object, through which the representations themselves come into being, Epicurus expounds in the following way. A constant outflow issues from the surfaces of things, an outflow not detectable by sensation, very rapid, and so

49. For opinion, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.33–4 (Hicks, ii. 562–3); cf. *W.* xiv. 482 (MS?).

50. On affects, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.34 (Hicks, ii. 562–5). Hegel's characterization of the two kinds of affects—pleasure and pain—anticipates his account of Epicurus' ethics; see p. 289 below.

123 rarified that it does not alter or affect the object's volume. | Because the object continually appears to us as persisting or stable, the outflow is undetectable by us, and through its entrance into us we know the definite character of a sensation. This definite character resides within the object and flows into us in this way. This is the most superficial mode of relationship the object has to the subject.[51]

Epicurus goes on to say that error can arise if a motion within us brings about an alteration in the implanted representation, so that it is no longer attested by sensation but suffers an interruption owing to a motion within us. So the reference is to a motion that we initiate within ourselves, one which is at the same time an interruption of the influence of the representation. Epicurus calls this spontaneous [*eigen*] motion of the representing [activity] 'an interruption'. The fuller form of the interruption is explicated further in what follows.[52]

The foundation for the metaphysics of Epicurus is the theory [*Vorstellung*] of Democritus, namely, that of the atoms and the void. The atoms as such must properly be left indeterminate. But Epicurus and others were forced into the inconsistency of ascribing properties to the atoms: shape, weight, and size. These atoms are the unchangeable. All external and internal objects, as well as the distinctions among objects, are [constituted] by atoms. Everything, every object, even the soul itself, is nothing but a differ-
124 ent arrangement of the | atoms.[53] [But] these are empty words. On this view properties are certain relations of the atoms to one another. In this vein we can say even today that a crystal is a certain arrangement of parts, one that then yields this shape.[54] This relationship of the atoms is not worth discussing; it is a wholly formal way of speaking.

51. For this account of the physical basis of sensations, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.46–9 (Hicks, ii. 574–9); cf. *W.* xiv. 485 (MS?). On the doctrine of images (εἴδωλα), see Cicero, *De finibus* 1.6.21 (Rackham, pp. 22–3). The final sentence, about 'the most superficial mode', is Hegel's own comment, not that of his sources.

52. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.50–1 (Hicks, ii. 578–81); cf. *W.* xiv. 486 (MS?). Hegel used an edition with the term διάλειψις 'interruption'), whereas newer editions replace it with διάληψις ('apprehension'), which makes the position clearer.

53. See p. 89 above, for Hegel's explanation and criticism of the atomic theory of Democritus, and pp. 90–4 above on its inconsistency, especially in the version of Leucippus. See Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 10.54–5; Hicks, ii. 582–5) on Epicurus' atomism. Cf. *W.* xiv. 487 (MS?). See p. 288 below for more on the atomic constitution of the soul.

54. In his manuscript 'Naturphilosophie und Philosophie des Geistes', Hegel refers in this connection to Abbé René Just Haüy, *Traité de Minéralogie*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1801), i. 157–8; see *GW* viii. 57, viii. 328; cf. Hegel, *Encyclopedia* (1830), paras. 315, 324 (*W.* vii, pt. 1, 265–70, 350); see *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, trans. M. J. Petry, 3 vols. (London and New York, 1970), ii. 115, 171, 176.

The counterpart moment to that of the atoms is the void or that interruption. So the movement of thinking is one that involves the atoms of the soul, but one in which there also occurs an interruption, a movement counter to the atoms that flow in from outside.[55] There is therefore nothing to be seen in this except the general principle of the positive and negative; the result is that even thinking is afflicted with a negative principle or moment of interruption. Epicurus concedes, however, that in the case of the atoms their size and shape do not resemble what they are for visible objects, that they are something other than what these terms ordinarily mean.[56] This, then, is Epicurus' metaphysics; its further details are devoid of interest.

### *d. Philosophy of Nature*

So this is the basis on which Epicurus' philosophy of nature is constructed. But it has an interesting side to it, because it is still the principle of our time. Epicurus declares himself directly opposed to [the idea of] an ultimate purpose for the world, opposed to the Stoic view and to its teleological treatment, opposed to the wisdom of a world creator, to a [divine] governance, and so forth. In his view chance or external necessity | is the principle 125
of all cohesiveness, of all mutual relation.[57]

So his more detailed treatment of nature rests on the principle we have already mentioned: that through sensation we have certain general representations or images, representations of interconnections. We have to apply these representations or προλέψεις to what cannot be sensed immediately.[58]

55. Diogenes Laertius speaks of bodies (atoms) and space (the void) in these terms, but not of an 'interruption' in Hegel's sense (on which see n. 52 just above). By 'interruption' Hegel embraces also the moment of freedom that Epicurus affirmed in contrast to Democritus, namely, the falling atoms' 'swerve' out of their direct course. On the 'swerve', see *W.* xiv. 489, as well as Cicero, *De finibus* 1.6.17–20 (Rackham, pp. 18–23). See also Cicero, *De fato* 10.22, 20.47–8; see *De oratore, Book III, together with De fato, Paradoxa Stoicorum, De partitione oratoria*, trans. H. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1942), 216–17, 242–5. See also Plutarch, *De animae procreatione in Timaeo* 1015; see 'On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus', in *Plutarch's Moralia*, vol. xiii, pt. 1, trans. Harold Cherniss (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1976), 192–3.

56. Diogenes Laertius discusses the size of the atoms and the divisibility of bodies (*Lives* 10.54–9; Hicks, ii. 582–91), saying (unlike Hegel) that, while these features are different at the level of bodies from what they are at the level of the atoms, they nevertheless bear some resemblance to one another.

57. See the lengthy speech of Velleius the Epicurean in Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.36 ff., which is in opposition to the Stoic view of providence; see especially 1.52–4 (Rackham, pp. 52–5). See also Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.76 (Hicks, ii. 606–7).

58. See above in our text, pp. 282–3, on πρόληψις and on the analogy between how we grasp what appears to us and how we grasp and represent something that is unobservable. Hegel interprets this analogical apprehension as the application of πρόληψις to the ἄδηλον. For an example of such an analogy, see n. 48 just above.

This means simply that Epicurus makes analogy the principle for the treatment of nature, and it is the same principle that still holds good today in natural science. We conduct experiments [*Erfahrungen*] and make observations. These are sense-experiences, which is something we readily overlook because we begin at once to speak about the representations that arise from the sensory experiences. In this way we arrive at general representations and these are what we call laws, forces, modes of existence—electricity, magnetism, and the like—representations that rest on experiment. Subsequently we apply these general representations to the sorts of objects, activities, or events that we cannot immediately experience for ourselves. In this way we reach a judgment about them by analogy as, for instance, [in going from] light to the light of the sun;[59] or we know about nerves and their connection with the brain, and we then say that, in [tactile] feeling and the like, what takes place is a transmission from the fingertip up into the brain.

But how are we to envisage [*vorstellen*] this? We cannot observe it for ourselves. Of course we can exhibit the nerves anatomically, but not the manner of their activity. So we envisage the activity of the nerves by analogy, on the model of analogous phenomena involving a transmission, such as the
126 vibration of a violin string, where the motion | propagates itself to the other end. Like those vibrations, the sensation of a nerve [is envisaged as] propagating itself into the brain.[60] Or it is like the familiar phenomenon that is especially evident with billiard balls, namely, when several are set touching in a row and the first one is struck, the end ball rolls away while the middle ones scarcely seem to move—so we envisage the nerves as consisting just of quite tiny balls that cannot be seen even through the most powerful magnifying glass; that at every touch and the like the end one bounds off and makes contact with the soul.[61] In the same way light is envisaged as filaments or rays, or as vibrations, or again as globules. This is exactly the method of analogy in Epicurus.[62] Or we say that lightning is an electrical phenomenon.

59. This remark could refer not only to an analogy between light and the sun's light but also to one between explaining light by particles, waves, oscillations, and the like, and equally by rays, namely, thin shafts or beams. See the *Encyclopedia* (1830), para. 276 (*W.* vii, pt. 1, 137–42; *GW* xx. 279; Petry, ii. 17–21; see also the following note.

60. This eighteenth-century view, that human nerves work like vibrating violin strings, was rebutted by Albrecht von Haller, *Elementa physiologiae corporis humani* (Lausanne, 1766), iv. 358–9, 364. See also Samuel Thomas Sömmerring, *Vom Baue des menschlichen Körpers* (Frankfurt am Main, 1791), v. 159–61, as well as the following note.

61. Sömmerring also refutes this other eighteenth-century view, that nerves operate like a sequence of billiard balls; see pp. 162–3 of the volume cited in the preceding note.

62. In the *Encyclopedia* (1830), para. 276 (*W.* vii, pt. 1, 137–42; Petry, ii. 17–21) Hegel speaks of an ideal relationship with respect to light; see n. *59* just above. There he is opposing

In the case of electricity we see a spark; lightning is a spark too. In virtue of this feature common to both we infer that they are analogous.[63]

So Epicurus says that what we cannot ourselves observe we grasp according to analogy. He is very open-minded about this and concedes that things might well prove to be otherwise. For example, we cannot directly observe the waxing and waning of the moon; so, on the basis of analogy, it may take place through the rotation of this body or through atmospheric configurations or even through addition and subtraction. Similarly, lightning may be the product of friction or of the collision of clouds—this yields the configuration of fire, which is one arrangement of the atoms. We talk like this too when we say that rubbing gives rise to fire, a spark, and we transfer this [observation] to the clouds; alternatively, lightning can also arise from clouds pressing together, | or it may even arise from a blast of wind issuing from a cloud.[64] 127

One circumstance that strikes us right away is the absence of any observations or experiments concerning how bodies act in relation to one another; but the gist of the matter or the principle is none other than the principle of our ordinary natural science. This [explanatory] method of Epicurus has been attacked and derided; but in this aspect there is nothing in it of which to be ashamed, because it continues to be the method underlying our own natural science.[65]

---

the two contemporary explanatory models, Newton's emanation-doctrine and Euler's oscillation-system; see J. Jacob Berzelius, *Lehrbuch der Chemie*, trans. from Swedish by F. Wöhler, vol. i, pt. 1 (Dresden, 1825), 23–7; see *GW* xx. 279, 649.

63. On lightning, see just below in our text, as well as Hegel's remarks on meteorological explanations in his *Encyclopedia* (1830), paras. 286, 288 (*W.* vii, pt. 1, 180–6; Petry, ii. 42–7, 50–4), passages that refer to the scientists F. A. K. Gren, Jean André Deluc, and Georg Christoph Lichtenberg. See Gren, *Grundriss der Naturlehre zum Gebrauch akademischer Vorlesungen*, 4th edn. (Halle, 1801), 834–7, which in turn refers to the 'Siebenter Brief des Hrn. de Luc an Herrn de la Metherie über die Schwierigkeiten in der Meteorologie und ihre Beziehungen auf die Geologie', in *Journal der Physik*, ed. Albrecht Carl Gren, vol. iv (Leipzig, 1791), 279–88.

64. On the analogy, see notes 48 and 58 just above. This paragraph refers to Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.78 (Hicks, ii. 606–9); but recent editions include a negation absent from the text available to Hegel, thus changing the meaning of the Greek to indicate that Epicurus was *not* so amenable to alternative explanations of natural phenomena as our text suggests. For him, plurality of explanations is appropriate only for events that may be brought about in more than one way, with diverse causes, since the goal of such explanation is mental tranquillity; see 10.80, 87 (Hicks, ii. 610–11, 614–17). For the examples involving the moon and lightning, see 10.94, 101–3 (Hicks, ii. 622–3, 628–31); cf. *W.* xiv. 494–5 (MS?). On lightning and clouds, see *Encyclopedia* (1830), para. 324 (*W.* vii, pt. 1, 347; Petry, ii. 170) and the notes to paras. 305, 324 in *GW* xx. 303–4, 325–6. See also Diogenes, 10.102–3.

65. This criticism of Epicurus occurs in Tiedemann (*Geist*, ii. 402); Wilhelm Gottlieb Tenneman gives a similarly disparaging account of Epicurus, in his *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 11 vols. (Leipzig, 1798–1819), iii. 347–432.

So the Epicurean philosophy has at any rate an aspect to which we ascribe value. In the philosophy of nature Aristotle and his predecessors set out a priori, from universal thoughts, and developed the concept from out of itself. That is one side. But equally necessary is the other side: experience has to be built up into its own universality, the laws have to be discovered. This means that what follows from the abstract idea coincides with the universal representation for which experiment [*Erfahrung*] and observation are prerequisite. The a priori element in Aristotle and in the others is well and good but still insufficient, because what they thus defined in a universal way does not come together with experience; and for that to happen experience must be refashioned into the universal. The leading of the particular back to the universal is the discovery of laws, forces of nature, and so on.

Therefore we can say that Epicurus is the founder of empirical natural
128 science, of empirical psychology, and the like. The effect | that the genesis of the knowledge of natural laws and the like has had in the modern world is the same as the effect that Epicurean philosophy had in its own sphere. For the more that people do become acquainted with natural laws the more that such things as superstition, marvels, and astrology disappear; all of that pales through acquaintance with the laws of nature.

The effect that Epicurean philosophy had in its own time was that it opposed the superstition of the Roman and Greek world and raised human beings above it. All this nonsense about the flight of birds, auguries, auspices, and the like, the determining of one's course of action by reading the entrails of animals, or by whether chickens are lively or listless and so forth—the Epicurean philosophy set itself against every superstition, inasmuch as it accepts as true only what corresponds to the προλεψις, the kind of knowledge that derives from sensation.[66]

### *e. Philosophy of Spirit*

Epicurus' moral theory is what is most decried and hence also what is most interesting. We find the notion of the atoms here too. First he describes the soul or spirit, but that does not tell us much; being based on analogy, this account is thus tied to, or bound up with, the metaphysics of the atoms. The logical element within our souls is an aggregation of refined atoms; within this aggregation the atoms first gain [conscious] force or activity through

66. On these superstitions, see pp. 272–3 and 285–7 above. See also Cicero, *De divinatione*, which presents in bk. 1 the Stoic defense of divination and then, in bk. 2, opposes it by exhibiting the absurdity of all these procedures and praises Epicurus' consequent repudiation of divinatory practices. See especially 2.49.103–4, 2.17.39–40 (which praises the Epicureans); Falconer, pp. 486–9, 412–15.

sensation, namely, through a | mutual sympathy or, in other words, 129
through the association that is brought about by the influx of atoms from without, from the surface of the body. This is a shallow, superficial view, one that cannot detain us.[67]

When we consider the abstract principle of Epicurus' moral theory, our judgment upon it is bound to be very unfavorable. If in fact the sensation of the pleasant and the unpleasant is to be the criterion of what is right, good, and true, and of what we ought to make our purpose in life, then, taken abstractly, morality in the proper sense is annulled, or the moral principle becomes instead an immoral principle.[68] But we have already noted that, although on the one side sensation is certainly made the principle, it should also be essentially bound up with the λόγος, with reason, understanding, thinking—expressions that are not definitely distinguishable in this context. With *logos*, circumspection, rational consideration, with calculation of what brings pleasure, there comes the reflection that some things may indeed be immediately pleasant but still have bad consequences. The upshot of this reflection is that many a pleasure gets renounced.[69]

On the other side, even in their making pleasure into the principle, the Epicureans in fact made the independence, happiness, or bliss of spirit into the principle, this happiness being sought in such fashion that it becomes a happiness that is free and independent of external contingencies, the contingencies of sensation. Hence the goal here is the same as it was in Stoic philosophy.[70] When the principle is viewed abstractly, there is, on the one side, the universal, or thinking, and, on the other side, what is singular, or sensation, and the two principles are utterly opposed to one another. But sensation is not the entire principle | of the Epicureans, because this 130

67. Hegel refers here to the rejection of Epicurean philosophy on moral grounds, a view shared by contemporaries of Epicurus, especially his Stoic opponents (see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10. 3–8; Hicks, ii. 530–7), and by Cicero in *Tusculan Disputations* ii. 14–15, 28, 44 (King, pp. 160–1, 174–7, 196–7). On Cicero, see also p. 280 above, as well as *De finibus* 2.80 (Rackham, pp. 170–1). This view of Epicurus is also found in Christian theology right up to Hegel's day. See also Tiedemann (*Geist*, ii. 368), who sees through the Stoics' motives in their attack, as well as Brucker (*Historia*, i. 1237–48) and Seneca, *De vita beata* 13; see Seneca's *Moral Essays*, trans. John W. Basore, 3 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1928–35), ii. 130–3. On Epicurus' atomic theory, see pp. 284–5 above. On the soul's constitution from atoms, see Diogenes Laertius 10.63–7 (Hicks, ii. 592–9). This passage from Diogenes makes no reference to an 'influx of atoms from without'; Hegel takes it from his presentation of the process of knowing (see p. 283 above).

68. On pleasure and pain as the criterion, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.128–9, 137–8 (Hicks, ii. 652–5, 660–3), and p. 283 above.

69. On sensation in relation to reason, see pp. 282, 285–6 above, and 293 below.

70. On weighing these factors, see pp. 292–3 below. On freedom from contingencies, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.134, 144 (Hicks, ii. 658–9, 668–9); cf. *W.* xiv. 501 n. (MS?).

[overarching] principle is the happiness attained, and only attainable, through reason; and so both principles [Stoic and Epicurean] have the same goal.

What Diogenes Laertius has to say in [book] VII about this point of view is that being unhappy while possessing reason is preferable to being happy without it (εὐλογίστως ἀτυχεῖν ἢ ἀλογίστως εὐτυχεῖν), because it is better to judge rightly in one's affairs than it is to be favored by good luck. Correct judgment and reason are to be preferred. Day and night, keep your thoughts on following reason and judging rightly. Let nothing rob you of peace of soul, in order that you may live like a god among humankind; for those who live among immortal goods have nothing in common with mortal ones.[71]

An unimpeachable testimony about Epicurean morals is to be found in Seneca's *De vita beata*, chapter 13: 'It is my verdict—and in saying this I go partly against many of my compatriots—that Epicurus prescribes a doctrine that is holy and correct and, upon closer inspection, one that is joyless and sorrowful, for his "pleasure" finally amounts to something quite insubstantial and paltry. What we ascribe to virtue or what we ascribe to the laws—virtuous living—he prescribes the very same for pleasure.' The way of life of a Stoic is constituted no differently from the life of a true Epicurean who is mindful of what Epicurus prescribes. 'Those who abandon themselves to a frivolous, dissolute life are just seeking a pretext, excuse or authorization for their intemperance' when they call this life 'Epicurean philosophy'.[72]

At first glance it may strike us that the Cyrenaics had the very same principle as the Epicureans. Yet Diogenes Laertius indicates the difference in the following way. The Cyrenaics comprehend pleasure only in the
131 category of motion or as something affirmative; in other words, | some-
something must cause pleasure, must be pleasing. In contrast, while Epicurus accepts pleasant sensation in the affirmative sense too, on the other side his principle also includes pleasure in rest, ἀταραξία, and ἀπονία—freedom from desire and fear and from troubles, cares, and toil, including having no interest or fears, no attachment to anything that we can be in danger of losing. According to Epicurus this pleasure is called ἡδονὴ καταστεματική. Diogenes Laertius says, moreover, that the Cyrenaics count bodily pains as worse than those of the soul, while the converse is true of Epicurus.[73]

71. Diogenes' *Lives* bk. 7 treats Stoic philosophers. See 10.135 (Hicks, ii. 658–9), where, however, modern editions say it is 'best' (not just 'better') to judge rightly; cf. *W.* xiv. 503.

72. See *Moral Essays*, trans. Basore (ii. 130–3) for these paraphrases from Seneca. Cf. *W.* xiv. 503–4 (MS?—both text and translation).

73. On the Cyrenaics, see pp. 163–71 above, on pleasant sensations and on pleasure as the principle. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.136–7 (Hicks, ii. 660–1) for this discussion of the Cyrenaics in contrast to Epicurus.

The principal teachings of Epicurus with regard to morals are contained in a letter to Menoeceus that Diogenes Laertius preserved. It says: 'Youth must not postpone philosophizing and the elderly must not find it too burdensome, for no one is too immature (ἄωρος) or is overly-mature (πάρωρος); it is never too early for it, nor is it ever too late for one's spirit to be restored to health. We must strive for what constitutes the blessed life, the elements of which are as follows. In the first place we must hold to the fact that God is an indestructible and blissful living being—just as universal belief has it—and lacks nothing in the way of imperishability or bliss. Gods there are indeed, and our cognition of them is evident (ἐναργής). The godless ones are not those who deny the gods or have done with them, but those who saddle them with the opinions of the multitude.'[74]

Here then we meet the gods of Epicurus, so much derided by Cicero in *De natura deorum*. But this divine element is to be understood quite simply as the universal as such. Epicurus says that the gods subsist somewhat like the numbers, in complete abstraction from what is sensible and visible; they are the universal, the wholly abstract. When we say 'the supreme being', *l'être suprême*, we believe that we have far surpassed Epicurean philosophy, and yet we have not in fact got beyond it.[75]

So the gods are in part like the numbers and they are in part | 132
anthropomorphic, perfect; this [impression] arises from the continual confluence of like images that we receive and through which the universal image comes about. Here too the result is something universal, but a sort of universal that is at the same time portrayed as concrete, as anthropomorphic. These are ideals that take shape in the human spirit.[76] Epicurus goes on to say that they are what is blessed, what is universal, the universal in concrete shape, the indestructible, what has no occupation of its own nor involvement with any other, what is not moved by anger nor by sacrificial offerings and favors.

74. Diogenes Laertius gives us the full text of the Letter to Menoeceus (*Lives* 10.122–35; Hicks, ii. 648–59), from which Hegel provides an abbreviated paraphrase of the opening part. Cf. *W.* xiv. 506 (MS?). On what is evident (ἐναργής), see just below in our text.

75. Cotta, the representative of the New Academy in Cicero's dialogue, presents an extended attack on Epicurean theology as expounded by Velleius; *De natura deorum* 1.42–56 (Velleius) and 57–124 (Cotta); Rackham, pp. 42–121. See especially 1.71 (Rackham, pp. 68–9), which ridicules the Epicurean contention that 'the gods have not a body but a semblance of body'. In saying that the divine element is 'the universal as such', Hegel seems to disregard the particular features against which Cicero directs his ridicule; see also n. 67 just above and n. 78 just below. For Hegel's criticism of God as 'the supreme being', see Vol. III of this edition (although he does not use this term there), and also *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 340–1, 660 n., 739.

76. See the scholion in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.139 (Hicks, ii. 662–5), which says that 'the gods are discernible by reason alone, some being numerically distinct . . .'. Cf. *W.* xiv. 507 (MS?).

We must revere the gods for their excellence and blessedness and not only to gain some advantage for doing so.[77] They dwell in empty space, in the intervals between the worlds. This seems ridiculous, but it is correlative with the category of 'interruption' or that of the void that only gets filled [here and there] by the atoms.[78] Hence to this extent the gods belong to the aspect of the negative in contradistinction to the sensible, and this negative element is thinking. What Epicurus says about the gods we can still say in part; of course the definition of God involves greater objectivity, but it is entirely correct that God is this blissful [state] that should be esteemed solely for its own sake. This knowledge that God is what is universal, and so forth, Epicurus ascribes to evidence, to energy (ἐνάργεια): the divine is.[79]

A second point for Epicurus is the contemplation of death, of the negative for existence, for the human feeling of self. He says: 'Get used to the thought that the negative, or death, does not concern us, for all that is good or bad is in sensation, is affirmative. Even though there be ἀταραξία, the absence of pain and so forth, this nonetheless belongs to sensation. Death, however, is a deprivation or non-being of sensation, it is στέρεσις. That being so, the right-thinking view that death in no way concerns us makes the mortal character | of life fully enjoyable. Insofar as the representation of the negative that death is does not intrude upon the feeling of vitality, the thought that death is no concern of ours—death not being imaginatively postponed for an infinite time—takes from us the longing for immortality. Why should I fear thee, O Death? When we are, death is not there, and when death is, we are not there.'[80] This is an ingenious thought—that death is thus no concern of ours, and fear is removed. What lies in the future is neither ours nor not ours. The right way to think about the future is that we do not anticipate it as

133

77. For these statements about the blessed gods and why we should revere them, Hegel draws first upon Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.139 (Hicks, ii. 662–5)—from the first of the forty 'principal teachings' of Epicurus—and then upon the words of Velleius in Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.45 (Rackham, pp. 46–7).

78. Cicero always has this doctrine of the intervals between worlds stated by the opponents of Epicurus. *De natura deorum* 1.18 (Rackham, pp. 20–1) makes Velleius the object of ridicule, saying that, from his confident manner: 'One would have supposed he had just come down from the assembly of the gods in the intermundane spaces of Epicurus.' See also n. 66 just above, as well as *De finibus* 2.75 (Rackham, pp. 164–5). On the void, see p. 285 above.

79. On ἐνάργεια, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.127–8 (Hicks, ii. 652–3). Hegel intentionally identifies this Epicurean term for 'evidence' with the Aristotelian ἐνέργεια ('energy'); cf. *W.* xiii. 398; xiv. 152, 529–31. Hegel is not alone in this respect; see the entry on ἐναργής in Franz Passow, *Handwörterbuch der griechischen Sprache* (Leipzig, 1841).

80. This is an expanded paraphrase of Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.124–5 (Hicks, ii. 650–1). Cf. *W.* xiv. 509–10 (MS?).

something that will be, nor do we harbor doubts about it as something that is not to be.[81] It is no concern of ours either that it is or that it is not, and so we need not be uneasy about it.

Epicurus then moves on to speak of the impulses. He says that some are natural impulses and others only hollow ones. Some of the former are necessary and some are not. The necessary impulses exist for the happiness and trouble-free functioning of the body. The error-free theory that is Epicurean philosophy instructs us in the selection and rejection of what has relevance for bodily health and the soul's ἀταραξία. For this is the aim of the blissful life: that the body should be healthy and the soul undisturbed, in equanimity. For this reason all that we do is done to avoid pain and disturbance. Once we have attained this peace and equanimity, this ἀταραξία, then all of the soul's turmoil is dissolved, since we need seek no further for a way to attain well-being of soul and body. When pleasure is the primary and innate good, we do not choose all pleasures but instead pass over many of them if discomforts follow on their heels; | we prefer a greater pain over 134
pleasure if [even] greater pleasure ensues from it. We take moderation or contentment to be a good—not like the Cyrenaics, in order to boast about it, nor [like the Cynics] for the sake of confining ourselves to the barest necessities, but instead in order to be satisfied if we do not have very much. So when we make pleasure our goal we are not seeking the enjoyment of the Sybarite; we are instead seeking to be free of bodily ills and vexation of spirit. This blissful life is procured by the sober reason that examines the grounds for choosing or rejecting anything and drives out those opinions by which the soul is at first shackled and thrown into turmoil. Rationality is the beginning of all this [blissful life] and is the supreme good. From it spring all the other virtues. It shows that one cannot live happily without wisdom [*Verständigkeit*], but also that one cannot live wisely, well, and rightly without what is pleasant—in part pleasant sensation, in part the absence of pain.[82]

So the content of Epicurean philosophy, the whole of it, its aim, is something exalted; and in this respect it is quite parallel with the aim of Stoic philosophy.

81. For this attitude toward the future, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.127 (Hicks, ii. 652–3).

82. This long paragraph, on the rational judgment that chooses wisely among pleasures in order to attain a tranquil, blissful life, is based on Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 10.127–32 (Hicks, ii. 652–7). Only Lw. includes the interpolation 'not like the Cyrenaics'. The German editors say that the whole statement should refer to the Cynics. We attempted a minimal correction in the English translation by adding '[like the Cynics]' to the second part of the statement, where it is most needed.

## B. SKEPTICISM AND THE NEW ACADEMY

### 1. The Academy in Later Centuries

I want to link the New Academic philosophy with Skepticism. The New Academy confronted Stoicism and Epicureanism; it is a continuation of the Platonic Academy, one that is opposed to dogmatism. The New Academy gets subdivided into a Middle and a New Academy. The Middle Academy begins with Arcesilaus, the New Academy with Carneades. Both of these Academies are very closely related to Skepticism, and the Skeptics themselves frequently have difficulty distinguishing Skepticism from the
135 Academic principle.[83] Often the difference amounts only | to verbal definitions, to wholly external distinctions.

The shared feature of these Academies is that they express truth as a subjective conviction of consciousness as such, a consciousness that does not have objectivity in and for itself. Inasmuch as truth is merely a subjective conviction, the New Academy also called it only 'probability'.[84] We readily discern here the connection with Platonic philosophy when we recall that for Plato the Idea—in the form of universality, to be sure—was the principle, and that his successors clung especially to this universality and linked the Platonic dialectic with it, a dialectic that proceeded by holding fast to the universal as such as true and showing what is determinate or particular to be null. As merely negative, a dialectic of this kind leaves nothing remaining save abstract universality. In Plato the elaboration of the concrete aspect of the Platonic Idea does not go very far. His dialectic often has only a negative result whereby determinations just get superseded,[85] so that with him we do

83. The distinctions that Hegel draws in this paragraph show him to be undecided between two traditional views of the Academy. On one side are those who made a twofold division between an older Platonic Academy under Speusippus, regarded as dogmatism, and a newer Academy congruent with Skepticism. See, for instance, Cicero's *Academica* 1.4.17 (Rackham, pp. 426–7), *De finibus* 5.3.7 (Rackham, pp. 396–9), and *De oratore* 3.18.67 (Rackham, pp. 54–5). See also Augustine, *The City of God* 19.1.3; trans. Marcus Dods (New York, 1950), 671–2. Those on the other side, influenced by Sextus Empiricus, further divide the later school into a Middle Academy commencing with Arcesilaus, and a New Academy beginning with Carneades. See Sextus, *Pyrrhonian hypotyposes* 1.33.220, 232 ('Outlines of Pyrrhonism'; hereafter *Pyrr. hyp.*); *Sextus Empiricus*, trans. R. G. Bury, 4 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1933), i. 22–3, 132–5, 142–3. In the latter passage Sextus, in a fuller and more nuanced discussion, seeks to distinguish the New Academy from Skepticism proper. By 'both academies' Hegel intends, here and in what follows, the Middle Academy and the New Academy.

84. These remarks about subjective conviction anticipate Hegel's accounts of Arcesilaus and Carneades that follow in our text.

85. On links to the Platonic philosophy and its characteristic dialectic, see pp. 196–8, 216 above. By 'successors' who maintained this link, Hegel probably means Arcesilaus and Carneades.

not get beyond the universal. The general stance of his Academic successors was to proceed dialectically against the specificity of Stoicism and Epicureanism, and, in so doing, when they spoke of truth they allowed only for probability and subjective conviction.

We have seen that both Stoic and Epicurean philosophies proceed by taking something determinate as the principle or the criterion of truth, so that this criterion is said to be something concrete. For the Stoics it is the cataleptic phantasy, | a representation, a determinate content, but such that 136
the representation is also thought of or conceived as a thought having content.[86] This is what is concrete. It is a linkage of thought and content. Even this concrete element remains only formal. The dialectic of the New Academy was directed against this concrete element.

### *a. Arcesilaus and the Middle Academy*

So Arcesilaus is the founder of the Middle Academy. He is a contemporary of Epicurus, from Pitane in Aetolia. He held the apprenticeship in the Academy and was in this way a successor of Plato; he occupied this teaching office up to the time of his death. He was born in the 116th Olympiad and is described as a very distinguished man, held in great esteem by his contemporaries. Being possessed of considerable wealth, he devoted himself wholly to studies—poetics, rhetoric, mathematics, and so forth. He had gone to Athens in order to get training in rhetoric; there he remained and devoted himself wholly to philosophy. He and his New Academy constitute an antithesis to that dogmatism—to Epicureanism and Stoicism—with which they were much occupied. There is an anecdote told about him, that someone said to him that many were going over from other philosophies to Epicureanism but there is no example of a move in the opposite direction. Arcesilaus replied that males can indeed become castrates, but castrates cannot once again become males.[87]

Cicero and Sextus Empiricus have preserved for us the chief points of his philosophy. His main principle is the ἐποχή. The sage must withhold, ἐπέχειν, approbation and assent. To be precise, this expression has particular

86. See p. 268 above on the Stoics' cataleptic phantasy, and pp. 281–3 above on the Epicurean doctrine of the criterion.

87. Diogenes Laertius is the source for statements in this paragraph about Arcesilaus' origins, his character, reputation, and wealth, as well as his studies and his interest in poetics; see *Lives* 4.28–31, 37–8, 44–5 (Hicks, i. 404–9, 414–17, 420–3). Arcesilaus was born in Aeolis, not Aetolia. He was the sixth head, or scholarch, of the Academy. Hegel could have got the 116th Olympiad as the time of his birth from his more recent sources (Brucker, *Historia*, i. 746, or Tennemann, *Geschichte*, iv. 443), but not from Diogenes, who says only that Lacydes began as Arcesilaus' successor as scholarch in the fourth year of the 134th Olympiad—hence

reference to Stoic philosophy, the basic thesis of which is that what is true is
137 a | representation or a content to which thinking has given its assent.[88] The cataleptic phantasy is a linking of the content with thought, which declares the content to be its own. This is the concrete element against which the later Academy is primarily directed. Because our representations, principles, and thoughts are indeed so constituted that they have a content, because their being depends on it, and that too in such a way that the content is taken up into the form of thinking, this content thus appears, as such, to be distinct from thinking; and the linkage of the two constitutes the concrete element, our consciousness, our representation. Arcesilaus did of course concede that this content of consciousness is a concrete element of this kind—there is no doubt about that. But he maintained that this does not give rise to any truth, for this linkage furnishes us only with good reasons and not with truth.[89]

Arcesilaus attacked the Stoics in more specific terms. The Stoics said that the cataleptic phantasy, or representation as thought, is the middle or the criterion between immediate knowing or sensation and abstract thinking. But this middle, the Stoics said, is the province of the fool every bit as much as it is of the sage. It lends itself to error every bit as much as to truth. Only a consciousness based upon reasons, a developed and thinking consciousness, is *knowing*; and hence the Stoics place scientific knowledge proper above the cataleptic phantasy. Arcesilaus says that these reasons or these cataleptic phantasies are, on their own account, a representation, a principle, a content as such. Scientific knowledge develops this content so that it is represented [as] mediated by an other, and this [other] is its reason or basis. But, says Arcesilaus, these reasons are themselves nothing other than an instance of cataleptic phantasy, and thus they are a being that is comprehended by thinking. So that middle remains always the arbiter between opining and

Arcesilaus died in that year—which is 241 BC (Tennemann has 244 BC), and also says that he died at age 75; see Diogenes, 4.44–5, and 60–1 (Hicks, i. 422–3, 436–7). This reckoning assumes that he did not resign the leadership prior to his death. Hegel does not mention Diogenes' report in the former passage that Arcesilaus flourished about the 120th Olympiad (300–296 BC). Hegel's erroneous statment that Arcesilaus went to Athens to study rhetoric is perhaps owing to a misreading of Diogenes, 4.29. The anecdote is in *Lives* 4.43 (Hicks, i. 420–1).

88. On the withholding of assent, see Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. hyp.* 1.232 (Bury, i. 142–3), *Adv. math.* 7.156–7 (Bury, ii. 84–5); cf. Cicero, *Academica* 2.21.67–8 (Rackham, pp. 552–5). In the first of these texts Sextus does not explicitly mention the sage, but he does say that the result of the ἐποχή is ἀταραξία, which is the purpose of wisdom and the Skeptic's goal; and, inasmuch as only the Skeptic can reach this goal, the Skeptic proves to be the one who is truly wise.

89. On the Stoic cataleptic phantasy, see pp. 268–70 above. It is the 'content of consciousness' that the Academy of Arcesilaus criticizes. See just below in our text, on the opposition between truth and 'good reasons'.

knowing. Thus the reasons that the sage has are no different [in kind] from those of the fool.[90]

In addition, Arcesilaus validates the distinctions that have been particularly emphasized and relied upon in recent times. The | concrete element, 138
the cataleptic phantasy, is supposedly a representation to which thinking has given its assent. This assent of thinking is directed to a thought; and what thinking finds itself in conformity with can only be a thought. An axiom is a universal thought-determination. Such [thoughtful] assent occurs only with respect to an axiom. But then we have merely the thought and not thinking with a determinate content (cataleptic phantasy). What is assented to is a *content*; this content is a determinate being [*Seiendes*]—a content that, as such, is not yet a thought, is not yet taken up into thinking. For the object is something alien to thinking, it is an other. So thinking cannot assent to an object of this sort but only to an axiom, to a principle in its universality.[91]

This is the celebrated distinction between being and thinking that we draw today too. The one is here, the other over there—subjective and objective that cannot come together.[92] It is important to be conscious of this distinction, and the distinction has to be upheld against the principle of the Stoics, for they have not shown that representations and phantasy, the subjective element of thinking and the objective element in their diversity, consist essentially in passing over into one another, in positing themselves as identical—this higher dialectic that had its abstract beginning with Plato.[93] That would be the proof that objective content and subjective thinking are identical and that their identity is the truth.

With the Stoics cataleptic phantasy appears as something concrete, as immediately asserted, but it is not shown that the concrete is what is true in

90. See p. 269 above, on the intermediate position of the cataleptic phantasy, on its ascription to the sage and to the fool alike, and on its subordination to scientific knowledge proper. In what follows Hegel is not referring to specific passages, but instead is developing the implications of the kind of academic criticism of the Stoic cataleptic phantasy such as that found in Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 7.150–7 (Bury, ii. 82–7).

91. See Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 7.154–5 (Bury, ii. 84–5). Here, as in *W.* xiv. 523 (MS?), Hegel renders ἀξίωμα as *Grundsatz* ('axiom'). The usual Latin translation is *enuntiatio* (so Cicero, *De fato* 1.1, 10.20; Rackham, pp. 192–3, 216–17) or *pronuntiatum* (in Fabricius' edition of Sextus, which Hegel used—see the Bibliography of Hegel's Sources). More recent English and French editions give it the sense of 'judgment'.

92. This is probably a reference not just in general to the distinction between thinking and being that has occupied all of modern philosophy since the Middle Ages, but also in particular to the ontological proof for God's existence and the Kantian critique of it; see Vol. III of this edition.

93. On this Platonic dialectic, albeit not with reference to the distinction of thinking from being, see above, pp. 198, 202, 206.

these diverse elements. So the concrete is accepted immediately and, in face
139 of this, the assertion of the | difference of object from subject is entirely consistent. It is the same form of thought that we find in modern times too. And, since Arcesilaus affirms that the main contents of our consciousness are grounds of this sort, concrete elements of this sort, then any such concrete element is not what is true. They are concrete, they are what is dominant in our consciousness, but that does not prove that they are what is true. According to the Stoic position itself, representation is the common possession of fools and sages alike, of knowledge and opinion too; it can be something true and just as readily something untrue. There are grounds, and these are, relatively speaking, the ultimate basis for a content, but they are not ultimate in and for themselves. So they can be regarded as good grounds or as probability in the way the Academics express it, but they are not what is true. This is a great insight.[94]

As for the practical side, Arcesilaus says that no rule for action is possible without assent, without something being defined as right. Life's purpose, or happiness, is then determined by grounds of this kind; we must be guided by good reasons for what we do or refrain from doing. Still, a good reason is only something probable. Whoever thus heeds what is based on good reasons will do well and be happy.[95] But finding good reasons calls for cultivation and intelligent thought.

### *b. Carneades and the New Academy*

Carneades was a successor to Arcesilaus in the Academy, although he lived considerably later. His death falls in the 162nd Olympiad. He was a Cypriot who lived in Athens.[96] He is also historically noteworthy because the Athenians sent him as an envoy to Rome, together with two other philosophers. These three were an Academic (Carneades), a Stoic (Diogenes of Seleucia)

94. See p. 268 above, on the Stoic position on representation. Hegel identifies the 'grounds' that for the Skeptics do not qualify as true, with the 'good grounds' or reasons that are the basis for necessary, practical actions (although they are not true in and of themselves). Hegel's 'good grounds' refers to Arcesilaus' *εὔλογον* and is on a par with Carneades' concept of 'the probable' (*πιθανόν*), on which see the following note.

95. On these 'good reasons', see Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 7.158 (Bury, ii. 86–7); cf. *W.* xiv. 526–7 (MS?).

96. According to Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 4.59–60; Hicks, i. 434–7), the sequence of scholarchs after Arcesilaus was Lacydes, Telecles and Evander (together), Hegesinus, Carneades; cf. Cicero, *Academica* 2.6.16 (Rackham, pp. 486–7). Diogenes reports his homeland as Cyrene (4.62; Hicks, i. 436–7), as does *W.* xiv. 527. In these lectures Hegel erroneously said he was a Cypriot, as attested by four of the transcripts.

and Critolaus of the Peripatetics; in the year 598 a.u.c. (=156 BC)[97] | they 140
came to Rome, in the time of Cato the Elder. This delegation introduced the Romans to Greek philosophy in Rome itself by delivering public discourses. In the manner of the Academics, Carneades presented two discourses, one in favor of justice and one opposing it, and by doing so he won for himself much fame and attention. The young Romans were unaware of these multiple turns of thought; they found this procedure all quite novel, they were attracted to it and soon won over. Many listeners flocked to the lectures of Carneades. But this greatly vexed Cato the Elder, among others, because the young Romans were being thus led away from the tried-and-true Roman perspectives and virtues. This seemed so dangerous to them that Caius Acilius went so far as to propose in the Senate that all philosophers—he did not name the envoys—be banished from the city. Cato the Censor prevailed on the Senate to complete the business with the envoys speedily so that they would henceforth teach only the sons of the Greeks, and the young Romans would once more get their education from the laws and institutions of the state and from the society of the senators.[98] An epoch in which such turns of thought emerge must impact the culture of a people in a way that is looked upon as calamitous for the ancient constitution, for the tried-and-true ancient customs and for obedience for the laws. But the malady arising from thinking is not to be prevented by laws and the like; it can and must be self-healing, once thinking is in a position to do that by its own devices and in an authentic way. | 141

Sextus Empiricus has given a full account of Carneades. His principle was that there is no criterion of truth; not sensation nor representation nor thinking nor anything else is the criterion of truth. His main thought is, in general, that a criterion has two elements; one is the objective element or actual being, what is immediately determinate, and the other element is an affect, an activity or attribute of consciousness. This activity of consciousness

97. A.u.c. = *ab urbe condita* ('from the founding of the city'). Gr. supplies the equivalent date in parentheses.

98. Cicero reports on this delegation to Rome (*De oratore* 2.155–61); see bks. 1 and 2, trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham, rev. edn. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1948), 310–15. So do Aulus Gellius (*Attic Nights* 6.14.9; Rolfe, ii. 62–3) and Aelian, *Variae historiae* 3.17. But Hegel takes as his main source Plutarch, *Cato maior* 22.1–23.1; *Plutarch's Lives*, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1914), ii. 368–71. Plutarch does not mention Critolaus as a third member of the delegation, although Brucker does (*Historia*, i. 763). According to Aulus Gellius, Caius Acilius served as translator for the senate's converse with the envoys. Caius Acilius is noted for having written in Greek a history of Italy. There is no evidence to support Hegel's statement that he proposed the banishment of all philosophers from the city; since all the transcripts agree concerning this statement, Hegel probably confused his role with that of Cato.

consists in altering the objective element, hence in not allowing the objective element, just as it is, to impinge directly upon us. So the same separation or the same relationship is presupposed here as before, namely, that the understanding is viewed as the ultimate and utterly absolute relationship.[99]

He [Carneades] now sets himself in opposition to Epicurus for holding that sensation is ἀπαθής, unmoved or unchangeable, that it is unaffected by the activity of consciousness. He maintains, on the contrary, that sensation must be analysed too—that, on the one hand, the soul is determined in sensation and yet, on the other hand, the determining factor is at the same time determined by the energy, ἐνάργεια, of the subject, by the energy of consciousness. He calls this 'representation'. A content, sensation, or being-determined on the part of consciousness, which content is also simultaneously determined in turn *by* consciousness—this activity and passivity of consciousness or this 'third thing' is what he terms the representation. He says that it is indicative both of itself and of what is objective—on the one hand, indicative of the subjective side and, on the other hand, having a content that is the objective element or the phenomenon. It is the παραστατικόν of itself and of the other. When we see, there is an affect; our sight afterward is not constituted in the way it was before the seeing. Representation, he says, is a light, is something that shows itself and everything else in it.[100] This is a very important, an essential, characteristic of all consciousness.

'Representing' is this differentiating within itself, this showing of itself
142 and of the other. But, Carneades continues, the representing is | thus what is universal; it embraces [*begreifen*] the sensation of Epicurus and the cataleptic phantasy; it is the crown of knowing, its focal point. But it does not always show what is true—just as a poor messenger can deviate from [the instruction of] the one who dispatches him. Not every representation affords a criterion of truth—only those in which there is something true. But no representation is certainly true; representations commonly contain what is

99. For Sextus' account, see *Adv. math.* 7.159–89 (Bury, ii. 86–103). In this paragraph Hegel draws heavily from the opening passages (1.159–63). The statement that the criterion is 'not sensation, nor representation nor thinking nor anything else' is in Sextus, and refers to Epicureans, Stoics, Platonists and Aristotelians respectively. See also pp. 296–7 above.

100. The criticism of Epicurus in this paragraph is based on Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 7.160–3 (Bury, ii. 86–9). Sextus does not name Epicurus in this context, but Hegel takes the passage as directed at him since it speaks of the faculty of sense as 'unmoved and unaffected and undisturbed'; see Hegel's account of sensation for Epicurus, p. 282 above. Cf. *W.* xiv. 530–2 (MS?). On ἐνάργεια, see n. 79, p. 292 above. In this paragraph παραστατικόν has the sense of 'something standing for'.

true and what is false; they are the criterion of the true and the false, and consequently no criterion at all.[101]

Now if no representation is a criterion, then thinking is not one either. Sensation as such is no criterion; it is not unchangeable, not unaffected [*apathisch*]. Representation likewise is no criterion and therefore, in the third place, neither is thinking, for thinking depends upon representation. This further level of thinking or of classifying [*Unterteilen*] must have its representation, which cannot be without a sensation devoid of thought, and there must first be this representation if thinking is to follow from it.[102] This is the basic feature in the Academic philosophy—on the one side, the distinction between thinking and actual being, and then the fact that representation is a unity of the two, although not this unity in and for itself.

The affirmative element that Carneades provided consists in the fact that criteria are certainly to be sought, and criteria are to be laid down for the conduct of life and the gaining of happiness. But these criteria are only convincing representations; in other words, they must be acknowledged to be something subjective. As a criterion, a 'convincing representation' of this kind must be a representation that is (1) convincing, (2) firmly established, and (3) developed, if it is to be a criterion for living.[103] These distinctions are, on the whole, features of a correct analysis. | 143

The Academics gave the name ἔμφασις or 'emphatic representation' to what is convincing, and ἀπέμφασις to what is not. 'Convincing representation' involves three stages. The first is a representation that seems to be true, is clear, is applicable to a number of cases and so forth; this, however, is but a singular representation. The second stage is the representation not taken solely by itself; one representation depends upon others, as in a chain; thus it must be firmly established, determined on all sides, ἀπερίσπαστος, not capable of being removed for the reason that it is known in this connection together with the others. This is a quite correct specification that generally applies to all cases. The third stage then amounts to no more than that each of these circumstances with which the representation is connected should be investigated too, on its own account, and not immediately presupposed, just as in the case of an illness all the symptoms must be taken into consideration

101. These remarks on representation (φαντασία), which for Sextus is the general category—'what is universal', as Hegel says—embracing the more specific Stoic and Epicurean criteria, are based on *Adv. math.* 7.163–4 (Bury, ii. 88–91); cf. *W.* xiv. 532 (MS?).

102. Sextus gives this account of why reason, or thinking, cannot be the criterion either (*Adv. math.* 7.165; Bury, ii. 90–1); cf. *W.* xiv. 532–3 (MS?).

103. Sextus speaks of Carneades needing a criterion for the conduct of life, and having to rely in part on the 'probable' representation for this purpose; *Adv. math.* 7.166 (Bury, ii. 90–1). Cf. *W.* xiv. 533 (MS?).

and evaluated.[104] The Academy therefore confines itself to convincing representations and focuses on the subjective aspect of consciousness.

## 2. Skepticism Proper: Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, Sextus Empiricus

### *a. Introduction and General Aim*

Skepticism has always enjoyed the reputation, and it still does, of being the most formidable adversary of philosophy and of being invincible, inasmuch as it is the art of dissolving everything determinate and exhibiting it in its nullity. Its result is indeed the negative, the dissolution of everything determinate, everything true, all content. This invincibility of Skepticism certainly has to be conceded, but only in the subjective aspect, with regard to the individual. The individual can adopt the stance of taking no notice of
144 philosophy, | can keep to the standpoint of affirming only the negative—but this is only a subjective invincibility.

The more specific relationship of Skepticism to philosophy is as follows. Skepticism is the dialectic of everything determinate, and the universal, the indeterminate, or the infinite is not exalted above the dialectic, since the universal, the indeterminate, the infinite—which stand over against the particular, the determinate, and the finite respectively—are themselves only something determinate too; they are only the one side, and as such they are determinate. Only indeterminate and determinate together constitute the whole of determinacy. Skepticism is dialectic. The philosophical concept likewise is itself this dialectic, for genuine knowledge of the idea is the same negativity that is inherent in Skepticism. The only difference is that Skepticism stands pat with the negative as a result. It sticks with the result as a negative, saying that this or that has an internal contradiction; therefore it dissolves itself and so it is not. Thus this result is the negative, but this negative is itself just another one-sided determinateness over against the positive. That is to say, Skepticism functions solely as understanding. It fails to recognize that the negative is also affirmative, that it has positive determination within itself, for it is negation of negation. Infinite affirmation is self-relating negativity.

Put quite abstractly, this is the relationship of philosophy to Skepticism. Philosophy is dialectical and must be so, for dialectic is the motive factor.

104. For these different degrees of being 'convincing', see Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 7.169–81 (Bury, ii. 90–7). The first stage is the 'probable' representation, the second is that which is also 'irreversible' (ἀπερίσπαστος) because interconnected with others, and the third is 'tested' and so a basis for judgment. Cf. *W.* xiv. 535–6 (MS?).

The idea as simply idea is what is inert, it is subsisting being; it truly is, however, only insofar as it grasps itself as living—namely, [it grasps] that it is dialectical within itself. The dialectic sublates what is universal, what is static and inert. The philosophical idea is | also internally dialectical in that 145
it is not in the mode of contingency, it does not sublate what presents itself by chance. Skepticism, however, has for its object the contingency with regard to the content; as soon as it is presented with the subject matter or the content, Skepticism demonstrates that, inwardly, the content is what is negative.

The first thing we have to consider is the outward history of Skepticism. The history of what is properly called Skepticism has its beginning with Pyrrho, though the Skeptics themselves, Sextus Empiricus, for example, say that Skepticism is very ancient. He goes so far as to present Homer as a Skeptic because Homer speaks of one and the same thing in opposite ways.[105] Skepticism in the general sense is our saying that things are changeable. They are, but their being is not genuine, for it posits equally their nonbeing—for instance, in speaking of 'today' we say the same thing of each succeeding day. 'Now' it is day, but 'now' can also be night, and so forth. We speak of each thing in opposite ways. We acknowledge something to be determinate, to be subsistent, enduring, and we also say the contrary about it. Something is so and yet it is not so. All things are changeable. It is possible, we think, for them to change, but also for them not to change. But [it is] not only possible, for they are inherently changeable; in other words, they *must* change. Only 'now' are they thus and so, for in a different time they are otherwise, and *this* time, the 'now', itself ceases to be in the course of my speaking about them. The time itself is nothing fixed and serves to fix nothing else. This negative aspect of all things is the principle of Skepticism, which is thus of great antiquity. | 146

Sextus Empiricus presents Bias as a Skeptic because his maxim was: 'Do not give a pledge.' The general sense of this is: 'Do not hold to anything whatsoever, do not bind yourself to any relationship at all, and be unwilling even to vouch for the soundness of a circumstance or an object.' In similar fashion they present Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Heraclitus as Skeptics;

105. Sextus Empiricus speaks of Pyrrho as the one who gave to Skepticism a clearer and more comprehensible basis than did his predecessors (*Pyrr. hyp.* 1.3.7.; Bury, i. 4–7). Sextus here gives the terms commonly applied to Skepticism: 'zetetic' (inquiring), 'ephectic' (suspending judgment), and 'aporetic' (doubting). But he does not say that Homer was a Skeptic; that comes from Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 9.71; Hicks, ii. 482–5).

and there is much controversy as to whether Plato belonged to their number.[106]

So Pyrrho counts as the founder of Skepticism. Sextus Empiricus says of him that he turned to σκέψις in a [more] physical fashion, σωματικότερον, and, [more] evidently, καὶ ἐπιφανέστερον, and with more distinct consciousness, with distinct expression. The events of his life are marked by Skepticism no less than is his teaching. He lived at about the same time as Aristotle. He was born in Elis and his contemporaries held him in high regard. He is reputed to have been chosen as chief priest of his native city; to have been given the rights of Athenian citizenship; to have gone with Alexander the Great to Asia, where he kept company with the Magi, and so forth. The story goes that Alexander had him executed for demanding the death of a satrap, which is supposed to have happened in the ninetieth year of his life.[107]

Pyrrho does not seem to have been a public teacher; nor does he seem to have left behind him any school, except for a few friends whom he had educated. It did not suit the style of the Skeptics to have a school as such—σκέψις is not αἵρεσις or school, but only an ἀγωγή, a guideline for right living and correct thinking. There are many anecdotes told about Pyrrho in which his skeptical conduct is made out to be ridiculous; in them the universal aspect of Skepticism is juxtaposed to a particular case so that the behavior, viewed in isolation, appears absurd. When a horse or a cart came toward him, he did not get out of the way. He ran straight into a wall because he

106. These reports too come from Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 9.71–3; Hicks, ii. 484–7), not from Sextus. See pp. 18, 21 above, where, in discussing the seven sages, Hegel correctly ascribes to Chilo, and not to Bias, the aphorism about giving a pledge. Hegel's inclusion of Parmenides here (attested by three of the transcripts) is probably owing to a confusion with Zeno. Sextus states that Heraclitean philosophy is distinct from Skepticism even though Aenesidemus says Skepticism is a route to it (*Pyrr. hyp.* 1.29.210; Bury, i. 124–5). Sextus also reports that some think Plato a dogmatist, some an 'aporetic', and some think him a bit of both (1.33.221; Bury, i. 134–5).

107. Sextus Empiricus speaks of Pyrrho in this way as the actual founder of Skepticism; see n. 105 just above. Neither of Hegel's main sources, Sextus and Diogenes Laertius, gives dates for Pyrrho's life. Recent research locates him in the period 365–275 BC, one generation younger than Aristotle. Hegel makes him Aristotle's contemporary owing to his belief that he accompanied Alexander's expedition and was executed at age 90 by Alexander (which would in fact have put him in a generation older than Aristotle). Hegel's account here includes some errors. For details, see Diogenes, *Lives* 9.58–65 (Hicks, ii. 472–8), who says he lived ninety years. He travelled with his teacher Anaxarchus, and so through him came into contact with Indian Gymnosophists and with the Magi. It was Anaxarchus, not Pyrrho, who was executed—by Nicocreon (not Alexander), who had him pounded to death in a mortar. Cf. *W.* xiv. 544–5 (MS?).

gave no credence to such things as sensible phenomena.[108] We see right away that the aim of these stories is to show the consequences of Skepticism in order to make it ridiculous. | Sextus Empiricus says about the New 147
Academics that one of their doctrines was that one must conduct one's own life not only according to the rules of prudence but also in accord with the laws of sensible phenomena and with circumstances.[109]

Timon of Phlius, the author of *Silloi* [satirical poems] and a follower of Pyrrho, is not important. A number of his *Silloi*, σίλλοι, witty distiches that are bitter and disdainful, are cited. Dr Paul has collected them in a dissertation, but they include much that is insignificant.[110]

Aenesidemus, a Cyrenaic, a contemporary of Cicero, revived Skepticism in Alexandria.[111] At that time Alexandria vied with Athens to become the seat of the sciences. The Skeptics were a presence there but not as a clearly distinct group. In history we see the Academy opposing itself especially to Dogmatism. In later times the Academy slipped more or less into Skepticism, from which it was separated by only a thin line. In Pyrrho's Skepticism there was not yet evident much cultivation and much orientation toward specific thoughts, toward philosophy; his Skepticism was directed more to the sensible domain. A Skepticism of that sort could be of no great interest in the context of philosophy's development as Stoicism, Epicureanism, Platonism, and so forth. For Skepticism to emerge with a commensurate philosophical stature it had first to undergo development itself on the philosophical side. That was the doing of Aenesidemus and Sextus Empiricus.

Sextus Empiricus is one of the most famous Skeptics. He was called 'Empiricus' because he was a physician. He lived in the middle of the second century AD. His works divide into two parts: the *Pyrrhonian hypotyposes*—

108. Diogenes Laertius names a number of Pyrrho's pupils (*Lives* 9.68–9; Hicks, ii. 480–3); in speaking of his apparently absurd actions, Hegel is elaborating on a terse remark by Diogenes (9.62; Hicks, ii. 474–5). Hegel is also drawing here mainly upon Sextus Empiricus, who says the Skeptics had no doctrine but they did have a way of living that they exemplified (*Pyrr. hyp.* 1.8.16–17; Bury, i. 12–13).

109. For the rules of practical conduct in the New Academy, see p. 294 above. Here Hegel probably has in mind Sextus, *Adv. math.* 7.185, 187 (Bury, ii. 100–1) and *Pyrr. hyp.* 1.11.23 (Bury, i. 16–17), from which it is clear that, unlike the New Academy, the Skeptics based their rules for prudent behavior on an undogmatic acceptance of everyday experience.

110. On Timon, see Diogenes Laertius (*Lives* 9.109–11; Hicks, ii. 518–21). An. says: 'Aristotle cites his *Silloi* ...'. For the collection, see Fridericus Paul, *Dissertatio de sillis Graecorum* (Berlin, 1821), 41–56.

111. Diogenes Laertius reports (*Lives* 9.115–16; Hicks, ii. 524–7) that the Skeptics' school disbanded after Timon, until it was re-established by Ptolemaeus of Cyrene. At the end of his list of successive Skeptics he includes the two emphasized by Hegel, Aenesidemus and Sextus. Hegel's version probably follows Brucker (*Historia*, i. 1328), who drew upon different sources.

148 in three books, a general | presentation of Skepticism—and, secondly, the eleven books *Adversus mathematicos*, that is, against science in general. The latter are specifically directed against geometry, arithmetic, grammar, music, logic, physics, and ethics. There are six books against mathematics and five against philosophy.[112]

In this instance the distinction from the Academy is slight, and it is based in particular on the Skeptics' zeal to avoid and to cut off all manner of dogmatic expression, so that, for instance, in a sentence they always put 'seeming' in place of 'being'. Thus the Skeptics find fault with the Academy for not yet being purists when they say that assent is an evil and the withholding of assent is something good.[113] Since they say it is good and not that it seems so, they have not risen to the level of pure Skepticism. But this is no more than a form that is at once sublated by the content. If we say that there is something that is a good and we ask what the good is, what it is to which thinking assents, then the content in this case is that we should not give our assent. So the form is 'It is a good', but the content is that we ought not to count something as good or as true. In this way they find fault with the Academics' saying that we must prefer one probability to another and one virtue to another.[114] 'Preferring' is thus one of the forms that the Skeptics also attack.

The general aim of Skepticism is that, with the vanishing of all [finite] being, of everything determinate, everything affirmative, self-consciousness should attain within itself this inner stability, a perfect ἀταραξία, ataraxia, indifference, imperturbability. This is the same result that we have seen in the case of the directly preceeding philosophies.[115] Thus, when something is held to be true, or to be real [*Seiende*] or to be something thought, something objective, then self-consciousness is bound to it. But the stability and the freedom of self-consciousness involve the absence of bonds—being bound or firmly attached to nothing, so that self-consciousness shall not lose its
149 equilibrium. The self-consciousness | that is bound falls into a state of

112. Diogenes Laertius mentions Sextus only briefly, as the author of 'ten books on Skepticism, and other fine works' (*Lives* 9.116; Hicks, ii. 526–7). Here Hegel is drawing upon Brucker (*Historia*, ii. 631) and upon the division of Sextus' works in Fabricius' edition of Sextus (Leipzig, 1718), which he used. On the empirical school of medicine, see Sextus, *Pyrr. hyp.* 1.34.236–41 (Bury, i. 144–9).

113. On this nitpicking distinction drawn between the New Academy and Skepticism, see Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. hyp.* 1.33.226–32 (Bury, i. 138–43).

114. On the relation of inclination or preference to belief, see Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. hyp.* 1.33.229–31 (Bury, i. 140–3).

115. Sextus sets forth this goal of the soul or self at rest, in *Pyrr. hyp.* 1.6.12 (Bury, i. 8–9). By the other philosophies that have a comparable result, Hegel means Stoicism and Epicureanism.

unrest—since nothing is fixed—because the object is itself changeable and not at rest, and so self-consciousness itself comes into a state of unrest.

Thus the aim of Skepticism is to do away with all of the unconscious bias in which the natural self-consciousness is held captive and, insofar as thought latches onto a content, to cure it of any such content fixed in thought. Out of the fluctuation of all things there emerges the liberation of self-consciousness—this ataraxia, the simple, inner selfsameness that can be acquired only through reason, through thought. Thought is what brings to consciousness whatever in the way of inclinations, habits, and the like there is in a human being, what one is; but at the same time this is made to fluctuate, so that we will not take it to be true, because it implicitly contradicts itself and supersedes itself. Thought brings this to consciousness and so gives rise to ataraxia. This ataraxia follows upon [recognition of] the fluctuation of everything finite just as the shadow follows the body.[116]

This [self]sameness or independence emerges of its own accord along with thought. With reference to ataraxia, Sextus Empiricus employs the following comparison: Apelles painted a horse and was utterly unable to depict its lather of sweat. In his vexation he threw at the picture the sponge he used to wipe his brushes and on which all the colors were mixed together, and by doing that he hit upon the true likeness of the lather.[117] Similarly, it is within the mixture of all actual being and all thoughts that the Skeptics find free self-consciousness. During a storm at sea Pyrrho pointed out to his anxious fellow passengers a pig that went on eating placidly, and he said: The sage must abide in such an ἀταραξία, although it | must not be swinish 150
but must be acquired through reason.[118]

To be more specific, the skeptical philosophy is also called 'Pyrrhonic and ephectic skepsis', from σκέπτειν, 'to investigate or to seek', without finding the truth itself. We must not translate *skepsis* as 'doctrine of doubt' or 'seeking to doubt'. Skepticism is not a doubt, for doubt is the very opposite of the tranquillity that ought to be Skepticism's result. 'Doubt' [*Zweifel*] derives from *zwei* [two]; it is a vacillation between two or more points; a person settles upon neither the one nor the other and yet should settle upon one or the other, even though each is doubted. An example is doubt concerning the immortality of the soul or concerning the existence of God. Forty

116. Sextus explains how ataraxia is attained by ridding oneself of dogmatism and the bias of the natural consciousness (*Pyrr. hyp.* 1.12.25–9; Bury, i. 18–21).

117. See *Pyrr. hyp.* 1.12.28 (Bury, i. 18–19) for this anecdote about Apelles.

118. Diogenes Laertius recounts this comparison with the pig (*Lives* 9.68; Hicks, ii. 480–1).

years ago a great deal was written about this, portraying—as in the 'Messias'—the misery of doubt.[119] This standpoint of doubt is the opposite of Skepticism. Doubt is restless because it wants to find rest in something set in opposition to rest, and can find it nowhere. Skepticism, however, is equally indifferent to the one and to the other, and does not wish to find security in one of the opposed elements. This is Skepticism's standpoint of ataraxia.

According to Sextus Empiricus, Skepticism further professes to be a force that, in some way or other, sets into mutual opposition what is sensed and what is thought, with the former taken in the Epicurean mode and the latter in the Stoic mode, immediate consciousness and thinking consciousness—a force that sets the sensible in opposition to the sensible or thought to thought, or else the sensible in opposition to thought or thought to the sensible. In other words, it is a means of showing their mutual contradiction and of showing that the one has as much value as the other, which is its opposite. This gives rise to the *epoche*, ἐποχή, that is, the withholding of assent or of taking something to be true, and from it arises freedom from
151 every agitation of the mind. | Thus, for example, sensible set in opposition to sensible. A nearby tower that is square appears at a distance to be round. The one [sensation] is as good as the other, so both concepts are applicable to the same object. This is, of course, a trivial example; but what matters is the thought contained in it.[120]

As for pitting thought against the sensible, they brought up the fact that Anaxagoras had given reasons to show that snow is black. When snow melts it loses whiteness, becoming colorless water, and what is colorless is black. Likewise in opposing thought to thought, providence is affirmed on the basis of the system of heavenly bodies but opposed by the fact that the good often fare badly and evil ones prosper.[121]

119. Hegel refers to Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock's vast epic poem, *Der Messias*, written and published in parts in 1748–73; the edition published in Leipzig in 1819 (4 vols.) was in Hegel's library. He could have in mind here the figure of the seraph Abdiel Abbadonna (Songs 2.627–31, 9.536–87), but also the beginning of Song 12 (lines 1–18) or the figure of the doubter Sebida (Song 17.459–70), and in particular the prayer of Thomas (Song 14.874–910). See also Jean Paul, 'Rede des todten Christus vom Weltgebäude herab, dass kein Gott sei', in *Religionsphilosophie und spekulative Theologie. Der Streit um die Göttlichen Dinge (1799–1812), Quellenband*, ed. Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg, 1994), 5–8.

120. For the discussion in this paragraph, see Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. hyp.* 1.4.8–10, 1.13.31–2 (Bury, i. 6–9). Cf. *W.* xiv. 553–4 (MS?).

121. Sextus Empiricus is the source for both examples in this paragraph; see *Pyrr. hyp.* 1.13.32–3 (Bury, i. 22–3). Cf. *W.* xiv. 555 (MS?).

*b. Argumentative Procedure: The Tropes*

We must now consider the Skeptics' procedure in greater detail. The general [method] is that its own opposite [*Ander*] is set over against whatever is determinate, whatever is affirmed or thought. The Skeptics have worked out the opposition in certain forms. Given the nature of Skepticism, one cannot ask for a system; one can instead only delineate general forms or methods of opposing. The Skeptics called a form of this sort a 'trope', τρόπος, which means 'mode' [*Wendung*]. The withholding of assent was supposed to come about by means of the tropes. These forms are to be applied to everything thought or sensed, in order to show that it is nothing in itself.

These tropes are of two kinds: ten older ones and five newer ones. The older ones pertain more to the sensible domain and belong to a less cultivated thinking. They are directed principally against what we call the common belief in the truth of things or of the sensible.[122] Skepticism essentially was very far from holding the things of immediate certainty to be true. In recent times Schulze in Göttingen has put on airs with his Skepticism; he has even written an 'Aenesidemus' and has also | expounded Skepticism in other works, in opposition to Leibniz and 15
Kant. This new Skepticism accepts what is quite contrary to the old—namely, that immediate consciousness or sense experience is something true.[123] The Skeptics even granted that we must be guided by these things. But truth is quite another matter. The Skeptics had no intention of granting that such things are something true. Skepticism has been directed primarily against the truth of ordinary consciousness.

As for the tropes, Sextus Empiricus remarks that they can be subsumed under three forms—that they have to do with (1) the judging subject, (2) the objective element about which the judging takes place, and (3) the relation of the two, of subject and object.[124] When thinking is cultivated further, it embraces things within more general points of view.

122. Sextus Empiricus says that the older Skeptics formulated the ten tropes and the more recent Skeptics the additional five (*Pyrr. hyp.* 1.14.36, 1.15.164; Bury, i. 24–5, 94–5). Sextus also refers to further tropes (1.16.178–86; Bury, i. 100–7) that Hegel does not discuss.

123. See Schulze's various titles on Skepticism, listed in the Bibliography of Hegel's Sources. Hegel wrote a critique of Schulze's own brand of skepticism (*GW* iv. 197–238). See the translation of excerpts from Schulze, *Aenesidemus* (1792), together with Hegel's review essay on Schulze's subsequent *Critique of Theoretical Philosophy* (1801), in *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism*, trans. George di Giovanni and H. S. Harris (Albany, 1985), 104–35, 313–62.

124. See Sextus, *Pyrr. hyp.* 1.14.38–9 (Bury, i. 24–7), where he says three superordinate modes or tropes serve to organize the original ten into groups (1–4; 7 and 10; 5, 6, 8 and 9)—the order in which Hegel presents them. He also says (something Hegel omits) that the three can be referred to the mode of relation, which stands as genus to the species (the three) and the subspecies (the ten).

We have now to expound the tropes in brief. In these older tropes we discern a lack of abstraction. 1. The first trope is the diversity of living things, of animals. From this diversity of organization there also arises the diversity of sensation. The diversity of animals is described in detail. Some animals come into being via copulation, others without it; some emerge from eggs and others via live birth. They have diverse origins and so they have diverse sensations too. Different things appear differently to different animals. What appears white seems yellow to someone with jaundice; what is sensed in one way by one is sensed differently by another.[125]

2. The second trope is the diversity of humankind. With regard to physical differences the Skeptics accentuated many ἰδιοσυγκρασίαι, idiosyncrasies. One person was chilly in the sunlight but warm in the shade; swallowing a large dose of hemlock has no ill effects on one person but does harm others; one person's sensation is this, another's that.[126] The 'diversity of
153 humankind | as a whole' refers here chiefly to sensation. [This diversity] is something that we now find in other modes too; we say that people differ with regard to taste, to world view, to religion and so forth. Religion in particular must be left to each person; so in the sphere of religion too there is nothing true, nothing objective; but the end result of that is subjective imagination, indifference toward all objectivity, all truth. Then the church is no more; we each have our own church and liturgy; we each have our own religion.

3. The third trope is the diversity in organization of the senses. Something that to the eye appears raised on a painted panel appears flat to the touch.[127]

4. The fourth is the diversity of the affects, of circumstances in the subject—tranquillity, hatred, and so forth. The young and the old frequently judge differently about one and the same object. Beauty does not present itself in the same way to the young as to the old.[128]

5. The fifth concerns the diversity of location, of position or distance, of the situation of objects, of illumination. This thing looks blue from here, yellow from there. The light of a lantern is weak in the sunshine and bright

125. For the first trope, see Sextus, *Pyrr. hyp.* 1.14.40–78 (Bury, i. 26–47). Hegel's remarks are a digest of 1.14.40–4. Cf. *W.* xiv. 558 (MS?).

126. Sextus presents the second trope in 1.14.79–90 (Bury, i. 46–55); see 79–81 for the physical differences that Hegel mentions; cf. *W.* xiv. 559–60 (MS?).

127. The discussion of the third trope, which begins with this example about painted panels, occurs in 1.14.90–9 (Bury, i. 54–9); cf. *W.* xiv. 562 (MS?).

128. For the fourth trope, see 1.14.100–17 (Bury, i. 58–69); Hegel here draws upon 100 and 105–6; cf. *W.* xiv. 562 (MS?).

in darkness, so we cannot say that the light is bright. A spot has this color, but from another standpoint it has a different color.[129]

6. The sixth trope is taken from admixture. No thing impinges on the senses in isolation, but rather [each] is mixed with something else. Aroma is bound up with air and temperature; the warmth of the sun intensifies it.[130]

7. The seventh trope is the combination, the size or the number of things. The horn of a billy goat looks black, but when scraped it is white; Carrara marble is yellow as a block, white when pulverized. Wine in moderation fortifies the body, in large quantities destroys it.[131]

8. The eighth is relationship. This is a universal trope. Relationship involves an opposition of the two entities in the relationship. | What is 154
reciprocal in the relationship is sometimes treated as independent, subsisting by itself. But insofar as it is what it is only in relationship, it is also not independent.[132]

9. The ninth trope is the more or less frequent occurrence of things. What is normal modifies judgments about things. So normalcy too is a circumstance that allows us to say that things only appear a certain way but not that they are so. In saying 'this is how things are', we can also point to a circumstance in which the opposite predicate is applicable to them.[133]

10. The tenth is an ethical trope and it refers to propriety, right, law, and custom. What counts as right in this place does not do so elsewhere. Hume even says that 'law' is only a matter of custom, that it is nothing in and for itself. One people has one rule, another has a different one. The law in Rhodes is that the son should pay the father's debts. In Rome he does not have to assume them if he renounces his claim to his father's property.[134]

129. For these examples pertinent to the fifth trope (1.14.118–23; Bury, i. 68–73), see especially 118–20, as well as n. 120 just above. Cf. *W.* xiv. 563 (MS?).

130. Sections 124–5 of the sixth trope (1.14.124–8; Bury, i. 72–7) contain this example; cf. *W.* xiv. 563 (MS?).

131. Hegel selects a few of the many examples Sextus gives in the first part (129–31) of his account of the seventh trope (1.14.129–34; Bury, i. 76–9); cf. *W.* xiv. 564 (MS?).

132. For the eighth trope, see 1.14.135–40 (Bury, i. 78–83), especially 137; cf. *W.* xiv. 564–5 (MS?).

133. The ninth trope is set forth in 1.14.141–4 (Bury, i. 82–5); cf. *W.* xiv. 565–6 (MS?).

134. In expounding the tenth and last of the 'older tropes' (1.14.145–63; Bury, i. 84–93), Sextus includes a wealth of examples of diverse customs that Hegel summarizes by saying: 'What counts as right in this place does not do so elsewhere.' For Hume on this issue, see Vol. III of this edition. Hegel's example about payment of the father's debts comes from Sextus, section 149. Cf. *W.* xiv. 566 (MS?).

The other five tropes of the Skeptics pertain to thinking, to the dialectic of the concept. They refer to a different, more cultivated standpoint of reflective thinking, and a definite concept is evident in it. Sextus Empiricus expounds them and then goes on to show that all skeptical investigations culminate in these five tropes. He says that the object under discussion is either something sensed or something thought. Howsoever it may be defined, there is a diversity of opinion about it, and especially of philosophical opinion. The first of these five tropes is as follows. Some hold what is sensed to be the criterion, others what is thought, others in turn a certain thought, and others a certain sensation. So there is a contradiction. This trope
155 therefore consists in the differing judgments concerning truth.[135] |

This is also the favorite trope of modern times, that owing to the diversity of philosophies nothing in philosophy is tenable. It is pointed out that different philosophies maintain quite contrary positions. We cannot arrive at truth, for people have thought too divergently about the truth.[136] How then is this contradiction to be harmonized? If this contradiction is not to be harmonized, Sextus continues, then we withhold our assent. If harmony is supposed to be produced, we face the question: how are we to decide, or on what is the decision to rest? Should what is sensed be judged by sensation or by what is thought? If what is sensed ought to be grounded and judged by what is sensed, then we concede that what is sensed requires a grounding. Thus what is supposed to be the grounding factor requires every bit as much a grounding itself, and so on *ad infinitum*. We get the same result if what is thought is supposed to be what judges. For it to serve in this way it requires grounding in its turn, since what is thought is the sort of thing about which there is no agreement. So what is thought requires a grounding, but the grounding factor is likewise something thought and requires a grounding in its turn, and so on.[137]

This is the second trope, the falling away to infinity. Here we have the relationship of cause and effect. From the effect we proceed to the cause; but this too is nothing original, for it is itself an effect, so we proceed to infinity in any event. But, when we fall into an infinite progression, we have no grounding, for what we take to be the cause is itself only effect. We only go

135. For the first of these other five tropes, see Sextus, 1.15.164–77 (Bury, i. 94–101), the latter part of which (170–7) discusses their relation to the first series of ten. For Hegel's remarks here, see especially 164–5 and 169.

136. For this contention as to why philosophical truth is unattainable, see Hegel's discussion of its modern form in Vol. I of this edition, early in the section on the aim of the history of philosophy.

137. This discussion of an infinite regress of grounding factors, continued in the following paragraph, is based on Sextus, 1.15.170–2 (Bury, i. 96–7); cf. *W.* xiv. 569 (MS?).

on perpetually to another, | which entails, however, that no final point is 156
posited, for the progression is endless, that is to say, in it no cause or grounding is posited. It is a very important notion [*Meinung*] that an infinite progression is not something truly ultimate. The erroneous notion that this progression is an authentic category we even find in Kant and Fichte; it does not, however, involve any truly ultimate point or—what amounts to the same thing—anything truly first.[138] The understanding depicts the infinite progression as something sublime, although the contradiction is that we speak of a cause, and it is evident that this cause is only an effect. With this progression to infinity we arrive only at contradiction and at constant repetition of the same thing, and not at the resolution of the contradiction and thereby at the genuine prius. Hence it is a false notion to view this progression as something genuine. Should the progression to infinity prove to be unsatisfactory—the Skeptics saw this too—and should it be cut short, then it can turn out that being or what is sensed has its grounding in thought, and, conversely too, thought, the other, has its grounding in what is sensed or in sensation. In this way each would be grounded without there being a progression to the bad infinite. The grounding factor would then also be what is grounded, but one would not then go beyond it but instead would return to it.

This they called the trope of reciprocity, δι' ἀλλήλους; we can also call it the circular proof. But we no more have a genuine grounding here than we did before. Each element is | present only by virtue of the other; there is no 157
being-in-and-for-self.[139] There is, however, a way to avoid this [result]. The highest form would be the acceptance or presupposing of an in-itself, something first and unmediated—an unproven axiom. This is how we proceed in the finite sciences too. When an unproven axiom of this sort is presupposed,

138. Sextus says (1.15.166; Bury, i. 94–5) that this second one of the other five tropes leads to suspension of judgment, to an argument with no starting point. Hegel, in contrast, ties it to an infinite causal regression reminiscent of Jacobi's argument that we are forever ascending a chain of conditioned elements but never arriving at what is unconditioned. See Vol. III of this edition. In mentioning Kant and Fichte in this context, Hegel confuses an infinite causal regress with an infinite regress as an element of proof in the domain of practical philosophy, in the context of the constitution of the 'I'. See Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, in *Kant, Gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin, 1900 ff.), v. 122; trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, 1956), 126–7. See also Fichte, *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* (1794), in *Fichte: Gesamtausgabe* (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt, 1964 ff.), pt. 1, ii. 271; see *Science of Knowledge*, trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (New York, 1970), 239. See also Vol. III of this edition.

139. For the Skeptics' trope of 'through one another' (the fallacy of *circulus in probando*—each of two propositions serving to ground the other), see Sextus, 1.15.169, 172 (Bury, i. 94–7). Diogenes Laertius speaks of a circular proof in connection with this trope (*Lives* 9.89; Hicks, ii. 500–1).

we are falling into the mode of presupposition. Just as dogmatism arrogates to itself the right to make a presupposition, so too everyone else has the right to presuppose the contrary. That is how it is with the modern anchoring of faith upon the subject's immediate revelation. Each one does nothing but affirm: 'I find in my consciousness that there is a God.' Another may with equal right say: 'I find that there is no God.'[140] With this immediate knowing in modern times we have not come so very far, perhaps no further than the ancients. This is the fifth trope, that of presupposition. In Sextus this is the fourth, and that of δι' ἀλλήλους is the last.[141]

This, then, is Skepticism. The skeptical consciousness or procedure is of great importance. For everything that is immediately accepted, but finite, it shows that it is nothing tenable, nothing secure, nothing absolute, nothing true; it shows that sensations are self-contradictory. Sextus Empiricus and others took the trouble to deal with all particular categories of the individual sciences and to show that they are nothing secure or true; he exhibits their implicit other. Thus he attacks the statements in mathematics that there is a point, a space, a line, a surface, one, and so forth. He deals in the same fashion with logical categories and shows their own other to be implicit in them.[142] For instance, we naively grant validity to point and space; a point is in space and is something simple in space, but it is dimensionless; conse-
158 quently it is not in space. Insofar as 'one' is spatial, | we call it a point; but if this statement is to have a meaning, then 'one' must be spatial; and if it is spatial, then it has dimensions, so it is no longer a point. It is the negation of space insofar as it is the absolute limit within space; as such, it makes contact

140. For the trope based on hypothesis, on an unproved axiom, see Sextus, 1.15.168, 173 (Bury, i. 94–9). For the modern version of it—Jacobi's 'immediate knowing'—see Vol. III of this edition.

141. In his overview (1.15.164–9; Bury, i. 94–5) Sextus lists the trope of presupposition as the fourth and that of reciprocity as the fifth, whereas in his exposition he reverses the order.

142. It is not evident to which Skeptics Hegel refers here. In the last three chapters of bk. 9 of his *Lives* (on Anaxarchus, Pyrrho, and Timon; Hicks, ii. 471–527), Diogenes Laertius provides a full account of Skepticism, including the older and newer tropes; but he is not a Skeptic himself and he does not apply the tropes to a critique of knowledge. We find that application made by Sextus, in the first six books of his *Adversus mathematicos*, which are aimed respectively at the (1) grammarians, (2) rhetoricians, (3) geometers, (4) 'arithmeticians', (5) astrologers, and (6) musicians; these books constitute vol. iv of Bury's edition, and are grouped there under the common heading 'Against the Professors'. For the mathematical elements that Hegel mentions, see 3.22–8 (point), 3.78–91 (space in relation to bodies), 3.29–59 (line), 3.60–77 (surface), and 4.11–20 (one); Bury, iv. 254–91, 310–15. See also the critique of the concepts of place, motion, time, and so forth, in Sextus' *Pyrr. hyp.* 3.1–20 (Bury, i. 324–39). For the logical categories, see *Pyrr. hyp.*, bk. 2 (Bury, i. 150–323) and *Adv. math.* bks. 7, 8 ('Against the Logicians'; all of Bury, vol. ii).

with space; this negation therefore has an association with space. Therefore the negation is itself spatial, so internally it is a nullity; but thereby it is also something internally dialectical.

Thus Skepticism has also dealt with properly speculative ideas and shown their importance. Exhibiting the contradiction in the sphere of the finite is an essential point of the speculative philosophical method. But, whatever the speculative idea itself involves, it is not one-sidedly finite, and it contains the negative, or this ideality, within itself.

Sextus Empiricus even refers to the speculative idea, expressed as we have seen it in Aristotle as thought thinking itself, absolute thinking, or as reason conceiving itself. Sextus argues against this idea as follows. The conceiving reason is either a whole or a part. If, as conceiving, it is the whole, then nothing is left for what is conceived, for the object or content. But, if it is a part that is supposed to conceive itself, then the other part is not conceived. Or, if this other part is in turn defined in another respect as the whole, then the same argument comes into play once more—there is nothing left for what conceives. Or, if the conceiving element be one part such that what is conceived be the other part, then the conceiving would not be conceiving itself, thinking would not be thinking itself, but something else instead—if in fact there be different parts.[143]

All this argumentation amounts to is introducing into the relationship of self-thinking thought the relationship of whole and | part, as it is in the 159
ordinary categories of the understanding. But this relationship is far too subordinate and unfit to be brought into the company of the speculative idea. So this argumentation rests upon first introducing an alien characteristic into the idea that it has before it and then, after thus contaminating this idea, arguing against it. The relationship of whole and part does not belong here. We give the idea an itch so that we can go on to scratch it.[144] A category gets brought into the picture in order that it may be isolated onesidedly, without taking into account the other moment in its determination. It is the same as when one says that subjectivity and objectivity are two words, so

143. Sextus' argument against thought being cognizant of itself is found in *Adv. math.* 7.310–12 (Bury, ii. 162–5). On Aristotle's position see pp. 238–9, 254–5 above.

144. This image probably derives from Lessing's letter (No. 4), 'Ueber den Bergmannschen Bolingbroke'; see Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. Karl Lachmann, 3rd edn. prepared by Franz Muncker, 31 vols. (Stuttgart, 1886–1924; repr. Berlin, 1968), viii. 10. There Lessing turns an expression of Bolingbroke's character Hudibras against the translator Bergmann, and surmises that Bergmann 'gives his author an itch in order to be able to scratch it. That is, he misunderstands him and then, in learned footnotes, chastises him for an absurdity that he himself has concocted.'

their unity cannot be expressed. One says one is sticking to the words, but this determination is one-sided; we must also take into account the other determination, that this difference is not something that holds good, but instead that it is what can be sublated.

This may be enough about Skepticism; and with that we have concluded the second part of the first period, that of Greek philosophy.

## III. NEOPLATONIC PHILOSOPHY

### *A. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS*

This third stage then—as the third—is the result of all that has gone before. With this third stage, which is what is concrete, a wholly new epoch begins. This third stage is the shape of philosophy that is most closely connected with Christianity, with this revolution that took place in the world. The last topic that we treated was the return of self-consciousness into itself, an infinite subjectivity devoid of objectivity; it was Skepticism, | the purely 160
negative attitude toward all external existence and knowledge, toward everything that counts as hard-and-fast and true. This return into subjective consciousness is an inner contentment, but a contentment gained by flight, by abandoning everything objective, a contentment of consciousness by means of pure, infinite, inward abstraction. So this annihilation of everything objective was our last topic; it is the absolute dearth of all content, the complete emptying-out of all content that is supposedly hard-and-fast and true. We noted that the Stoic and Epicurean systems have this same result and goal.[1] But it is in Skepticism that this divestiture finds its consummation, this divestiture of everything determinate; and thereby is posited the perfect internalization or inwardization [*Erinnerung*, *Innerlichmachung*].

As far as the external or political [sphere] is concerned, this is the form of philosophy in the Roman world as such. The character of the Roman world was the abstract universality that, as power, is this callous dominion in which every individuality proper to the separate peoples has been superseded. In its existence the world has divided itself into two parts—the atoms or the private citizens on one side and their external bond on the other; and this merely external bond is dominion or coercive authority as such, which likewise was vested in one single subject, in the emperor. This is the age of complete despotism, of the decline of all public or community life; there is a withdrawal into private life and private interests. So it is the age when private rights flowered, the right that pertains to the property of the individual person. This character of abstract | universality that is immediately 161
bound up with the atomistic ethos, with this singularization, we see consummated in the sphere of thinking too. The two spheres correspond completely.

It is from this point that spirit moves onward; it makes an inner breach, it goes forth again from its subjectivity to objectivity, but directly to an

1. See pp. 289, 306 above.

intellectual objectivity, to an objectivity that is in spirit and in truth.[2] This objectivity is intellectual and not one in the outward shape of single objects nor in the shape of duties, of a singular morality; instead it is an absolute objectivity, one that, as we said, is born of the spirit and so is the authentic truth. In other words, it is, on the one hand, the return to God but, on the other hand, God's relationship to human beings, God's manifestation or appearance to them, albeit as God is in and for himself in truth, as God is for spirit. This is the transition—the reinstatement of what is objective for itself, of spirit; it is the infinity of the thinking that grasped itself only subjectively, now becoming objective to itself.

In the case of Stoicism too we saw this return of self-consciousness into itself, in the fact that spirit, as thinking and by thinking and by the purity of thinking, is inwardly free, is inwardly self-reliant and independent. But in the Stoic case we also saw a world, an objectivity; the Stoic λόγος, the νοῦς, is all-pervasive in the world, it is the foundation or the substantial aspect of the entire world. So there too we have objectivity; and likewise in the earlier philosophies we have seen that νοῦς is the essence of the world.[3] But the difference between this earlier standpoint and the present one is more precisely this: we saw that Aristotle grasped or conceived of the whole series of living and spiritual things, and he recognized the concept, or thought, to be their truth. With the Stoics this unity of thought, or the systematic
162 element, was emphasized as the defining feature, whereas Aristotle | paid more attention to the individual things. In Stoicism this unity of thought became essentially the foundation.

But we have to grasp this foundation that is the νοῦς, or λόγος, in the way it determined itself, to grasp that in fact it was substantial only; in other words, the Stoic νοῦς or λόγος represented a pantheism. For this pantheism has to be distinguished from the philosophy of spirit or the thought of spirit, from the consciousness of spirit. What first occurs to us, upon ascending to the

2. An allusion to the New Testament, John 4: 24. The biblical allusion highlights the fact that Hegel regards the Christian world view and theology as forming much of the intellectual and cultural setting in which Neoplatonism emerged, and to which it responded. This opening section on the 'General Characteristics' of Neoplatonism incorporates his summary of the Christian concepts of God and the God–world relationship, without explicitly stating that it does so. Compare with it the first section of Vol. III of this edition, 'Introduction: The idea of Christianity'.

3. For this account of Stoicism, see pp. 271, 273 above, as well as Diogenes Laertius, *De vitis* 7.138; see *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, trans. R. D. Hicks, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1925, 1938), ii. 240–3. The view that νοῦς is the essence of the world Hegel finds in Anaxagoras and especially in Plato and Aristotle; see above on Anaxagoras and on Socrates' criticism of his thought (pp. 101, 104), on Plato (pp. 191, 205), and on Aristotle (pp. 238 and, especially, 254).

realization that the universal is *my* thought, is to entertain the notion of pantheism. The beginning of the mind's elevation to the universal is when spirit comes to feel that all is life, that there is life everywhere, that it is all one life and one idea. So in Stoicism the substantial form had this unity, the form of pantheism.

Now when self-consciousness steps forth out of itself, out of its infinitude or its self-absorbed thinking and toward what is determinate, when it freely and independently, although uncharacteristically, steps forth to particular things, to particular duties or ways of acting—in other words, when the thought that thinks this universal substance, the νοῦς or λόγος, passes over from there to the particular and now thinks the heavens, the earth, the stars, human beings, and so forth—then it descends immediately from this universal plane into the particular as such or immediately into the finite in general, for these are finite shapes. What is [authentically] concrete is simply the universal that particularizes itself in itself, and in this particularity or in this finitizing nevertheless remains infinitely present to itself. For pantheism, in contrast, there is a universal foundation | or a substance that finitizes itself 163
and thereby degrades itself. There is a universal, but the transition to the particular is devoid of any return to the universal. In other words, the principle of emanation is that the universal, in particularizing itself—God, in creating the world—debases itself through what is particular and limited; it sets a limit to itself, finitizes itself, and this finitization is then devoid of any return into itself that sublates these limitations or this finitization.

We find the same relationship in the mythology of the Greeks and Romans. There is a god, a concrete god and no mere abstraction. But the configuration of god or the defining of god only makes god finite. In beauty the finite is taken back into the infinite, but incompletely. Even the most beautiful work of art remains a particular shape that is finite, one that does not correspond to the free idea. The other [of the idea], the particular, the reality, its objectivity and configuration, must be only of the kind that is adequate to the universal that has being in and for itself. This adequacy of being is lacking in the shapes of the gods, as it is in the shapes that are called duties and in those that are natural.

So what is now required is for knowing, or the spirit that has internalized itself in this way, to objectivize itself or return to objectivity, return to the world—for it to reconcile to itself the world that it has forsaken. This objectivity must be adequate to spirit, namely, it must be a redeemed world, a world distinct from spirit but at the same time a reconciled world. Just as it is the standpoint of the world, so this concrete standpoint becomes that of philosophy, the standpoint of spirit's emergence; for this is

just what spirit is—not only pure thinking but the thinking that makes itself objective and maintains itself in this objectivity. It makes the objectivity
164 adequate to itself and is present to itself in it. The earlier | objectifications of thought are spirit's going forth only into specificity or into finitude and not into an objective world that is itself adequate to what has being in and for itself. This is the general standpoint. So, from this internalization [*Erinnerung*], from the forfeiture of the world, there is engendered a world that, in its externality, remains at the same time an inner world and is consequently a reconciled world. Thus what commences here is the world of spirituality.

So there are the following shapes. First, the consciousness that has become subjective makes the absolute as what is true into its object once again; what is free and true it sets forth outside itself and thus it apprehends, as object, what has being in and for itself—as an object that is for it what is genuine. That is to say, it comes to belief in God. Being-in-and-for-self, the wholly universal, the absolute power, thought of at the same time as objective—precisely this is God. In that God is now manifested again and enters into appearance, namely, that God is for consciousness, what arises is the relationship of human beings to this object of theirs, to this that is absolutely true.

This is a new standpoint that is of absolute interest from this point onward; it is the relationship of humanity to what truly is, to God. It is not a relationship to external things, to ideas or duties, as it was in Plato. These duties and ideas, which the Stoics have posited for themselves—all of that is only something circumscribed or specific; it is not the all-embracing determining of the kind that we have just mentioned. In this relationship the subject's preoccupation with itself, with its own freedom—as the sage puts
165 it—is superseded. It is superseded with respect to its one-sidedness. |

This same freedom, bliss, and imperturbability that was the goal of Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Skepticism is supposedly attained for the subject too, but it is mediated through God, or through concern for the truth that has being in and for itself. So it is bliss [obtained] not by means of flight from what is objective but essentially by turning toward it, with the result that it is through what is objective that this very freedom and bliss are won for the subject. This is the standpoint of the reverence for and consideration of God, of what has being in and for itself; it is the human being's orientation toward God. The goal of human life is an eternal, free, infinite goal, but one reached only by this orientation, so that in this object itself, standing free and firm over against it, the subject in itself wins its own freedom.

We have here antitheses that it is essential to mediate. If we take this position in a one-sided fashion, then God is 'over there' and the human being in its freedom is 'over here'—something inward that has apprehended itself infinitely in being-for-self, the human being in its freedom. Over against it [stands] what has being in and for itself, what is absolutely true; on this side stands what is itself pure inwardness, which is itself absolute but only formally absolute. Subjective human freedom, or self-consciousness, is pure relation to self, pure being-in-self. This is something absolute, but only formally so and not concretely. This antithesis now comes to the fore and necessarily lays claim to the concern of spirit. Moreover, insofar as the human will determines itself as negative toward what is objective, wickedness and evil arise in opposition to what is absolutely affirmative.

A further essential moment is the definition or form in which God as such must now be thought or grasped. God is now to be defined essentially as concrete, as what has being in and for itself, | and what is concrete belongs 166
to the concept of spirit. It is indispensable that God should be thought in relationship to the world and to humanity inasmuch as he is a living God. The relationship to the world is then a relationship to an other, and differentiation or determination is posited with it. So relationship to the world appears initially as a relationship to an other that is outside of God. But in that it is God's own relationship and activity, God's having the relationship [to the world] within himself is a moment of God himself. God's connection with the world is a characteristic within God himself; otherwise put, the other to the one, the duality, the negative, the one's other-being, or determination as such, is essentially a moment to be thought within God. That is to say, God is internally concrete, internally self-disclosing, and thus, as distinct characteristics, is internally self-positing.

This differentiating within God himself is the point where what has being in and for itself connects with human being, with the worldly realm as such. We say that God created humankind and the world. This is a determination within God himself, one that is, first of all, God's own internal self-determination, and it is the beginning point of the finite. The very point of internal differentiation is the point of mediation of the finite or the worldly with God himself. What is finite and human has its beginning there within God himself; its root is God's concrete nature, the fact that God differentiates himself internally. So then in this way the determinations or particularizations are, on one side, God's determinations or ideas within himself, God's own internal productions, with the result that what subsequently appears finite is still within God himself—the world is within God himself, so it is an intellectual, divine world. In this divine world God has, as it were,

begun to differentiate or determine himself, and that is then the connec-
167 tion | with the finite, temporal world. In that God is represented as concrete we have immediately a divine world within God himself. This constitutes the transition to the stage we are at now.

The unhappiness of the Roman world lay in this abstraction—in the fact that people no longer found their satisfaction as they had before, namely, in polytheism or pantheism; natural things, air, fire, water, stars, and the like, as well as the state or political life, were no longer the sorts of things in which people found satisfaction, possessed their truth, placed their highest value. Now, on the contrary, in the world's anguish over its present state, there arose despair, a disbelief in these configurations of the natural, finite world, just as this despair entered into life in the state too, into what constituted the human, ethical world. People came to lose faith in this configuration of actuality as external nature. The condition that we call human life in unity with nature and in which human beings possess God along with nature, because they find their satisfaction therein, ceased to exist. These configurations of the true or the divine as something natural and political disintegrated; in these circumstances people felt unhappy; they were cut off from what is true. The temporal world appeared to them to be something negative or untrue. They divorced this configuration from what is true, from God, and thus they recognized God in the spirit; they recognized that natural things and the state are not the mode in which God is present, that God's authentic determination was instead an intelligible world. In this way the unity of God with nature was broken, but only so that it could be posited once again in a higher way—in the world's being taken up into God, as an
168 intelligible world. |

This authentic world within God, this self-determining on God's part, now constitutes a principal point of interest. The human being's relationship to God is now defined as the order of salvation, as cultus, but in particular also as philosophy, with the express consciousness that our goal is to belong to this intelligible world, that individuals ought to make themselves fit for it, to conform themselves to it. The relationship that people think of themselves as having with God is defined in particular by the way people think that God is. It is not the case, as people do indeed say today, that we do not need to know God and yet we can be cognizant of this relationship. If God is what is primary, what is true, then the relationship to God is determined through God. If we want to specify what is true about the relationship, we must be acquainted with the status of what is true. God must be known first.

These are the principal points, the sphere in which thinking now takes precedence. So thinking proceeds directly to the negation of the natural.

Thinking consists no longer in seeking what is true in a finite guise; as it re-emerges from inwardness, it goes forth to an objectivity or to something true that does not have its attributes in the natural mode, as is the case in mythology, nor has them as duty, but instead has the determinations in itself as flowing exclusively from its nature and from no other. These are the principal moments of the standpoint that we are now approaching. It belongs to the Neoplatonists and the Neopythagoreans. But before we come to it we have to say something about Philo Judaeus and to mention a few moments that have their setting in the history of the church. | 169

## *B. THE PHILOSOPHERS*

### 1. Philo of Alexandria

Philo was a Jew from Alexandria who was born a few years before Christ. He was one of the first in whom we have this new direction of the general consciousness visible to us as a philosophical consciousness. In the reign of Caligula he was sent to Rome as emissary of the Jewish people, in order to provide the Romans with a better picture of the Jews. Legend has it that he also came to Rome in the reign of the Emperor Claudius and there made the acquaintance of the Apostle Peter. He left to posterity a great many writings, which were published in folio at Frankfurt in 1691. There is a newer edition by a recently deceased professor in Erlangen.[4]

In general he worked as the Neoplatonists did. He took as his basis the Jewish scriptures—for instance, the Books of Moses—and he gave to their immediate literal sense a more profound meaning, a mystical and allegorical sense. So in part his writings are only allegorical, mystical exegesis—for example, of the creation story. The representation of actuality is, on the one hand, still bound to these forms, while, on the other, what these forms express in only an immediate fashion no longer suffices. Thus begins the endeavor to grasp these forms more profoundly, or, as we say, to read

4. The account of Philo in this paragraph probably follows Jacob Brucker, *Historia critica philosophiae*, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1742–4), i. 631. Brucker in turn has drawn upon Josephus (*The Antiquities of the Jews* 18.10) and Eusebius of Caesarea (*Ecclesiastical History* 2.4–5), sources mentioned in the introduction to the 1691 folio edition of Philo, which Hegel used (see the Bibliography of Hegel's Sources). In mentioning the supposed second trip to Rome, Brucker (ii. 799) erroneously cites Eusebius 2.18 as well as Ioannes Albertus Fabricius, *Bibliotheca Graeca*, 14 vols. (Hamburg, 1705–28), iv. 4; but later (iv. 115), in citing Eusebius, he speaks not of an encounter with Peter but only of a reading of Philo's writings before the Senate. See the Bibliography for the newer, 1820 edition of Philo.

between the lines, to find a deeper significance. There is on the whole a great difference between what these forms contain and what they express. In all history, art, philosophy and the like, the important thing is for what is in them to be brought out as well. The work of spirit just is the bringing-out or the bringing-to-consciousness of what is in them. When we *know* what is in them, we have brought it out for consciousness. So this bringing-out is the essential thing.

The other side of the coin is that, even though in earlier configurations what lay in them was not yet brought out before consciousness, we cannot for that reason say that it did not lie there, that it was not present in the
170 human spirit. It was not in consciousness | and also not in the representation, but it *was present* there [in the spirit]. On the one hand, the bringing of thought to determinate consciousness is a reading between the lines, but, on the other hand, that is not what it is with regard to the content. We need only to understand what consciousness is, and what is not yet brought out but lies within it. This aspect is pre-eminent in Philo's approach.

We have to take into consideration only the principal moments of Philo's thought. The first point is that for Philo God can be envisaged only by the eye of the soul. He calls this a ὅρασις, an ecstasy brought about by God. The soul must pull itself free from the body, it must relinquish what is sensible and lift itself up to the pure object of thought, which only the soul is capable of seeing. We can call this an intellectual intuiting, namely, a [kind of] thinking.[5] The other point, however, is that God cannot be *known* by the eye of the soul. It can know only *that* God is; it cannot know *what* God is.[6]

5. Philo interprets 'Israel' to mean 'He who sees God', in *De Abrahamo* 12.57; see *Philo*, 10 vols. and 2 supplementary vols.; vols. i–v trans. F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker, vols. vi–x trans F. H. Colson, and the supplementary vols. (from Armenian) trans. Ralph Marcus (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1929–62). This passage from *On Abraham* is in vi. 32–3. For the parallel between sensible sight and the soul's sight, see *De specialibus legibus* 3.34.194 (Colson, vii. 596–7). For the link of ὅρασις with ἔκστασις, see *De opificio mundi* 23.71 (Colson and Whitaker, i. 54–7), a passage that speaks of the mind's vision of the purely spiritual or intelligible world; see also Dieterich Tiedemann, *Geist der spekulativen Philosophie*, 6 vols. (Marburg, 1791–7), iii. 133. Philo speaks of the soul pulling itself free from the body, in *De migratione Abrahami* 35.192 (Colson and Whitaker, iv. 242–5), an allegorical essay in which Abraham departs from Haran (symbolizing the sensible world) and comes to behold truth. Philo gives a full account of ecstasy in *Quis rerum divinarum haeres sit* 51.249–53.265 (Colson and Whitaker, iv. 408–19), in his interpretation of the 'deep sleep' that fell upon Abraham (Gen. 12: 15). On the concept of intellectual intuition, see Vol. III of this edition (on Schelling).

6. See Philo, *Quod Deus sit immutabilis* 11.55, 13.62 (Colson and Whitaker, iii. 36–43) on the distinction between 'seeing' God and having knowledge of God. In similar fashion he discusses and commends the quest for the God whose essence cannot be apprehended (*De specialibus legibus* 1.6.35–7.36; Colson, vii. 118–21). See also *De nominum mutatione* 1.1–3.17 (Colson and Whitaker, v. 142–53).

God's essence is the primordial light, [understood] wholly in the Oriental way. Furthermore, God's likeness or reflection is the understanding, the λόγος, the πρωτογένης, the first-born Son who rules the world and maintains its order. This *logos* is the totality [*Inbegriff*] of all the ideas. God as the One, as such, is simply the ὄν, pure being.[7] Thus Philo confines the idea of God to pure being. So God is something abstract; and when we say 'God the Father', namely, God who has not yet created, then this One that is intrinsically devoid of determination, this undisclosed [being], is the initial unity.

But God determines himself, and what is engendered or what is determined by him within him remains within him and belongs to him. The 'other' that God distinguishes from himself is a moment of himself. God must be thought concretely. Thus, on one side, the idea | of God is confined 171
to itself. So God is first of all the One; but the One is indeterminate, whereas God is concrete, God is living. That is to say, God differentiates himself inwardly or determines himself in that λόγος or in the first-born Son. So it can be said that, if God is only the ὄν, then God cannot be known cognitively; we can see only *that* God is. This is quite correct. Cognitive knowing is the knowing of the self-determining God, of God's determining-within-himself, God's being-alive.

So the first moment is the primordial light, the essence or substance that fills and encompasses all things. God is filled with himself, αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ πλήρης (πλήρωμα). Everything else is impoverished, is empty. This empty or negative sphere God fills and encompasses.[8] God is himself One and All. The One is an abstraction, the All is absolute plenitude. But this plenitude is itself still abstract, it is not yet concrete. What is concrete is the λόγος. God dwells only in the aeon, in the primordial image, in the pure concept of time. The understanding or the λόγος is definitive, it is what comprises determinate being—the realm of thought, the angel of light. This is the primordial human being, the heavenly one, the human being in

7. On God's essence as the primordial light, see *De somniis* 1.13.75 (Colson and Whitaker, v. 334–7), which is a comment on Ps. 27: 1 and Gen. 1: 3; see also the following note. On the Word of God, the ideas in the mind of God, and the creation as in God's image, see *De opificio mundi*: 5.20 and 6.24–5 (Colson and Whitaker, i. 16–17, 20–1). Philo designates the Logos as 'Firstborn Son' who leads the flock, in *De agricultura* 12.51 (Colson and Whitaker, iii. 134–5), and as 'High Priest' and 'Firstborn', in *De somniis* 1.37.215 (Colson and Whitaker, v. 412–13). Philo does not identify the Logos with the rational soul, as does Hegel. On God as simply 'to be', without a nature to be spoken of or given a proper name, see *De somniis* 1.39.230 (Colson and Whitaker, v. 418–19).

8. For Philo's account of how God is his own 'place', containing all things and being contained by nothing, see *De somniis* 1.11.62–4 and *Legum allegoria* 1.14.44 (Colson and Whitaker, v. 328–9, i. 174–5); cf. *W.* xv. 23 (MS?).

God, the *logos*, when we represent spiritual activity to ourselves under this heading; the *logos* is the sunrise. This λόγος divides itself into ideas, which Philo also calls 'angels'. This primordial human being, the initial *logos*, is the tranquil world of thought. Distinct from it is the λόγος προφορικός, namely, the productive or active *logos*, the agency or the creating of the world, just as it is the abiding *logos* in the preservation of the world. For self-consciousness it is the teacher of wisdom, the high priest, the spirit of divinity who instructs humankind; it is the self-conscious return of spirit to itself.[9]

Then Philo passes over to the sensible world too; the abstract principle there is non-being [*Nichtseiende*], οὐκ ὄν. Just as in God there is being or ὄν, what is first, οὐσία, so the world's *ousia* is the οὐκ ὄν, the negative.[10] In the
172 beginning the Word of God created heaven | as the abode of the angels,

9. On God's 'dwelling in the aeon', see *Quod Deus sit immutabilis* 6.31–2 (Colson and Whittaker, iii. 24–7). On the *logos* as 'determinative' (the Captain in the incorporeal world), see *De confusione linguarum* 34.171–4 and *De somniis* 1.22.135–57 (Colson and Whitaker, iv. 102–5, v. 368–79). On the identification of the understanding or *logos* with the angel of light, see *De confusione linguarum* 28.146 (Colson and Whitaker, iv. 88–91), where Philo speaks of an 'archangel', not an 'angel of light'; possibly Hegel is linking this point with the figure of Lucifer in Jacob Boehme (see Vol. III of this edition). On the *logos* as, or in relation to, the primordial human being, see *Legum allegoria* 1.12.31 and *De somniis* 1.14.83–15.85 (Colson and Whitaker, i. 166–7, v. 340–1). In the latter passage Philo speaks of the different senses given to the word 'sun' in the Bible, including the sun as symbol of sensory knowledge and of the Word of God ('the light of our senses has risen like a sun'). In *W.* xv. 24 Hegel identifies the primordial human being with the Adam Kadmon figure of the Cabala. Philo vacillates when it comes to identifying the ideas with angels. In *De confusione linguarum* 34.172–4 he distinguishes angels, as unembodied souls, from the ideas, and in this correspondence with the religious tradition the angels form a link between heaven and earth; see *De somniis* 1.22.135–7, in the context of a commentary on 'Jacob's ladder' (Gen. 28: 10–17); see also *De somniis* 1.25.157 and *Legum allegoria* 3.61.175–7 (Colson and Whitaker, v. 378–9, i. 418–21). According to these texts the angels of the intelligible or of the *logos* are within the sensible domain and are not the intelligible itself. For a contrasting view, see *De opificio mundi* 7.26–9 (Colson and Whitaker, i. 20–3) and the following note. On the primordial human being as the locus of reason, see *De vita Mosis* 2.25.127 (Colson, vi. 510–11); Philo speaks of this primordial being as spiritual activity, whereas Hegel erroneously identifies it with the primal *logos* as a 'tranquil world of thought' (perhaps influenced by the image of Adam Kadmon). On speaking as creating, see *De sacrificio Abelis* 18.65 (Colson and Whitaker, ii. 142–3). Cf. *W.* xv. 24 (MS?). The last sentence in this paragraph in our text comes directly from Johann Gottlieb Buhle, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie* ..., 8 pts. in 9 vols. (Göttingen, 1796–1804), iv. 124. For Philo, in contrast, wisdom is a designation for the *logos*, not just for what it teaches; see The Song of Solomon in the Bible, and Philo, *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat* 16.54 and *De ebrietate* 8.30–1 (Colson and Whitaker, ii. 238–9, iii. 332–5).

10. This statement echoes a sentence in Buhle (*Lehrbuch*, iv. 125). See Philo, *De opificio mundi* 5.21–2 (Colson and Whitaker, i. 18–19) on the Creator's ungrudging goodness, which in turn echoes Plato, *Timaeus* 29e (on which, see p. 208, n. 95 above). See also *De specialibus legibus* 1.13.327–8 (Colson, vii. 290–1), on why the incorporeal ideas are not 'empty names'. See pp. 201, 215 above on οὐκ ὄν as the 'other' rather than 'nothing', and in relation to Plato's 'matter'. See pp. 337–8 below on Plotinus' adoption of this theme.

who are not phenomenal and make no impression on our senses. This heavenly world, an incorporeal heaven and an incorporeal earth, the locus of the incorporeal essences, the elements, is the archetype of sun, air, water, stars, and so forth, and the sensible world is its counterpart. This he then ties to [the account of] Moses, to the days of creation. So a Pythagorean and Platonic form is employed here.[11] These are the principal moments in Philo's philosophy.

## 2. The Cabalists

Here we can mention the Cabala. The wisdom of the Jews is called 'Cabala', and we are told that it is contained in two books, [the first being] the book *Jezirah* [*Sefer Yetzirah*], 'On the Creation'. Rabbi Akiba recounts the origin of this book as follows. It is the heavenly book that Adam received from God as consolation for the Fall. It is an obscure *mélange* of consolation devices—astrological, magical, medicinal, and prophetic. Akiba lived shortly after the destruction of Jerusalem during the reign of the Emperor Hadrian, and he is said to have been flayed alive after an uprising against the Romans. Rabbi Simeon [ben] Yohai, his disciple, is reputed to be the author of the book *Zohar* ('Splendor') [*Sefer Ha-Zohar*]. Both books were translated into Latin in the seventeenth century. In the fifteenth century as well an Israelite of later times, Rabbi Cohen Irira, wrote a book called *Porta coelorum*, 'The Gate of Heaven', which makes reference to the Arabs and the Scholastics.[12]

11. See Philo, *De opificio mundi* 7.26–9 (Colson and Whitaker, i. 20–3). In this echo of Gen. 1: 1 in our text Hegel makes the Word of God the creator, and, instead of mentioning 'earth', he speaks of heavenly realms. Philo speaks (7.27) of the dwelling place of 'manifest and visible gods', whereas Hegel substitutes 'angels' for 'gods'. On the basis of this substitution he can maintain that the ideas or the elements of the *logos*, namely, what constitute the invisible, intelligible world, are what Philo calls 'angels', thus invisible and non-manifest angels. For Philo the visible world is a counterpart to the heavenly world; see 7.29; cf. *W.* xv. 25–6 (MS?). *De opificio mundi* 14.45, 15.47–16.49 illustrate how Philo ties his thought to the Genesis creation account (Colson and Whitaker, i. 34–9). On the Pythagorean tetrad and tetractys and their Platonic connection, see pp. 44–8 above.

12. Much of this paragraph is based on Tiedemann (*Geist*, iii. 139–49). Brucker (*Historia*, ii. 834) is also a source for the opening statement about the two books of the Cabala. The transcripts mix the attribution of the *Jezirah* to Rabbi Akiba, together with the legends concerning its origins, legends Hegel's sources ascribe to the Cabalists. Buhle's account of the Cabala (*Lehrbuch*, iv. 146–73) is dependent in detail on that of Tiedemann. Hegel's sources say nothing about Latin translations of the two books, although Brucker (*Historia*, ii. 834 ff.) does refer to translations of other Cabalistic works. Abraham Cohen Herrera of Florence (died 1635 or 1639 in Amsterdam), a Marrano (Christianized Spanish Jew) by descent, was the only Cabalist to write in Spanish. His *Puerto del Cielo* exists only in manuscript in the original, but was published in a Hebrew translation (Amsterdam, 1655) and in the Latin condensation (*Porta coelorum*) of the Hebrew in 1677.

The secret wisdom of Cabalism can be extracted from these books. The better parts of it involve views similar to those of Philo. Just as the One is the original source of all numbers and is not itself a number when viewed as unity, so God is the principle of all things. Everything is contained *eminenter* in what
173 is first, in the One, | though not *formaliter* but instead *causaliter*. What is first in this 'all' is Adam Kadmon, Ἀδάμ Καδμόν, the first human being, the crowning glory [*höchste Krone*]. The other spheres, the circles of the world, are then formed by further going-forth, by emanation; and this emanation is portrayed as streams of light of the *Sefiroth*—this world of *Atziluth*. The pure spirits are further distinctions into which this obscure method delves.[13]

### 3. The Gnostics

Similar relationships and images are to be found in the Gnostic texts. Professor Neander has made a comprehensive and very erudite collection of them. A few forms correspond to those we have already mentioned.[14]

One of the most outstanding Gnostics is Basilides. What comes first for him too is the unutterable God, θεός ἄρρητος. The νοῦς or the first-born is called λόγος, σοφία, what sets in motion—defined more precisely as right-eousness and peace. Then follow more specific principles, which he calls 'archons'—the chieftains, so to speak, in the realm of spirits, or the particular ideas. A main feature of this system is again the process of refining the soul, the economy of purification, the οἰκονομία καθάρσεως. The first [element] embodies every perfection, though only as *potentia*, as enclosed within itself; the νοῦς or the first-born is first of all the revelation of what is hidden. Through ties with God everything finite can have a part in authentic right-eousness, in true peace.[15]

13. Surely the German *Zephyre* ('zephyrs') that appears in our text here and just below should be treated as equivalent to the Hebrew *Sefiroth*, the Cabala's term for these streams of light. At one point later on our German text does use the Hebrew term, and Tiedemann, Hegel's main source here, uses its Germanized form. In the cabalistic schema of Isaac Luria (1534–72), *Atziluth* is the first and highest of the 'worlds'—the world of emanation and divinity. The second, *Beriah*, is the world of the 'throne' and of the highest angels. The third, *Yetzirah*, is the world of 'formation', the chief domain of angels. The fourth, *Aziyah*, is the 'world of making', which is the spiritual archetype for the material world. See Gershom G. Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism* (New York, 1946). Tiedemann (*Geist*, iii. 149–59) is Hegel's source for much of the information in this paragraph.

14. See August Neander, *Genetische Entwickelung der vornehmsten gnostischen Systeme* (Berlin, 1818). In expounding Gnosticism in relation to church history and the history of dogma, Hegel draws upon the work of his academic colleague, Neander. See also Vol. III of this edition, as well as *Philosophy of Religion*, iii. 84–6.

15. Just before Neander's presentation of Gnosticism (see the preceding note) comes his introduction, 'Elements of Gnosis in Philo'. The treatment itself consists of three parts: (1) Gnostics linked with Judaism; (2) anti-Jewish Gnostics; (3) smaller eclectic Gnostic sects.

The Gnostics also call this first [element] what 'cannot be thought', the ἀνούσιον, even 'non-being', what does not go forth to determinacy, to | being. The first is also called σιγή, 'pure silence'. The ideas, the *Sefiroth* 174
or angels, are here called 'aeons'; these are the roots, the λόγοι or σπέρματα [seeds], the πληρώματα [plenitudes] or the particular fulfillments.[16] For other Gnostics the first is also called 'the unfathomable' or βυθός, the absolute abyss in which everything is as superseded, or the προαρχή, what is 'prior to principle', prior to beginning, or the προπατήρ, what is 'before the Father'. The explication of the One is then the διάθεσις, and the particular διαθέσεις are the particular ideas. This explication—also called 'logos'—is termed 'the incomprehensible making itself comprehensible', κατάληψις τοῦ ἀκαταλήπτου.[17]

The second [element] is also called ὅρος or limitation, and inasmuch as development is grasped more specifically in the antithesis it involves two principles, the male and the female, the uniting or συζυγία of which yields the fulfillment, the πληρώματα. In this context the βυθός or abyss is then called the 'hermaphrodite', ἑρμαφρόδιτος, or the ἀῤῥηνόθηλυς, the 'androgyne' (man-woman).[18]

All these forms end up in obscurity. Their foundations are on the whole these same determinations and their general motivation is precisely to specify and to grasp as something concrete what has being in and for itself. I wanted to call these forms to mind only in order to indicate their connection with the general pattern. They involve a very profound need of concrete reason.

---

Neander begins with Basilides (pp. 28–91) and devotes the most comprehensive attention to him. We are reminded of Philo and of the Cabala by the fact that Basilides too presents the first element as 'the unutterable God'; see Neander, pp. 10, 33. On the first-born and the realm of ideas, see pp. 34–5. Later (p. 38) he speaks of the ruler or the 'archon'; Hegel uses the plural ('archons'), which is not found in Neander in this context. For the 'economy of purification', see pp. 39–40, and for the initial perfection and the νοῦς, pp. 33–4.

16. Hegel's expression 'what does not go forth to determinacy' may refer to Neander, p. 170, which depicts this first, unthinkable element as neither male nor female. Hegel does not make clear that here the account (from Neander) concerns not Basilides but the thought of Marcus, a Valentinian Gnostic. On the 'silence', see Neander, p. 100. In mentioning the *Sefiroth* Hegel calls attention to parallels among Philo, the Cabala, and Gnosticism; calling them 'roots' draws upon Neander's account of Marcus (p. 171).

17. This account of the abyss and its 'explication' is taken from Neander's presentation of the Valentinian system (pp. 94–5).

18. In this paragraph Hegel draws upon Neander's account of Ephraim of Syria, who adapted some Gnostic terminology to an orthodox framework, and of the Valentinian version of the hermaphrodite, consisting of male and female principles; see pp. 96–7.

4. The Alexandrian school

Alexandria had for a long time been the seat of the sciences, the hub where the religions and mythologies of various peoples intermingled and where, in scientific affairs, East and West had sought and found their meeting
175 point. | We often find this Alexandrian school referred to as an eclectic philosophy. We remarked earlier that an eclecticism yields nothing but a superficial aggregate. But in a higher sense eclecticism is a more profound standpoint of the idea, a standpoint of the kind that unites the antecedent principles—which are single or one-sided and contain only moments of the idea or the idea as undeveloped—with the result that a more concrete and more profound idea unites these moments into one. In this sense Plato can be called an eclectic; the Alexandrians are eclectics too, but not in the trivial sense; for this expression always carries with it at the same time the image of creative interpretation [*Herauslesen*].

It is customary to use the name 'eclectic school' expressly for this Alexandrian school. As I have discovered, Brucker was the first to do it. Diogenes Laertius prompted this because he speaks of a certain Potamo from Alexandria (whose dates are uncertain) and quotes several passages from him, and in doing so he says that Potamo had constructed an eclectic philosophy. The passages he cites are evidently culled from all of the philosophies—from Aristotle, Plato, the Stoics—but they are not significant passages. What distinguishes the Alexandrian school is not to be discerned in them. But, because Potamo was called an Alexandrian, this term 'eclectic', found in Diogenes, came to be applied to the Alexandrian school as such.[19]

Alexandria was the seat of the sciences. The Ptolemies in particular made a point of attracting scholars to Alexandria, partly out of their own interest in science. They founded a great library that later burnt down and also the museum, that is, an academy of sciences. There they supported philosophers and scholars whose only occupation was simply to devote their lives to the sciences, and they showed no favoritism to individual schools. Something
176 like this also took place later on in Athens.[20] | So the Neoplatonic or

19. Brucker's account of the Alexandrian school (*Historia*, ii. 189–462) covers Potamo, Ammonias Saccas, Longinus, Erennius, and the Neoplatonists—Origen, Plotinus, Amelius, Porphyry, Iamblichus—as well as Julian the Apostate, Proclus, and a number of other philosophers that Hegel omits. On Potamo, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 1.21 (Hicks, i. 20–3). Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann speaks of 'eclectic philosophy' in his *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 11 vols. (Leipzig, 1798–1819), v. 264. So do Tiedemann (*Geist*, iii. 129 ff., 189 ff.) and Buhle (*Lehrbuch*, iv. 174–511—'History of the Alexandrian Eclectic Philosophy').

20. Hegel's remarks about Alexandria closely follow Buhle (*Lehrbuch*, iv. 195–200) except for the statement about Athens, which is not substantiated.

Alexandrian philosophy does not constitute one particular school over against the others; instead it united all principles within itself, but in a higher, authentic, way.

*a. Ammonius Saccas and Plotinus*

Ammonius Saccas, 'the sackbearer', is the founder of this school. He died in AD 241. None of his writings and no detailed accounts of his philosophy have come down to us.[21] The main way in which philosophy was pursued in Alexandria was by writing commentaries on Platonic and Aristotelian works. We still have many of the commentaries on Aristotle—those of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Prodicus, Nicolaus of Damascus, Porphyry, Maximus of Tyre, and so forth—some of which are excellent. Still other Alexandrians wrote commentaries on Plato, but of a sort that evidenced knowledge of other philosophers and philosophies too, and they grasped very well the point of unity for the various modes of the idea.[22]

Ammonius Saccas had many disciples, some of whom distinguished themselves in other sciences too; among them were Longinus, whose treatise 'On the Sublime' we still have, and Origen the Church Father.[23] The most famous of them is Plotinus, and we are going to speak about him next.

21. One source (among others) on Ammonius Saccas as founder of the school is Brucker (*Historia*, ii. 205). But Brucker says (ii. 213–14) that his date of death is unknown. In the same passage Brucker declares the lack of a written transmission of his thought; cf. Tennemann (*Geschichte*, vi. 26). Hegel does not explain here that the lack is owing to the fact that Ammonius taught only orally and not to some mishap in the transmission of his thought. If it were otherwise, there would have been no point to the agreement reached by Erennius, Origen, and Plotinus, that they would divulge nothing of Ammonius' teaching; on this, see n. 25 just below.

22. None of Hegel's sources juxtaposes these commentators in this fashion; nor do the commentators belong simply to the Alexandrian school. Alexander of Aphrodisias did his work about AD 200 in Athens. Only Pn. includes the name Prodicus, which he may have misheard from mention of Andronicus of Rhodes. Andronicus wrote in Rome in the first-century BC, and he is more noteworthy as the first to edit Aristotle's writings than he is as a commentator. Nicolaus of Damascus was a first-century BC biographer of Augustus and adviser to Herod the Great. Porphyry is the only one of these to be included in Alexandrian philosophy; on him, see p. 340 below. Maximus of Tyre, who lived in Rome and Greece during the reign of Commodus and that of Antoninus Pius (second century AD), can be regarded as a forerunner of the Alexandrian school; Brucker (*Historia*, ii. 177–8), Tiedemann (*Geist*, iii. 158–60), and Tennemann (*Geschichte*, v. 224) all present him as a Platonist and not as one of the commentators on Aristotle, of which Tennemann gives a sizable list (v. 183–4) while expounding the aims and methods of these commentators. While remarking on commentators on Plato, Hegel may have in mind those (such as Atticus, *c.* AD 150–200) whom Brucker discusses under the heading 'Platonic philosophy' (*Historia*, ii. 162–88).

23. This list of disciples comes from Brucker (*Historia*, ii. 214). In Hegel's day most did not think that Origen the Church Father was the same person as Origen the disciple of Ammonius; see Brucker (*Historia*, ii. 217) and Tennemann (*Geschichte*, vi. 26). Tiedemann mentions Origen

We have a biography of Plotinus, written by Porphyry. What is striking in this biography (as in those of Iamblichus and Proclus as well) is that precise details of his life circumstances are intermingled with a host of miraculous things. This was an era in which the miraculous element had its part to play. But, once we are acquainted with the lucid philosophizing and lucid sense of such persons as Plotinus, Proclus, or the others, we cannot help being astonished at the tales included in the account of his life.[24]

Plotinus was an Egyptian, born at Lycopolis in Egypt in AD 205, in the
177 reign of Emperor Alexander Severus. He | is said to have gone to many philosophical teachers and then to have become melancholy. In his twenty-eighth year he came to Ammonius and he pursued philosophy with him for eleven years; here he embraced a lofty conception of Indian and Persian philosophy. Plotinus went with the army of Emperor Gordian [III] to Persia; but the campaign ended in misfortune and Plotinus had difficulty extricating himself safely. At the age of 40 he went to Rome, where he remained until his death. Here too his mode of life was outwardly striking, for he sought to resurrect the ancient Pythagorean customs. He went about in Pythagorean garb and refrained from meat, or fasted. As a public teacher he won high regard among all social classes. He also taught by commentary on older philosophical writings. His own writings in particular consist of answers to propounded questions. [They are works] that he put into written form in the last six years of his life, and Porphyry edited them.[25] The Emperor Gallienus

the disciple of Ammonius (*Geist*, iii. 264), saying that we have no writings by him, only after he (Tiedemann) has discussed the Church Father (iii. 260–2). Buhle, on the contrary, identifies the two Origens as one and the same person (*Lehrbuch*, iv. 297–8). In fact there was a second Origen, a pagan philosopher, and both Origens are said to have been students of Ammonius.

24. It is common to include Porphyry, *Vita Plotini* ('Life of Plotinus'), in editions of Plotinus, *Enneads*. That is the case with the 1580 edition (Plotinus, Operum philosophicorum ...) that Hegel used (see the Bibliography of Hegel's Sources), and with the English edition we cite in what follows: *Plotinus*, trans. A. H. Armstrong, 7 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1966–88), which contains Porphyry, *Life*, in i. 1–85. See Porphyry for accounts of the sign (a snake) at the time of Plotinus' death (ch. 2) and of a failed attack upon him through the use of magical power (ch. 10); see Armstrong, i. 6–7, 32–3. Porphyry tells such tales with the intention of exalting Plotinus, whereas Hegel's doubt about their appropriateness is based on a remark by Plotinus (not understood by Porphyry) concerning the gods, that 'They ought to come to me, not I to them' (ch. 10; Armstrong, i. 34–5). Also, see p. 340 below on Iamblichus and pp. 340–1 below on Proclus.

25. Porphyry offers no direct information about Plotinus' birth, since 'he could never bear to talk about his race or his parents or his native country' because he 'seemed ashamed of being in the body' (*Life*, ch. 1; Armstrong, i. 2–3); but he does put Plotinus' death at age 66 in Rome (=270 BC), as the end of this paragraph indicates, and from this Porphyry figures back to a birth in the thirteenth year of the reign of Severus (ch. 2; Armstrong, i. 6–7). Hegel takes his information here from Brucker (*Historia*, ii. 218–19), who identifies the emperor as Alexander Severus—who actually ruled 222–35, Lucius Septimus Severus (ruled 193–211) being the

wanted to place at his disposal a town in Campania, where Plotinus was supposed to put Plato's republic into practice. But his ministers prevented it, and they acted very shrewdly in doing so because, given the external situation of the Roman Empire, where a different spiritual principle was bound to become universal, this was an undertaking that could not redound to the honor of the Platonic republic or of Plotinus.[26] Plotinus died at Rome when he was 66 years old.

We still have his writings, under the name *Enneads*.[27] The 'Enneads' are six in number, each one consisting of nine books, so that there are fifty-four books altogether. Each book is in turn divided into chapters; it is a wide-ranging work. Porphyry himself says that | it is an uneven product, that 178
Plotinus had written twenty-one books before Porphyry came to him, and that the last books are the weaker ones.

At any event, these books are not a cohesive work; instead they take up individual topics and treat them philosophically. The approach of Plotinus is, by and large, to lead the particular concern back to what is wholly universal. Hence it is a bit tedious to read his books, for the reason that

emperor at the time of Plotinus' birth. Porphyry furnishes this report about Plotinus' philosophical education with Ammonius, his adventure in Persia, and his coming to Rome (ch. 3; Armstrong, i. 8–11). Tennemann (*Geschichte*, vi. 41) and Tiedemann (*Geist*, iii. 272) recount his Pythagorean side, the latter erroneously citing Porphyry, ch. 7; Hegel's version most closely resembles that of Buhle (*Lehrbuch*, iv. 306). Porphyry speaks at length of his activities as a teacher and as arbiter of disagreements (chs. 7–9; Armstrong, i. 24–33); see also chs. 13–14 (Armstrong, i. 38–43), on his teaching via commentaries, and by question and answer. Gr. is the only transcript to transmit the erroneous statement that Plotinus did all his writing in six years; the number sixteen is found in W. xiv. 38 and is based on statements in Porphyry, chs. 3–6 (Armstrong, i. 10–25). Porphyry says there that, once Erennius and Origen had broken the agreement not to transmit in writing the teachings of Ammonius, Plotinus felt no longer bound by it; also, that in the ten years leading up to age 59 Plotinus wrote twenty-one treatises, in the next six years twenty-four more, and nine more shortly before his death (altogether fifty-four, constituting the six books of the *Enneads* or 'Nines', as Porphyry assembled them). So actually Plotinus' authorship extended over some seventeen years. Porphyry tells of being entrusted by Plotinus with the task of arranging and editing his writings (ch. 24; Armstrong, i. 72–85), but not of what the editing itself involved.

26. See ch. 12 of Porphyry, *Life* (Armstrong, i. 36–9) for the account of Gallienus' plan. See p. 181 above for the basis of Hegel's doubts regarding the possible success of such a project.

27. Porphyry states (*Life*, ch. 12) that in arranging Plotinus' treatises into 'books' he emulated the practice of Apollodorus of Athens (who classified the works of Epicharmus the comedian) and of Andronicus the Peripatetic (who did the same for the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus); he then proceeds to give the titles of all of the individual treatises in the sequence of his arrangement into the *Enneads*; see Armstrong, i. 72–85. For the details about their arrangement that follow in this paragraph of our text, see n. 25 just above. In ch. 6 (Armstrong, i. 24–5) Porphyry offers his opinion that Plotinus wrote the first twenty-one treatises before 'attaining ... his full vigor', and that in the last nine his power was evidently failing.

the particular starting point is almost always led back once more to the same place, and the same general thoughts perpetually reappear.[28] So we can get a very good grasp of the Plotinian ideas from a few books, without having to pursue new developments in the remainder. The Platonic Idea, form, and expression are especially dominant, but the Aristotelian counterparts are there too. We can call Plotinus a Neoplatonist and, with equal justification, call him a Neoaristotelian. With him we find multiple elucidations of one and the same main idea, quite in the Aristotelian manner. The forms Aristotle made explicit—those of δύναμις or *potentia*, ἐνέργεια or energy, and so forth—are also prevalent forms in Plotinus, and he treats their relationship as an essential topic too. The main thing is that we must not take him as being opposed to Plato and Aristotle. He also drew upon the thinking and the *logos* of the Stoics.[29]

What is characteristic in Plotinus is his great enthusiasm for the elevation of spirit to the Good and True—to what has being in and for itself. So in one respect his whole philosophy is a metaphysics, although not the kind in
179 which a tendency to deduction | or inference prevails but instead a tendency to lead the soul back to the beholding [*Anschauung*] of the One and Eternal—so that in this contemplation the soul is brought to the blessed life. Thus his orientation is not so much one that derives or conceptualizes what presses upon us as actuality, but rather one that takes this as the starting point and draws spirit away from it, away from this external sphere, and gives to spirit its central place in the simple, clear idea. The whole tenor of his philosophizing is one of guidance to virtue and to the intellectual contemplation of the One as virtue's source. Plotinus sets out to cleanse the soul of unbelief, superstition, astrology, magic, and the like. He chastises the Gnostics for saying nothing at all about virtue and the Good, about how virtue can be acquired, how the soul can be cultivated and purified. We must not merely say, 'Look to God'; we must also show how this is to be

28. Porphyry says about this unsystematic feature of Plotinus' writing that he wrote 'on the subjects that came up in the meetings of the school' (*Life*, ch. 4; Armstrong, i. 12–13); see also Porphyry's remarks about editing the treatises (ch. 24; Armstrong, i. 72–3).

29. Plotinus' many references to Aristotle and to the Stoics, and his extensive use of Aristotelian concepts, can be seen from appropriate author and topic listings in various sources, such as the *Lexicon Plotinianum*, ed. J. H. Sleeman and Gilbert Pollet (Leiden and Leuven, 1980) or the *Index Fontium* in *Plotini Opera III* (Oxford Classical Texts; Oxford, 1982). On Aristotelian concepts, see also *Enneads* 6.7.37, 'How the Multitude of the Forms Came into Being, and On the Good' (Armstrong, vii. 200–5), which discusses thinking as attributed to the Good. At this point in our text Hegel passes over Plotinus' extensive polemic directed against Aristotle and the Peripatetics as well as against the Stoics. *Enneads* 5.3.5 (Armstrong, v. 84–9) is an example of a passage that Hegel may regard as 'quite in the Aristotelian manner'.

accomplished, how human beings are to be brought to this vision.[30] This then is, broadly speaking, the general orientation of his thought.

As for the details, we no longer have any talk of criteria as we did with the Stoics and Epicureans. What gets stressed instead is the situating of oneself in the central point, in pure intuition or pure thinking, in spirit's pure unity with itself, which was the goal and result for Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics. So one begins here by placing oneself at this standpoint and by awakening it inwardly as a rapture (in Plotinus' terminology) or as an inspiriting [*Begeisterung*]. The main thing is to raise oneself up to the representation of pure being, for that is the simplifying of the soul through which it is transposed into blissful stillness, because its object too is simple and at rest. He calls this 'ecstasy', but it is not the ecstasy of sensation or of the fanciful imagination; rather, it is pure thinking that is at home with itself, | thinking that makes itself into the object. He speaks often of this 180
state. In one place he says: 'Frequently when I awaken to myself apart from the body and from the sensible domain and I am beyond otherness and externality, when I am inwardly present to myself and have a truly wonderful intuition and lead a godlike life, then I have ecstasy.'[31]

We have already mentioned the principal thought of Plotinus that is determinate, namely, the objective element, the content that becomes present to itself in this ecstasy, in this being of thinking. In general, and according to its principal moments, this content is that what is first is essential unity, is essential being [*Wesen*] as such, as primary. The principle is not things as subsisting, not the apparent multiplicity of existence; on the contrary, it is strictly their unity. This unity is the source that has no other principle, the source for all knowing; and knowing does not deplete it, for it remains internally at rest.[32]

What is first is οὐσία, the unknown abiding within itself but in such a way that the essential thing for the soul is to think this unity for itself; and the goal for subjective thinking, with regard to both knowledge and the practical domain, is the Good. The defining of the One is what matters most.

30. See *Enneads* 2.9.15 (Armstrong, ii. 284–5); cf. *W.* xv. 41 (MS?).

31. This paragraph draws upon *Enneads* 6.9.11 and concludes with an abridged paraphrase from the opening of 4.8.1 (see Armstrong, vii. 340–3, iv. 396–7); cf. *W.* xv. 45 (MS?). Hegel uses the latter passage as an example of 'ecstasy' even though Plotinus does not actually use the term in it, though he does in 6.9.11 (where he says it involves 'not even any reason or thought', whereas Hegel finds it to be a pure thinking that makes itself into its own object).

32. See *Enneads* 3.8.9–10 (Armstrong, iii. 392–5), from which this account of the first, essential unity is taken. There Plotinus speaks of it as simpler than what it generates, as what is above life and from which the activity of life flows out as from an inexhaustible spring. On the concept of essence as such, cf. *W.* xv. 45–6.

Plotinus says: 'When you have said "the Good" do not then think to add anything more. When you have annulled the being of the objective realm and apprehended the Good in its purity you will then be seized by astonishment.'[33]

The first being [*Sein*] overflows, and this is the progression to determinateness. Plotinus designates this bringing forth as a going-forth, a procession. It is not to be defined as a movement and change, for these eventuate in something different, whereas here it is simply the fact of overflowing. God or
181 the Good is | what engenders, and its engendering is an illuminating, a reflection of itself. A radiance flows forth from God just as light does from the sun.[34]

Plotinus then compares the Good with what is other, with what is, with actual objects. That which is perfect runs over [*übergehen*] in emanation and radiates all around; because it lacks nothing it overflows. This overflow is what is brought forth, and it turns back toward the One, toward the Good. The One is its object, its fulfillment, its content. The Good is the object of its desire. This reversal of what is brought forth, this turning-back to the primary unity, is understanding as such. So what is first is what we call the absolute being [*Wesen*]. Understanding, νοῦς, or thinking consists then in the fact that by returning to itself the primary being beholds itself; it is a seeing *and* something seen [*ein sehendes Sehen*]. This reflectedness back into itself, this circular motion, is what thinking is.[35]

These are the main definitions for Plotinus. The first aspect, [that] of δύναμις or ἐνέργεια, is the positing by means of the idea's returning into

33. On the One as 'the unknown', as beyond knowing, see *Enneads* 5.3.12, 6.9.1 (Armstrong, v. 116–17, vii. 302–3). On how we are to 'think' this One (Plotinus says 'philosophize about' it or 'contemplate' it), see 6.9.3 (Armstrong, vii. 310–13). On the Good as goal, see 6.7.36 (Armstrong, vii. 198–201). On our 'astonishment' (Plotinus: 'you will be filled with wonder ...'), see 3.8.10 (Armstrong, iii. 396–7). The 'quotation' at the end of this paragraph in our text is actually a paraphrase of elements from these latter two passages.

34. See *Enneads* 5.2.1 (Armstrong, v. 58–61) on the generation of beings by an 'overflow' from the superabundance of the One. Plotinus links 'God' with 'Good' and 'One', in 5.1.3 (Armstrong, v. 28–33), a passage that also contains the comparison with the radiance of the sun.

35. See *Enneads* 5.1.6–7 (Armstrong, v. 32–5) for this statement of the reversal or return. Hegel's phrase 'ein sehendes Sehen' may be influenced by Ficino's Latin translation (*in cognoscendo circulo*—'in circular knowing') as a way of dealing with unclarity or possible textual corruption in this passage, in lines that Armstrong (p. 35) renders as 'the circle is of a kind which can be divided; but this [intellectual apprehension] is not so'. Cf. 5.2.1, 6.7.16 (Armstrong, v. 58–61, vii. 136–41). See 5.3.11 (Armstrong, v. 108–11) for Plotinus' account of the 'multiple intellect' that thinks itself (Hegel's 'sehendes Sehen'), in the context of the intellect's movement out of the One.

itself.[36] This explication of the idea has to be acknowledged as authentic in all its moments, although it does involve one difficulty. What is dubious on the face of it is just this going-forth. The infinite does disclose itself, but this disclosure can be viewed in a variety of ways. In recent times too we have heard much talk about this going-forth out of God. Difference goes forth out of indifference.[37] But 'going-forth' is always an expression of the sensible domain, is something immediate. | It does not express the necessity of the 182
self-disclosing or self-differentiating; it is just posited, it just happens. Representation finds it quite sufficient *that* the Father begets the eternal Son, but this form of the immediacy of movement or determination does not suffice for the concept. So according to its content the idea is quite correctly and truly comprehended as this threefoldness, and that is an important point.

We could mention many other attractive features in Plotinus. And yet in his *Enneads* he frequently reiterates the same general views; we find plenty of adversions to the universal and no convincing progression through the whole, of the sort we have seen in the case of Aristotle. The λόγος or what is thought is not apart from νοῦς; the νοῦς *is* what is thought; it envisages only itself, as thinking. The further internal development of thinking gives rise to the intellectual world, the true world, which then stands in relationship to the sensible world in such a way that the sensible world is but a distant likeness of it.[38]

The sensible world has matter (ὕλη) as its principle; Plotinus devotes much philosophical attention to it and also, in connection with matter or ὕλη, attention to evil. In his view matter or ὕλη is only *potentia* or δύναμις; it is not ἐνέργεια. Its being is but a harbinger of becoming; δύναμις is 'all' or πᾶν, it is not 'something'; only energy is constitutive of something, is determinate. Matter perpetually inclines toward what is other; it is a vestigial, dim image, an εἴδωλον; it is ἐνεργείᾳ ψεῦδος, a falsehood in the guise of [*durch*] energy, namely, an 'authentic falsehood' or, in other words, what in truth *is not*—

36. For the Aristotelian concepts of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, see p. 334 above. On the idea's return into itself, see *Enneads* 5.2.1 (Armstrong, v. 58–61), which says that the superabundance overflowing from the One turns back toward it and, in doing so, becomes intellect.

37. Jacob Boehme could be the 'recent' figure Hegel has in mind because, in his presentation of Boehme, in the context of the passage from the first principle to the second, Hegel speaks of 'the emanation of the divine One' and of the δύναμις or 'the wisdom of all powers'; see Vol. III of this edition. He could also be referring to Schelling, *Philosophie und Religion* (1804), which replaces the concept of a positive emanation or going-forth from primordial unity, with the negative image of a 'fall' (*Abfall*) away from the ideas. For a discussion of this topic in Schelling, in relation to Boehme, see Robert F. Brown, *The Later Philosophy of Schelling: The Influence of Boehme on the Works of 1809–1815* (Lewisburg, PA, 1977), 110–13.

38. Plotinus discusses the identity of νοῦς and what is thought (νοητὸν) in *Enneads* 5.3.5, and the relationship of the intelligible and sensible worlds in 2.4.4 (Armstrong, v. 86–9, ii. 112–13).

τὸ ὄντως μὴ ὄν, that whose being is precisely non-being. Matter is not ἐνέργεια or an actual being, for it instead has its truth, what it in fact is, in
183 non-being. This expresses its nature; non-being | constitutes its being.[39] The category of matter is therefore something negative, and Plotinus has much to say about that.

Then he comes to the topic of evil. Evil stands over against good. The Good is that on which everything depends, it is the designator of everything, it is what *is*—the self-sufficient, the measure or principle and the limit of everything, the bestower of soul and life. It is not only beautiful but also surpassing the best, ὑπέρκαλος; it is the kingly or ruling element in thought; it is νοῦς, although not the sort that commences with a presupposition, draws an inference and reaches a conclusion, but instead the νοῦς that contains everything within it and is at home with itself.[40]

Evil, then, is what is not; it has its root in non-being. There is a chapter on this topic, the eighth book of the First Ennead, where Plotinus speaks as follows: how is evil 'known'? Evil is what remains when we take away the Idea. Thought becomes a non-thought when it dares to direct itself toward what is not its own, just as when the eye turns from the light in order to see darkness; it sees darkness and this 'seeing' is at once a 'not-seeing'. This is how it is when thought is in matter, in what is evil.[41]

Plotinus is quite concerned with the Gnostics, particularly in Ennead II, book 9. The Gnostics, like him, made the intellectual and spiritual realm into what truly is. They get their name from γνῶσις, from knowing. They take the Christian books as their basis, but in doing so they transmute everything into something spiritual; the form of determinate being that actuality has, which is the main thing in Christ, they etherealize into a universal thought as such.[42]

Plotinus declares himself opposed to the Gnostics and maintains as essential the connection of the intelligible with what is actual. He says: 'Despising the world and the gods in it and what is beautiful is not the

39. For Plotinus' view of evil, see n. 41 just below. On matter as potentiality, see *Enneads* 2.5.4–5 (Armstrong, ii. 164–71).

40. The eighth treatise of the First Ennead is entitled 'On What Are and Whence Come Evils'. Plotinus begins his inquiry by first setting forth the nature of the Good (1.8.2; Armstrong, i. 280–3) and Hegel takes the same approach; cf. *W.* xv. 48 (MS?).

41. Plotinus characterizes evil as non-being in *Enneads* 1.8.3, and he speaks in this manner of our indirect way of 'knowing' it much as we 'see' darkness as the absence of light, in 1.8.9 (Armstrong, i. 282–3, 302–5); cf. *W.* xv. 62–3 (MS?). In 1.8.8. he equates matter with evil (Armstrong, i. 298–9), as Hegel does just above in our text.

42. Plotinus explicitly attacks the Gnostics only in *Enneads* 2.9 ('Against the Gnostics') and not elsewhere (Armstrong, ii. 224–301). On Gnosticism, see pp. 328–9 above.

way that one becomes good. The wicked person despises | the gods, and it 184
is only then that such a person is truly wicked. The Gnostics profess to show the greatest honor to the gods of thought. But there would then be no bond [*Sympathie*] between the intelligible and the actual if we confined ourselves to [the world of] thought. In the actual world our souls are related to the things in it. Ought this world to be shut off from [the world of] thought? Those who despise human consciousness, which is related to this world, have only a verbal knowledge of the intelligible. How should it be pious to suppose that πρόνοια or providence does not extend to what is here below?'[43] In this way Plotinus defines his position in opposition to the Gnostics, in opposition to sheer intellectuality.

The Gnostics were opposed to the Western Church, which combatted them in multiple ways. One particular episode in the heresies of the first centuries of Christianity was when the Gnostics denied or annulled the moment of actuality in Christ's finite existence [*Dasein*]. They said that Christ had only an apparent body. The Manichaeans speak wholly in this sense; they describe the divine process as God or the Good going forth, casting its light and thus engendering an intelligible world.[44]

What is third is νοῦς or intelligible spirit as the reversion, positing the second and first as one, sensing as one, and this sensation of unity is love. The heretics were very well acquainted with this idea, but they did away with the form of singularized actuality in which it is presented in the Christian religion. On this view Christ's crucifixion appears to be only illusory, to be taken only allegorically—so that the crucifixion signifies the actual suffering of the captive soul. Hence they say that Jesus is crucified in every world and in each soul; it is a mystical crucifixion. The particles of the light are consolidated by vegetation, and | this consolidated being of the 185
light particles then engenders itself as a plant. What is presented here in a single case they regard as a universal idea that replicates itself in every single instance of nature, in the vegetable and animal kingdoms as well as in the nature of the soul.[45] So Plotinus declared himself as opposed to these

43. The passage within quotation marks is a paraphrase from *Enneads* 2.9.16 (Armstrong, ii. 284–7); cf. *W.* xv. 65–6 (MS?).

44. On the denial of Christ's *Dasein*, see Vol. III of this edition. Hegel's oft-cited source, Neander's *Genetische Entwickelung* ..., lacks a full presentation of the Manichaean position, offering instead (pp. 89–90) only the addendum, 'Comparison of the doctrine of Basilides with that of Mani'.

45. Hegel's sources do not confirm the identification of intelligible spirit as the third moment, nor love as the sensing of it. In discussing Basilides in relation to the Valentinian Gnostics, Neander does speak of Bythos, ἔννοια, νοῦς and ἀλήθεια as forming 'the holy quaternity, ground and root of all existence'; but he also says that the Valentinian triad consists of βυθός,

Gnostics in a different sense from that of the church. The church maintained the unity of the divine and human natures just as emphatically; hence this became the representation and the consciousness within the Christian religion, with the result that the human nature [of Christ] in its actuality came to be taken in this way and not in an allegorical or a merely philosophical sense.[46]

Porphyry and Iamblichus were well-known disciples of Plotinus. The former, who was a Syrian, died in 304; the latter, likewise from Syria, died in 333. We still have Porphyry's introduction to the Ὄργανον of Aristotle, in which the Aristotelian logic is set forth according to its principal moments. It is wholly at the level of the understanding, wholly formal. Thus the Neoplatonists combine the empirical treatment of science, at the level of the understanding, with the wholly speculative idea and with miracles and strange occurrences. For a long time Porphyry's introduction was the source for information about the Aristotelian logic.[47]

### *b. Proclus*

We have still to mention Proclus, a later Neoplatonist. He was born in AD 410, and he died in 485, in Athens. Marinus, one of his pupils, wrote an account of his life and also related many miraculous tales about him. According to this report, he was born in Xanthos, in Lycia, a place in Asia Minor dedicated to Apollo and Athena. Both of these deities treasured him as a favorite; Apollo cured him from an illness by his personal touch, and
186 Athena urged him to go to Athens. | He went to Alexandria and then to Athens, where he lived with Plutarch, whose daughter introduced him to philosophy, since she was the only one who preserved her father's knowledge [*Kenntnis*] of the theurgic science. Proclus studied everything pertaining to the mysteries—the writings of Hermes and the Orphic poems. Wherever he went he understood the ceremonies better than the priests did. He visited all the religious sites and he even knew the Egyptian rites. He got himself

---

νοῦς, and λόγος; see *Genetische Entwickelung*, pp. 34, 100–1. The remainder of this passage in our text, on the crucifixion, the light particles in vegetation, and so forth, is taken from Neander, pp. 90–1.

46. Plotinus opposed the Gnostics because they disputed the divinity of the cosmos; see *Enneads* 2.9.16 (Armstrong, ii. 284–7). The Church opposed them because they disputed the actual existence of the divine in the Incarnation and because of their Docetism; see Vol. III of this edition.

47. For the birthplace of Porphyry and that of Iamblichus, and their dates of death, see Brucker (*Historia*, ii. 241, 248, 268), Tiedemann (*Geist*, iii. 435), and Tennemann (*Geschichte*, vi. 493). On Porphyry's introduction to the *Organon*, see Vol. III of this edition. On combining science with 'miracles and strange occurrences', see p. 34 above.

initiated everywhere and observed feast days with prayers and hymns. He composed several hymns himself. He was a priest or an acolyte of all the well-known mystical rites and of the more highly esteemed Orphic rites. Marinus says that a philosopher must be the universal hierophant, the hierophant of the whole world. Marinus goes on to recount many miraculous and fabulous stories about the powers of his teacher. We cannot fail to be amazed at the contrast between the fundamental insight of these philosophers and what their pupils declare in the accounts of their lives.[48]

Proclus left us many writings, in particular commentaries on Plato's dialogues. Several of them have been printed, others not yet so. His main work is 'On Plato's Theology', from which we can become acquainted with his own philosophy, and a shorter writing entitled 'Philosophical Institutions', *Στοιχείωσις*, that Creuzer has had printed together with a few of those commentaries. Finally, Proclus also wrote a great deal about geometry, mathematics, optical topics, and so forth.[49]

It has to be said that Proclus gave the Neoplatonic ideas, particularly the Plotinian ideas, more detailed elaboration and specificity than did Plotinus himself. We can learn the principal ideas readily from his writing on Plato's theology. In | the 'Philosophical Institutions', the *Στοιχείωσις θεολογική*, he 187
occupies himself in particular with the most penetrating and most wide-ranging dialectic of the One. He finds it necessary to show the Many as One and the One as Many—to lead back to unity the forms that the Many

48. Marinus' biography (the *Vita Procli*) can be found in the (unpaginated) introduction to *Proclus Successor Platonicus: In Platonis theologiam libri sex*, ed. Aemilius Portus (Hamburg, 1618; Frankfurt, 1960). The birth and death dates Hegel reports are in Brucker (*Historia*, ii. 319–20) and Tennemann (*Geschichte*, vi. 284, 493). In contrast to *W.* xv. 71–2, our transcripts contain two errors. Proclus was born in 412 in Byzantium, not in 410 and not in Xanthos (which only later became his homeland). The erroneous date of 410 may arise from subtracting the length of his life from the year of his death while supposing that the lifespan was reported in lunar years, which are slightly shorter than solar years.

49. Fabricius, *Bibliotheca Graeca*, offers an overview of the published and unpublished commentaries of Proclus, as well as works that have been lost (viii. 455–552), and Brucker too mentions them (*Historia*, ii. 336); so we need not suppose that Hegel was directly acquainted with them. He was, however, familiar with Friedrich Creuzer's edition of Proclus (see the Bibliography of Hegel's Sources), one volume of which was dedicated to him. Also, he possessed Victor Cousin's edition of the *Opera omnia*. An indication that Hegel may have known first-hand the commentary on Plato's *Timaeus* is that in the *Philosophy of Religion* (ii. 639) he recounts the version given by Proclus of the inscription on the temple of Sais. Michelet cites this commentary in an editorial footnote in *W.* xv. 89. It is possible, however, that Hegel took this information at second hand, from Tennemann (*Geschichte*, vi. 328 n. 132). The 'Philosophical Institutions' is contained in the *Theologia Platonis*; see the Latin translation of this text by Portus, as well as the English translation made from the original Greek by Thomas Taylor, *The Platonic Theology*, 2 vols. (London, 1816), repub. with a preface by R. Baine Harris (Kew Gardens, NY, 1985). See also the next note.

assumes.[50] But it is a dialectic that is carried on more or less externally and it is extremely wearisome. What is most definite and most excellent in Proclus is the more precise definition of the idea in its three forms, the τριάς, the trinity. He first gives their abstract definition and then calls these three 'gods'. After that he considers the three abstract determinations in turn, each on its own account as a totality of the triunity, so that there are three determinations that constitute the being-in-and-for-itself, but in such a way that each in turn is fulfilled within itself and is to be considered as concrete. This is the point he reached.

What is particularly noteworthy is how he defined the trinity. This trinity is of interest in the Neoplatonists generally, but in the case of Proclus it is particularly interesting because he did not stop at its *abstract* moments. Instead he grasps each of the three determinations of the absolute in turn as totality, and by doing so he obtains a *real* trinity. We must look upon this as an advance, as an outlook that is perfectly correct. Distinctions are posited within the idea as follows. The One determines itself. But, because the moments are its own, are its own distinctions, in these distinctions it is also wholly what it is, but in such a way that these distinctions are the forms of a totality and that the whole is the process of these three totalities positing themselves identically in one another.[51] To this extent Proclus is much more definite and has gone much further than did Plotinus, and we can say that in this regard his work contains what is most highly developed and most
188 excellent in the Neoplatonists. |

As for the definition of the triad, its three moments are the One, the Infinite, and the Limit. These are the abstract moments presented in his 'Platonic Theology': ἑνάς, ἄπειρον, πέρας—[the One], the unlimited, and the

50. The Latin translation used by Hegel entitles this work *Institutio theologica*. Hegel refers to it (in our text and in *W.* xv. 73) as 'Philosophical Institutions' on account of its decidedly philosophical character. Today its more accurate rendition in Latin is *Elementatio theologica*. Here we will cite it according to the critical Greek text and English translation by E. R. Dodds, *Proclus: The Elements of Theology*, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1963). It has affinities with Plato's *Parmenides*. The dialectic of the One and the Many is its opening theme: 'Prop. 1. Every manifold in some way participates in unity'; 'Prop. 2. All that participates in unity is both one and not-one'; 'Prop. 5. Every manifold is posterior to the One'; 'Prop. 31. All that proceeds from any principle reverts in respect of its being upon that from which it proceeds' (Dodds, pp. 2–5, 34–5). The second part of *The Elements*, beginning with proposition 113 (Dodds, pp. 100–1), presents the hierarchy that extends from the One down to the material realm as having the same final goal, the reversion of the Many to the One. Proclus develops the concept of negation in the manner of Plato's *Parmenides*; it is a topic that Hegel mentions in *W.* xv. 76 but not here in our text.

51. For the positing of the three totalities as an identity, see *Platonic Theology* 3.13.142 (Taylor, pp. 180–1); see *Elements of Theology*, prop. 103 (Dodds, pp. 92–3).

limit—are determinations that we have seen in Plato too. Insofar as the One is the absolute One, unknowable of itself and undisclosed, what is sheerly abstract, then it cannot be known. All that can be known about it is that it is an abstraction. The negative moment is not yet posited as active in it. Quantity as such is the infinite, the indeterminate, just as it is said to be in Plato too.[52]

The third moment is πέρας, the Limit or the limiting factor, νοῦς as such. Defined more specifically and concretely, the One is substance; the Infinite is life as such, and the Limit or πέρας is νοῦς or understanding. For what is concrete, for the unity of opposites, Proclus follows Plato by using the expression τὸ μικτόν, 'the mixed'; but this is an unsatisfactory expression.[53]

The first triad, then, is the unity of these three determinations themselves as such; it is οὐσία, the initial διάκοσμος θεοῦ, the first order of the divine realm or the first of the gods. As Proclus says, it is God. This therefore is the One and, as concrete oneness [*Eins*], this One or this οὐσία, is itself the unity of the Infinite and the Limit. The Limit goes forth from the incommunicable, from what has no commonality [with anything else], from this first One that he also [calls] a god, just as each of these three determinations, each triad, is a god. Thus the Limit goes forth from the One, but from the thinking summit [*die denkende Spitze*]. It is the summit of thinking, the point to which all essentially reverts [*das wesentlich Umkehrende*] or the ἐπιστροφή, just as this is presented in Plotinus too.[54]

This initial threeness, this first διάκοσμος, this first god, remains concealed in the Limit. The Limit is the negative unity, | it is subjectivity as such, and 189
all subsisting or all being of the intellectual realm is fixed in it.[55] The

52. In this paragraph Hegel is drawing upon *Platonic Theology* 3.8.132–4 (Taylor, pp. 166–9; in the English translation, 3.3 = 3.8), a passage that discusses these three moments of the triad in Plato's *Philebus* and that says the first principle is ineffable. Hegel's statement that 'quantity as such is the infinite ...' probably refers to Proclus' account there of the relationship of limit to the unlimited. Cf. *W* xv. 82–3 (MS?). For Hegel's account of Plato on these themes, see p. 203 above.

53. Proclus discusses the third moment, called 'that which is mixed', as consisting of being, life, and intellect, in *Platonic Theology* 3.9.135 (Taylor, pp. 169–70); cf. *W.* xv. 85 (MS?).

54. See *Platonic Theology* 3.12.140, 3.14.143–4 (Taylor, pp. 177–8, 182) for this account of the first triad and of the divinity of the three triads; cf. *W.* xv. 87–8 (MS?). Proclus says (in 3.9.135; Taylor, p. 170) that life is what goes forth from the principles, and intellect 'converts itself to the principles' and brings the end back to unite with the beginning, as 'one intelligible circle'. Hegel's identification of the Limit with 'the thinking summit' and with the ἐπιστροφή is based on his identification of the Limit with thinking (νοῦς). See n. 50 just above (on 'the essential reversion') and n. 35 above (on Plotinus' version of it).

55. *Platonic Theology* 3.12.140 (Taylor, pp. 177–8) speaks in this way of a 'first god'. See *Platonic Theology* 3.14.144 (Taylor, pp. 181–2) on the 'fixed being' of the intellectual realm. Cf. *W.* xv. 90 (MS?).

intellectual realm *is*, and it has its being, its substantiality, in this One, in this οὐσία.

The second moment is then the going-forth, the progression. Subsisting is what is first, and the second is also a subsisting in οὐσία, but it is at the same time the going-forward or the Infinite, and so, when concretely defined, it is life. Life contains within itself the subsisting, or οὐσία. It is itself the entire totality in the form of the Infinite or the indeterminate, so that it is a manifold. But it also contains within itself the Limit or the reversion whereby it is perpetually made conformable to the principle, to οὐσία, and brings an intellectual circle to completion. So the second triad is analogous to the first. Just as in the first triad everything remains within the Limit, so here everything remains within the principle of the Infinite.[56]

The third substance is thinking as such, it is the whole διάκοσμος being led back to itself. So this third moment has as its content and object the second substance, the second god, the second διάκοσμος. It has as its object what is posited in the form of the Infinite, namely, life. This intellectual multiplicity that life is it contains within itself. Life is a moment of this third substance, but, at the same time, thinking is what leads the intellectual world back to the substance; it is what posits the unity of the circle of life with the first or absolute unity. The hidden God, the οὐσία that remains within the Limit, is the cause of all things; it contains all things within itself, ἑνιαίως, in the mode of unity (ἕνωσις). Everything is held secure within the first, and this first, at its summit, engenders the second order.[57]

In speaking of this advance Proclus breaks forth rapturously, exclaiming: 'We want to sing and give praises.' All of this is just one idea—the abiding, the progressing, and the returning. Each of them is totality on its own account, but the last is the totality that brings everything back into itself. These three triunities make known in a mystical fashion the absolute cause
190 of all things, the first | substance.[58] In its proper sense 'mystical' means 'speculative'. The mystical or speculative [task] consists in comprehending as a unity these distinctions that are defined as totalities, as gods.

56. On the second moment or the second triad, see *Platonic Theology* 3.14.141, 144 (Taylor, pp. 178, 181–2); cf. *W.* xv. 85 (MS?). See also n. 54 just above.

57. The third unity Proclus calls the 'intelligible intellect' (νοητὸς νοῦς); *Platonic Theology* 3.14.143 (Taylor, p. 181). On the 'hidden God', see 3.12.140 (Taylor, pp. 177–8).

58. See *Platonic Theology* 3.7.131 (3.3 in Taylor, p. 165) where Proclus says that 'proceeding from the first principle, we may celebrate the second and third principles of the whole of things', and also 3.14.143 (Taylor, p. 182), which states that 'these three triads mystically announce that unknown cause, the first and perfectly imparticipable God'. Cf. *W.* xv. 88–9 (MS?).

The expression 'mystical' does in fact occur frequently in the Neoplatonists, for whom μύειν means none other than 'to consider speculatively'.[59] The religious mysteries too are secrets to the abstract understanding, and it is only for rational, speculative thinking that they are object or content. Proclus says about the first moment that it is the god who is thought, θεὸς νοητός; the second is the god who is both thought and thinking, θεὸς νοητός and νοερός, and the third is the thinking god or θεὸς νοερός, who is inwardly this return or reversion to the unity in which all three are contained. These three constitute the one absolute, concrete God as such.[60] These are the principal definitions in the theology of Proclus, and all that remains for us is to mention a few external points.

The topic of theurgy crops up frequently in the Neoplatonists and even in Proclus. The term θεουργεῖν means 'to make a god'. The theurgical view, particularly with reference to the divine images of the pagans, is that the divine thinking produces names, and each name exhibits, as it were, an image, ἄγαλμα. The θεουργία consists, then, in using certain symbols—principally names, which are already a form of externality, and the images themselves that the artist's thought produces—for the illumination, ἔλλαμψις, of the unstinting goodness of God. So the statues and paintings of artists exhibit the inner speculative thinking, the state of being imbued with the divine, that brings itself to outward expression. The consecration of images is also represented in this way; within it we see the connection expressed more precisely, because the Neoplatonists regarded both the mystical element and the external images as animated by the divine itself. These | are phenomena that God communicates in keeping with his endless 191
goodness, so that the divine energy is present in [all these] images.[61] I wanted to call to mind this aspect of Neoplatonism only because it played a major role in that period.

59. See *Platonic Theology* 3.7.131 (Taylor, p. 165), which characterizes 'the mystic doctrine' but does not explicitly say it is mysticism 'to consider speculatively'. See also n. 92, p. 207 above, and n. 54 just above.

60. On these moments as 'gods', see *Platonic Theology* 3.14.144 (Taylor, pp. 182–3); cf. *W.* xv. 91 (MS?).

61. Hegel's definition of 'theurgy' agrees with that of Proclus; see *Platonic Theology* 1.29.69–70 (Taylor, pp. 89–90). One difference is that Hegel here, as also in *W.* xv. 92 (MS?), ascribes the production of names to divine thinking, to νοῦς as demiurge, whereas Proclus attributes it to human knowing that operates analogously to the divine thinking. See p. 340 above, for the role played by theurgy in Proclus' life. For Plotinus, on the contrary, theurgy seems to have had no significance; see n. 24, p. 332 above. Augustine mentions the role of theurgy for Porphyry (*City of God* 10.9; Dods, pp. 312–14). In his treatise *On the Mysteries* Iamblichus held that theurgic acts are more a working of the divine on human beings than they are the reverse.

Proclus taught as scholarch in Athens. Marinus, his biographer, was his successor, [and then] Isidore of Gaza. Damascius was the last one in this academic school. In AD 529 the Emperor Justinian had this school closed, and he banished all pagan philosophers from the Empire, including Simplicius, one of the best commentators on Aristotle. These philosophers sought refuge and freedom in Persia and found acceptance there. After some time they were allowed to return, but they were no longer able to set up a school. In this fashion pagan philosophy in general perished—in this external fashion—although the philosophy of the Neoplatonists, in particular that of Proclus, persisted for a long time, and later on we shall have several occasions to refer back to it.[62]

With this the first period, that of Greek philosophy, comes to a close. In it there occurs this simple progression—first the abstract in natural form, then its progression [to] abstract thought in its immediacy, as being, and then thinking or νοῦς, although itself still abstract; and finally νοῦς or the idea in its wholly concrete character as triunity, so that the abstract moments of this triad are themselves grasped as totalities too.

62. See Vol. III of this edition, on the end of ancient pagan philosophical schools. Hegel adopts the view prevalent in his day, that the closing of the schools and the philosophers' retreat to Persia were of decisive significance for the end of ancient philosophy; see Tennemann (*Geschichte*, vi. 357–61). Discrepant with this view is the fact that Simplicius wrote his commentaries after his return from Persia, during the period 532–60. In Hegel's eyes John Scotus Erigena stands as a particular example of the continuance of Neoplatonism in the Christian era; see Vol. III of this edition (on Bruno's Neoplatonism), and *W.* xv. 160, 188–9, 237–41.

# GLOSSARY

The glossary contains a selection of frequently used and/or technical terms, especially those posing problems in translation. General principles of translation are discussed in the Editorial Introduction. The glossary has served only as a guide, to which the translators have not felt obliged to adhere when context or English idiom has required different renderings. When more than one English word is given, the generally preferred terms are listed first, while terms following a semicolon may be suitable in less technical contexts. 'Cf.' indicates related but distinguished German terms, which generally are translated by different English equivalents. Adjectives are listed without endings. This glossary is indexed only on German terms; the indexes to each volume serve partially as English–German glossaries.

| *German* | *English* |
|---|---|
| absolut | absolute |
| Absolute | the absolute |
| abzuleiten | deduce (cf. *herleiten*) |
| allgemein | universal, general |
| Allgemeine | the universal |
| Andacht | devotion, worship |
| Anderssein | other-being, otherness |
| anerkennen | recognize, acknowledge (cf. *erkennen*) |
| Anerkenntnis | recognition (cf. *Erkenntnis*) |
| angemessen | suitable, appropriate, commensurate, fitting |
| anschauen | intuit, envisage |
| Anschauung | intuition, envisagement (cf. *Wahrnehmung*) |
| an sich | in itself, implicit (cf. *in sich*) |
| Ansich | in-itself, implicit being |
| Ansichsein | being-in-self |

| | |
|---|---|
| Anundfürsichsein | being-in-and-for-self |
| Arbeit | labor (cf. *Werk*) |
| auffassen | comprehend, grasp (cf. *begreifen*, *fassen*) |
| Auffassung | comprehension |
| aufheben | sublate; transcend, supersede, annul |
| Aufhebung | sublation; transcendence, supersession, annulment |
| auflösen | resolve, dissolve |
| Auflösung | resolution, dissolution |
| Bedeutung | meaning, significance (cf. *Sinn*) |
| Begierde | desire, appetite |
| beglaubigen | verify, attest, confirm |
| Beglaubigung | verification, attestation |
| begreifen | conceive |
| Begreifen | conception, conceiving |
| Begriff | concept |
| bei sich | with self, present to self, at home |
| Beisichsein | presence with (to) self, self-communion, at home with self |
| beobachten | observe |
| Beobachtung | observation (cf. *Betrachtung*) |
| Beschäftigung | occupation, concern |
| besonder | particular |
| Besonderheit | particularity |
| bestehen | subsist, endure, consist |
| Bestehen | subsistence |
| bestimmen | determine, define, characterize, specify |
| bestimmt | determinate, definite |
| Bestimmtheit | determinateness, determinacy |
| Bestimmung | determination, definition; character(istic, -ization), destination, vocation, specification, attribute |
| betrachten | consider, treat, deal with |
| Betrachtung | consideration, treatment, examination, discussion (cf. *Beobachtung*) |
| Bewusstsein | consciousness |
| beziehen | relate, connect, refer to |
| Beziehung | relation, connection, reference (cf. *Verhältnis*, *Zusammenhang*) |
| Bild | image |
| bildlich | imaginative, figurative |
| Bildung | culture, formation, cultivation |

| | |
|---|---|
| bloss | mere, simple, sheer |
| Boden | soil, ground, territory |
| darstellen | present, portray, set forth |
| Darstellung | presentation, portrayal, exposition (cf. *Vorstellung*) |
| Dasein | determinate being, existence (cf. *Existenz*, *Sein*) |
| Denkbestimmung | category, thought-determination |
| denken | think |
| Denken | thinking, thought (cf. *Gedanke*) |
| denkend | thinking, thoughtful, reflective |
| eigentümlich | characteristic (adj.), proper |
| Einbildung | imagination (cf. *Phantasie*) |
| Eine (der, das) | the One, the one |
| einfach | simple |
| Einzelheit | singularity, single (or singular) individual (cf. *Individuum*) |
| einzeln | single, singular |
| Einzelne | single individual (cf. *Individuum*) |
| Element | element (cf. *Moment*) |
| empfinden | (to) sense |
| Empfindung | sensibility, sensation, sentiment, sense (cf. *Gefühl*) |
| entäussern | divest, externalize |
| Entäusserung | divestment, externalization |
| Entfremdung | estrangement |
| entgegensetzen | oppose |
| Entgegensetzung | opposition |
| Entzweiung | cleavage, rupture, severance; cleaving, split |
| erfassen | apprehend, grasp (cf. *auffassen*, *fassen*) |
| erheben | elevate, raise up |
| Erhebung | elevation, rising above |
| Erinnerung | recollection (cf. *Gedächtnis*) |
| erkennen | know, cognize, recognize, learn, discern, know cognitively (cf. *anerkennen*, *kennen*, *wissen*) |
| Erkenntnis | cognition; knowledge, cognitive knowledge (cf. *Anerkenntnis*, *Kenntnis*, *Wissen*) |
| erscheinen | appear (cf. *scheinen*) |
| Erscheinung | appearance, phenomenon (cf. *Manifestation*) |
| Erziehung | education |
| Existenz | existence (cf. *Dasein*—when the distinction is important, the German is given in square brackets) |

| | |
|---|---|
| existieren | exist (cf. *sein*) |
| fassen | grasp (cf. *auffassen*, *begreifen*, *erfassen*) |
| Form | form (cf. *Gestalt*) |
| für sich | for (by, of) itself, on its own account, explicit |
| Fürsich | for-itself |
| Fürsichsein | being-for-self, explicit being |
| Gebiet | field, realm |
| Gedächtnis | memory (cf. *Erinnerung*) |
| Gedanke | thought, thoughts (cf. *Denken*) |
| Gedankenbestimmung | category of thought |
| Gedankenbildung | ratiocination |
| Gefühl | feeling (cf. *Empfindung*) |
| Gegensatz | antithesis, contrast; antipathy, opposition (cf. *Entgegensetzung*) |
| Gegenstand | object, issue, topic |
| gegenständlich | objective |
| Gegenwart | presence, present |
| Geist | spirit (capitalized when clearly referring to God) |
| gelten | count, be valid |
| Gemeinde | community |
| Gemüt | mind, soul, heart (cf. *Gesinnung*) |
| Genuss | enjoyment, pleasure, communion |
| geoffenbart | revealed (cf. *offenbar*) |
| Geschichte | history; story (cf. *Historie*) |
| geschichtlich | historical (often synonymous with *historisch*) |
| Gesinnung | conviction, disposition |
| Gestalt | figure, shape |
| Gestaltung | configuration |
| Gewissen | conscience |
| Glaube | faith, belief |
| glauben | believe |
| Gleichgültigkeit | indifference, unconcern |
| Gleichheit | equivalence |
| Glück | fortune |
| Glückseligkeit | bliss, happiness |
| Grund | ground, reasons, basis |
| gründen | (to) base |
| Grundlage | foundation |
| herabsetzen | degrade, reduce |
| herleiten | derive (cf. *abzuleiten*) |

| | |
|---|---|
| hinausgehen | overpass, go beyond |
| Historie | history (cf. *Geschichte*) |
| historisch | historical (often synonymous with *geschichtlich*) |
| ideal, ideell | ideal |
| Idee | idea |
| Individuum | individual (cf. *Einzelne*) |
| in sich | within itself, into self, inward, internal, self-contained (cf. *an sich*) |
| jenseitig | otherworldly |
| Jenseits | the beyond, the other world |
| kennen | know (cf. *wissen*) |
| Kenntnis | information, acquaintance (cf. *Erkenntnis*, *Wissen*) |
| Kraft | force, strength, energy; power (in compounds) (cf. *Macht*) |
| Kultus | cultus |
| Lehre | teaching, doctrine |
| lehren | teach |
| Leidenschaft | passion |
| Macht | power (cf. *Kraft*) |
| Manifestation | manifestation (cf. *Erscheinung*) |
| Mannigfaltigkeit | manifold(ness) |
| Mensch | human being (to avoid sexist connotations, frequently: one, we, they, people) |
| Menschheit | humanity |
| mit sich | with self; integral |
| Moment | moment (cf. *Element*) |
| Moral | morals |
| Moralität | morality (cf. *Sittlichkeit*) |
| nachdenken | (to) deliberate, meditate, ponder |
| Nachdenken | deliberation, meditation, meditative thought |
| Natur | nature |
| natürlich | natural |
| Natürliche | the natural |
| Natürlichkeit | natural life, natural state, naturalness; simplicity, unaffectedness |
| offenbar | revelatory, manifest (cf. *geoffenbart*) |
| Offenbaren | revealing |
| Offenbarung | revelation |
| partikulär | private (cf. *besonder*) |

| | |
|---|---|
| Perzeption | perception |
| perzipierend | percipient |
| Phantasie | phantasy; fanciful imagination (cf. *Einbildung*) |
| Positive | the positive, positivity |
| Räsonnement | argumentation, reasoning |
| realisieren | realize (cf. *verwirklichen*) |
| Realität | reality (cf. *Wirklichkeit*) |
| Recht | right |
| reflektiv | reflective |
| Reflexion | reflection |
| rein | pure |
| Sache | matter, subject matter; thing, fact, case |
| Schein | semblance, show |
| scheinbar | seeming |
| scheinen | seem |
| schlechthinnig | utter, simple (cf. *absolut*) |
| schliessen | conclude, infer |
| Schluss | syllogism, conclusion |
| Schmerz | anguish, sorrow; pain |
| seiend (part. and adj.) | having being, subsisting |
| Seiende(s) | (God and cognates:) actual being (finite objects:) being, entity, subsisting being |
| sein (verb) | be: is (God and cognates); is, exists, occurs, etc. (finite objects) |
| Sein (noun) | being |
| setzen | posit |
| Setzen | positing |
| Sinn | sense, meaning (cf. *Bedeutung*) |
| sinnlich | sensible, sentient, sensuous, sense (adj.) |
| Sinnlichkeit | sensuousness, sensible nature |
| sittlich | ethical |
| Sittlichkeit | ethics, ethical life, ethical realm (cf. *Moralität*) |
| spekulativ | speculative |
| Spekulative | the speculative, speculation |
| Subjekt | subject |
| Subjektivität | subjectivity |
| substantiell | substantive, substantial |
| teilen | (to) divide |
| Teilung | division, separation (cf. *Urteil*) |
| trennen | (to) separate, part (from) |

| | |
|---|---|
| Trennung | separation |
| Trieb | drive, impulse, instinct |
| Übergang | transition, passing over |
| übergehen | pass over |
| übergreifen | overreach |
| überhaupt | generally, on the whole; altogether, after all, in fact, as such, etc. |
| Überzeugung | conviction |
| umfassen | embrace, contain |
| unangemessen | incongruous, unsuitable, inadequate, incommensurate |
| Unglück | misery, unhappiness |
| unmittelbar | immediate (cf. *unvermittelt*) |
| Unmittelbarkeit | immediacy |
| unterscheiden (verb) | distinguish, differentiate |
| Unterscheidung | differentiation, distinction (cf. *Unterschied*) |
| Unterschied | distinction (cf. *Unterscheidung*) |
| unterschieden (past part. and adj.) | distinguished, differentiated (part.); distinct, different (adj., cf. *verschieden*) |
| unvermittelt | unmediated (cf. *unmittelbar*) |
| Urteil | judgment, primal division (cf. *Teilung*) |
| urteilen | (to) judge, divide |
| Vereinzelung | singularization |
| Verhalten | attitude, comportment, behavior |
| sich verhalten | comport oneself, relate oneself, function |
| Verhältnis | relationship, condition (cf. *Beziehung, Zusammenhang*) |
| Verhältnisse (pl.) | conditions, circumstances, state of affairs |
| vermitteln | mediate |
| Vermittlung | mediation |
| Vernunft | reason |
| vernünftig | rational |
| verschieden (adj.) | different, distinct, diverse (cf. *unterschieden*) |
| Verschiedenheit | difference, diversity |
| versöhnen | reconcile |
| Versöhnung | reconciliation |
| Verstand | understanding |
| verwirklichen | actualize (cf. *realisieren*) |
| Verwirklichung | actualization (cf. *Wirklichkeit*) |
| vollendet | consummate; perfect, complete, final |

| | |
|---|---|
| Vollendung | consummation |
| vorhanden | present, at hand, extant |
| vorhanden sein | be present, be at hand, exist (cf. *sein*) |
| vorstellen | represent; imagine |
| vorstellend | representational, representative |
| Vorstellung | representation; image, imagination, view |
| wahr | true |
| Wahre | the true |
| wahrhaft(ig) | true, genuine, authentic, truthful |
| Wahrheit | truth |
| Wahrnehmung | (sense) perception (cf. *Anschauung*) |
| Werk | work (cf. *Arbeit*) |
| Wesen | essence; being |
| Widerspruch | contradiction |
| Willkür | caprice, arbitrariness; free choice, free will |
| wirklich | actual |
| Wirklichkeit | actuality (cf. *Realität*) |
| wissen | know (cf. *kennen*, *erkennen*) |
| Wissen | knowledge, knowing (cf. *Erkenntnis*, *Kenntnis*) |
| Wissenschaft | science, scientific knowledge |
| Zeugnis | witness, testimony |
| Zufall | chance |
| Zufälligkeit | contingency |
| Zusammenhang | connection, connectedness, nexus, coherence, correlation (cf. *Beziehung*, *Verhältnis*) |
| Zweck | purpose; end, goal, aim |
| zweckmässig | purposeful, expedient |
| Zweckmässigkeit | purposiveness, expediency |

# BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HEGEL'S SOURCES
## FOR GREEK PHILOSOPHY

This bibliography includes all the sources to which Hegel explicitly makes reference in this volume of the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* or that can be inferred with reasonable certainty from his formulations. Works cited in the footnotes as evidence for ideas contained in the lectures, but that cannot be established as sources upon which Hegel himself drew, are not included in the bibliography.

The bibliography does not list specific works of many of the authors—e.g. individual dialogues of Plato—but rather editions or collections with which Hegel is likely to have been familiar. Works with both Greek and Latin titles are cited only with the Latin title. Some long titles with subtitles are abbreviated, and in some instances the gist of a Latin, French or German subtitle is rendered in English.

The sources given in this bibliography fall into five groups:

* works listed in the Auction Catalogue of Hegel's library;
† works to which Hegel refers in these lectures or elsewhere, and of which he almost certainly made use;
‡ works probably used by Hegel but for which there are no explicit references;
§ modern editions or English translations of the foregoing works used by Hegel, to which reference is made in the footnotes;
¶ modern editions (such as Diels) that do not correspond to texts used by Hegel under that name.

‡ [Ammon, Christoph Friedrich v.], *Bittere Arznei für die Glaubensschwäche der Zeit. Verordnet von Herrn Claus Harms und geprüft von dem Herausgeber des Magazins für christliche Prediger. Aus dem zweiten Bande des Magazins besonders abgedruckt* (Hanover and Leipzig, 1817).

‡ [Ammon, Christoph Friedrich v.], *Antwort auf die Zuschrift des Herrn Fr. Schleiermacher iiber die Prüfung der Harmsischen Sätze, von dem Herausgeber des Magazins für christliche Prediger* (Hanover and Leipzig, 1818).

* Antoninus, Marcus [Aurelius], *Libri XII eorum quae de seipso ad seipsum scripsit ad exemplar Oxoniense MDCCIIII recusi*, introduction John Francis Buddeus, text ed. Christopher Wolle (Leipzig, 1729).

‡ —— *Unterhaltungen mit sich selbst*, German translation from the Greek, with annotations, J. W. Reche (Frankfurt, 1797).

‡ Aristophanes, *Comoediae. Ad optimorum librorum fidem accuratae editae. Editio stereotypa*, vol. i (Leipzig, 1829).

* —— *Wolken. Eine Komödie*. Greek, with German translation (Berlin, 1811).

* Aristotle, *Opera quaecunque hactenus extiterunt omnia*, ed. Desiderius Erasmus, 2 vols. in 1, Basle, 1550. (Hegel owned the edition of 1531.)

* —— *Opera omnia graece*, Greek text, ed. Johann Gottlieb Buhle, with critical annotations, and with the addition of a new Latin translation, 5 vols. (Strasburg, 1781–1800).

* —— *Operum Aristotelis Stagiritae philosophorum omnium longe principis*, new edn., Greek and Latin, from the compilation of Isaac Casaubon, 2 vols. in 1 (Lyons, 1590).

§ —— *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1984).

‡ Arrian, *Arrians Epictet*, German translation from the Greek, J. G. Schulthess (Zurich, 1766).

† Ast, G. A. Friedrich, *Grundriss einer Geschichte der Philosophie* (Landshut, 1807).

* Böckh, August, *Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener*, 4 books in 2 vols. (Berlin, 1817).

† —— 'Ueber die Bildung der Weltseele im Timäos des Platon', in *Studien* (Heidelberg), ed. Carl Daub and Friedrich Creuzer, 3 (1807), 1–95.

* Brandis, Christian August, *Commentationum Eleaticarum pars prima: Xenophanis Parmenidis et Melissi doctrina e propriis philosophorum reliquiis veterumque auctorum testimoniis exposita* (Altona, 1813).

* Brucker, Jacob, *Historia critica philosophiae*, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1742–4). (Hegel owned the 1756 edn.)

† Buhle, Johann Gottlieb, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie und einer kritischen Literatur derselben*, 8 pts. in 9 vols. (Göttingen,1796–1804).

† Carus, Friedrich August, 'Ueber die Sagen von Hermotimos aus Klazomenae: Ein kritischer Versuch', *Beyträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie* (Jena and Leipzig), ed. Georg Gustav Fülleborn, 9 (1798): 58–147.

‡ [Cebes], *Eclogae ex optimis graecis scriptoribus ad vitam studiosae juventutis informandam* (Turin, 1749).

§ —— *The Tabula of Cebes*, trans. John T. Fitzgerald and L. Michael White (Chico, Calif., 1983).

* Cicero, Marcus Tullius, *Epistulae ad Atticum, Brutum et fratrem* (Amsterdam, 1632).

§ —— *Letters to Atticus*, trans. E. O. Winstedt, 3 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1913).

* —— *Libri tres de natura Deorum*, from the edition of Johann August Ernest with annotations by John Davis, George Henry Moser and Daniel Wyttenbach, and observations added by Friedrich Creuzer (Leipzig, 1818).

§ —— *De natura deorum and Academica*, trans. H. Rackham, rev. edn. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1951).

* —— *De officiis libri III. Cato maior, sive De senectute* ... (Strasburg, 1582).

‡ —— *Abhandlung über die menschlichen Pflichten*, trans. from the Latin by Christian Garve, 4th edn. (Breslau, 1792).

§ —— *De officiis*, trans. Walter Miller (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1913).

§ —— *De senectute, De amicitia, De divinatione*, trans. William A. Falconer (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1923).

‡ —— *Opera*, 5 vols. (4 vols. plus an index vol.) (Leipzig, 1737).

§ —— *De finibus bonorum et malorum*, trans. H. Rackham, 2nd edn. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1931).

§ —— *De oratore, Book III, together with De fato, Paradoxa Stoicorum, De partitione oratoria*, trans. H. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1942).

§ —— *Tusculan Disputations*, trans. J. E. King (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1927; rev. edn., 1945).

* Corneille, Pierre, *Théatre de Corneille*, vol. iii (Paris, 1692).

§ —— *Œuvres completes*, vol. iii, ed. Georges Couton (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade; Paris, 1987).

¶ Diels, Hermann (ed.), *Doxographi Graeci*, 3rd edn. (Berlin, 1879; repr. Berlin, 1958).

¶ Diels, Hermann (ed.), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Griechisch und Deutsch*, 3 vols., 5th and later edns. ed. Walter Kranz (Berlin, 1934–60).

* Dio Cassius, *Historiae Romanae quae supersunt*, stereotype edition in four volumes (Leipzig, 1818).

§ —— *Dio's Roman History, Vol. 4*, trans. Earnest Cary (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1916).

* Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum graece et latine*, ed. Heinrich Stephanus (1570).

* —— *Vitae philosophorum a Diogene Laertio, Eunapio Sardiano et Hesychio* (Leiden, 1595).

* —— *Vitae philosophorum* ..., with the additions of Hesychius and the interpretations of Casaubon and Eunapius (Cologne, 1616).

‡ —— *De vitis, dogmatibus et apophthegmatibus clarorum philosophorum libri X*, with annotations of I. Casaubon, T. Aldobrandin, and M. Casaubon; Latin version of Ambrosius, emended by Marcus Meibomius (Amsterdam, 1692).

* —— *Vitae philosophorum graece et latine* (Leipzig, 1759).

§ —— *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, trans. R. D. Hicks, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1925, 1938).

‡ Eberhard, Johann August, *Allgemeine Theorie des Denkens und Empfindens*, rev. edn. (Berlin, 1786).

‡ —— *Handbuch der Aesthetik für gebildete Leser aus allen Ständen*, 3 vols., 2nd edn. (Halle, 1807–14).

‡ —— *Theorie der schönen Wissenschaften*, 2nd edn. (Halle, 1786).

† Empedocles, *Empedocles Agrigentinus: De vita et philosophia eius exposuit carminum reliquias ex antiquis scriptoribus collegit* ..., ed. Friedrich Wilhelm Sturz, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1805).

† —— *Empedoclis et Parmenidis fragmenta ex codice Taurinensis Bibliothecae* ..., ed. Amadeus Peyron (Leipzig, 1810).

* Epicurus, *Epicuri Fragmenta librorum II et XI de natura* ... ed., with annotations, J. Conrad Orelli (Leipzig, 1818).

‡ Fabricius, Johann Albert, *Bibliotheca Graeca, Sive notitia Scriptorum Veterum Graecorum quorumcunque monumenta integra, aut fragmenta edita* ..., 14 vols. (Hamburg, 1705–28).

* Fénelon, François de Salignac, de la Mothe, *Les Aventures de Télémaque* (Copenhagen, 1809).

‡ —— *Les Aventures de Télémaque, fils d'Ulysse* (London, 1742).

§ —— *Telemachus, Son of Ulysses*, ed. and trans. Patrick Riley (Cambridge, 1994).

* Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, *Appellation an das Publikum* (Jena, Leipzig, and Tübingen, 1799).
* —— *Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre als Handschrift für seine Zuhörer* (Leipzig, 1794).
§ —— *Science of Knowledge*, trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (New York, 1970).
§ —— *Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, ed. Reinhard Lauth and Hans Jacob, division 1 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1964 ff.).
‡ Friedrich II, *Œuvres du philosoph de Sans Souci*, 3 vols. (Potsdam, 1750).
‡ —— *Poësies diverses* (Berlin, 1760).
§ —— *Briefwechsel Friedrichs des Grossen mit Voltaire*, ed. Reinhold Koser and Hans Droysen (Leipzig, 1908), vol. i.
§ —— *Letters of Voltaire and Frederick the Great*, trans. Richard Aldington (London, 1927).
‡ Gassendi, Pierre, *Epicuri philosophiae tomus primus*, 3rd edn. (Lyons, 1675).
* Gellius, Aulus, *Noctes Atticae*, bound with *Annotationes Petri Mosellani in Auli Gellii Noctes Atticae* (Cologne, 1533).
§ —— *The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius*, trans. John C. Rolfe, 3 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1927; rev. edn. 1946–52).
* Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre; oder, Die Entsagenden*, pt. 1 (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1821).
§ —— *Goethe: Werke. Sophien-Ausgabe.* 1st division, vol. xxiv (Weimar, 1894).
§ —— *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship and Travels*, trans. Thomas Carlyle, 2 vols. (New York, 1882).
‡ Haller, Albrecht von, *Elementa physiologiae corporis humani*, vol. iv. *Cerebrum, Nervi, Musculi* (Lausanne, 1766).
‡ Harms, Claus, *Das sind die 95 theses oder Streitsätze Dr. Luthers, theuren Andenkens. Zum besonderen Abdruck besorgt und mit andern 95 Sätzen als mit einer Uebersätzung aus Ao. 1517 in 1817 begleitet von Claus Harms* (Kiel, 1817).
‡ Heraclitus, *Héraclite: Fragments*, ed. Marcel Conche (Paris, 1986).
‡ Herodotus, *Historie*, French translation from the Greek, by Pierre-Henri Larcher, with an essay on the chronology of Herodotus ... 7 vols. (Paris, 1786).
§ —— *The History*, trans. David Grene (Chicago, 1987).

* Hugo, Gustav, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte des römischen Rechts*, vol. iii of *Lehrbuch eines civilistischen Cursus*, 5th edn. (Berlin, 1815).
‡ Iamblichus, *De vita Pythagorica liber graece et latine*, ed. M. Theophilus Kiessling (Leipzig, 1825).
§ —— *On the Pythagorean Life*, trans. Gillian Clark (Liverpool, 1989).
* [Pseudo-]Iamblichus, *Theologoumena arithmeticae*, ed. Friedrich Ast (Leipzig, 1817).
§ —— *The Theology of Arithmetic*, trans. Robin Waterfield (Grand Rapids, 1988).
* Kant, Immanuel, *Critik der practischen Vernunft* (Riga, 1788).
§ —— *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, 1956).
† —— *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, 2nd edn. (Riga, 1787).
§ —— *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, from R. Schmidt's collation of the first (A) and second (B) editions (London, 1929, 1933).
§ —— *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (Berlin, 1900 ff.).
§ Kirk, G. S., Raven, J. E., and Schofield, M. (eds.), *The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 1983).
* Klopstock, Friedrich Gottlieb, *Der Messias*, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1819).
† Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, *Hamburgische Dramaturgie.* vol. i (Hamburg, n.d.).
‡ —— *Sämmtliche Schriften*, ed. C. G. Lessing, J. J. Eschenburg, and C. F. Nicolai, 31 vols. (Berlin, 1771–1825).
§ —— *Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. Karl Lachmann, 3rd edn. Franz Muncker, 31 vols. (Stuttgart, 1886–1924; repr. Berlin, 1968).
* Lucretius, *De rerum natura libri sex*, ed. Oberto Gifanio (Antwerp, 1566).
* Mendelssohn, Moses, *Phädon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, in drey Gesprächen*, rev. edn. (Berlin and Stettin, 1768).
§ —— *Mendelssohn: Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. iii, pt. 1, *Schriften zur Philosophie und Aesthetik*, ed. Fritz Bamberger and Leo Strauss (Berlin, 1932; repr. Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt, 1972).
§ —— *Moses Mendelssohn: Selections from his Writings*, ed. and trans. Eva Jospe (New York, 1975).
* Neander, August, *Genetische Entwickelung der vornehmsten gnostischen Systeme* (Berlin, 1818).

‡ Nicolai, Friedrich, *Abhandlung vom Trauerspiele*, in *Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freien Künste* (Leipzig, 1757), vol. i, pt. 1.

† Paul, Fridericus, *Dissertatio de sillis Graecorum* (Berlin, 1821).

* Paul, Jean [Richter, Johann Paul Friedrich = Novalis], *Clavis Fichtiana seu Leibgeberiana* (Erfurt, 1800).

† Philo Judaeus, *Omnia quae extant opera*, ed. Sigismund Geleni, Adrian Turneb, and David Hoeschel (Frankfurt, 1691).

† —— *Opera omnia graece et latine*, ed. Augustus Fridericus Pfeiffer, 5 vols. (Erlangen, 1820).

§ —— *Philo*, 10 vols. and 2 supplementary vols.; vols. i–v trans. F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker; vols. vi–x trans. F. H. Colson; supplementary volumes trans. Ralph Marcus (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1929–62).

* Plato, *Opera quae extant omnia*, Latin translation by Joannes Serranus [Jean de Serres], ed. Henricus Stephanus [Henri Estienne], 3 vols. ([Geneva,] 1578).

‡ —— *Quae exstant*, Greek text ed. Heinrich Stephanus, with the Latin translation of Marsilio Ficino, 11 vols. (Biponti, 1781–7).

* —— *Œuvres completes*, trans. and ed. Victor Cousin, vols. ii–vii (Paris, 1824–31).

§ —— *Plato*, trans. R. G. Bury, Harold N. Fowler, W. R. M. Lamb, and Paul Shorey, 12 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1914–37).

‡ Pliny, *Historiae naturalis libri XXXVII*, vol. i (Leyden, 1635).

§ —— *Natural History*, vol. iii, trans. H. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1940).

‡ Plotinus, *Operum philosophicorum omnium libri LIV*, Greek edition from the most ancient codices, with the Latin translation and commentary of Marsilio Ficino (Basle, 1580).

§ —— *Plotinus*, trans. A. H. Armstrong, 7 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1966–88).

* Plutarch, *Quae supersunt omnia*, ed. Johann Georg Hutten, vols. ii, xii (Tübingen, 1792, 1800).

§ —— *Lives*, trans. Bernadotte Perrin, 11 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1914–26).

§ —— *Moralia*, trans. Philip H. DeLacy et al., 16 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1927–69).

* Porphyry [=Malchus], *De vita Pythagorae*, ed., with annotations, Conrad Rittershus (Altdorf, 1610).

§ Porphyry [=Malchus], 'The Life of Pythagoras', trans. Morton Smith, in Moses Hadas and Morton Smith, *Heroes and Gods: Spiritual Biographies in Antiquity* (New York, 1965).

* Proclus, *Compendiara de motu disputatio, posteriores quinque Aristotelis de auscultatione naturali libros, mira brevitate complectens* (Basle, 1531).

* —— *Initia philosophiae ac theologiae ex Platonicus fontibus ducta sive ... in Platonis Alcibiadem commentarii*, Greek edition by Friedrich Creuzer, 4 vols. (Frankfurt, 1820–5). (Vol. i contains the *Alcibiades* commentary. Vol. iii, dedicated to Hegel, contains *The Elements of Theology* with a Latin translation.)

§ —— *The Elements of Theology*, critical Greek text and English trans. E. R. Dodds, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1963).

* —— *Opera omnia*, ed. Victor Cousin, from codices of the royal library in Paris, vols. iii–vi (Paris, 1821–7). (Vol. iii contains the *Alcibiades* commentary, vols. iv–vi the *Parmenides* commentary.)

* —— *In Platonis theologiam libri sex*, ed. Aemilius Portus, with a short life of Proclus by Marinus Neapolitanus (Hamburg and Frankfurt am Main, 1618).

§ —— *The Platonic Theology*, trans. Thomas Taylor, 2 vols. (repr. Kew Gardens, NY, 1985).

‡ —— *In Platonis Timaeon commentariorum libri quinque, totius veteris philosophiae thesaurus* (Colophon, 1534).

* Racine, Jean, *Œuvres*, 5 vols. (Paris, 1817).

* Raumer, Friedrich von, *Ueber die Poetik des Aristoteles* (Berlin, 1829).

* Riemer, Friedrich Wilhelm, *Griechisch–Deutsches Hand-Wörterbuch*, 2 pts. (Jena, 1816).

* Ritter, Heinrich, *Geschichte der Jonischen Philosophie* (Berlin, 1821).

* Rötscher, H. Theodor, *Aristophanes und sein Zeitalter: Eine philologisch-philosophische Abhandlung zur Alterthumsforschung* (Berlin, 1827).

* Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, *Du contract social; ou principes du droit politique* (Amsterdam, 1762).

§ —— *Discourse on Political Economy and the Social Contract*, trans. Christopher Betts (Oxford and New York, 1994).

‡ —— *Discours sur l'origine et les fondemens de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (Amsterdam, 1755).

§ —— *Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men*, trans. Franklin Philip. ed. Patrick Coleman (Oxford and New York, 1994).

‡ —— *Aemil, oder Von der Erziehung*, German translation from the French, with annotations (no translator given) (Berlin, Frankfurt, and Leipzig, 1762).

* Savigny, Friedrich Carl von, *Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft* (Heidelberg, 1814).

‡ —— 'Ueber den Zweck dieser Zeitschrift', in F. C. von Savigny, C. F. Eichhorn, and J. F. L. Göschen (eds.), *Zeitschrift für geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft*, vol. i, pt. 1 (Berlin, 1815), 1–12.

¶ Schelling, F. W. J., *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. K. F. A. Schelling, 14 vols. in 2 divisions (Stuttgart and Augsberg, 1856–61).

§ —— *First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature*, trans. Keith R. Pierson (Albany, NY, 2004).

¶ Schiller, Friedrich, *Schillers Werke. Nationalausgabe*, ed. Siegfried Seidel, vol. x (Weimar, 1980).

‡ Schlegel, Friedrich, *Athenäum, eine Zeitschrift von A. W. Schlegel und Fr. Schlegel*, vol. i, pt. 2 (Berlin, 1798); vol. iii, pt. 1 (Berlin, 1800).

§ —— *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe*, ed. Ernst Behler, Jean-Jacques Anstett, and Hans Eichner, 35 vols. (Munich, Paderborn, and Vienna, 1958 ff.).

* Schleiermacher, Friedrich, *An Herrn Oberhofprediger Ammon über die Prüfung der Harmsischen Sätze* (Berlin, 1818).

‡ —— *Zugabe zu meinem Schreiben an Herrn Ammon* (Berlin, 1818).

† —— *Herakleitos der Dunkle, von Ephesos, dargestellt aus den Trümmern seines Werkes und den Zeugnissen der Alten*, in *Museum der Alterthums-Wissenschaft*, ed. Friedrich August Wolf and Philipp Buttmann (Berlin, 1808), vol. I, pt. 3, pp. 313–533).

§ —— *Sämmtliche Werke.*, 3rd division, *Philosophische und Vermischte Schriften*, vol. ii (Berlin, 1838).

† Schulze, Gottlob Ernst, *Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von dem Herrn Prof. Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementar-Philosophie.* Together with a defense of skepticism against the pretentions of the critique of reason (n.p., 1792).

‡ —— *Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie*, vol. i, *Darstellung des Zwecks der theoretischen Philosophie und der über dessen Erreichbarkeit möglichen Denkarten* (Hamburg, 1801).

§ —— Translation of the two foregoing works, by George di Giovanni and H. S. Harris, in *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism* (Albany, 1985).

‡ —— *Aphorismen über das Absolute. Von einem für dieses Mal ungenannten, aber nichts weniger als unbekannten Verfasser*, in Friedrich

Bouterwek (ed.), *Neues Museum der Philosophie und Litteratur*, vol. i, pt. 2 (Leipzig, 1803), 107–48.

‡ —— *Die Hauptmomente der skeptischen Denkart über die menschliche Erkenntniss*, in *Neues Museum der Philosophie und Litteratur*, vol. iii, pt. 2 (Leipzig, 1805), 3–57.

* Seneca, Lucius Annaeus, *Opera Philosophica* (Halle, 1762).

* —— *Opera, quae extant omnia*, with the annotations of Erasmus of Rotterdam (Lyons, 1555).

§ —— *Moral Essays*, vol. ii, trans. John W. Basore (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1932).

† Sextus Empiricus, *Opera*, Greek and Latin. *Pyrrhoniarum institutionum libri III*, ed., with notes, Heinrich Stephanus. *Contra mathematicos libri VI*, and *Contra philosophos libri V*, ed. Gentianus Hervetus. Greek text corrected, the editions emended, and with notes added, J. A. Fabricius (Leipzig, 1718).

§ —— *Sextus Empiricus*, trans. R. G. Bury, 4 vols. (Loeb Classical Library, New York and London, 1933–49).

* Shakespeare, William, *Schauspiele*, trans. Johann Joachim Eschenberg, rev. edn., vol. ix (Mannheim, 1779).

* —— *Schauspiele*, ed. Johann Heinrich Voss, Heinrich Voss, and Abraham Voss, vol. i (Leipzig, 1818).

‡ Simplicius, *Commentarii in octo Aristotelis physicae auscultationis libros cum ipso Aristotelis textu* (Venice, 1526).

§ —— *In Aristotelis physicorum libros quattuor priores ... libros quattuor posteriores commentaria*, ed. Hermann Diels (Berlin, 1882, 1895). (In *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca*.)

‡ Sömmerring, Samuel Thomas, *Vom Baue des menschlichen Körpers*, vol. v. *Hirn- und Nervenlehre* (Frankfurt, 1791).

* Sophocles, *Tragoedie septem*, ed., with notes, Rich. Franc. Phil. Brunck. 2 vols. (Strasburg, 1786).

* Spinoza, Benedict, *Opera quae supersunt omnia*, new edn., ed. H. E. G. Paulus, with a life of the author and some notes on the history of the writings, 2 vols. (Jena, 1802–3).

* Stephanus, Heinrich [Henri Estienne], compiler, *Poesis philosophica*, or poetic philosophical fragments from Empedocles, Parmenides, Xenophanes, Cleanthes, Timon, and Epicharmus. Appended are poems of that Orpheus who has been dubbed ὁ θεολόγος. Also, certain passages from Heraclitus and Democritus, and their letters (n.p., 1573).

‡ Stobaeus, John, *Eclogarum physicarum et ethicarum libri duo*, the ancient manuscripts corrected, annotated, and supplied with a Latin translation, by A. H. L. Heeren, 4 vols. (Göttingen, 1792–1801).

§ —— *Anthologium*, 4 vols. *Anthologii libri duo priores, qui inscribi solent Ecologae physicae et ethicae*, ed. Curtius Wachsmuth, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1884); *Anthologii libri duo posteriores*, ed. Otto Hense, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1894) (repr. 4 vols., Berlin, 1958).

* —— *Sententiae ex thesauris Graecorum delectae*, cites about 250 authors, arranged in related discourses or passages, and translated into Latin, by Conrad Gesner, 3rd edn. (Tiguri, 1559).

‡ Strabo, *Rerum geographicarum libri XVII*, ed. from the best Greek manuscripts, with variants and annotations, with the Latin translation of Xylander, by Johann Philip Siebenkees et al., 7 vols. (Leipzig, 1796–1818).

§ —— *The Geography of Strabo*, trans. Horace Leonard Jones, 8 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1917–33).

† Tennemann, Wilhelm Gottlieb, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 11 vols. (Leipzig, 1798–1819).

* Tiedemann, Dieterich, *Geist der spekulativen Philosophie*, 6 vols. (Marburg, 1791–7). (Hegel owned vols. i–iii.)

† —— *Ueber den Process des Socrates* (n.p., n.d.). [Published anonymously, attributed to Tiedemann by the German edition].

‡ Valerius Maximus, *Dictorum factorumque memorabilium libri IX* (Amsterdam, 1632).

‡ Wieland, Christoph Martin, *Die Abderiten. Eine sehr wahrscheinliche Geschichte* (Weimar, 1776).

* Xenophon. *Quae extant opera*, with the annotations of Heinrich Stephanus, 2nd edn. (n.p., 1581).

* —— *Anabasis. De expeditione Cyri minoris. Feldzug nach Oberasien*, Greek text., ed. F. H. Bothe (Leipzig, 1818).

§ —— *Xenophon*, 7 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1914–25). (*Apology*, trans. O. J. Todd, vol. iv; *Hellenica*, trans. Carleton I. Brownson, vols. i–ii; *Memorabilia*, trans. E. C. Marchant, vol. iv).

# INDEX


Abdera 16, 17 n. 7, 88, 119
absolute, the 23, 102
  absolute spirit 255
abstract, the 64, 75, 89, 136, 206, 265
Academy, the 178–9, 227, 305, 306
  Middle Academy 294, 295–8
  New Academy 269 n. 14, 294–5, 298–302
Achilles Paradox 67
actuality 27 n. 34, 155, 218–19, 234
Adam 119, 327, 328
  Adam Kadmon 326 n. 9
Aenesidemus 305, 309
air 24, 28, 77 n. 202, 78, 86–7, 108, 211, 271
Akiba, Rabbi 327
Alcibiades 128, 145
Alcmaeon 37, 42
Alexander the Great 227–9, 258, 304
Alexandria 170, 230, 305, 323, 330, 340
Ammonius Saccas 331, 332
Anaxagoras 14, 16, 30, 94–109, 127, 251, 252 n. 226
  life of 96, 98–101, 308
  philosophy of 100–9
Anaximander 15 n. 4, 23–5, 29, 31, 203 n. 80
Anaximenes 23–5, 30
animals 102, 125, 241–2, 257, 273, 310
Anniceris 165, 168, 170
Antisthenes of Rhodes 70, 171–2, 173
antithesis 43, 45, 91, 211, 253, 321
  of faith and reason 131–2
Apollo 23 n. 21, 150, 177 n. 5, 229, 340
Arcesilaus 266, 294, 295–8
Archytus of Tarentum 36 n. 61, 178, 180
argumentation 117–18, 309–15
Aristippus of Cyrene 163–4, 174
Aristophanes 142–4
Aristotle 112, 123, 139–40, 159–60, 162, 181–2, 205, 208, 225–62, 263, 265, 288, 315, 318, 331, 334
  life of 226–9
  on the Presocratics 13, 14, 19 n. 12, 20 n. 15, 25 n. 30, 27–9, 30, 38, 40–2, 48, 50–3, 61, 66–9, 73–4, 79, 85–6, 93–4, 96, 103, 105–6
  philosophy of 231–62
art 307, 319, 345
  in Athens 98–9
  plastic work of 129–30
  *see also* music; poetry
  assent 269–70, 306
  epoche 295–7, 308
ataraxia 264, 290, 293, 306–8
atheism 100, 176 n. 1
Athens 16, 19–20, 55–6, 96–8, 100, 120, 128, 156, 157, 173, 178–9, 181, 205, 227, 229, 230, 265–7, 279–80, 295, 298, 305, 330, 350

Athenian life 130, 148, 152–3, 156, 171
atomism 89–94, 284–5, 288–9

'bald' argument 163
Basilides 328, 339 n. 45
beauty 193, 200–1, 204, 319, 338
becoming 74, 77, 90, 134
being 73–4, 90, 122, 201, 207, 263, 335
being-for-self 90, 255
being-in-and-for-itself 127, 237, 254–5, 320
One, as the 57, 59, 63
Bias of Priene 17 n. 6, 18, 303
Bible, the 69, 120, 127, 137, 199
Books of Moses 323, 327
Genesis 198 n. 64, 325 n. 7, 326 n. 9, 327 n. 11
John, Gospel of 318 n. 2
Matthew 69
New Testament 318 n. 2
Psalms 325 n. 7
Song of Solomon 326 n. 9
*see also* Adam; fall, the bliss 176, 293, 320, 334–5
body 51, 191–2, 209, 217, 245–6
Boehme, Jacob 326 n. 9, 337 n. 37
Brandis, Christian August 58
Brown, Robert F. 5, 337 n. 37
Brucker, Jacob 330

Cabala 326 n. 9, 327–8, 329 n. 16
Carneades 269 n. 14, 281 n. 43, 294, 298–301
Carus, Friedrich August 96
cataleptic phantasy 268–9, 294, 296–7
causality 104–5, 204–5, 216, 241, 312–13
final cause 247
Cave, allegory of the 187
chance 241–2, 275, 285
change 26, 61, 78, 92, 108, 235, 236–7, 240 n. 190, 303
Christianity 176–7, 185, 317, 318, 339–40
Catholic Church 10
Christ 69, 199, 338, 339–40
primacy of the subject in 12 n., 225
Protestantism 194
Chrysippus 267, 270, 272 n. 21
Cicero 30, 50–1, 55, 72, 136, 170, 182, 186 n. 32, 213, 231, 262, 264, 267, 269 n. 14, 272–5, 280–1, 285 nn. 55 and 57, 288, 289 n. 67, 291, 292 n. 78, 294 n. 83, 295–6
circle 48, 50, 212, 213–14, 238, 243–4
Cleanthes 266–7
cognition 188, 248, 268–9
*see also* knowledge
Cohen Herrera (Irira), Rabbi Abraham 327
concept, the 86, 108, 117, 213, 246, 269
concrete, the 40, 74, 92, 295–8
conscience 154, 220, 277–8
consciousness 121, 127, 278, 300
modes of 268–9
ordinary 118
self-consciousness 306–7, 319, 321
constitution, political 115, 129, 181, 185–6, 218, 244
content of thinking 110, 121, 270, 296–7
contradiction 159–60, 161, 260, 302, 313
Crates 162 n. 100, 171 n. 122, 172 n. 125, 173 n. 129, 266
creation of the world 319, 321, 325, 326
in Plato 208–17
Creuzer, Friedrich 82–3, 182 n. 23, 341
criterion, the 167–8, 263–4, 268, 282–3, 294, 299, 301
Critias 145, 150 n. 75, 176
Croesus, king of Lydia 17, 21–3
culture 111–17, 167, 173–4

custom 118, 125, 127, 140, 146, 219
Cynics 171–5, 264, 293
Cyrenaics 158, 163–71, 264, 290, 293
Cyrene 178, 180–1

daimon, of Socrates 145, 147–8, 149, 150
definition 201–2, 270
Delphi 150, 227
democracy 37, 98, 129
Democritus 16, 87–9, 92–3, 279, 284
Descartes, Rene 135, 190 n. 42, 203 n. 80
desire 223, 276
determination 63–4, 69, 121, 167, 263
  determinate being 90–1, 297
  indeterminate, the 26, 203, 302
  self-determination 109, 203–4, 235
  universal determination 121
dialectic 63, 123, 132–3, 158–9, 161, 267
  in Plato 195–207
  in Skepticism 294–5, 297, 302–3
  Zeno's 66–70
dialogues 133–4
  Plato's Dialogues 182, 195, 198, 207
Diogenes Laertius 16 n. 5, 18, 20, 24 n. 25, 30, 55, 93–4, 95 n. 251, 157, 229–30, 266, 267, 281, 290, 330
Diogenes the Cynic 66, 158 n. 59, 162, 166, 172 n. 125, 173, 174
Dion of Syracuse 178–80
Dionysius the Younger, of Syracuse 179–80
Divided Line analogy 187–8
divination 149, 288
  *see also* omen
Dogmatism 263–93, 306, 314
duty 21, 117, 256, 277–8

earth, element of 78–9, 86–7, 108, 209, 211, 271
Eberhard, Johann August 164
ecstasy 324, 335
education 36, 111–17, 119–20, 152, 221
  *see also* culture; learning
Egypt 32, 51, 332, 340
Elea 16, 54, 56
Eleatics 15, 17, 54–70, 177
  philosophy of 57–70, 73, 199–201, 235
elements, the four 85, 106, 211, 240 n. 190
  *see also* air; earth; fire; water
emanation 319, 336
empiricism 226, 232, 250, 260, 288
  the empirical 91–2, 233, 263
*Encyclopedia, The* (by Hegel) 91 n. 240, 107 n. 272, 253 n. 230, 284 n. 54, 286 nn. 59 and 62, 287 n. 63
Empedocles 16, 44, 82–7, 94 n. 249, 106, 241
  life of 83–5
  philosophy of 85–7
energy 235–7, 245
entelechy 235, 237, 245–6
  *see also* purpose
'enthusiasm' 189 n. 39, 193, 198, 199
Ephesus 16, 70–1
Epictetus 267
Epicureanism 13, 30, 92 n. 244, 165, 263–4, 279–93, 294–5, 308
Epicurus 272, 279–93, 300
  life of 279–81
  philosophy of 282–93
Eristics, *see* Megarics
Eros 65, 76 n. 201, 189
error 82, 284, 296
essence 236
  divine essence 206, 325
ethical life 125, 139, 140, 154, 219, 224, 277–8
  ethical nature 218
ethics 52–3, 255
  *see also* morality
Eubulus (Eubulides) of Miletus 158

Eucleides of Megara 157–9
Euclid 178
Eudaemonism 22, 257
Euthydemus 141–2
evil 85, 119, 257, 275–6, 321, 337–8
  tree of the knowledge of good and evil 127

faith 131–2, 194
fall, the 210, 327
  of soul 191, 192
family 224, 225, 257
fate 126, 154–5, 272
feeling 118, 125
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 123 n. 21, 132, 193, 258 n. 244, 313
finitude 59, 64, 192, 196–7, 203–4, 212, 261, 321
fire 48, 64–5, 77 n. 202, 78–80, 86–7, 108, 209, 211, 271
  world conflagration 80
form 215, 236–7, 245, 246, 250–1
  formalism 53, 270, 273
  logical forms 260–1
Frederick II, of Prussia 186, 277 n. 37
freedom 12, 202, 265, 275–8
  Greek 11–12, 17, 37, 51
  subjective 98, 127, 136, 219–20, 223, 320–1
French, the 112, 231, 233
friendship 85–6, 170, 281

Garniron, Pierre xi, 2
Gassendi, Pierre 92
genus 43–4, 95, 196
Glaucon 184–5
Gnostics 328–9, 338–9, 340 n. 46
  Valentinians 329 n. 16, 339 n. 45
God 30, 63, 75, 121, 125, 149, 183, 208, 212–13, 216, 237, 238 n. 185, 254, 266, 271–2, 291–2, 314, 318–22, 324–8, 336, 343
  absolute being 58
  as concrete 321–2
  devoid of jealousy 208, 234
  God-world relation 27, 318–22
  identity of subjective and objective 192
  *Inbegriff* (sum of all realities) 63, 325
  living 211, 325
  as self-determining 321–2, 325
  as Spirit 210–11, 261
  *see also* Trinity
gods 26, 42, 45–6, 58, 82, 114, 120, 147, 148–9, 192, 271–2, 291–2, 319, 344
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 114, 115 n. 8, 216 n. 121
good 85–6, 119, 121, 135–6, 138–40, 158–9, 168, 169, 193, 257, 306
  the Good, in Platonism 4, 194, 208, 234, 334, 335–8
  highest good 273–4
Gorgias 119, 123–4, 171
Greeks 10–11, 12, 146, 220
  *see also* Athens; Sparta

happiness 22, 164, 169, 257, 274–5, 289–90
harmony 46, 274–8
  musical 47, 76
Harms, Claus 131
Harris, H. S. xi, 5
heart, the 118, 139–40
heavenly bodies 48–9, 99, 214, 239, 319
Hegesias 165, 168–70
Heraclitus 16, 70–82, 177, 235, 271, 303
  life of 70–1, 206
  philosophy of 71–82, 108
'here', the 68–9, 78 n. 203
Hermias 227, 229
Hermotimus of Clazomenae 95–6
Herodotus 17, 18 n. 8, 19, 20 nn. 13 and 15, 21, 51, 146 n. 65

Hesiod 11 n. 2, 58, 85 n. 226, 113, 208 n. 96, 221
Hippias 20 n. 15, 58, 141, 175 n. 137
Hippocrates 73, 111–13
Hodgson, Peter C. xi, 5
Homer 81 n. 212, 113, 208 n. 96, 221, 303
Hugo, Gustav 278
human being 121, 124, 135–6, 166–7, 247, 257, 273, 275, 310, 321
  primordial 325–6, 328
  relation to God 320, 322
Hume, David 194 n. 53, 311

I, the 12, 90, 110, 162, 249
Iamblichus 32 n. 49, 34 nn. 55 and 58, 35 n. 60, 46, 332, 340, 345 n. 61
idea 11–12, 86, 326
  Idea in Platonism 4, 38, 121, 180, 183, 187, 193, 196, 200–1, 203, 206, 209, 210, 212–13, 219, 234, 294, 334
ideal, the 75, 91, 195–6, 218
  idealism 110, 193, 226, 249
identity 63, 201–2, 210
  with self 190, 274, 276
immediate knowing 125, 208, 270, 309, 314
indifference 171, 263–4, 274, 277
  *see also* ataraxia
individuality 98, 129
  the individual 154–6, 168, 225, 257–8
infinite, the 23–5, 203–4, 312–13, 342–4
  apeiron 23, 27, 41
intuition 78, 194, 283, 324
inwardness 75, 188–9, 320
Ionian philosophy 14, 30 n. 46, 76, 95–6, 195
Italy 16, 33–4, 54

Jaeschke, Walter xi, 2, 193 n. 50, 308 n. 119
Judaism 327–8
  Jews, the 323
judgment 260, 283, 309
Jupiter 114, 174, 192, 221, 258
  Zeus 46, 48, 129, 268 n. 2
justice 52, 141–2, 193, 219, 220–5
  Dike 65, 208

Kant, Immanuel 69, 121, 122, 123 n. 21, 164, 203 n. 80, 240, 242, 256 n. 239, 259 nn. 248–9, 275, 297 n. 92, 309, 313
Klopstock, Friedrich Gottlieb 308 n. 119
knowledge 187, 194, 233–4, 296

law 91, 116, 118, 125, 141, 142, 146, 258, 276, 299, 311
  Athenian law 20–1, 153–5
  English law 154
  natural law 273
  Roman law 10, 278
learning 137, 188, 193, 194
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 249, 309
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim 164 n. 108, 231 n., 315 n. 144
Leucippus 16, 87–8, 90–4, 284 n. 53
liar's paradox 161
limit, the 59, 67–8, 203, 342–3
Locke, John 226, 250 n. 220
logic 76, 90, 195–6, 210, 267, 314
  Aristotle's logic 258–62
  Epicurus' logic 282–3
  Stoic logic 268–71
logos 81, 139–40, 243, 247, 255–6, 271–4, 289, 318, 325–6, 328–9, 334, 337
  prophorikos 326
  spermatikos 271
Lyceum, the 229
Lycurgus 19, 181

Macedon 156, 226, 266
Marcus Aurelius 267, 277
Marinus 340–1, 346
mathematics 113, 178, 213–14, 261, 314, 341
  geometry 46, 213, 215, 247
  *see also* number
matter 27, 29, 192, 209, 212, 213, 215, 236–7, 245, 249–50, 252–3, 337–8
measure 121, 135–6, 138
Megara 157, 178
Megarics 157–63, 260
Melissos 54, 61
Mendelssohn, Moses 164, 198
Menedemus of Eretria 159, 161
Meno 135, 197 n.
mesmerism 128, 145, 148
metaphysics 206, 245, 259, 334
  of Aristotle 234–9
  of Epicurus 283–5
morality 117, 126, 139, 170
  moral philosophy 195, 289–90
  Stoic morals 273–9
motion 53, 73–4, 189, 235, 284
  unreality of 66–9
music 47–9, 76, 113, 115, 204
mysticism 323, 344–5
myth 114, 182–4, 187, 189, 191, 201, 221 n. 133
  mythology 1, 58, 319

Nausiphanes 280 n. 41
natural, the 12, 158, 172–3, 256, 322–3
*Natural Law* (by Hegel) 256 n. 239
nature, philosophy of 23–4, 80, 195, 228
  of Aristotle 239–44
  of Epicurus 285–8
  of Plato 206–18
  of the Stoics 271–3
Neander, August 328
necessity 60, 208
  external 241, 243, 285
negation 59, 63, 264, 315
  negation of negation 90
  negative, the 302–3, 326
Neoaristotelians 231, 334
Neoplatonism 13, 205–7, 231, 317–46
non-being 59, 63, 73–5, 77, 201, 303, 326, 338
nous 30, 101–9, 205, 238, 251–5, 318, 328, 337–8
'now', the 68, 77–8, 251, 303
number 210
  Pythagorean 38–50, 52–3, 213, 235

objectivity 11, 76, 110, 297, 318
one
  number one 39–41, 44, 91
  one-many 202, 205–6, 341–2
  The One 4, 26–8, 57, 61, 64, 69, 75, 202, 205–7, 325, 335–6, 341–2
opinion 61, 64, 188, 282–3
opposites 75, 204, 308, 309
oracle 146–8, 150, 178
Origen 331
Orpheus 112–13, 340
other, the 90, 201, 321

pain 275–6, 282, 290, 293
Panaetius 267
pantheism 271–2, 318–19, 322
Parmenides 55–6, 59–62, 64–5, 205, 211, 303
participation, theory of 40–1, 201 n. 77, 204, 235 n. 171
particular, the 125, 197, 263, 319
  *see also* private interest
passions 222, 223, 255–6
Peloponnesian War 123, 128, 176
Pericles 96–7, 99, 100, 114, 115, 120, 123, 130, 229
Peripatetics 170, 229, 231, 262, 264
Persia 17, 23 n. 21, 146 n. 65, 227, 332, 346
  Persian War 96
Peyron, Amadeus 82

*Phenomenology* (by Hegel) 68 n. 173, 77 n. 203, 78
Pherecydes of Syros 17 n. 6, 24 n. 27, 31, 50–1
Philip of Macedon 226
Philo of Alexandria (Judaeus) 323–7, 328
philosophy
  diversity of philosophies 118, 312
  meaning of 33–4, 185
  philosopher-ruler 184, 186
  popular philosophy 136–7, 262
  withdrawal of philosophers 156
*Philosophy of Religion* (by Hegel) 2, 9 n., 26 n. 32, 115 n. 8, 194 n. 53, 279 n. 39, 291 n. 75, 341 n. 49
*Philosophy of Right* (by Hegel) 255 n. 236, 258 n. 244, 278 n.
*Philosophy of World History* (by Hegel) 12 n., 20 n. 15, 147 n. 65, 179 n. 12
Pisistratus 19–20
Plato 14, 38, 40, 50, 55–6, 61, 72–3, 75, 104–5, 111–18, 133, 154, 160, 166, 174, 175–225, 227, 233, 234, 258, 263, 265, 277, 294, 297, 304, 331, 334, 341, 343
  life of 176–81
  philosophy of 181–225
pleasure 22, 158, 164–5, 169, 203, 283, 289–90, 293
  pleasant/unpleasant 169–70, 274
Plotinus 60, 332–40
Plutarch 120, 340
  Pseudo-Plutarch 28
poetry 58–9, 113, 119–20, 176, 186, 234
politics 113–15, 257–8
  *see also* constitution; state
Polycrates of Samos 31–3
Porphyry (Malchus) 31 n. 48, 32 n. 50, 34, 38, 53–4, 331, 332–3, 340
positing 75, 110, 121–2, 125
Potamo 330
potency, potentiality 235–7, 245
private interest 111, 117, 119, 121, 126, 147–8, 156, 317
  private property 181, 224–5
Proclus 45, 205–6, 207 n. 92, 332, 340–6
Prodicus 127, 331
Protagoras 111–16, 119–23, 135–6, 199
providence 272, 308, 339
Ptolemies, the 160, 331
purpose 85–6, 101–2, 104–5, 233, 237, 241–4, 258
  end in itself 102
Pyrrho 21 n. 19, 280 n. 41, 303, 304–5, 307
Pythagoras 15, 17, 31–7, 47, 52–3, 65
Pythagorean 83, 177–8, 332
  community 31, 34–7, 51
  philosophy 37–54, 213, 215, 235
  theorem 32–3, 53, 137 n. 46

reason 75, 131–2, 255–6, 274, 290
  good reasons 119, 296, 298
  *see also* logos; nous
recollection, theory of 137, 188–9, 192–3
religion 116–17, 125, 152, 310
  *see also* God; gods
representation 134, 183, 187, 201, 211, 268–70, 282–3, 285, 295, 300–2
republic, Platonic 218, 220–5, 333
revelation 149, 194, 217, 314
Rome 267, 298–9, 332, 333
  Roman world 265, 277–8, 299, 317–18, 322, 333
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 225, 256 n. 239, 258 n. 244

sage, the 169–70, 172, 264, 274–7, 295–7
  seven sages 17–23

Samos 16, 31, 33, 54, 279
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 128 n. 31, 192 n. 47, 247 n. 211, 253 n. 230, 337 n. 37
Schleiermacher, Friedrich 72 nn. 187–8, 79 n. 207, 82, 131 n. 38, 141 n. 53
Scholastics, the 231–2, 236, 260, 327
Schulze, Gottlob Ernst 309
science 107–8, 187, 195, 228, 269–70, 286–8, 306, 330
*Science of Logic* (by Hegel) 27 n. 34, 40 n. 72, 68 n. 173, 73 n. 192, 75 n. 198, 89 n. 238, 90 n. 239, 91 n. 240
self *see* I, the
Seneca 267, 279, 290
sensation 80–1, 164, 167, 187, 248–51, 257, 269–70, 282–3, 285–6, 289, 300–1, 308, 312–13
sensible (sensuous), the 93, 196, 203, 337
Sextus Empiricus 21, 42–3, 59, 75, 77, 81, 86, 122, 176, 270–1, 294 n. 83, 295–6, 299–300, 303–5, 307–15
Sicily 16, 54, 83, 123, 178, 179
Simeon ben Yohai, Rabbi 327
Simplicius 24 n. 25, 59, 346
Skepticism 13, 21, 199 n. 67, 263–5, 271, 294–316, 317
Socrates 55–6, 72, 97, 104–5, 111–18, 124–56, 157, 163–4, 171, 172, 173, 177–8, 184, 195, 205, 255–6
  life of 126–30
  Socratic irony 130–3
  Socratic method 130–3
  trial of 148–56
Socratic Schools 156–75, 263, 265–6
Solon 19–22, 52, 176, 181
Sophists 111–24, 125, 131, 135–6, 160, 177, 193, 195, 199–201, 260
Sophocles 125
sorites ('heap') argument 162–3
soul 22, 49–51, 79–80, 86, 139–40, 183, 189–94, 209, 212–13, 217, 244–5, 249–51, 324, 328, 335
  Aristotle's threefold division of 246–8
  immortality of 51, 189–91, 198 n. 63
  purification of 328, 334
  world-soul 212, 214, 271–2
space 67–9, 244, 314–15
Sparta (Lacedaemonia) 33, 97–8, 129, 156
speculative thought 73, 124, 198, 202, 233, 254, 261–2, 315, 344–5
Speusippus 227, 294 n. 83
Spinoza, Benedict 63 n. 160, 190 n. 42, 192 n. 47, 237 n. 179
spirit 100, 137–8, 165, 317–18, 320
  absolute spirit 255
  Aristotle's philosophy of 244–58
  Plato's philosophy of 218–25
  spiritual world 176
  world spirit 155, 181
state, the 113, 130, 152, 180, 184–6, 218, 219, 220–5, 257
Stewart, J. Michael xii, 5
Stilpo of Megara 158, 160 n. 97, 161 n. 100, 266
Stoicism 13, 263–79, 293, 294–6, 308, 318–19, 334
Sturz, Friedrich Wilhelm 82–3, 84 n. 225
subjectivity 12, 14, 75–6, 98, 110, 119, 121, 138–9, 144–5, 256, 297
  *see also* I, the
sublation 212, 303, 306
substance 27, 236–7, 245–6, 258
suicide 84, 170, 266
supersensible world 176, 185, 187
  intelligible world 188, 322, 337
superstition 272, 288, 334
syllogism 210–11, 259–61
  absolute syllogism 261

*tabula rasa* 250, 252
Tennemann, Wilhelm Gottlieb 9 n., 15 n. 3, 91–2, 95 n. 250, 153, 232, 262 n. 256
Thales 15, 17, 18, 23–30, 33
Theodorus the Cyrenaic 165, 168–9, 174 n. 133
Theophrastus 24 n. 25, 229 n. 155, 230, 280 n.
thinking 60, 69, 100, 109–10, 125, 188, 190, 238, 251–5, 260–1, 270, 301, 322–3, 335
  absolute 206
  objective to itself 318, 320
thought 57, 94–5, 194, 307–8, 312–13
  *see also* thinking
Thucydides 20 n. 15, 128 n. 30
Tiedemann, Dieterich 9 n. 15 n. 3, 95 n. 250, 123–4, 153 n. 80
Timaeus the Pythagorean 207–8
time 67–8, 77–8, 214–15, 251
tragedy 126–7, 164, 176, 231, 267 n. 12
triad 41–2, 44
  triads of Proclus 342–4
Trinity, doctrine of the 238 n. 185
  Father 238, 325, 337
  Son 210, 211, 238 n. 185, 325, 337
tropes 309–14
truth 59, 75, 86, 92, 122, 124–5, 160–1, 193, 268–70, 294, 299–300, 309
tyrant 19, 84, 175, 179
  thirty tyrants 129, 176

understanding, the 76, 81–2, 123, 203, 260, 313
unity 92, 206, 253, 335, 344
universality 22, 134, 162, 234, 263
  the universal 29, 43, 109, 122, 143, 190, 196, 200, 271, 278, 291, 319
  universal principle 263–4, 274, 297
unmoved mover 238, 241 n. 196

virtue 52, 114–16, 129, 139–40, 141, 172, 197, 222, 255–7, 274–5, 334
vocation, the human 164, 167–8, 171, 172, 176, 258
void, the 89, 92–4, 284–5, 292

water 23, 26–8, 30, 78–9, 86–7, 108, 211
will 91, 276, 321
  free will 219–20
  rational will 277–8
wisdom 170, 172, 204, 222, 293
Wolff, Christian 186, 198, 203 n. 80

Xenophanes 54–5, 58–9, 61–2, 303
Xenophon 127 n., 128, 133, 140–42, 146–7, 148–51

Zeno of Elea 55–6, 61–2, 65–70, 205
Zeno the Stoic 265–9, 271